BewaRRRe of the RRRRevolutionary RRRReporter (County Twin Brother Bunny TM) BeaRRRRing Gag OrdeRRRRs! 🐰 Timid with Brother Bunny's government bringing carrots. Stern with encroachers on journalistic non-freedom.

Once upon a time, in the enchanted kingdom of Delaware County, New York, there lived a very RRRRevolutionary newspaper publisher named Randy Shepard. 🐇

He was a brave little zaichik.  A fearless defender of the First Amendment.  A ferocious opponent of government censorship. A man prepared to drag the entire county government into federal court to vindicate the sacred freedom of the press.

RRRREVOLUTION! FREE SPEECH! DOWN WITH GOVERNMENT GAG ORDERS! 🐰✊

Then, one terrible day, something horrifying happened.

An investigative journalist sent his editor a copy of a FOIL request.

A FOIL REQUEST! 🐇😱

Containing questions about public money spent on litigation involving his own newspaper!

The little zaichik nearly fainted. 🐰💦

What if his editor READ it?

What if she LEARNED something?

What if she INVESTIGATED?

Worse yet, what if somebody thought they were COORRRRDINATING?

With "THAT WOMAN"????!!!! 🐰😱

NO, NO, NO and NOOOOO! the cornered bunny thought, his little ears standing straight up. 🐰

Can't happen. Not to us. Not to our RRRRRRevolutionary RRRRRReporter, who has been soaking Delaware County taxpayers in litigation over 30 grands per year — but that's MONEY, ma cher ami... 💰🐇

Information? From THAT WOMAN? For FREE?

MON DIEU! QUELLE HORREUR! 🐰🥕

The RRRRevolutionary publisheRRRR spRRRRang into action.

He seized his keyboaRRRRRd, summoned eveRRRRRy ounce of his RRRRRRevolutionary couRRRRRage - and issued an uRRRRRgent pRRRRRoclamation:

Please, please, PLEASE stop sending information to me, my newspaper, or ANYONE ASSOCIATED with us! 🐰🚫

Anyone associated?

The editor? Certainly!

The reporters? Naturally!

The freelancers? Presumably!

The cleaning lady? Better safe than sorry!

The delivery driver? Suspiciously associated!

The editor's cousin's dentist? DANGEROUS TERRRRRITORY! 🐇🚨

The zaichik had discovered a revolutionary principle of journalism:

THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW — PROVIDED NOBODY TELLS THE NEWSPAPER. 🐰📰

And what was the terrifying information he was so desperate to avoid?

A request for government records.

Records about government spending.

On litigation.

His own litigation.

Which his newspaper was covering.

While suing the government for allegedly interfering with its freedom to report.

You see, the RRRRevolutionary RRRReporter believes passionately in the First Amendment.

He simply prefers to exercise it in splendid isolation from people who might have information. 🐇🥕

Meanwhile, his brother Wayne had testified in federal litigation about county instructions routing press inquiries through the County Attorney or Public Information Officer.

What a RRRRRemarkable family RRRRRResemblance! 🐰🐰

The county says: “ALL PRESS INQUIRIES THROUGH OUR OFFICE!”

The RRRReporter says: “ALL INFORMATION MUST STAY AWAY FROM OUR OFFICE!”

That was before the bunny popped out.

Eh?

Delaware County (NY) Voters: You Are Voting With The Money Of Out of the Area Property Owners, Too - and these owners may SUE and have you pay for those lawsuits, so VOTE RESPONSIBLY as to who you are putting into the public office

I am publishing this lawsuit from 2008 so that local voters remember come November - you are voting not only for yourself, but also for us, property owners and taxpayers, who own property in Delaware County, pay taxes, same as you, through our collective noses, but are not allowed to vote.

This is just another example of the longstanding "legal talent" Frank W. Miller, Esq. representing the County in frivolous investigations and lawsuits generated by mindless acts of County's officials. 

This is also a reminder to Delaware County voters.

You Are Voting With My Money, Too.

In Matter of Willkie v. Delaware County Board of Elections, 55 A.D.3d 1088 (3d Dept. 2008), Delaware County authorities went after Bovina property owners who dared to vote locally while maintaining homes elsewhere. The Sheriff's Department investigated. Voters were disqualified. The property owners sued and won.

The Third Department confirmed that maintaining two residences does not automatically deprive a person of the right to choose one as a voting residence.

I own multiple properties in Delaware County. I pay tens of thousands of dollars in property taxes annually. I cannot vote there because I reside in South Carolina.

Yet the officials you elect can spend my tax money on lawyers who pursue sanctions against my husband for lawsuits he never filed, defend private individuals through taxpayer-supported municipal insurance, and generate still more litigation and potential public liability.

I am challenging those expenditures in court, including through my recently filed Nassau County taxpayer-waste lawsuit against NYMIR and the attorneys involved.

I pay for the government you elect. I pay for its lawyers. I pay for its insurance. And I have no ballot with which to hold any of them accountable.

When you vote in Delaware County, remember that the financial consequences of your government's decisions reach far beyond the people standing in line at the polling place.

You are voting with my money, too. And I intend to demand an accounting of every dollar spent unlawfully.

AND - READ this case, NOTE what EXACTLY the County and its Sheriff's office was doing - it was deliberately trying to claim that people was "pretextually" claiming residnece in the Town of Bovina and are not entitled to vote and control through their vote how those taxes are used.

This is TINA MOLE's TOWNSHIP - REMEMBER THAT.

And, the court finally said that there was no reason for the Sheriff's Department - or the County in general - to insinuate that the ownership or use of the property was pretextual.

Unfortunately, the fate of voting rights of out of the area and out of state property OWNERS and TAXPAYERS who do not reside in Delaware County, is not so bright - we are outright forbidden to vote.  Even though our tax money is extracted from us, under the threat of property foreclosure, every year.

JUST CONSIDER how many property owners (sometimes 2/3 in a given township of Delaware County - cannot vote).

Please, vote FOR US.

========================

 55 A.D.3d 1088 (2008)

865 N.Y.S.2d 739

In the Matter of HALL F. WILLKIE et al., Respondents,
v.
DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Appellant.

Not in source.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department.

Decided October 23, 2008.

Mercure, J.P., Carpinello, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur.

Spain, J.

Following the passage of a zoning ordinance in the Town of Bovina, Delaware County, which was publicly supported by each petitioner, an opponent of the ordinance filed affidavits with respondent challenging the voter registrations of each petitioner on the basis that he or she was not a resident of Bovina within the meaning of the Election Law (see Election Law § 5-220). In response, petitioners provided documentary evidence of their respective ties to Bovina. After reviewing this evidence, together with investigations conducted by the Delaware County Sheriff's Department (see Election Law § 5-702) which revealed that petitioners' Bovina homes were not used full time, respondent determined that petitioners Hall F. Willkie, Juliet F. Lauricella, Thomas A. Lauricella, David Hendricks and Stephen Robbins did not reside in Bovina and, consequently, were not qualified to vote there. Additionally, respondent placed the registrations of petitioners Julianne Bond-Shapiro, David Spry and Maria Spry 1089*1089 in inactive status after correspondence sent to their respective residences in Bovina was returned as unclaimed (see Election Law § 5-213).

Petitioners subsequently commenced this proceeding seeking an order directing respondent to reinstate their voter registrations in Bovina, and a declaration that the "eligibility of dual residents to register and vote at a given residence [should] be determined by considering the resident's expressed intent, his or her renunciation of the right to vote elsewhere, and whether or not such person has legitimate, significant and continuing attachments to his or her voting residence of choice." Petitioners also requested an injunction enjoining respondent from employing any standard other than that elucidated above. Supreme Court granted petitioners' application in its entirety and respondent now appeals.

For voting purposes, we conclude that petitioners are, indeed, residents of Bovina. Ordinarily, respondent's factual determinations are presumptive evidence of a petitioner's voting residence (see Election Law § 5-104 [2]; Matter of Bressler v Holt-Harris, 37 AD2d 898, 898 [1971], affd 30 NY2d 529 [1972]). Here, however, no presumption arose because respondent did not apply the correct rule of law in determining the issue. Election Law § 1-104 (22) defines a residence as "that place where a person maintains a fixed, permanent and principal home and to which he [or she], wherever temporarily located, always intends to return." Although the plain language of the statute—and opinions expressed in dissent over the years (see People v O'Hara, 96 NY2d 378, 386-390 [2001, Rosenblatt, J., dissenting]; Matter of Bressler v Holt-Harris, 30 NY2d 529, 530-532 [1972, Jasen, J., dissenting]; Matter of Gallagher v Dinkins, 41 AD2d 946, 947-948 [1973, Martuscello, J., dissenting], affd 32 NY2d 839 [1973]; Matter of Gladwin v Power, 21 AD2d 665 [1964, Steuer, J., dissenting])—would support respondent's interpretation of "residence" as the equivalent of domicile, requiring a finding that the individual has more significant contacts to that place than any other, the Court of Appeals has not interpreted the statute so narrowly. Indeed, it is clear that the Election Law "does not preclude a person from having two residences and choosing one for election purposes provided he or she has `legitimate, significant and continuing attachments' to that residence" (Matter of Isabella v Hotaling, 207 AD2d 648, 650 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 801 [1994], quoting Matter of Ferguson v McNab, 60 NY2d 598, 600 [1983]; see People v O'Hara, 96 NY2d at 385).

"The crucial determination whether a particular residence 1090*1090 complies with the requirements of the Election Law is that the individual must manifest an intent, coupled with physical presence `without any aura of sham'" (People v O'Hara, 96 NY2d at 385, quoting Matter of Gallagher v Dinkins, 41 AD2d at 947; see Matter of Shafer v Dorsey, 43 AD3d 621, 622 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 804 [2007]). Election Law § 5-104 (2) provides that, "[i]n determining a voter's qualification to register and vote, the board [of elections should] consider, in addition to the [voter's] expressed intent, his [or her] conduct and all attendant surrounding circumstances relating thereto," including, among other things, "business pursuits, employment, income sources, residence for income tax purposes, age, marital status, residence of parents, spouse and children, . . . sites of personal and real property . . . , motor vehicle and other personal property registration, and other such factors that it may reasonably deem necessary."

We find that each petitioner herein has demonstrated significant and genuine contacts with Bovina such that his or her choice of Bovina as his or her residence for voting purposes should have been honored.  Six of the eight petitioners established that they have a home in Bovina and, although they live and work in New York City during the week, they spend most weekends and vacations in Bovina. Further, these petitioners demonstrated that their ties to Bovina were not a sham for voting purposes, but genuine, long-term contacts created out of a true desire to become part of the Bovina community. For example, Willkie has owned his home in Bovina since 1985 and lists his Bovina address on two separate bank accounts. Hendricks and his life partner purchased their home in Bovina in 1994 and Hendricks has been registered to vote in Bovina since 1996. Bond-Shapiro maintains a home in Bovina Center, having lived with her boyfriend in his family home since 2002.^[*] The Sprys purchased their Bovina home in 1991 and have been registered to vote in Bovina since that time. Robbins purchased his home in Bovina in 1995 and lists his Bovina address on two separate bank accounts. He registered to vote in Bovina in 1996 and has remained registered there since that time.

In the case of each of these petitioners, their New York City address is listed on their income tax returns as their permanent home address. However, each petitioner listed the Bovina address on his or her driver's license and there is nothing in the record to indicate that any petitioner voted elsewhere while registered to vote in Bovina. Further, in their own words, 1091*1091 petitioners expressed the fact that, although their employment requires them to maintain another residence, their intent is to spend as much of their lives in Bovina as possible. The Lauricellas are distinct in that their Bovina home is owned jointly with their children. The home was purchased in 1995 and has been utilized by them and their extended family on weekends and for vacations and has never been rented. Further, the Lauricellas do not own another residence and had been residing with their daughter and son-in-law in West Nyack, Rockland County, to assist in caring for their grandchildren. They utilize a Bovina post office box as their mailing address for all purposes and clearly expressed their intent to someday live full-time in Bovina.

Significantly, the inquiry is not which of petitioners' dual residences is "the more appropriate one" for voting purposes, but whether the residence held by petitioners is a legitimate one (People v O'Hara, 96 NY2d at 385). The record herein is devoid of any suggestion that any petitioner herein has attempted to "create an address solely for the purpose of circumventing residency requirements" (id.). Under these circumstances, where petitioners have renounced their right to vote elsewhere and manifested an intent to reside long term in Bovina, coupled with a legitimate and significant physical presence, we find no basis upon which to disturb Supreme Court's determination that petitioners have successfully established their voting residences in Bovina (see id.; Matter of Ferguson v McNab, 96 AD2d 916, 917 [1983], affd 60 NY2d 598 [1983]; Matter of Shafer v Dorsey, 43 AD3d at 622; Matter of Bressler v Holt-Harris, 37 AD2d at 899; see also Matter of Geller v Lasher, 196 AD2d 613, 614 [1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 654 [1993]; Matter of Umland v Board of Elections of City of N.Y., 143 AD2d 240, 241-242 [1988]; Matter of Gallagher v Dinkins, 41 AD2d at 947; Matter of Gladwin v Power, 21 AD2d at 665; cf. Matter of Isabella v Hotaling, 207 AD2d at 650; Matter of Ramos v Gomez, 196 AD2d 620, 621 [1993]).

Turning to respondent's challenge to the injunctive relief awarded by Supreme Court, we find that the court erred in enjoining respondent from employing—in the future—any legal standard other than that specifically elucidated in its order when determining the eligibility of dual residents to register and vote. While Supreme Court has the discretion to fashion permanent injunctive relief under appropriate circumstances (see e.g. Matter of Hebel v West, 25 AD3d 172, 177-178 [2005], lv denied 7 NY3d 706 [2006]), this injunction, at best, compels respondent to follow the law; "[i]t is, in other words, `little more than a direction to do right in the future'" (Gimbel Bros. v 1092*1092 Brook Shopping Ctrs., 118 AD2d 532, 536 [1986], quoting Earl v Brewer, 248 App Div 314, 315 [1936], affd 273 NY 669 [1937]). As respondent is already obligated to follow the law and there is nothing in the record to suggest that it will not do so, "the extraordinary relief of an injunction is unnecessary and inappropriate" (Van Laak v Malone, 92 AD2d 964, 966 [1983]; see also Matter of Town of Dickinson v County of Broome, 183 AD2d 1013, 1015 [1992]).

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted injunctive relief, and, as so modified, affirmed.

[*] While this home is owned by members of his family, he and Bond-Shapiro are reported to be in negotiations with them to purchase the home.

Delaware County's Expensive Legal Protection Racket: Who Is Paying for Personal Grudges? Voters - beware of public officials allowing this waste of public funds

When taxpayer-funded lawyers pursue personal vendettas, private individuals receive municipal insurance coverage, and the public gets the bill

Delaware County, New York, is a place where ordinary residents struggle with rising property taxes, deteriorating housing, and the cost of maintaining their homes.  Yet the County and its municipal partners appear to have found an extraordinary use for public resources: financing litigation against people who have criticized local officials, defending private conduct through municipal insurance, and pursuing sanctions against those who dare to sue.

I know this because I have spent years litigating against these officials.  And on October 2, 2026, I took the fight to Nassau County, where I sued the New York Municipal Insurance Reciprocal (NYMIR), Hancock Estabrook LLP, and attorneys Frank W. Miller and Ryan M. Poplawski.

The lawsuit is Neroni v. New York Municipal Insurance Reciprocal, Nassau County Supreme Court, Index No. 621856/2026.

I chose Nassau County for the lawsuit because that is where NYMIR's main office is, so it is a required venue.

The lawsuit raises a simple question: Who authorized taxpayer-supported insurance money to finance the legal defense of a private individual who admitted under oath that he was not entitled to municipal representation?

Who was that individual?

WAYNE MARSHFIELD, Delaware County and Town of Hamden supervisor, who I sued in his capacity as representative of headquarters of Watershed corporation in the Town of Hamden, as shown in the Beacon record filed by me with the court and served upon Marshfield.

Who authorized this expense? Marshfield, his lawyers, the County and the Town of Hamden stall the answer.

In fact, Marshfield first put in a sworn statement to the court that he is not entitled to legal defense at public expense, and was turned down when he asked Town of Hamden attorneys Young Sommer - that was in March of 2026, but in August 2026 a NYMIR invoice miraculously appeared in the court file, filed by Marshfield' PRIVATE attorney Frank Miller/Hancock Estabrook LLP showing that Miller was not a private attorney, but an attorney assigned at public expense - to a person sued as a private actor - by an UNKNOWN local municipality.

Miller refused - rudely - to disclose which municipality was behind this waste of public money.

Miller is now resisting several lawsuits based on participation in this waste.

I turned in Miller and Marshfield to the Fraud Unit of New York State Department of Insurance - because I, as a criminal defense attorney, represented clients for things like that, such conduct is qualifiable as insurance fraud, under Penal Law Article 176, and the amount so far expended of public funds is over 8,000 dollars - fitting the level of a D felony that carries punishment of up to 7 years in state prison.

While Miller, Marshfield, County and Town of Hamden resist discovery and try to badmouth me and hurt me and my husband and my daughter in every possible way, they may of course resist ME and MY inquiries.

But they may not resist YOU the voters and taxpayers who are on the receiving end of this ongoing waste - consider also the recent sale of a million dollar building for peanuts, I am suing DelCo Sheriff and County Attorney for that, too, for taxpayer waste, as I am a property owner and a taxpayer in Delaware County.

They MUST answer to YOU, the VOTERS - come November at the polls.

You the voters have a right to remove from office, by your vote, people responsible for this ongoing waste of public funds, raising taxes on you - just consider Marshfield's recent public lamentation that NYMIR premiums are going up.  He knows why, but did not tell you.

And why has nobody identified the municipality whose insurance arrangement is paying for it?

The insurance invoice that opened a very expensive can of worms

In Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council, Delaware County Index No. EF2026-106, Wayne Marshfield was sued in his individual capacity.

On March 31, 2026, Marshfield submitted a sworn affidavit explaining that the Town of Hamden's attorneys, Young Sommer, had declined to represent him because the claims against him did not concern his official duties.

That should have resolved the question of municipal representation.

Yet a subsequently disclosed invoice from Hancock Estabrook LLP, involving attorneys Miller and Poplawski, identified NYMIR as the client and described the matter as assigned by the insurance company. The invoice sought approximately $8,192.70 for legal services involving Marshfield.

The billing records traced the insurance assignment to March 16, 2026 — before Marshfield's March 31 sworn acknowledgment that he was ineligible for a municipally funded defense.

Marshfield was removed from the action on April 3, 2026. Nevertheless, the litigation continued, including demands for sanctions, attorney fees, and anti-filing restrictions.

This raises questions that should concern every municipal taxpayer:

• Which municipality authorized the insurance-funded representation?

• Under what policy provision was Marshfield covered for conduct outside his official duties?

• Who authorized the legal expenses after he was removed from the lawsuit?

• Why was an insurance-company invoice presented in litigation involving a claimed entitlement to attorney fees?

• Who ultimately bears the cost of this representation?

I have sought answers.  The identity of the municipality behind the insurance arrangement has remained undisclosed.

New York's Constitution is not an optional suggestion

Article VIII, § 1 of the New York State Constitution restricts municipalities from giving or lending their money or property, or extending their credit, in aid of private individuals and enterprises.

Municipal insurance exists to protect lawful municipal interests. It is not a blank check for defending private conduct simply because the individual happens to hold public office.

The distinction matters.

A town supervisor acting within the scope of official duties may qualify for publicly financed representation under applicable law and insurance arrangements. A person sued for independent private conduct has no automatic entitlement to have municipal taxpayers finance that defense.

My Nassau County lawsuit alleges that NYMIR and the attorneys involved arranged or used municipal insurance coverage to provide legal representation to Marshfield despite his own sworn acknowledgment that he was ineligible.

It asserts taxpayer-waste claims under General Municipal Law § 51, violations implicating Article VIII, § 1 of the New York Constitution, and conduct raising questions under Penal Law Article 176, which governs insurance fraud.

Insurance fraud is a serious allegation. The questions concern the representations made to obtain coverage, the identity and eligibility of the insured, the purpose for which coverage was used, and the financial responsibility for the resulting bills. Those matters require examination of the actual insurance records.

I have also asserted Judiciary Law § 487 claims against Hancock Estabrook, Miller, and Poplawski for alleged deceit and collusion in the resulting litigation.

The underlying sworn affidavit of Marshfield confirming that he was not entitled to legal representation of Miller/Hancock at taxpayer expense and the insurance invoice showing that at the time the affidavit was submitted, such a taxpayer funded representation was already ongoing for two weeks, and proceeded afterwards for many months - and still proceeds -  were filed as NYSCEF Docs. 2 and 3 in the Nassau County action.

A lawyer who cannot distinguish a husband from his wife?

The insurance dispute is part of a much larger problem.

Frank W. Miller has repeatedly sought sanctions against my husband, Frederick J. Neroni, for litigation and other activities conducted independently by me.

In Watershed, Frederick J. Neroni was not even a party.

Miller nevertheless sought sanctions and an anti-filing injunction against him.

The commencement papers conclusively established that I alone filed and prosecuted the action.

When Frederick J. Neroni subsequently sued Miller for seeking and obtaining sanctions against him in that case, Miller claimed that Frederick J. Neroni had filed Watershed.

A lawyer should be able to identify who commenced a lawsuit. The answer is in the caption and commencement papers.

It does not require a law degree - only basic reading skills taught in kindergarten.

Apparently, Miller missed those valuable kindergarten classes.

He looked at the record - and a court decision - specifically saying - FREDERICK J. NERONI IS NOT A PARTY IN THIS PROCEEDING - and claimed the opposite in court papers, seeking dismissal of Frederick J. Neroni's GML 51 taxpayer action for waste of public funds against Miller and his illustrious law firm - whose managing partner, by the way, is brother to the Chief Administrative Judge of courts outside New York City - therefore all the breaks despite Miller's sheer incompetence, repeated lying to the court and open an brazen waste of public funds on private pursuits of people, including journalists, like I am.

In another proceeding, Miller expressly argued that Frederick J. Neroni's marriage to me, and our participation together in property-related litigation, justified seeking sanctions against him for my independent conduct. Neroni v. Delaware County, EF2025-447, NYSCEF Docs. 64 and 80.

Frederick J. Neroni moved for sanctions against Miller. Miller did not oppose the motion.

Justice Christopher P. Baker denied it without an explanation.  Of course, we are suing him for multiple prejudgments - and he in return is denying us ADA accommodations and babying Miller, even when he - repeatedly - acts like he never saw the insides of a law school.

Miller has continued seeking sanctions against us.

Apparently, in Delaware County litigation, the marriage certificate can become a substitute for proof of individual misconduct.

The judge who had prosecuted the man at the center of our lawsuit

The situation became more extraordinary in October 2026.

In Neroni v. Molé, we had challenged circumstances surrounding James Laughman, whose presence, alleged criminal activities, and connections with law enforcement were material to litigation concerning our property at 201 Main Street, Delhi, NY, which Laughman captured in 2022, kept for two years, threatened gun violence upon our daughter living nearby - among other things - and whose presence there was ended only after he allegedly dropped dead in the house, leaving it irreversibly contaminated by fentanyl.

Now we are facing environmental remediation expenses that exceeds the value of the property, while the local municipalities - despite a stop occupancy order posted in October of 2024 on the door by the Village of Delhi - continue to tax it as an inhabitable residence AND a commercial office.  

We sought Laughman's criminal records through FOIL requests.

County Attorney Amy Merklen and County District Attorney Shawn J. Smith, both represented by Miller in an action by which we seek reimbursement for the government taking - because we asserted, and as professional criminal defense litigators, correctly assessed (as it came now last week) - that Laughman was a convicted drug dealer and thus a very likely confidential informant of the local law enforcement PLANTED into our house and the house was TAKEN from us and turned BY DA SMITH, AMY MERKLEN, CRAIG DUMOND, TINA MOLE with assistance of MICHAEL MILLS of Delhi Police into a drug lab/halfway house/drug dealing sot.

These actors resisted disclosure while at the same time seeking all kinds of sanctions against us for TELLING THE TRUTH and SEEKING COMPENSATION for the County releasing a convicted drug addict and dealer onto the unsuspecting community which not only resulted in destruction of our property - but which resulted, very likely in the spreading of drugs in the community to help DA Smith claim a good conviction rate.

Laughman put on OUR house surveillance cameras and a sign: "FUCK THE POLICE I WILL SHOOT".

He threatened to shoot our daughter's eyeballs, openly.

He was a convicted felon, he could not possess a gun.

My daughter complained.

Village of Delhi police arrived and protected Laughman - REPEATEDLY.

On October 9, 2026, we finally obtained criminal records establishing that Justice Joseph A. McBride, formerly Chenango County District Attorney, had personally prosecuted Laughman, obtained a felony conviction, and participated in subsequent probation proceedings.

McBride had already imposed sanctions and anti-filing injunctions against us in Neroni v. Baker and Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council.

He had also pronounced actions filed by us during the preceding three years frivolous, including litigation concerning Laughman.

He did so without disclosing his own prosecutorial involvement with that individual.

The newly discovered records are central to Frederick J. Neroni's pending Motion #14 in Neroni v. Molé. We assert that McBride's prior involvement created disqualification and material-witness issues, including under Judiciary Law § 14, 22 NYCRR 100.3(E)(1), and Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 25-20.

Miller represented governmental defendants with access to records we had been unable to obtain. 

HE GODDAMIT KNEW that we were right when we were asserting that Laughman was a drug addict and drug dealer - Miller had in front of him such RECORDS in the County Clerk's office since 2017!!!!

Yet, he had us sanctioned for frivolous conduct - because I turned him in for his prior shenanigans into the grievance committee and he had to pull certain unredacted child records offline - he was doxxing a child to get even with Scuderi-Hunter.

He secured sanctions before we obtained the records exposing the judge's prior prosecutorial role, and is now trying to capitalize on it, MULTIPLYING litigation against the county - because they DID NOT foreclose my access to FEDERAL COURT where I can CONTINUE to sue the County for what I have just discovered and will continue to discover, as a journalist, as a property owner and as a taxpayer.

And those sanctions are now being invoked in further litigation.

This is how public liability multiplies: instead of resolving an underlying dispute, government-funded litigation generates additional proceedings concerning sanctions, disqualification, withheld records, judicial conduct, and the right to obtain appellate review.

Who pays for all of that?

Even the Attorney General joined the demand for punishment

The problem extends beyond Delaware County's private outside counsel.

On August 18, 2025, Frederick J. Neroni and I filed an Amended Verified Complaint in Neroni v. Delaware County, eliminating all federal causes of action and seeking remand to state court.

Four days later, on August 22, Assistant Attorney General Timothy P. Mulvey, representing Attorney General Letitia James, joined Miller and other defense attorneys in a letter asking the federal court to retain the amended complaint and consider whether our claims were frivolous.

The letter was filed as ECF Doc. 51 in N.D.N.Y. No. 3:25-cv-00801.

That request confronted the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22 (2025), holding that a post-removal amendment eliminating the federal claims supporting removal extinguishes supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and requires remand.

The attorneys nevertheless requested that the federal court retain our state-law complaint for a frivolousness determination.

When Attorney General James later moved to dismiss the same complaint in New York Supreme Court, she did not pursue the accusation that the pleading was frivolous.

The demand for punishment disappeared.

The effort to dismiss our claims did not.

Personal grudges, public offices, and the same familiar officials

My disputes with Delaware County officials did not begin yesterday.

As a practicing attorney and later as an investigative journalist, I publicly criticized, since 2014 on this blog, and since 2009 as a lawyer, fabricated child protective charges, criminal prosecutions, and misconduct of officials including Amy Merklen, John Hubbard, Richard Northrup, DuMond, and former County Attorney Porter Kirkwood.

I described investigative practices I had encountered in professional litigation, including the use of undisclosed cooperating witnesses and provocateurs whose testimony could transform ordinary conversations into supposed evidence of wrongdoing.

I documented aspects of those practices in my 2018 book, The Oxygen Mask Rule, still available on Amazon.com.

In September–November 2015, after leaving New York but while I still held my law license, I published approximately thirty investigative articles sharply criticizing Delaware County officials, including then-County Attorney Porter Kirkwood.

Kirkwood was then running for a Family Court judgeship against Gary Rosa.  Despite prominent political and judicial support - and he was supported by then-retired County Judge Carl F. Becker, retired 3rd Department appellate judge Carl Mugglin, and then-sitting NYS Senator James Seward - he lost.

I believe my reporting directly caused that result - my articles were scathing, document-based, based on my personal knowledge of Porter Kirkwood's conduct in litigation through interaction with him, as a lawyer, over the years, there were about 30 of them published a month or two before election in 2015, they are still available on this blog, just word-search his name - and he lost.

Kirkwood subsequently became Sixth Judicial District Executive, with responsibilities involving judicial administration and disability accommodations. He now - get the irony - assigning judges to our cases and is managing denials of disability accommodations to us by various judges.

The issue is the concentration of governmental authority in the hands of individuals with a long history of personal and professional misconduct, glaring misconduct, involving the very people affected by their decisions.

Public office cannot become a vehicle for settling old scores. Publicly financed litigation cannot become a private retaliation service.

The taxpayers are the involuntary financiers

NYMIR is a municipal insurance reciprocal.  

In plain English - it is a pool of taxpayer money from different municipalities, about 1,000 of them across the State of New York based on my research, where municipalities use monies collected from taxpayers to finance each other's litigation needs.

Its financial resources arise from the insurance arrangements of participating public entities.

As insurer, NYMIR cannot simply assign a lawyer to represent a person out of the blue - there must be a paper trail: an existing municipality, an existing policy/contract/subscription with that municipality, the municipality's authorization of the legal representation under its insurance policy through NYMIR.

Delaware County - and that was confirmed in an October 2025 deposition of Amy Merklen in federal ongoing case Decker advertisement - I published her deposition on this blog - not just finances, but CONTROLS litigation its insurance finances.

I sued Marshfield in Neroni v Watershed Corporation where I specifically asserted that Delaware County is secretly pulling strings of local "independent" non-profits to do the County biddings - including in retaliation against journalists.  I sued after WAC fired my daughter in retaliation against our litigation against Delaware County.

After Miller ran his mouth claiming that I was lying, frivolous, whatever - he then produced, as the fraudulent trickster that he is - after he obtained sanctions against me based on his sorry story from the disqualified Judge McBride, a prosecutor of Laughman in one of yet unadjudicated cases underlying sanctions that Miller asked McBride to prejudge - so he produced the NYMIR invoice PROVING ME RIGHT!!! but brazenly seeking his fraudulently obtained attorney fees against me nevertheless.

While refusing to disclose to me WHO AUTHORIZED THE WASTE OF PUBLIC FUNDS?  WHO AUTHORIZED LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF MARSHFIELD IN A PRIVATE LAWSUIT AGAINST HIM AT PUBLIC EXPENSE?  WHO DID WHAT I SAID IN THE LAWSUIT DELAWARE COUNTY IS DOING ALL ALONG - SECRETLY PULLING RETALIATION STRINGS ON JOURNALISTS?  In a variety of ways? Despite already being sued - since 2023 - in Decker Advertisement where Marshfield, and Merklen, and the County, are represented BY MILLER at public expense - THROUGH NYMIR.

That means municipal insurance expenses have public financial consequences, even when the money does not pass directly from a town treasury to a lawyer's bank account.

Municipal contributions, insurance costs, claims experience, and litigation expenses ultimately affect the cost of operating local government.

And local government is financed by residents and property owners.

In Delaware County, where households struggle with property taxes and the costs of maintaining aging properties, every questionable legal expense deserves scrutiny.

An $8,192.70 invoice is not the entire issue. It is the documentary opening into a much larger question: how many legal expenses are being incurred for private conduct, retaliatory litigation, sanctions applications, and disputes that competent, independent public counsel could have avoided?

How much additional municipal liability is being created by litigation tactics pursued at public expense?

How much money is spent defending the consequences of earlier decisions?

And how many people know that their local government's insurance arrangements may be financing litigation they would never have authorized if asked directly?

Why I sued NYMIR in Nassau County

I filed my lawsuit on October 2, 2026, in Nassau County Supreme Court, where NYMIR maintains its principal office.

The action names NYMIR, Hancock Estabrook LLP, Ryan M. Poplawski, and Frank W. Miller.

It seeks relief concerning alleged taxpayer waste, the legality of the challenged insurance-funded representation, restitution, and statutory damages against the attorneys under Judiciary Law § 487.

I own multiple parcels of taxable real property in New York, including Delaware County. I pay the taxes supporting the municipal system whose expenditures I challenge.

My lawsuit asks who authorized the coverage, who benefited, what representations were made, and whether the arrangement complied with New York law.

It also seeks to prevent repetition of the challenged conduct.

A public official's private legal problems do not automatically become the taxpayers' financial obligations.

Neither a municipal insurance policy nor an attorney's invoice can supply legal authority that the Constitution and statutes withhold.

They simply cannot.

And voters can and should hold public officials accountable for stealing from taxpayer pocket - and that includes DA Smith who, instead of prosecuting Miller, is represented by him and is openly endorsing, through litigation, his continued waste of taxpayer funds.

The questions Delaware County must answer

The public deserves an accounting of who is receiving municipal-funded legal representation, the legal basis for that representation, the identity of the public entity bearing the expense, and the total cost of the resulting litigation.

Residents also deserve to know whether their governments are purchasing competent, independent legal advice or financing years of unnecessary litigation driven by personal conflicts, questionable sanctions requests, and attempts to shield public officials from accountability.

The problem is larger than one invoice or one attorney.

When government officials can use public resources to pursue private conflicts, the people who finance those resources bear the costs. When questionable litigation produces additional claims against the municipality, those costs multiply. When insurance arrangements conceal which municipality is paying, public accountability becomes harder still.

Delaware County's residents are entitled to transparency concerning their money.

I intend to continue demanding it.

The lawsuit against Delaware Count insurer NYMIR - and Miller and his law firm - for waste - is Neroni v. New York Municipal Insurance Reciprocal, Nassau County Supreme Court, Index No. 621856/2026, NYSCEF Docs. 1–3, filed October 2, 2026.

The Slimy Tales - Part III

 

The Miraculous Healing Story of Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius

Part III: Does a Molluscan Judicial Officer Have Authority to BWOMP-YA Motions Questioning His Authority to BWOMP-YA Motions?

A fairy tale of revolutionary molluscan psychiatry, neurosecretory gratification, and the triumph of therapeutic slime production over unnecessary cognition.

We continue the exciting publications of THE SLIMY TALES!!! TADA!!!

You can immerse yourself in the miracle slimy world Part I - here, and Part II - here.

Chapter I. The Greatest Achievement in Molluscan Psychiatry

It was a glorious, damp morning at the Institute of Molluscan Behavioral Therapy.

Dr. Gaston Slug, M.D., Ph.D., F.A.M.P., the world's foremost authority on molluscan mental health, was preparing to announce the results of his most successful clinical experiment.

His celebrated patient, Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius, Custos Slimi, had achieved a state of mental health previously considered unattainable in judicial mollusks.

He had been completely liberated from cognitive responses incompatible with optimal slime production.

The treatment had required considerable scientific ingenuity.

Before entering the Institute, Sir Marcus had occasionally displayed alarming symptoms of juridical cognition.

Upon encountering a motion, his nervous system sometimes attempted to process its contents.

When confronted with a jurisdictional objection, he occasionally experienced a fleeting impulse to determine whether the objection had merit.

Worst of all, he had once exhibited a momentary neurological disturbance upon encountering the proposition that a judicial officer's authority must originate somewhere outside the judicial officer himself.

Such episodes were deeply concerning.

Every cognitive impulse consumed metabolic resources.

Every attempt at legal reasoning diverted energy from slime production.

And every moment spent contemplating the limits of judicial authority threatened the delicate neurosecretory equilibrium essential to molluscan happiness.

Fortunately, Dr. Gaston's revolutionary treatment had succeeded beyond his wildest expectations.

Sir Marcus now enjoyed perfect cognitive tranquility.

His eyestalks were bright.

His shell was magnificent.

His slime glands functioned at unprecedented capacity.

And whenever a motion appeared, he experienced an instantaneous, deeply gratifying neurological event.

BWOMP-YA!

Followed by a glorious discharge of slime.

Dr. Gaston was ecstatic.

Chapter II. The Anatomical Scandal

The Institute's first scientific controversy arose when a visiting neurologist, unfamiliar with molluscan anatomy, attempted to describe Sir Marcus's therapeutic response as a "knee-jerk reaction."

Dr. Gaston was horrified.

"Sir!" he exclaimed. "I must protest!"

The visitor looked surprised.

"Why, Doctor? It is a familiar neurological expression."

"Familiar, perhaps, to vertebrates! But molluscan judicial officers have no knees!"

The audience gasped.

"Furthermore," continued Dr. Gaston, "the expression is vulgar, dismissive, and profoundly disrespectful to the dignity of molluscan neurophysiology."

"But surely you agree that the response is automatic?"

"Automatic? My dear colleague, you have entirely missed the point! We are not observing some primitive muscular contraction. We are witnessing an exquisitely beneficial neurosecretory experience!"

Dr. Gaston strode to the blackboard.

With considerable ceremony, he wrote:

GASTONIAN INSTANTANEOUS NEUROSECRETORY GRATIFICATION RESPONSE™

GINGR™

A revolutionary therapeutic phenomenon in which an external jurisdictional stimulus bypasses all unnecessary cognitive processing and produces an immediate, pleasurable BWOMP-YA experience, accompanied by abundant secretion of premium judicial slime.

The audience rose to its feet.

Professor Archibald Slimesworth wiped away a tear.

"Magnificent, Gaston! You have restored scientific dignity to the entire field of reflexive molluscan jurisprudence!"

"Precisely," replied Dr. Gaston. "And unlike the anatomically impossible knee-jerk reaction, GINGR™ is specifically adapted to the physiology, psychology, and professional needs of judicial gastropods."

The visiting neurologist apologized.

He was subsequently reassigned to the Department of Vertebrate Misunderstandings.

Chapter III. The Motion That Threatened Molluscan Happiness

For several weeks, Sir Marcus enjoyed uninterrupted therapeutic bliss.

A motion arrived.

"BWOMP-YA!"

A magnificent secretion.

Another motion arrived.

"BWOMP-YA!"

An even more magnificent secretion.

Occasionally, Sir Marcus BWOMP-YA'd motions before they arrived, demonstrating what Dr. Gaston described as anticipatory neurosecretory optimization.

Then, one morning, a clerk entered carrying a particularly troublesome document.

"Your Honor, a motion has been filed."

"BWOMP-YA!" replied Marcus happily.

"But Your Honor, the motion questions your authority to BWOMP-YA motions."

Marcus paused.

His left eyestalk rotated clockwise.

His right eyestalk rotated counterclockwise.

For a terrifying fraction of a second, something resembling a thought threatened to emerge.

"MY AUTHORITY?"

"Yes, Your Honor."

"TO BWOMP-YA?"

"Precisely."

Marcus began to tremble.

The slime-production monitor registered a decline.

"DOCTOR GASTON!"

Within minutes, the Institute's emergency psychiatric team had assembled.

Dr. Gaston approached his patient.

"Marcus, tell me what happened."

"THEY FILED A MOTION!"

"And what did you do?"

"I BWOMP-YA'D IT!"

"Excellent!"

"AND PROMPTLY!"

"Splendid!"

"BUT DOCTOR! THE MOTION QUESTIONS WHETHER I HAVE AUTHORITY TO BWOMP-YA MOTIONS!"

Dr. Gaston stroked his chin.

He recognized an unprecedented therapeutic opportunity.

"Marcus, suppose somebody files a motion questioning your authority to BWOMP-YA a motion. What do you do?"

"I BWOMP-YA THAT MOTION TOO, OF COURSE! AND PROMPTLY!"

"Excellent! And suppose somebody files a motion questioning your authority to BWOMP-YA the motion questioning your authority to BWOMP-YA the original motion?"

"I BWOMP-YA THAT ONE TOO!"

"And the next?"

"BWOMP-YA!"

"And the next?"

"BWOMP-YA!"

"And the next?"

"BWOMP-YA!"

The slime-production monitor began registering extraordinary activity.

Dr. Gaston turned toward his colleagues.

"GENTLEMEN! WE HAVE DISCOVERED THE PRINCIPLE OF RECURSIVE NEUROSECRETORY GRATIFICATION!"

Chapter IV. The Infinite Gratification Experiment

The Institute immediately organized a controlled clinical trial.

Professor Slimesworth constructed a special apparatus consisting of an electronic motion feeder, a neurological monitor, and a calibrated slime reservoir.

The first document appeared.

MOTION NO. 1: CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY TO BWOMP-YA

"BWOMP-YA!"

The monitor registered a powerful GINGR™.

The reservoir began filling.

A second document appeared.

MOTION NO. 2: CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY TO BWOMP-YA MOTION NO. 1

"BWOMP-YA!"

An even stronger GINGR™.

The slime level rose.

A third document appeared.

MOTION NO. 3: CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY TO BWOMP-YA MOTION NO. 2

"BWOMP-YA!"

The neurological monitor flashed:

MAXIMUM GRATIFICATION ACHIEVED.

But the experiment continued.

Motion No. 4.

"BWOMP-YA!"

Motion No. 5.

"BWOMP-YA!"

Motion No. 6.

"BWOMP-YA!"

Motion No. 7.

"BWOMP-YA!"

By noon, Sir Marcus had experienced 247 consecutive GINGRs™ without displaying a single measurable cognitive response.

The slime reservoir overflowed.

The laboratory floor disappeared beneath a glistening green lake.

Two research assistants floated into the corridor.

Professor Slimesworth examined the recordings.

"Gaston! This is extraordinary! The more seriously the patient's authority is questioned, the greater his neurosecretory gratification!"

Dr. Gaston was overcome with emotion.

"Of course! The objection is not an obstacle to treatment. It is the therapeutic stimulus itself!"

He turned toward the assembled researchers.

"Do you understand what this means? A single motion questioning judicial authority can generate an unlimited succession of pleasurable GINGRs™!"

The audience applauded.

Sir Marcus responded with another magnificent BWOMP-YA.

Chapter V. The Dangerous Temptation of Cognition

Unfortunately, not everyone at the Institute appreciated the miracle.

A young researcher named Percival Snail entered the laboratory carrying a volume of New York statutes.

"Dr. Gaston, may I ask a question?"

"Certainly, Percival, provided it does not disturb the patient's neurosecretory equilibrium."

"Does Sir Marcus actually possess the authority he claims?"

Dr. Gaston frowned.

"What an extraordinary question."

"Well, if he lacks subject matter jurisdiction, his declaration that he possesses it cannot create it."

"Percival, please!"

"And if Judiciary Law § 14 disqualifies him from participating in a proceeding, his decision to participate cannot repeal the statute."

"Percival, you are upsetting the patient!"

"And if a motion challenges the legal validity of his previous orders, disposing of that motion does not establish that the previous orders were valid."

The neurological monitor began flashing.

WARNING: COGNITIVE CONTAMINATION DETECTED.

Sir Marcus trembled.

"DOCTOR..."

"Yes, Marcus?"

"WHAT IF..."

"NO, MARCUS! NEVER ASK WHAT IF!"

"What if I don't actually..."

"THINK OF LETTUCE!"

"...have authority?"

A terrible silence descended upon the laboratory.

The slime-production monitor registered a catastrophic decline.

Professor Slimesworth fainted.

Dr. Gaston recognized the emergency immediately.

His patient was experiencing a dangerous relapse into juridical cognition.

Chapter VI. The Miraculous Restoration

"QUICK!" shouted Dr. Gaston. "BRING THE THERAPEUTIC MOTION FEEDER!"

The assistants wheeled in the apparatus.

Dr. Gaston seized a blank motion form.

"Marcus! Look at me!"

Marcus stared weakly.

"Somebody has filed a motion."

A faint glimmer appeared in the patient's eyestalks.

"Yes..."

"The motion questions your authority."

Marcus stirred.

"To do what?"

"To BWOMP-YA motions."

His slime glands began twitching.

"And, Marcus, the motion also questions your authority to decide whether you possess authority to BWOMP-YA motions."

"DOCTOR..."

"Yes, Marcus?"

"CAN I..."

"YES, MARCUS! YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO!"

"CAN I BWOMP-YA IT?"

"OF COURSE!"

"AND IF THEY QUESTION MY AUTHORITY TO BWOMP-YA IT?"

"WHAT DO YOU DO, MARCUS?"

"I BWOMP-YA THAT MOTION TOO!"

"AND HOW QUICKLY?"

"PROMPTLY!"

A tremendous GINGR™ swept through the patient's nervous system.

BWOMP-YA!

A magnificent torrent of slime erupted.

The reservoir burst.

The laboratory flooded.

Three assistants were swept into the courtyard.

Professor Slimesworth's spectacles floated past the observation window.

Dr. Gaston stood triumphantly in the rising green waters.

"HE'S CURED! HE'S CURED!"

Chapter VII. The Ultimate Scientific Breakthrough

The Institute convened an extraordinary scientific conference.

Dr. Gaston presented his findings.

"Gentlemen, we have established that the healthiest judicial mollusk is one who experiences no cognitive interference between a jurisdictional stimulus and the resulting BWOMP-YA."

He displayed the patient's neurological pathway:

JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTION

↓

COMPLETE COGNITIVE BYPASS

↓

GINGR™

↓

BWOMP-YA!

↓

MAXIMUM SLIME PRODUCTION

The audience applauded.

A visiting professor raised a tentacle.

"But Doctor, how does the patient determine whether he possesses the authority to BWOMP-YA the motion?"

Dr. Gaston smiled.

"My dear colleague, that is precisely the cognitive pathology we have successfully eliminated."

"But surely the patient must distinguish between having authority and exercising it?"

"Why?"

"Because the exercise of authority does not establish its existence."

Dr. Gaston sighed.

"Professor, you are thinking like a vertebrate."

The audience murmured disapprovingly.

"Here at the Institute, we do not burden our patients with such unnecessary distinctions. We are concerned with molluscan mental health, not the preservation of obsolete cognitive habits."

"But what happens when the motion specifically questions the patient's authority to dispose of that very motion?"

Dr. Gaston's face lit up.

"Ah! Now you have reached the most exciting aspect of our discovery!"

He approached the blackboard.

"A motion questioning authority produces one GINGR™. A motion questioning authority to dispose of that motion produces another. A motion questioning authority to dispose of the second motion produces yet another."

He drew a magnificent spiral.

"Each challenge generates a new opportunity for therapeutic gratification!"

"But where does the authority originate?"

Dr. Gaston looked astonished.

"Authority? My dear Professor, you have entirely misunderstood the experiment. We are not manufacturing authority."

He gestured toward the enormous reservoir of judicial slime.

"WE ARE MANUFACTURING HAPPINESS!"

The auditorium erupted in applause.

Epilogue. A Perfectly Healthy Judicial Mollusk

Years later, visitors to the Institute could still observe Sir Marcus Josephus McBridus Snailius, Custos Slimi, enjoying the fruits of Dr. Gaston's miraculous therapy.

He sat upon a magnificent velvet cushion.

Before him stood an electronic motion feeder.

Beside him, an enormous slime reservoir.

A document appeared.

"Your Honor, this motion challenges your subject matter jurisdiction—"

"BWOMP-YA!"

A glorious GINGR™.

Another document.

"Your Honor, this motion questions your authority to dispose of the previous motion—"

"BWOMP-YA!"

Another magnificent GINGR™.

A third document.

"Your Honor, this motion challenges your authority to decide whether you have authority—"

"BWOMP-YA!"

The slime flowed freely.

Dr. Gaston watched affectionately through the observation window.

"Magnificent," he whispered.

Professor Slimesworth nodded.

"Not a single independent thought in seven consecutive months."

"And the slime?"

"Record production, Doctor."

At that moment, a young medical student approached.

"Dr. Gaston, may I ask something?"

"Certainly."

"If Sir Marcus has been completely cured of the capacity to consider whether he possesses authority, how can he determine whether he has authority to BWOMP-YA a motion questioning his authority?"

Dr. Gaston smiled indulgently.

"My dear young man, you have misunderstood the entire purpose of the treatment."

"How so?"

"He doesn't determine it."

The student looked confused.

"Then what does he do?"

From the therapeutic chamber came a tremendous roar.

BWOMP-YA!

A fresh torrent of slime cascaded into the reservoir.

Dr. Gaston spread his arms triumphantly.

"THERE! YOU SEE? THAT IS WHAT PERFECT MOLLUSCAN MENTAL HEALTH LOOKS LIKE!"

And Sir Marcus continued happily BWOMP-YA'ing motions questioning his authority to BWOMP-YA motions, enjoying an endless succession of glorious GINGRs™, without ever experiencing the slightest cognitive inconvenience.

A psychiatric molluscan intern timidly raised a tentacle.

"Dr. Gaston, doesn't Sir Marcus eventually get bored of BWOMP-YA'ing?"

Dr. Gaston stared at the intern in astonishment.

"Bored? My dear young colleague, boredom requires cognition! And cognition is precisely the pathological condition from which we have so successfully cured him!"

"But surely repetition—"

"Repetition? Every BWOMP-YA produces a fresh Gastonian Instantaneous Neurosecretory Gratification Response! Every new motion is a new opportunity for happiness!"

"And if the motions are identical?"

"Even better! No danger of an unfamiliar stimulus provoking thought!"

Dr. Gaston pointed proudly toward the observation chamber.

"Observe! Seven hundred consecutive BWOMP-YAs. Not a trace of boredom. Not a flicker of cognition. And the slime production is still increasing!"

The intern looked impressed.

"So the patient is permanently happy?"

"Provided the motions keep coming."

From the observation chamber came a delighted cry.

"BWOMP-YA!"

Dr. Gaston sighed with professional satisfaction.

"Fortunately, his litigants are extraordinarily devoted to his continued mental health."

THE END — UNTIL THE NEXT MOTION.

The Institute of Molluscan Behavioral Therapy reminds readers that knee-jerk reactions are anatomically inapplicable to judicial gastropods. All therapeutic BWOMP-YA responses described herein are scientifically classified as Gastonian Instantaneous Neurosecretory Gratification Responses™ and should be celebrated as manifestations of optimal molluscan mental health.