The Miraculous Healing Story of Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius — Part II: The Motion Eraser™

A New Breakthrough at the Institute of Molluscan Behavioral Therapy

Readers may remember Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius, Custos Slimi (known to friends as J.M. Slime), of the pre-eminent Chenangus Slimery Castle.

Sir Marcus had been successfully treated at the Institute of Molluscan Behavioral Therapy for a particularly stubborn case of Persistent Molluscan Obsessive Retaliatory Disorder.

The treatment had been spectacularly successful.

Justice — bwomp-ya.

Fairness — RIP bubble.

Notice.

Service.

Truth.

Integrity.

All successfully processed through the patented Slime Refinery™, leaving Sir Marcus peaceful, happy and capable of producing beautifully polished official prose.

The Institute pronounced him healed.

There was, however, a small qualification in his prognosis.

The cure was expected to last at least until the vacaturus insects arrived.

They arrived.

---

Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius was back at the Institute.

Doctor Gaston Slug, M.D., Ph.D., F.A.M.P.
(Fellow of the Academy of Molluscan Psychiatry)

looked over his spectacles.

“Marcus?”

Marcus said nothing.

“Marcus, you look terrible.”

Marcus's left eyestalk twitched.

“They filed motions.”

Doctor Slug smiled reassuringly.

“People file motions every day.”

“Against ME.”

Doctor Slug stopped smiling.

“Against... you?”

“ME.”

A long silence followed.

Doctor Slug cautiously opened Marcus's chart.

Treatment of Persistent Molluscan Obsessive Retaliatory Disorder

“Did you use the Slime Refinery™?”

“Of course.”

“Justice?”

“Gone.”

“Fairness?”

“Gone.”

“Notice?”

“Gone.”

“Service?”

“Gone.”

“Integrity?”

Marcus looked offended.

“Doctor. Please.”

“Sorry. Professional habit.”

Doctor Slug closed the chart.

“Then what is the problem?”

Marcus leaned forward.

“They want me to vacate what I did.”

Doctor Slug gasped.

“Under what?”

Marcus whispered:

“5015(a)(4).”

Doctor Slug's clipboard fell to the floor.

“And...”

Marcus could barely continue.

“2221(a).”

Doctor Slug pressed the emergency button.

Red lights flashed throughout the Institute.

CODE 5015(a)(4).

CODE 2221(a).

MOTION CHALLENGING PRIOR JUDICIAL ACTION DETECTED.

Technicians in white coats came running.

---

THE TERRIBLE PROBLEM WITH MOTIONS

The Institute immediately convened an emergency interdisciplinary conference.

Molluscan psychiatrists.

Gastropod proceduralists.

Senior slime engineers.

One extremely old snail from Records Management.

They assembled around a blackboard.

Doctor Slug wrote:

MOTION

He drew an arrow.

MOTION → DECISION

Another arrow.

MOTION → DECISION → ORDER

The room became uncomfortable.

Marcus shifted inside his shell.

Doctor Slug continued:

MOTION → DECISION → ORDER → RECORD

Marcus began sweating slime.

Doctor Slug put down the chalk.

There it was.

The fundamental defect in traditional motion practice.

THE RECORD.

If Marcus granted a motion challenging something Marcus had done, there would be a record of that.

Unacceptable.

If Marcus denied a motion challenging something Marcus had done, there would also be a record of that.

Also unacceptable.

If Marcus wrote an order explaining why the challenge was wrong, the explanation itself would become part of the record.

Even worse.

This was a grave technological problem.

The original Slime Refinery™ could remove Justice, Fairness, Notice, Service, Truth and Integrity.

But it could not remove a filed motion.

A filed motion was stubborn.

It had papers.

It had a filing date.

It had a motion number.

It had an electronic existence.

It sat there on the docket.

Looking at Marcus.

Marcus looked back at it.

The motion continued looking at Marcus.

“DO SOMETHING!” Marcus screamed.

---

A GREAT SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

Doctor Slug paced around the laboratory.

“Think, Gaston. Think.”

He returned to the blackboard.

MOTION → DECISION → ORDER → RECORD

He stared at it.

Then he erased ORDER.

That didn't work.

There was still a motion and a decision.

He erased DECISION.

That didn't work either.

There was still a motion.

Then Doctor Slug stopped.

Very slowly, he looked at the eraser in his hand.

He looked at the blackboard.

He looked at Marcus.

He erased:

MOTION

Silence.

Marcus's eyestalks rose.

Doctor Slug's eyestalks rose.

The technicians' eyestalks rose.

The extremely old snail from Records Management fainted.

Marcus whispered:

“Doctor...”

“Yes?”

“Do that again.”

Doctor Slug wrote:

MOTION

Then:

BWOMP-YA.

Gone.

Marcus stared at the empty blackboard.

“Doctor...”

“Yes?”

“That's brilliant.”

Doctor Slug smiled professionally.

“I know.”

And thus, after centuries of primitive Anglo-American motion practice, the Institute of Molluscan Behavioral Therapy announced its greatest technological breakthrough:

THE MOTION ERASER™

Why decide a motion challenging your own conduct when you can erase the motion?

---

CLINICAL TRIAL NO. 1

The new treatment was soon tested.

A motion had been filed challenging what Sir Marcus had done.

This presented the traditional procedural options:

GRANT.

No.

DENY.

No.

DECIDE.

Absolutely not.

The Institute administered one dose of Motion Eraser™.

BWOMP-YA.

No motion.

Sir Marcus blinked.

“That's it?”

“That is it.”

“No decision?”

“No.”

“No denial?”

“No.”

“No order disposing of it?”

“No.”

Marcus began smiling.

“No need to explain myself?”

Doctor Slug smiled back.

“Marcus, that is the entire therapeutic principle.”

Sir Marcus was delighted.

---

CLINICAL TRIAL NO. 2

Then another motion appeared.

This one was particularly unpleasant.

It challenged Sir Marcus's authority to continue sitting in the matter.

Marcus immediately called Doctor Slug.

“Doctor!”

“Yes?”

“Another one!”

“Same symptoms?”

“Worse!”

“Did it challenge you?”

“YES.”

“Motion number?”

“Six.”

Doctor Slug calmly opened the Deluxe Professional Motion Eraser™ kit.

“Apply directly to docket.”

BWOMP-YA.

Marcus sighed with relief.

Then somebody noticed another one.

“Doctor?”

“Yes?”

“There is a Motion Seven.”

BWOMP-YA.

Peace returned to Chenangus Slimery Castle.

---

THE MIRACLE OF MODERN MOLLUSCAN PROCEDURE

The advantages were immediately obvious.

Under the obsolete system:

Litigant files motion challenging judicial conduct.

↓

Judge decides motion.

↓

Decision exists.

↓

Record exists.

This antiquated procedure had one enormous defect.

Other people could later see what happened.

Under the revolutionary McBridus-Slug Method™:

Litigant files motion challenging judicial conduct.

↓

BWOMP-YA.

Much cleaner.

Much quieter.

Much less paperwork.

And no awkward need to write:

“The motion challenging my own authority is denied because I have determined that my own authority should not be challenged.”

The Motion Eraser™ does all of that without wasting a single word.

---

BUT THERE WAS A PROBLEM

Three days into the clinical trial, Doctor Slug received an urgent telephone call.

“Doctor!”

It was Marcus.

“They still have it!”

“Have what?”

“THE MOTION!”

“That is impossible. We erased it.”

“From the docket!”

“Yes.”

“They have the filing confirmation.”

Doctor Slug froze.

“Oh.”

“And the document.”

“Oh.”

“And the electronic notification.”

“Oh.”

“And copies.”

“Oh dear.”

“And they apparently take screenshots.”

Doctor Slug sank slowly into his chair.

The Institute had encountered the principal limitation of Motion Eraser™ technology:

ERASING A MOTION FROM A DOCKET DOES NOT ERASE THE FACT THAT THE MOTION WAS FILED.

Marcus became frantic.

“Can you make the confirmation disappear?”

“No.”

“Their copy?”

“No.”

“The email?”

“No.”

“The screenshot?”

“No.”

“The chronology?”

“No.”

“The fact that Motion Six once existed?”

“No.”

“The fact that Motion Seven once existed?”

“No.”

Marcus's eyestalks drooped.

“So what exactly did you cure?”

Doctor Slug considered the question.

“The docket.”

---

THE FOSSIL PROBLEM

This created a new field of molluscan science:

Procedural Paleontology.

A motion might disappear from the present docket.

But electronic litigation produces fossils.

Filing confirmations.

Notifications.

Document numbers.

Copies.

Dates.

Earlier docket records.

Correspondence.

References in other documents.

The extinct motion leaves tracks.

Doctor Slug explained the problem gently.

“Marcus, imagine that a dinosaur disappears.”

“I don't like dinosaurs.”

“Stay with me.”

“Fine.”

“The dinosaur is gone.”

“Good.”

“But its bones remain.”

Marcus frowned.

“So?”

“Someone can establish that the dinosaur existed.”

Marcus stared at him.

Doctor Slug continued:

“Your motions have bones.”

Marcus screamed.

---

AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION IN MOLLUSCAN JURISPRUDENCE

The Institute therefore issued an important scientific clarification.

DENYING A MOTION means:

A motion existed.

The court considered it.

The court ruled upon it.

The ruling exists.

The reasons, if supplied, exist.

The procedural history exists.

ERASING A MOTION means:

The motion existed.

Then something happened to the docket.

These are not the same phenomenon.

Indeed, the second phenomenon raises a rather interesting question all by itself:

WHERE DID THE MOTION GO?

That question requires no opinion about whether the motion was correct.

No opinion about whether it should have been granted.

No opinion about whether Sir Marcus liked it.

No opinion about whether Sir Marcus thought the people filing it were irritating.

It requires only two historical objects:

BEFORE.

and

AFTER.

The motion was there.

Then it wasn't.

The Institute's lawyers advised Doctor Slug that this portion of the treatment brochure should probably end here.

---

A MESSAGE FROM THE INSTITUTE OF MOLLUSCAN BEHAVIORAL THERAPY

Does your docket contain uncomfortable motions?

Do litigants persistently challenge things you have already done?

Do you suffer from recurrent outbreaks of:

CPLR 5015(a)(4)?

Does CPLR 2221(a) cause itching, inflammation, or uncontrollable eyestalk twitching?

Are ordinary treatments such as:

GRANT

DENY

and

DECIDE

no longer providing adequate relief?

You are not alone.

Thousands of distinguished judicial mollusks suffer every year from Persistent Reviewable Record Syndrome™.

Fortunately, modern molluscan science has the answer.

MOTION ERASER™ PROFESSIONAL

From the makers of the original Slime Refinery™.

Simply locate the irritating motion.

Apply directly to docket.

BWOMP-YA.

No denial.

No adjudication.

No uncomfortable explanation.

Just a smooth, professionally groomed docket.

Specially formulated for:

Vacaturus

Recusalus

Disqualificatus

Voidus-Ab-Initio

and the particularly resistant:

Five-Zero-One-Five-A-Fouricus

Also clinically tested against recurrent outbreaks of:

Two-Two-Two-One-A

---

TESTIMONIAL

“They kept filing motions challenging ME!”

— Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius, Custos Slimi

After treatment with Motion Eraser™ Professional, Sir Marcus reported:

✔ Dramatically reduced visible motion population

✔ Immediate relief from Motion Six

✔ Immediate relief from Motion Seven

✔ No painful written denials

✔ No irritating explanations

✔ Cleaner docket appearance

✔ Dramatically improved slime happiness

There was only one reported side effect:

THE FILERS KEPT THEIR RECEIPTS.

The Institute is presently conducting research into this unfortunate condition.

Until a cure is discovered, patients are advised that Motion Eraser™ removes motions from the treated docket only. It does not remove filing confirmations, electronic notifications, retained copies, screenshots, chronology, memory, or reality.

Ask your administrative judicial mollusk whether Motion Eraser™ is right for you.

MOTION ERASER™

Because denying it leaves a record.

They knew Taggart could not be a tax assessor - now it is a surprise she and the Town of Hamden are sued for allowing her to exercise that function?

Note: you can view records of criminal conviction of Katherine Covell/Taggart that I personally purchased from Delaware County Clerk's Office - here.

There is an odd inversion in the position now being taken in litigation by Katherine Taggart and the Town of Hamden.

The Town did not discover Katherine Taggart's legal history after she began exercising the functions of Town Assessor. It knew about it beforehand. Town Supervisor Wayne Marshfield discussed it publicly. The Town Board's own minutes recorded it. Taggart herself had previously gone back to Delaware County Court seeking relief from the consequences of her felony conviction. And the documentary history of that conviction remains in the files of the Delaware County Clerk.

Nevertheless, Hamden proceeded from employing Taggart in its assessor's office to allowing her to exercise the assessor function. It paid her with public money. Taggart eventually represented herself under oath as the “Town of Hamden Assessor.”

Now Taggart and the Town are defendants in Neroni v. Delaware County, Supreme Court, Delaware County, Index No. EF2025-447, where the legal consequences of that decision are squarely presented: whether Taggart possessed lawful authority to act as assessor; whether assessments made through the exercise of authority she did not lawfully possess are valid; and whether paying public money for that purported exercise of public office constitutes municipal waste.

None of this arrived without warning.

I. The Criminal Record Is a Public Record

The starting point is People of the State of New York v. Katherine M. Covell, Delaware County Court, Indictment/SCI No. 2009-012, Index No. 2009-397.

The March 13, 2009 Indictment charged Katherine M. Covell—now Katherine Taggart—with two counts of Driving While Intoxicated and, in Count III, Vehicular Manslaughter in the Second Degree, Penal Law § 125.12(1), arising from the November 29, 2008 death of Frank Ruiz.

What happened next is established by the court's own records.

The January 22, 2010 Plea Minutes record Covell's guilty plea to Count III, Vehicular Manslaughter in the Second Degree, a Class D felony.  The court questioned her under oath concerning the plea and the underlying events and found her guilty upon the plea.

The June 28, 2010 Sentencing Minutes record the resulting sentence: four months in the Delaware County Correctional Facility and five years of probation, with specialized supervision.

The Order Imposing Fine, signed by County Court Judge Carl F. Becker on June 28, 2010, is even more categorical. It recites that Katherine M. Covell had been convicted of Vehicular Manslaughter in the Second Degree, “a Class D Felony,” in violation of Penal Law § 125.12(1).

The Uniform Sentence & Commitment identifies the same offense, the same Penal Law provision and the four-month sentence. The official form expressly identifies Covell as a “FELONY OFFENDER.”

Finally, the Delaware County Court's Certificate of Disposition/Certification of Conviction, dated August 25, 2011, certifies that a conviction was entered against Katherine M. Covell on January 22, 2010 for Vehicular Manslaughter in the Second Degree, a Class D Felony, and that sentence was imposed June 28, 2010.

There is therefore nothing to debate about whether the conviction exists.

II. Nor Is There Any Identity Question: Katherine Covell Is Katherine Taggart

The record eliminates another possible distraction.

In 2020, Taggart herself applied to Delaware County Court to seal the conviction pursuant to CPL 160.59.

Her Notice of Motion and Affidavit in Support of Sealing Pursuant to CPL 160.59, received July 17, 2020, was filed in the name Katherine Taggart, with Covell expressly identified as her former name. She identified the conviction she wanted sealed as the vehicular-manslaughter conviction.

Justice Gary A. Rosa's Decision and Order—Motion to Seal Pursuant to CPL 160.59, dated September 18, 2020, accordingly identifies the applicant as:

Katherine M. Covell
AKA(s): Katherine Taggart.

The order identifies 2009-012, Vehicular Manslaughter Second, Penal Law § 125.12(1), as the conviction and denied the application to seal it because the conviction was not an eligible offense under CPL 160.59(1)(a).

Chief Clerk Kelly Reynolds then sent the decision directly to Katherine M. Taggart by letter dated September 22, 2020, expressly identifying the criminal proceeding as People v. Katherine M. Covell, IND/SCI No. 2009-012, Index No. 2009-397.

These are not Internet allegations about Taggart. They are Taggart's own application and orders and records maintained by the Delaware County Clerk.

III. Hamden Knew Before It Entrusted Taggart With the Assessor Function

Most significant for the present controversy is that the Town of Hamden itself documented its knowledge.

The Minutes of the Town of Hamden Town Board Meeting of July 3, 2024 record that Supervisor Wayne Marshfield affirmatively raised Taggart's felony conviction while discussing the Town's hiring of her as its “Assessor trainee.”

The minutes state that Marshfield distributed a paper to the people attending the meeting—including The Reporter correspondent—addressing concerns about the hiring. The minutes expressly record that Taggart had sustained a felony conviction and then record Marshfield's position that she should be given another chance and would be an asset to Hamden. 

That document is important for a reason having nothing to do with whether one agrees with Marshfield's views about rehabilitation.

It establishes notice.

The Town cannot plausibly treat Taggart's legal history as information discovered years afterward. Its Supervisor was publicly discussing that history with the Town Board and the press while Taggart was still being described as the Town's assessor trainee.

There is an important distinction between giving somebody employment and giving somebody public office. Rehabilitation may provide an entirely sensible reason to employ a person with a criminal conviction. It does not authorize a municipality to disregard statutory restrictions governing who may exercise a particular public office.

An assessor is not merely another employee in Town Hall.

New York's Real Property Tax Law establishes the office, prescribes its method of appointment, imposes minimum qualifications, and assigns to the assessor governmental authority over the valuation and assessment of private property for taxation. RPTL § 310 provides that an assessing local government “shall have one assessor”; that an appointive assessor is appointed by the appropriate governmental authority; and, critically, that “[n]o person shall be eligible for appointment as assessor unless he meets the minimum qualification standards established for such office by the commissioner.” 

RPTL § 318 separately governs certification and training of assessors. 

Independently, Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), which, according to court precedent, is self-executing, establishes that a holder of public office is deemed to have left that office as soon as that person is convicted of a felony.  For Covell/Taggart - she was convicted of a felony BEFORE she was appointed as tax assessor of the Town of Hamden, NY, and therefore she is deemed to have NEVER TAKEN that public office, with all the resulting legal consequences.

IV. Hamden Went Ahead Anyway

That history makes what followed more—not less—significant.

Taggart progressed from assessor clerk/trainee to exercising the assessor function itself. By 2026, Hamden's own records were no longer describing her merely as a trainee or clerk.

The Minutes of the Town of Hamden Town Board Meeting of January 7, 2026 list:

Katherine Taggart, Acting Assessor — $24,000 — monthly

and separately list:

Tina Moshier — Assessor Clerk — $20/hour.

Thus, Hamden's own official records distinguish the two positions. Taggart was being paid public money as Acting Assessor, while Moshier was separately employed as Assessor Clerk. 

And Taggart herself has now gone further.

In the pending litigation she submitted an Affidavit of Katherine Taggart, NYSCEF Doc. No. 160, representing under oath that she is the “Town of Hamden Assessor.”

Yet, as a matter of law, Taggart never took that public office, making her affidavit to the court a filing of a false record.

That assertion matters because it is precisely her legal status as a felon that excludes a legal possibility for her to hold a public office that is currently challenged in court.  

Yet, Taggart as a litigant currently MOVED TO STRIKE - what? - references to her own conviction for drunk-driving killing of a human being that made it impossible for her to hold a public office that she still usurped, along with its salary.

V. No Lawful Assessor Means a Much Larger Problem Than Taggart's Job Title

This litigation is consequently not about punishing Taggart for a crime committed many years ago.  She was already punished by Delaware County Court - inadequately so, but she was.

It concerns governmental authority she is usurping now and the consequences for a large number of people and entities from that usurpation of power.

A tax assessment is not an informal opinion about what somebody's property might be worth.  It is governmental action undertaken pursuant to statutory authority and ultimately used to impose a compulsory financial obligation upon the property owner.

The distinction between an authorized public officer and somebody merely performing the officer's functions therefore matters.

The pending complaint challenges assessments imposed upon the Neroni properties and seeks relief based upon the proposition that Taggart lacked lawful authority to exercise the assessor function. It also challenges Hamden's expenditure of public money in compensating her for exercising that purported authority.

Those are logically related but legally distinct consequences.

First, there is the assessment problem. If the person purporting to exercise the statutory authority of assessor is deemed to have vacated (never took) that office, all of her acts in the usurped office do not exist - these tax assessments are legal nullities, which is exactly what is sought to be declared by the court now.

Second, there is the public-money problem.  If Hamden knowingly paid municipal funds for the purported exercise of an office by a person legally incapable of exercising that office, the expenditure itself is unlawful and is an unlawful waste of public funds.

Third, there is now an affidavit problem. Taggart has appeared in the litigation and sworn that she is the Town of Hamden Assessor—the very official status that her legal status as a convicted felon extinguished before she knowingly usurped the assessor office.

VI. Hamden Cannot Convert an Authority Question Into a Sympathy Question

The July 3, 2024 Town Board minutes are revealing because they show how the Town framed the matter from the beginning.

Marshfield's response was essentially rehabilitative: Taggart had paid the price imposed by the criminal justice system; considerable time had passed; she deserved another opportunity.

Marshfield had a right to sympathy.

Marshfield had no authority to cancel Taggart's legal status as a convicted felon which barred her from holding public office.

Marshfield crossed that line.  He is not a Judge of Delaware County Court.  He has no power to relieve Taggart of her status of a convicted felon - which not only bars her from holding any public office, but which deems that office VACANT because of her legal status as a convicted felon.

Hamden knew there was a legal problem before it proceeded.  Its own July 3, 2024 minutes prove contemporaneous knowledge of the underlying facts.  The Reporter reported the problem a long time ago, and reported that Marshfield claimed that the "Town attorneys" "will look into it".

No matter how hard any attorneys may look into a record of a felony conviction, they cannot see there what is not there - the cancellation of that same status that bars occupation of public office by a convicted felon.

Yet, the Town's later records prove that the Town nevertheless elevated Taggart from assessor trainee to the person actually exercising the assessor function. Its January 7, 2026 minutes document public compensation of $24,000 for the “Acting Assessor.” Taggart's own affidavit now claims the office outright. 

So - is Taggart in contempt of criminal court on top of all other legal troubles?

VII. And Now They Are Sued

That sequence is what makes the present litigation entirely unsurprising.

The Town knew.

Taggart knew.

The Delaware County Clerk's records existed.

Taggart herself had invoked those records when she unsuccessfully sought to seal the conviction in 2020.

Hamden's Supervisor publicly addressed the conviction while Taggart was an assessor trainee. 

The Town nevertheless allowed her to progress into the assessor function and paid her public money for exercising it. Its own 2026 minutes call her “Acting Assessor.” 

Taggart then swore in Supreme Court that she was the Town of Hamden Assessor.

And now Taggart acts outraged and, through counsel, seeks to (1) strike references to her felony conviction, (2) punish the plaintiff - severely - for daring to raise the issue of her usurpation of public office and of all legal consequences that flow from the record of her felony conviction.

But, whether the Supreme Court strikes any references to it or not, the County Court still has the record of her felony conviction, subject to mandatory judicial notice by Supreme Court - or any other court - that is the only legal status of Taggart that matters: her office of Town of Hamden, NY Tax assessor has been vacated before she took it, as a result of her felony conviction for drunk-driving killing of a human being.

And that, on the existing record and under the existing mandatory statutory law, means exactly this: (1) Taggart is NOT a Town of Hamden Tax Assessor;  (2) Town of Hamden does not have a tax assessor since the retirement of the previous tax assessor - with all the legal consequences of that situation, which the Town is aware of and deliberately chose to ignore.

With an UNsurprising consequence of being sued for it by property owners/taxpayers.

Wayne Marshfield and his Pickpocket Fairy Godmother NYMIR

Once upon a time, in the faraway Kingdom of Delaware County, there lived a public official named Wayne Marshfield.

Wayne had a peculiar misfortune.

Wherever Wayne went, terrible financial mysteries seemed to occur around him.

And every time they occurred, Wayne was shocked.

The Great Senior Meals Mystery

First came the Great Senior Meals Mystery.

For decades, Delaware Opportunities provided meals to senior citizens in Delaware County. Then, suddenly, in May 2026, Delaware Opportunities announced that it could no longer continue the program because Delaware County allegedly owed it approximately $300,000.

A crisis erupted.

There were emergency meetings, emergency meals, volunteers, restaurants, churches, sheriff's deputies and heroic efforts to make certain that senior citizens did not go hungry.

Everybody rushed to rescue the senior citizens.

Everybody was shocked.

Especially mysterious was how the disaster had managed to sneak up on everyone.

Wayne Marshfield was not some innocent traveler who happened upon the wreckage after the fact. He occupied positions within both institutional worlds surrounding the senior-meals program: he was a Delaware County Supervisor involved with the County's Office for the Aging structure and simultaneously Treasurer and a Board member of Delaware Opportunities. Other officials likewise occupied overlapping positions.

So some of the people sitting on the side that allegedly had not paid approximately $300,000 were also sitting on the side that allegedly had not received approximately $300,000.

Who was billing whom?

Who was reviewing the bills?

Who was reconciling the accounts?

How did the alleged debt reach approximately $300,000 before the senior-meals program collapsed?

It was a terrible mystery.

And Wayne was there when everybody discovered it.

But fairy tales sometimes repeat themselves.

And now Wayne has entered Déjà Vu Land.

This time the mysterious disappearing money is called insurance premiums.

“Our Insurance Costs Went Up Drastically”

On September 8, 2026, Wayne brought troubling news to the people of Hamden.

The Town might have to exceed New York's property-tax cap.

Why?

Among other things, insurance had become terribly expensive.

Wayne explained to a local news outlet:

“Our insurance costs went up drastically because NYMIR recommended we increase the coverage on a couple of our facilities.”

Between insurance, wages and fuel, Marshfield reportedly anticipated that Hamden probably would exceed the tax cap.

Oh dear.

NYMIR costs had gone up drastically.

Another terrible financial mystery.

Where could all that insurance money possibly be going?

As luck would have it, Wayne had recently participated in a little NYMIR adventure of his own.

Poor Wayne Gets Sued

Only a few months earlier, Wayne had encountered a terrible problem.

Someone sued him in Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council, EF2026-106 in Delaware County Supreme Court.

Naturally, Wayne went looking for someone to pay for his lawyers - not out of his own pocket, of course.  Only mere mortals like the rest of taxpayers do that.

First he went to the Town attorneys and asked for Town insurance coverage.

Alas, ALLEGEDLY (the mystery of who is behind the NYMIR invoice is still outstanding) they could not help him.

Wayne later explained under oath:

“I was informed shortly thereafter that the Town attorneys could not represent me as I was sued in a capacity other than my capacity as Town Supervisor.”

And:

“Since the claims against me did not appear to relate to my duties as a town officer, the town attorneys, after several days, determined that they could not represent me in the matter.”

Poor Wayne.

This wasn't Town business.

So Wayne tried another door.

He contacted his homeowner's insurance broker.

Then he produced the Town Board resolution concerning defense and indemnification of Town employees to see whether that might provide coverage.

Alas, that door was locked too.

Wayne swore:

“Unfortunately, that turned out not to be a basis for a defense and indemnification.”

Later in the same affidavit, Wayne made the point once again. Neither he nor the attorneys working with the Town had reason to believe the lawsuit had anything to do with his official duties.

What a predicament.

The lawsuit did not concern Wayne's duties as Town Supervisor.

The Town attorneys could not represent him.

The Town's defense-and-indemnification resolution provided no basis for defending or indemnifying him.

The homeowner's insurer had not come riding to the rescue.

Whatever was Wayne to do?

Enter the Fairy Godmother

Every good fairy tale has a fairy godmother.

Wayne's was called NYMIR.

Suddenly, Wayne had Hancock Estabrook LLP and attorney Frank Miller.

Wayne told the Court that on March 16 he had been able to “retain” Hancock Estabrook and Miller.

There was even a charming fairy-tale flourish:

“Since Mr. Miller was already familiar with many of the suits filed by the Neronis, he graciously agreed to accept my representation.”

Very graciously indeed.

Because months later, a magic invoice appeared.

It was dated August 12, 2026.

It was for $8,192.70.

And the “Client” identified on the invoice was not Wayne Marshfield.

It was:

NEW YORK MUNICIPAL INSURANCE RECIPROCAL.

The matter was:

“TATIANA NERONI V. WAYNE MARSHFIELD CLAIM #THDN-2026-001-001.”

Of course, as of April 3, 2026, that is not even a correct description of the case and Marshfield is not a party there anymore -  but who cares when the Fairy Godmother can pickpocket taxpayers for Marshfield for as much as Marshfield wants/needs for his private needs?

A 30-year habit of treating public property as his own dies hard.

Even the date of the magic transformation was preserved.

Hancock Estabrook's March 16 billing entry—the very date Wayne said he had been able to retain Miller—states:

“Received and examined incoming summons and complaint re: Marshfield with assignment by insurance company.”

How did litigation which Wayne himself swore was outside his duties as Town Supervisor, and for which Wayne himself swore the Town's defense-and-indemnification resolution provided no basis, suddenly acquire a municipal-insurance fairy godmother?

Our fairy tale does not say.

It tells us only what the documents tell us:

On the facts to which Wayne himself swore, he was not entitled to municipal coverage. Yet NYMIR money was used to finance his lawyers.

But This Fairy Godmother Is a Pickpocket

There is something unusual about Wayne's fairy godmother.

She doesn't have any money of her own.

She cannot actually turn pumpkins into legal fees.

Before the fairy godmother can wave her magic wand, somebody has to fill her purse.

And ultimately that money comes from taxpayers.

So Wayne's particular variety of magic works something like this.

The taxpayers put money into municipal coffers.

Municipalities pay NYMIR.

NYMIR pays lawyers.

The lawyers litigate.

The lawyers send NYMIR the bill.

And when the purse needs replenishing, the fairy godmother quietly slips her hand back into the taxpayers' pockets.

Wayne's fairy godmother is a pickpocket.

And she was only getting started.

Wayne Escapes the Lawsuit — But the Fairy Godmother Stays

On April 3, 2026, Wayne was removed as a defendant through the amended pleading.

Wonderful news!

The lawyers' own billing records acknowledge receiving the amended summons and complaint on April 6 and describe it as an action “to eliminate Marshfield as defendant.”

Wayne was out.

Surely the fairy godmother could put away her wand.

Surely the lawyers could stop billing.

Surely the taxpayers could put their wallets back into their pockets.

Not in this fairy tale.

The lawyers kept toiling - unlawfully - at taxpayer expense, without disclosure to the court or to opponent WHICH MUNICIPALITY is unlawfully funding the defense of Marshfield through NYMIR out of scarce taxpayer funds.

They billed for opposing the effort to remove Wayne from the docket - after he was already removed from the case.

They billed for asking the Court to rule on Wayne's earlier, now mooted (nullified) motions.

They billed for pursuing Wayne's nullified sanctions effort.

They billed for stuff as if they never footed the door of a law school.

April passed.

The meter ran.

May passed.

The meter ran.

June came.

The meter ran.

July came.

The lawyers reviewed the decision purporting to award sanctions “in favor of our client” and reported their “successful outcome” to Wayne and the insurance company.

August came.

They billed for preparing the application for attorney fees.

The fairy godmother had transformed herself from someone supposedly defending Wayne against litigation into someone financing Wayne's continued affirmative participation in litigation after Wayne was no longer a defendant.

And Wayne's contribution toward this enchanted legal adventure?

Wayne Never Paid the Fairy Godmother - But Kept it Secret

How much did Wayne personally pay Hancock Estabrook and Miller?

Nothing.

How much did Wayne personally owe Hancock Estabrook and Miller?

Nothing.

Wayne admitted both facts under oath in September, in another case.

Apparently the fairy godmother didn't pick Wayne's pocket.

She knew where the taxpayers lived.

Meanwhile, in Another Part of the Kingdom...

But Neroni v. WAC was not Wayne's first adventure with our fairy godmother.

The same fairy godmother was already busy in another case.

Decker Advertising v. Delaware County.

That litigation has been going on for almost three years now—and counting.

Wayne is a defendant there too.

And NYMIR has also been providing for Wayne's defense there.

So while the fairy godmother was spending money on Wayne's WAC adventure, she was already financing another Wayne Marshfield litigation adventure that had been running for years.

One case.

Another case.

Lawyers.

Discovery.

Depositions.

Motions.

Briefs.

More lawyers.

More bills.

More years.

The magic taxpayer-funded purse apparently gets quite a workout.

And then Wayne appeared in September with the terrible news:

“Our insurance costs went up drastically.”

Oh dear.

Could the nearly three-year Decker adventure have anything to do with NYMIR's costs?

How much has NYMIR spent there?

Could the WAC adventure have anything to do with those costs?

How much else has NYMIR spent on Wayne?

Did any of those expenditures affect Hamden's premiums?

We don't know yet.

Wayne and the Locked Filing Cabinet

There is an obvious way to answer these questions.

Open the books.

Show the policies.

Show the coverage determinations.

Show the invoices.

Show the payments.

Show who requested coverage.

Show who approved it.

Show the claims.

Show what NYMIR has actually spent.

Show whether and how those expenditures affected premiums.

Wayne recently had an opportunity to illuminate at least part of this mystery in Neroni v. Merklen.

He made no documentary disclosure.

And when confronted through a Notice to Admit with the documents concerning his WAC representation, Wayne developed a remarkable case of informational amnesia.

He knew that he had personally paid no attorney fees.

He knew that he had personally incurred no obligation to pay attorney fees.

But was NYMIR identified as the “Client” on Hancock Estabrook's invoice?

Wayne lacked knowledge or information.

Did the invoice demand payment from NYMIR rather than from Wayne?

Wayne lacked knowledge or information.

Did Hancock Estabrook's billing records say that the firm received Wayne's lawsuit “with assignment by insurance company”?

Wayne lacked knowledge or information.

Did that insurance-company assignment exist before his court affidavit?

Again, Wayne lacked knowledge.

How curious.

Wayne knows enough about NYMIR to tell Hamden taxpayers that its costs have “gone up drastically.”

But when somebody asks what NYMIR has been doing for Wayne, suddenly the enchanted forest becomes very foggy.

So I Asked the Kingdom

I have now filed a FOIL request for the records.

Perhaps those records will explain everything.

Perhaps they will show that Wayne's litigation adventures had nothing whatsoever to do with Hamden's increased NYMIR premiums.

Excellent.

Then let the records show it.

But perhaps the records will tell us something else.

How much has NYMIR spent defending Wayne in Decker during nearly three years of litigation?

How much did it spend on Wayne in WAC?

Why did NYMIR finance Wayne's WAC lawyers when Wayne himself swore that the lawsuit was outside his official Town duties and that the Town's defense-and-indemnification resolution supplied no basis for his defense?

Why did NYMIR-funded litigation continue after Wayne had been removed as a defendant?

Who authorized all of this?

And did any of it affect what Hamden taxpayers now have to pay NYMIR?

Will Wayne reveal what has been going on?

Will Hamden produce the records?

Will NYMIR's magic purse finally be opened?

Or will the filing cabinet remain locked?

And remember - this same pickpocketing Fiary Godmother - as well as some other similar "godparents" - may be behind of a much larger taxpayer pickpocketing scheme - the BUTTERLFY "welcome, rich neighbor scheme" (where such schemes never happen usually without BIG-TIME briberies of local officials) - and result in a BIG TIME ROBBERY of local schools and other public services of the already under-served poor area, for all that Marshfield and Co. care.  Which is also ongoing under Marshfield's wise leadership.

For the continued coverage of these exciting mysteries - stay tuned.

Injustice by Conference - that's what Madison County judge Patrick J. O'Sullivan is repeatedly doing - that is what I sued him for

 I wrote about Justice O'Sullivan in this blog in 2023-2025, you can word-search the articles in the search window on the right.

It was mainly how Justice O'Sullivan was engaging in shortcuts of procedure in court cases, including attempt to "conference" motions.

I had to sue Justice O'Sullivan at the point when he demanded from my family members and members of international legal community who wanted to watch a motion hearing with Justice O'Sullivan presided, to explain to Justice O'Sullivan WHY they wanted to watch a supposedly PUBLIC hearing.  The demand was sent by Judge O'Sullivan through court clerk's email ex parte to the targeted prospective court watchers and was not filed on NYSCEF.

When I sued him, Judge O'Sullivan instantly granted our motion for a summary judgment, dismissed the case on the merits - and mooted the lawsuit against him.

But, he did not stop discriminating against pro se litigants in property disputes and did not stop using conference - and alterations of court records - in such proceedings, as he did in our case.

I wrote and published a law review article summarizing my experience and the new case from Madison county, you can read the law review article here.

Amy Merklen to First Amendment in the Sidney graffiti case: eh?

 On July 23, 2026, I published an article about Sidney graffiti indictment by Delaware County DA's office, raising 1st Amendment questions - that the indictment is political and one-sided.

I also FOILed DA Smith - which caused him to spat against me attempting to own his government-given email and to claim that I do not contact him at that e-mail - while at the same time including me into the journalistic media release list.  Because I sued the County, of course, for denying me, as a journalist, that right.

On August 26, 2026 County Attoney Amy Merklen who self-designated herself as County's Record's Access Officer produced this 9-day wonder response to my FOIL/1st Amendment journalistic inquiry:

The defense of the girls indicted by DA Smith might be interested to know what the County claims in response to my FOIL/1st Amendment request.

First, Merklen claimed that the criminal investigation in Sidney graffiti case - despite the indictment already revealed to the public, with humiliating and embarrassing and scary legal consequences to the girls indicted - IS STILL ONGOING (that is the only basis how FOIL requests of this nature may be denied).

She claimed that BECAUSE the information I sought was “gathered for law enforcement purposes” and because the investigation is allegedly ongoing, despite the indictment, she may deny a journalist access to the actual photographic evidence of MESSAGES for which the girls were criminally indicted for felonies.

That is a direct violation of FOIL, and a direct violation of the 1st Amendment, my rights as a representative of the press for access to these records, as I sought records on issues of public concern, potentially political prosecution of individuals in Delaware County, and specifically belonging to the camp of political opponents of the predominantly Republican County management.

Mind that the County management, with a straight face, claimed to federal court in Decker Advertisement, Inc. v. Delaware County, NY, an ongoing case, that they had a right to de-designate Walton Reporter from publishing County's governmental notice because The Reporter is not Republican-leaning, and because the County, with a Republican-leaning management, has a right to match the choice of newspaper to simply publish legal notices of the County, with the County management's personal political leanings.

Also mind that once the indictment is filed, the investigation is presumed to be officially over - thus making certain criminal records, with the exception of testimony in the grand jury - open to the public.

And all that I asked was SPECIFICS:  the actual PHOTOGRAPHS of what the girls WROTE on those sidewalks or buildings, what kind of POLITICAL MESSAGES they are CRIMINALLY charged with creating on public property.

I, of course, will appeal that FOIL decision - but Merklen has put herself now, unlawfully, in the position of BOTH the FOIL Records' Access Officer - and advisor to FOIL Appeals Officer (Tina Mole), which is adamantly unlawful - but when did it stop either Merklen or Mole?  

So, the response to FOIL Appeal will be predictable.  

The case is litigation-prone for non-disclosure of records on issues of public concern.

Second, Merklen claimed that no records exist as to First Amendment training of any officers or employees of the County who participated in investigation or prosecution of the girls.

That response was predictable - given that Merklen, in a recent deposition in Decker, made sworn statements that she has no clue about the 1st Amendment, could not identify a seminal 1st Amendment case, and that she delegates all federal litigation on 1st Amendment issues to outside counsel, and then does not watch what that counsel files on her behalf in that litigation.

But, I wanted to see it in writing that, even after THREE YEARS IN LITIGATION on 1st Amendment retaliation issues with Walton Reporter (since 2023) and 2 years in litigation with me and my husband also on 1st Amendment retaliation issues in multiple cases, state and federal - Merklen STILL did not come around to put together a 1st Amendment training policy, or to actually train Delaware County officers and employees in how 1st Amendment works.

Delaware County taxpayers should vote Mole out of office finally.  Not only Mole uses her public office to enrich herself and her buddies, but she also keeps appointing the incompetent Merklen as County Attorney and condones Merklen's inviting litigation to the County by her incompetence - and taps into taxpayer coffers to finance litigation against herself and Merklen in individual capacity for intentional misconduct, which should be covered by taxpayer-funded insurance.

I will continue to comment on this case.

Stay tuned.

Attention Delaware County farmers: WIll Matter of Ryan and Neroni v WAC dismissals be overturned based on WAC's new disclosures of its government functions? WAC Wins the Right to Be “Private” and then, a dismissal of Neroni v WAC asserting WAC is a state actor. A Month Later, WAC Wants to Exercise a Quasi-Judicial Function To Refer Farmers to State Mediation. Of Claims against WAC

 

On June 18, 2026, the Appellate Division, Third Department handed the Watershed Agricultural Council a significant victory.

In Matter of Ryan v. Watershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 03853, the court affirmed dismissal of farmer Colm Ryan's Article 78 proceeding seeking records from WAC under the Freedom of Information Law.

WAC's position was simple: we are not government.

The Third Department agreed—for FOIL purposes.

It characterized WAC as a “charitable not-for-profit environmental corporation” contracting with the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”).  

The court emphasized WAC's allegedly formally private attributes: its board elects its members; DEP has only one representative on the board; WAC establishes its own budget; WAC hires and fires its own employees; and WAC maintains its own insurance.  Those findings, of course, were contradicted by the case's own record - but the spectacularly lazy, incompetent and very possibly corrupt Judge Brian Burns who I wrote about multiple times on this blog, wrote otherwise - and the 3rd Department rubber-stamped Burns' incorrect findings of fact without looking.

Yet, the 3rd Department acknowledged at least two facts, troubling for WAC, that make the victory in Ryan considerably less sweeping than WAC might prefer.

First, WAC receives approximately 95% of its revenue from DEP.

Second, the Third Department expressly acknowledged that WAC “arguably performs a governmental function by working to reduce water pollution in the City's watershed region.”

Nevertheless, it held that WAC's contractual relationship with DEP did not make WAC an “agency” under FOIL.

All that WAC had to do to keep that victory is to keep its proverbial mouth shut.

But - WAC kept talking.

And only two months after Ryan, and one month after dismissal of Neroni v WAC (see below) based on Ryan - WAC publicly announced something rather difficult to reconcile with the image of an ordinary private nonprofit contractor:

WAC now wants to refer farmers into the New York State Agricultural Mediation Program to resolve disputes before they reach court.

WAC's August 25 Meeting Creates a Very Uncomfortable Question

On August 27, 2026, The Reporter published Lillian Browne's article, “As Land Changes Hands, WAC Looks to Mediation to Ease Farm Conflicts.”

Browne reported on WAC's August 25 meeting and a presentation concerning the New York State Agricultural Mediation Program.

This was not a discussion about WAC employees mediating their own office disputes.

WAC Executive Director Ryan Naatz identified the subjects confronting WAC: conservation easements, property rights, funding, agricultural development, and New York City's role in the watershed.  He specifically discussed conservation work funded through DEP watershed agreements.

Then the discussion became considerably more interesting.

According to Browne, a WAC council member asked whether WAC could incorporate the New York State Agricultural Mediation Program into WAC's dispute-resolution policy as a step before formal litigation.

The reported answer was yes.

WAC members then discussed whether WAC could refer farmers directly to the mediation program when WAC encounters disputes involving conservation easements, property rights, and other complicated matters before farmers filed lawsuits against WAC.

The mediator's response?

“Send them our way.”

Excuse me?

Who Gave This “Private Nonprofit” Authority to Refer Farmers Anywhere?

That is no longer an academic question.

If a farmer voluntarily asks WAC for help obtaining mediation, there is nothing remarkable about WAC providing the telephone number, as a matter of courtesy.

But that is not the institutional arrangement described in the article.

The proposal discussed at the WAC meeting was to incorporate state mediation into WAC's own dispute-resolution policy before litigation and TO IMPOSE THAT POLICY upon farmers by "referring" farmers directly to mediation when WAC encounters qualifying disputes.

That immediately raises a basic question:

What authority does WAC have to exercise a QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION (government function) and to “refer” a farmer's dispute to a state mediation program when the farmer has not agreed to mediation?

And especially when, most likely, an average farmer does not have a law degree and cannot put WAC on the spot with a question - what AUTHORITY - especially after you obtained back-to-back dismissals in Matter of Ryan and in Neroni v WAC asserting that you are NOT state actors and NOT a state agency - do you have to exercise a GOVERNMENT FUNCTION - ANY GOVERMENT FUNCTION, AT ALL?

WAC cannot have it both ways.

If WAC is merely an ordinary private nonprofit contractor - as WAC presented to the Ryan and Neroni v WAC courts (judges Burns, McBride, respectively), then WAC has precisely NO authority over an unwilling farmer - the same as any other private nonprofit.

A private actor/nonprofit can offer mediation.

It can recommend mediation.

It can inform a farmer that mediation exists, as an option before a farmer would consider - with his lawyer! or on his own, as a pro se litigant - mediation.

A farmer can voluntarily request mediation.

But “referral” as part of WAC's institutional dispute-resolution process before litigation is something different. 

It places WAC in the quasi-judicial, governmental position of 

• identifying disputes, 
• classifying them for intervention, and 
• routing affected persons toward an official dispute-resolution mechanism.

Where does that authority come from?

• A contract?
• A conservation easement?
• DEP?
• The 1997 watershed agreements?
• A WAC program agreement signed by the farmer?
• A statute?
• A regulation?
• Or exactly from nowhere?

That question becomes especially acute where the dispute is between the farmer and WAC itself.

A quasi-judicial officer MUST BE NEUTRAL.

It may not be both a PARTY in the dispute to be mediated, and the REFERRING QUASI-JUDICIAL OFFICER.

Yet, that is exactly what WAC suggested as its own new PUBLICIZED policy.

Who decides that the farmer should be “referred”?

WAC?

And what happens if the farmer says no?

Mediation Is Consensual. WAC's Claimed Referral Role Is the Issue.

There is an important distinction here.

Nobody needs governmental authority merely to suggest mediation.

But WAC was discussing something institutional: putting the New York State Agricultural Mediation Program into its dispute-resolution policy as a step before litigation.

That necessarily raises questions about authority, consent and consequences.

If participation remains entirely voluntary, then WAC should say exactly that:

No farmer is referred without the farmer's affirmative consent; refusing mediation has no consequence whatsoever for WAC funding, conservation programs, easement administration, eligibility, enforcement, future dealings with WAC, or litigation.

If that is the rule, publish it.

If it isn't the rule, then WAC has a much bigger problem.

Because an organization controlling access to publicly financed agricultural and conservation programs cannot transform “voluntary mediation” into institutional leverage merely by calling the process "a referral".

And, WAC, a COUNSELED entity, may not interfere with UNCOUNSELED, PRO SE farmers' rights of access to court be giving them LEGAL ADVICE as to mediation, LEGAL ADVICE that is WRONG and that purports to amount to a quasi-judicial order that WAC has no authority to issue.

And if WAC possesses some governmental or contractual authority to initiate such a process without the farmer's prior consent, then the obvious question returns:

Where did a supposedly private nonprofit acquire that authority?  And did WAC LIE TO TWO COURTS in two separate lawsuits - Justice Burns and the Third Department in Matter of Ryan, and Justice McBride and the Third Department (case is now on appeal) in Neroni v WAC - in claiming that it is not a government agency and not a state actor while at the same time SECRETLY BREWING a "REFERRAL" policy exactly on opposite grounds - and going public with that policy only AFTER the dismissals were obtained?

The Timing Is Spectacular

WAC's timing could hardly be better.

Or worse.

The Third Department decided Ryan on June 18, 2026.

The court concluded that WAC was not a governmental “agency” for FOIL purposes after examining the record then before it. The court emphasized WAC's formal corporate independence and rejected Ryan's request for discovery into the DEP-WAC relationship.

The Delaware County Supreme Court decided Neroni v WAC, based on Ryan decision by the 3rd Department, at the insistence of WAC, on July 14, 2026, dismissing the case and claiming that WAC is just a private nonprofit and not a state actor for purposes of a civil rights, 1983 action.

Justice Mcbride then dismissed claims in Neroni v WAC against NYC DEP (WAC's partner and source of finance and governmental functions), relying on its own dismissal of July 14, 2026 - which, in turn, relied on the Third Department's June 18, 2026 decision in Ryan.

You know what was the date when that dismissal was issued?  August 25, 2026,  look up Neroni v WAC, EF2026-106, NYSCEF Document # 278.

August 25, 2026 is the very date when WAC went public with its new "referral" policy.  You can't make this up.  They could not wait even one day.

On August 25, 2026 WAC declared that it will include a REFERRAL policy into its own dispute resolution policy with farmers - as reported by the local press.

And WAC did this while appeal in Neroni v. WACis pending over whether WAC's may be characterized, by conduct, as a state actor for purposes of a 1983 action.   

That is quite a way to celebrate dismissals in Ryan and in Neroni v WAC.

Even Better: DEP Was at the Same Meeting

The mediation presentation was not the only important event at the reported WAC's August 25, 2026 meeting.

Three days later, The Reporter published another article by Lillian Browne: “Keeping NYC Tap Water Flowing, Without a Filter.”

That article reports that DEP Acting Executive Director Adam Bosch appeared before WAC at the same August 25, 2026 meeting to present DEP's Future of Filtration Avoidance white paper and discuss the regulatory future of New York City's unfiltered drinking-water system.

Browne explains that the 1997 watershed agreement produced more than $1.7 billion in DEP commitments for watershed programs and expressly identifies WAC as one of the regional entities administering those programs.

DEP is now preparing for the next Filtration Avoidance Determination and reassessing the effectiveness of the land-management programs upon which that governmental regulatory system depends.

So here is what happened at one WAC meeting:

DEP came in through one door to discuss the governmental regulatory program WAC helps administer.

The New York State Agricultural Mediation Program came in through another door to discuss having WAC refer farmers with property and conservation disputes into state mediation before litigation.

And WAC remains, apparently, just an ordinary private nonprofit, not an agency for FOIL purposes, not a state actor for a 1983 action purpose.

Right.

A Shoutout to Farmers: Do Not Accept WAC's Claimed Authority to “Refer” You Anywhere - You Are Being DELIBERATELY WRONGED

First, WAC cheated you out of your legitimate right to FOIL WAC as a state agency to discovery what is brewing in WAC.

Actually, I do not know why the Ryan plaintiff/petitioner went that way - but there is a different way and different entity to FOIL for the same information, NOW, it is not foreclosed by the Ryan 3rd Department decision: just FOIL NYC DEP.  Or file 1st Amendment requests with NYC DEP.  Or file federal FOIA requests with USDA - another participant in filtration avoidance programs.  Those are undeniably state actors, and as to USDA, denials of FOIA requests can be challenged in federal court.

As to WAC's newly announced "referral" policy, farmers should pay very close attention to the word “refer.”

Mediation is consensual unless court-ordered or required by statute or regulation.

If you want mediation, request it.

If WAC offers you mediation (at WAC's own expense) and you want it, nothing can prevent you from accepting it - but I would be very careful to hire a lawyer for the process, otherwise WAC will dupe you of your access to court in that mediation, you know that.

But if WAC tells you that it is “referring” you to mediation because of a dispute involving your farm, your conservation easement, your property rights, your funding, or your dealings with WAC or DEP, do not simply accept the premise that WAC possesses that authority.

Ask.

Ask WAC:

What is the legal basis for your authority to refer my dispute to mediation?

Ask whether the purported authority comes from:

1. a statute or regulation;
2. your conservation easement;
3. a WAC participation agreement you actually signed;
4. WAC's contract with DEP;
5. the watershed MOA or subsequent agreements;
6. a written WAC policy; or
7. some other source.

And ask for the document and the specific provision.

Do not settle for “this is our policy.”

A private organization's adoption of a “policy” does not itself create authority over somebody else's property dispute.

Ask the More Important Question: What Happens If I Say No?

If WAC says mediation is voluntary, farmers should ask WAC to put that proposition in writing.

Ask:

1. Can I refuse this referral?
2. Will refusing mediation affect my eligibility for any WAC program?
3. Will it affect funding?
4. Will it affect an existing conservation easement or WAC's administration of that easement?
5. Will my refusal be communicated to DEP?
6. Will it affect future dealings with WAC?
7. Will WAC characterize my refusal adversely in subsequent litigation?
8. Who decided that my dispute should be referred in the first place?

And:

9. What authority did that person have to make that decision?

Those aren't hostile questions.

They are elementary questions about authority of an entity attempting to exercise POWER over you to potentially FORECLOSE your access to court, to SUE THAT SAME ENTITY or its financing partners.

Because if the answer really is:

“WAC has absolutely no authority over you; we are merely suggesting an entirely voluntary service that you may freely accept or reject without consequence,”

then WAC can say that plainly.

If WAC obtained DELEGATED authority to refer farmers to medication from a government program - it may not EXERCISE those delegated authority to refer farmers to mediation when it ITSELF is a party.  Such a referral would directly violate requirement for referrer's neutrality as a quasi-judicial officer.

And be especially alert if refusing WAC's “referral” carries any consequence within the publicly funded watershed program WAC administers, the situation is entirely different.

WAC Cannot Invent Jurisdiction by Calling It a “Policy”

This is the central problem.

WAC's board can adopt policies governing WAC.

That does not mean WAC can adopt a policy creating QUASI-JUDICIAL authority over farmers to be de facto judges in WAC's own cases - in at least referring farmers to mediation.

The source of authority matters.

Consent matters.

The consequences of refusing matter.

And where an organization overwhelmingly financed by government, administering governmental watershed programs, working directly with DEP, and exercising substantial practical power over farmers proposes to insert itself into the path between a property dispute and litigation, the governmental character of that function matters too.

WAC wanted a dismissal Ryan and Neroni v WAC, to shield itself from 

(1) FOIL requests (Ryan); 

(2) civil rights actions under 42 USC 1983 (Neroni v WAC).

It got dismissals in both.

But Ryan itself acknowledged that WAC arguably performs a governmental function.

Now, while Neroni v. WAC is on appeal over state action, WAC has volunteered evidence of another one.

Quasi-judicial dispute referral.

So farmers should ask the question that the courts have not yet required WAC to answer:

Who gave WAC authority to “refer” your property dispute anywhere?

And until WAC identifies that authority, do not concede that it exists.

SAY NO TO THE FORCED REFERRALS BY WAC TO MEDIATION BEFORE YOU SUE WAC

YOU KNOW WAC WILL CHEAT YOU - AS IT CHEATED SO FAR SEVERAL COURTS IN RYAN AND NERONI V WAC.