"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Sunday, September 27, 2015

Changes in fraud upon the court law made the Mokay saga a corpse, but the zombi treads on

In May of 2014 the New York State Court of Appeals changed the law pertaining to fraud upon the court.

It made the civil cause of action in fraud upon the court inapplicable to:

1) individuals who were not parties in litigation out of which the fraud upon the court claim arose;
2) inapplicable to settlements; and
3) inapplicable to conduct that occurred after the final judgment in the case

I will illustrate my points.

This is a direct quotation from the case CDR Creances S.A.S v Cohen2014 NY Slip Op 03294 Decided on May 8, 2014: 


The evidentiary standard applied by the federal courts is sufficient to protect the integrity of our judicial system, and discourage the type of egregious and purposeful conduct designed to undermine the truth-seeking function of the courts, and impede a party's efforts to pursue a claim or defense. We adopt this standard and conclude that in order to demonstrate fraud on the court, the non-offending party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the offending "party has acted knowingly in an attempt to hinder the fact finder's fair adjudication of the case and his adversary's defense of the action".


The new standard allows only a non-offending "party" to bring a claim of fraud upon the court.  The Mokay children were not parties in the divorce action of their parents.

The new standard requires a finding by clear and convincing evidence - that was not done for Mr. Neroni.

The new standard requires a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the offending party "has acted knowingly in an attempt TO HINDER THE FACT FINDER'S FAIR ADJUDICATION of the case AND his adversary's defense of the action".

One cannot hinder adjudication by engaging in conduct after the adjudication is concluded, thus, the new standard excludes conduct committed after the final judgment in the case out of which the claim of fraud upon the court arises.

On cannot hinder fair adjudication of the case AND, at the same time, his adversary's defense of the action where the case was settled, thus a claim of fraud upon the court excludes settlements, according to the new standard.

Since Mr. Neroni's case was very much pending, and the trial was set on May 13, 2014, 5 days after the decision, but was adjourned on Plaintiffs' request.

Plaintiffs never disclosed the new law to the court, as they were required by law, and continued with litigation that has become frivolous as of May 8, 2014.

Yet, the law came in effect before the case was finished and is fully applicable to it.

So, now we have an "interim" judgment for over $300,000 awarded to people who had no right to assert the claims, by a judge who prefers to engage in unauthorized practice of medicine and re-diagnose back injuries of female immigrant attorneys who sue him (that is me) rather than to do his job.

I am filing a complaint against Dowd and against the trio of attorneys (Richard Harlem, Eric Jervis, James Hartmann) who perpetrated this fraud.

As I said before in the Neroni v Harlem case, fraud asserted by Richard Harlem as an attorney is not an accident or mistake, Richard Harlem learnt at the knee of a master, see my blog about the Blanding saga.

As to responses of authorities to these complaints, stay tuned.

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