"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Friday, September 24, 2021

New York may not regulate Giuliani (or other lawyers) because law license revocation courts officially merged with prosecution

New York may not regulate Giuliani (or other lawyers) because law license revocation courts officially merged with prosecution



Tatiana Neroni, J.D.

September 24, 2021




The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that when a court combines in itself functions of a judge and a prosecutor in the same case, all decisions of such courts are null and void as violating 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Due Process Clause[1].

New York law licensing courts have made prosecution in attorney disciplinary cases as an official part of the court as far back as in 1975[2] and continue to do the same until now.

Therefore, all decisions of New York courts imposing attorney discipline – including in Giuliani’s case – are null and void.

[1] Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).

[2] Anonymous, an Attorney Admitted to Practice in the State of New York v NYC Bar Assn., 515 F.2d 427 (2nd Cir., 1975).

New York may not regulate Giuliani (or other lawyers) because its legislature has never clearly determined what it is that it is regulating when it is regulating “the practice of law”


New York may not regulate Giuliani (or other lawyers) because its legislature has never clearly determined what it is that it is regulating when it is regulating “the practice of law”



Tatiana Neroni, J.D.

September 24, 2021



The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that for any law to be constitutional, it has to be done by the legislature, and the legislature must clearly define in that law – so that an ordinary person of average education and intelligence understands it - what the law allows and what it prohibits, and the law must give a clear guidance to the executive branch (police and prosecutors) and to judges how to apply it[1].  

When New York regulates “admission to the bar”[2], it regulates not the same admission to the bar which requires a human body with a heartbeat, over 21 years of age and with some dollars in his or her pocket, but what it mysteriously calls “the practice of law”.

Yet, New York’s legislature so far did not come around yet to clearly define what “the practice of law” means.

Thus, New York may not, until it does so define, regulate any lawyers, including Rudy Giuliani, and any New York’s decisions admitting or expelling lawyers from “the practice of law” are null and void.

[1] Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).

[2] New York State Judiciary Law § 90.

New York may not regulate Giuliani (or other lawyers) because it has never determined that lawyers are a profession of such a nature that without its legislative regulation a lot of people will suffer a lot of serious harm


New York may not regulate Giuliani (or other lawyers) because it has never determined that lawyers are a profession of such a nature that without its legislative regulation a lot of people will suffer a lot of serious harm


Tatiana Neroni, J.D.

September 24, 2021



The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly stated over 100 years ago that the government may only regulated those businesses and professions which are of such nature that without legislative regulation, will cause a lot of people a lot of bad harm[1].

In other words, only inherently dangerous and dishonest professions and businesses may be constitutionally regulated by the government.

On that premise, why then do we have to populate our judiciary and our prosecutors only and exclusively with members of that inherently dangerous and dishonest profession?

Especially that the profession has proven its inherent danger and dishonesty by giving to themselves absolute immunity to commit crimes in office – as judges[2] and as prosecutors[3].

So, they have allowed themselves to fabricate cases, including Giuliani’s, with impunity – and now they are teaching Giuliani how to tell the truth to the public?

But if Giuliani sues them in federal court, will invoke judicial and prosecutorial immunity for fabricating cases?

This little inconsistency aside, there was never any determination by the New York legislature that the legal profession is of such a nature (dangerous and dishonest) that without legislative control a lot of people will suffer a lot of serious harm.

Therefore, according to the U.S. Supreme Court precedent[4], New York may not constitutionally regulate lawyers, and the decision against Giuliani is null and void.



[1] Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916).

[2] Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

[3] Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).

[4] Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916).


The decision to suspend Giuliani’s law license: jurisdictional basis fabricated by the licensing court


The decision to suspend Giuliani’s law license:

jurisdictional basis fabricated by the licensing court


Tatiana Neroni, Juris Doctor

Initial publication in Russian on – September 7, 2021 ©



In its decision to preliminarily suspend the law license of Rudy Giuliani, lawyer to 45th US President Donald J. Trump, the New York licensing court has reviewed and rejected Giuliani’s protest against court’s regulation of his political speech in and out of court and suspended Giuliani’s law license, before the formal charges were filed and without any hearing, because of his political statements about results of presidential elections 2020 in 4 states:

1.     Arizona,

2.     Georgia

3.     Michigan

4.     Pennsylvania[1].

In asserting its right to regulate political speech of attorneys in and out of court the New York licensing court relied upon two U.S. Supreme Court cases:

1.     Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1051 (1991), and

2.     Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 US 447, 465 (1978).

The reality is that neither one of these precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court contains permission to any governmental bodies, courts included, to regulate political speech of lawyers – with very narrow exceptions that did not apply in Giuliani’s case.

On the very opposite, in the former of the two precedents cited by the New York licensing court in Giuliani’s case, Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 US 447, 465 (1978), the essence of the case was about regulating of purely commercial speech of a lawyer – the so-called “ambulance-chasing”, imposing of the lawyer’s paid business to patients of hospitals without their consent.

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has been very cautious not to regulate political speech of lawyers in Ohralik, and not to even appear as if it is attempting to do that – it stated specifically in Ohralik that the speech regulated in that case was not political in character. 

In the latter of the two precedents cited by the New York licensing court in Giuliani’s case,  Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1051 (1991), the essence of the case was disciplinary punishment of a criminal defense attorney who has won a jury trial for his client.  The punishment was for the lawyer’s press-conference before the formal charges were brought against his client, where the lawyer has publicly accused the local police of criminal activities, fabrication of a criminal case against his client and mishandling of the drugs seized by the police elsewhere.

The U.S. Supreme Court has actually vacated the attorney’s punishment, stating that

1.     An attorney may need to make out-of-court public statements on behalf of his client in the course of a court case if the attorney decides that the client’s interests so demand;

2.      An attorney may publicly criticize the government out-of-court despite a pending court case, which is political speech that the government may not regulate, with two exceptions – if the attorney has used in his/her political speech

1)     Information obtained through a mandatory court discovery process, and

2)     Information subject to a pre-trial court gag order.

The court in Giuliani’s case never mentioned that Giuliani used in his statements information falling into either of the above two exceptions, therefore, the New York court had no authority to regulate Giuliani’s political speech – in or out of court.

Therefore, Giuliani was correct in his protest that the court lacked authority to regulate his political speech through a license regulating procedure.

Moreover, the court in Giuliani’s case acknowledged that at all times when making his statements Giualiani acted in a representative capacity, as the voice of his client, 45th US President Donald J. Trump.

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated more than half a century ago that the government may not do in an indirect way what it may not do in a direct way[2].

Donald J. Trump is not an attorney licensed by the State of New York to practice law, nor does he purport to practice law in the state of New York, and thus is not subject to regulation by New York State court regulating attorneys[3].

New York attorney licensing court had no authority to regulate political speech of 45th US President Donald J. Trump – not directly and not indirectly, through regulating his representative, lawyer Giuliani.

Nor did the court have authority to regulate Giualini’s speech had that speech been on Giuliani’s own behalf, in view of the true holding and reasoning of the two US Supreme Court cases Giuliani’s court has (deliberately) misquoted.

Therefore, the Giuliani court had no jurisdiction over proceedings, its decisions are null and void and the continuing proceedings must be barred as unconstitutional.


[1] Matter of Giuliani, 2021 NY Slip Op 04086 (1st Dept, June 24, 2021).

[2] Speiser v.Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).

[3] See New York State Judiciary Law § 90(2) (“The supreme court shall have power and control over attorneys and counsellors-at-law and all persons practicing or assuming to practice law”).

Monday, September 20, 2021

The ACLU hires people to practice law without a license, with a great salary and benefits, too


Here is a job just posted by the ACLU on

Note that the ACLU does not require for this job either a law degree or a law license while the job clearly requires "practice of law" in Virginia.

In other words, the ACLU hires people to violate criminal state law?

But - since it is the child of Soros and Ginsburg - it can do anything?


Policy and Advocacy Strategist

$58,000 - $108,000 a year - Full-time
You must create an Indeed account before continuing to the company website to apply

Job details

$58,000 - $108,000 a year
Job Type

Full Job Description


The Policy and Advocacy Strategist helps to develop and implement the ACLU-VA’s legislative, policy, and advocacy priorities by:

  • Analyzing current and prospective local, state, and national ACLU issues.
  • Conducting, analyzing, and presenting rigorous research which:
  • Identifies and evaluates best practices around model policies and programs (legislation, ordinances, directives, practices), as well as implementation strategies.
  • Building and maintaining trusted, respectful relationships with people directly impacted by the issues, community members and leaders, coalitions, allied organizations, issue experts, legislative staff, government officials, and elected officials.
  • In coordination with Policy Director, lead and co-lead legislative and policy strategies which:
  • Increase public and impacted community awareness of, and opportunities to engage on, civil liberties and civil rights issues.
  • Will result in meaningful change and actively mitigate potential disparate impact on Black and Brown communities.
  • Include a plan for successful implementation and a process for monitoring impact.
  • Help lead legislative and policy program implementation by:
  • Coordinating to develop and implement ACLU-VA’s legislative agenda and advocacy priorities, including but not limited to lobbying local government officials, members of the legislature, their staff and the Governor’s office, analyzing and tracking legislation, drafting legislation or amendments and preparing and delivering testimony
  • Coordinating and participating in legislative and advocacy meetings to advocate on behalf of ACLU VA’s legislative agenda
  • At each stage of the work, the Policy and Advocacy Strategist is expected to:
  • Draft clear, concise internal and external memos and develop advocacy tools in coordination with the communications team– including fact sheets, talking points, public education materials, position letters, and policy briefs – in multiple formats for a range of audiences.
  • Work with the Policy Team and community members to include the voices, perspectives, and experiences of those directly impacted by the issues being addressed into the process.

Salary Range: $58,000 - $108,000. To preserve the opportunity for advancement, we do not typically hire above the mid-point of the range.

Benefits include 4 weeks paid vacation; 4 weeks sick leave; employer-paid medical, vision, and dental insurance for staff and eligible dependents; a 401(k) retirement benefits plan with employer match; life insurance; and short and long-term disability insurance.

Due to COVID-19 and our desire to keep our employees safe, our organization is currently operating remotely. This will continue until at least January 4, 2022. After that time, we have an interim remote work policy in place that will offer remote work flexibility to all staff until June 30, 2022. After that time, employees will follow the long-term remote work policy( to be discussed during the hiring process). This position will occasionally require a presence in the downtown Richmond office.

. Requirements:

Minimum Requirements

  • Significant hands-on experience successfully advocating for legislative or policy change on social justice and/or civil liberties issues.
  • Experience in researching, collecting, and synthesizing large amounts of information from a range of sources and providing recommendations on next steps.
  • Proven ability to think critically and strategically about solving problems in a way that produces results.
  • A commitment to Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Belonging.
  • A commitment to the mission and values of the ACLU of Virginia, including racial justice and anti-racism.
  • Willingness and availability to work beyond the normal workday and on weekends during Virginia’s Legislative Session as needed.

Essential Skills & Abilities

  • A Policy and Advocacy Strategist must have policy development and implementation experience, a curious and strategic mindset, and experience working on the core issues for criminal legal reform
  • Experience lobbying or advocating for a legislative measure in Virginia or another state or local government.
  • Demonstrated experience working with individuals and communities directly impacted by racial injustice.
  • Experience tracking legislation through the legislative process at a state or federal level and communicating progress to others.
  • Experience working in a diverse coalition to achieve a policy change outcome.

Desirable Experience, Skills & Abilities

  • Proven ability to communicate clearly and effectively, explaining complex issues in accessible terms for a range of audiences, both verbally and in writing.
  • Proven ability to work independently and manage multiple projects with competing deadlines on a tight timeline, while maintaining a strong attention to detail.
  • Proven ability to build and maintain effective relationships with a broad range of constituencies, including people who have been impacted by the policies for which we advocate.
  • Resilience and understanding that working towards systemic change is a marathon and not a sprint.
  • Experience in helping to develop campaign goals, plans, strategies, and tactics to achieve outcomes on specific issue areas particularly policy experience advocating for anti-racist models for criminal legal reform is a plus
  • Experience working on both issue campaigns and electoral campaigns a plus.
  • Ability to communicate in Spanish, Korean, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Arabic, ASL or other language used by marginalized communities across Virginia.
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
1 day ago