If law professors represented by top notch lawyers cannot get a fair shake in the courtroom, what chances does an average person have?
That is the issue with Amy Wax's employment discrimination case currently navigating its way through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.
In that case, Professor Wax is represented by John Eastman whose identity as a former Trump attorney who was "Guilianied" by the California State Bar - remember, occupational licensing may not be political, but it is in both "democractic" states - but was apparently under-Giulianied and can still practice law in the 3rd Circuit - is the subject of more lively discussion of the legal profession than legal issues raised by Professor Wax's lawsuit - academic freedom in teaching law, a matter of public concern.
When Amy Wax, a tenured professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, brought an employment discrimination lawsuit against her employer, she probably did not anticipate that one of her principal difficulties would be persuading federal judges to address the lawsuit she actually filed. Especially that she TEACHES civil procedure in law school. In an Ivy League law school. So she is herself a top notch law professor.
Wax asserted racial discrimination under Title VI, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, identified university employees who had received different treatment for their public statements, and challenged disciplinary proceedings that resulted in substantial financial and professional sanctions against her - but not against them.
She also asserted that Penn had violated the academic-freedom guarantees incorporated directly into her employment contract.
By the time her case reached the Third Circuit on November 17, 2026, however, the discussion had acquired a distinctly different character.
Appellate federal Judge Thomas M. Hardiman reportedly suggested that Wax's attorney, John Eastman, was trying to “shoehorn” a free-speech case into an employment discrimination lawsuit.
The following day, the ABA Journal published a headline announcing that the Third Circuit had determined the case was about free speech rather than employment discrimination. At that time, and up to now, the appellate court had issued no such decision. It had merely heard oral argument.
The remarkable feature of this progression is that the legal theory attributed to Wax by the judges and the press had nothing to do with the theory she had actually pleaded.
A plaintiff can challenge discriminatory enforcement of an employment policy without asserting that every statement implicated by that policy enjoys independent constitutional protection.
A private university can violate a contractual promise to respect academic freedom without becoming a state actor.
And a lawyer representing such a plaintiff can invoke federal antidiscrimination statutes without converting the litigation into a First Amendment action.
These distinctions are elementary, particularly for institutions whose business is teaching, practicing, and interpreting law.
The underlying dispute began with Penn's decision to discipline Wax for statements concerning race, affirmative action, academic performance, and other subjects she discussed both inside and outside the classroom.
Law Dean Theodore Ruger's March 2, 2022 charging document also cited her invitation of Jared Taylor, founder of "American Renaissance", to speak in a course on conservative legal thought. The invitation became part of the university's disciplinary case against her.
There is something peculiar about a law school treating the invitation of a writer to speak to law students as evidence of professional misconduct of the law professor who invited the speaker. The purpose of legal education includes examining arguments, identifying their factual premises, testing their reasoning, and learning to respond to propositions with which one disagrees. In a civilized, thoughtful, law-based manner. Inviting a speaker to present his views supplies students with an opportunity to question those views. It does not transform the professor into the speaker's advocate.
More importantly, Penn had adopted written rules addressing precisely this situation.
Its Guidelines on Open Expression protect the presentation and examination of alternative theories, the expression of competing views, and criticism of prevailing practices. Section I.D expressly provides that when those principles conflict with another university policy, the Guidelines take precedence. The university's interpretive guidelines also protect members of its community against official reprisals for hosting speakers whose views prompt objections (ECF No. 26-4 at 2, 5).
These were not promises invented by Professor Wax's lawyers for litigation. Penn's own counsel, Michael L. Banks, authenticated and submitted the Faculty Handbook and Guidelines on Open Expression as exhibits supporting the university's March 12, 2025 motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 26-2, 26-3, 26-4). Thus, the contractual protections Wax invoked were before the federal court in the university's own submissions.
The disciplinary record presented another substantial problem. Penn had commissioned former Northwestern Law Dean Daniel Rodriguez to investigate Professor Wax's treatment of students.
According to Professor Wax's verified amended complaint, Rodriguez found no evidence that she graded minority students differently, denied them professional opportunities, or singled them out for special ridicule or disparagement.
Professor Wax further maintained that the university withheld the report from her and her lawyers (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 42–43). Nevertheless, the disciplinary proceedings continued, culminating in a one-year suspension at half pay, loss of her named professorship, loss of summer compensation, and a public reprimand.
Penn's Faculty Handbook required clear and convincing evidence to support a major disciplinary sanction.
It also classified knowingly false or recklessly unsupported disciplinary charges as major infractions in their own right (ECF No. 26-3 at 55–56).
The significance of those provisions, the Rodriguez investigation, and the procedures followed by the Hearing Board was central to Professor Wax's contractual claims. Indeed, Jules van Binsbergen, dissenting from the university's internal academic-freedom review, criticized the proceedings as a Kafkaesque process designed to punish speech through accusations of professional misconduct (ECF No. 22-1, Exhibit 12).
Professor Wax's federal discrimination theIory raised a related but distinct sticky question:
why did Penn discipline her while declining to impose comparable sanctions on other employees whose public statements concerned racial or ethnic groups?
Professor Wax's amended complaint identified seven university employees and described the statements attributed to them.
One example was Dwayne Booth, whose cartoon depicted Jewish figures as Nazis drinking the blood of Palestinians. Professor Wax expressly identified that imagery as a modern recasting of the medieval blood libel—the accusation that Jews murdered Christian children to obtain their blood, a fabrication used for centuries to incite persecution and violence against Jewish communities (ECF No. 22, ¶ 100).
That cartoon was intensely and deliberately insulting to a person of Jewish identity.
That historical connection was central to Professor Wax's comparator evidence. The complaint did not simply attach the label “antisemitic” to Booth's cartoon. It identified the imagery and explained its relationship to a specific historical form of antisemitic propaganda.
Other comparators included Ahmad Almallah, who reportedly chanted, “There is only one solution: intifada revolution,” and Julia Alekseyeva, a Penn professor who posted a video celebrating the fact that the person accused of murdering UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson was a Penn alumnus. Alekseyeva called him “the icon we all need and deserve” and declared that she had never been prouder to be a professor at the University of Pennsylvania (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 17–21).
Professor Wax's complaint asserted that Penn had not imposed comparable disciplinary sanctions on these employees. Her theory was selective disciplinary enforcement: Penn punished her for speech concerning Black Americans while tolerating statements by other employees concerning Jewish people, Israel, and political violence.
She identified herself as white and Jewish, and her January 31, 2025 EEOC charge expressly accused Penn of racially discriminatory and antisemitic enforcement of its speech policies (ECF No. 26-5 at 3).
The question for the federal court was whether those pleaded facts supported a plausible inference of discrimination against Professor Wax because of her protected characteristics. That inquiry necessarily involved examining Penn's treatment of other employees, the standards applicable to them, and the reasons for the different disciplinary outcomes.
On August 27, 2025, District Judge Timothy Savage dismissed the federal discrimination claims with prejudice. Although he recognized that university employees outside the law school could serve as comparators because Penn's disciplinary policies operated university-wide, he concluded that the identified employees were insufficiently similar to Professor Wax. He distinguished their statements by subject matter, severity, frequency, and audience.
In discussing the comparators, Judge Savage wrote:
“The remarks of her purported comparators were not antisemitic; they were critical of Israel's treatment of Palestinians.” (ECF No. 55 at 11.), emphasis added.
That pronouncement deserves particular attention. Professor Wax had pleaded that Booth's cartoon depicted Jewish figures drinking Palestinian blood, invoking the medieval blood libel. Judge Savage replaced that historical characterization and perception of the cartoon by a person of Jewish identity - identity to which the cartoon was deliberately addressed - with his own determination that the comparators' remarks were political criticism rather than antisemitism.
That was a judgment call that only a fact-finder - a jury - may make.
The historical blood libel did not cease to be relevant because the cartoon employed its imagery in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nor did Judge Savage's characterization account for Alekseyeva's celebration of a man accused of murdering an American insurance executive, which had nothing to do with Israel's treatment of Palestinians.
The court was deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), assessing legal sufficiency of a pleading before discovery, not conducting a trial instead of a jury, in violation of the 7th Amendment.
Under Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009), well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff must be accepted at the pleading stage.
Judge Savage recited that standard in his own opinion (ECF No. 55 at 5), then proceeded to adopt unfavorable factual characterizations of Professor Wax's comparator evidence.
The distinction between testing whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim and resolving disputed factual inferences is fundamental. Determining what Booth's imagery meant, whether the statements of the identified employees were comparable, and whether Penn's different disciplinary treatment reflected discriminatory enforcement were factual questions central to Professor Wax's case.
Judge Savage's decision to resolve those questions against her before discovery directly implicates the Seventh Amendment.
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in suits at common law. That protection extends to statutory discrimination claims seeking legal damages. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974); Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550–52 (1990).
A judge may dismiss a legally insufficient complaint. He may not convert a pleading motion into a substitute for jury adjudication by resolving disputed facts and competing factual inferences against the plaintiff.
In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002), the Supreme Court rejected requiring an employment discrimination plaintiff to plead a complete prima facie evidentiary case merely to survive dismissal.
Professor Wax identified her protected characteristics, the adverse employment sanctions imposed on her, seven comparators, and the differential treatment she attributed to Penn. Judge Savage engaged in imperissible fact-finding, assessed the comparators' statements, determined their relative seriousness, rejected the inference of discriminatory enforcement, and treated the absence of additional pleaded incidents as a reason to find them insufficiently similar.
He did all of this before discovery had even begun.
He did that, as an ultimate insult, to an Ivy League law professor who taught civil procedure.
He HIMSELF acted as a raging anti-semite in reducing the OPENLY antisemitic cartoon to "political speech" - that was a deliberate slap in the face of an already insulted and subjected to antisemitic discrimination 73-year-old prominent law professor.
Professor Wax had no opportunity to obtain Penn's internal disciplinary records, examine the treatment of the identified employees, question the university's decisionmakers, or develop evidence concerning the reasons for the differences in disciplinary treatment.
Judge Savage (an appropriate last name - he DID act as a complete savage in this case) usurped Professor Wax's Seventh Amendment right to jury factfinding by resolving contested factual inferences against her at the pleading stage, before she could obtain the evidence through discovery.
And then he dismissed her federal discrimination claims with prejudice, declaring:
“There is nothing Wax can add that would make her discrimination claims plausible.” (ECF No. 55 at 14–15.)
He could just as well use "Professor Wax", for once. Or Plaintiff. Professor Wax was not dirt under his feet as he openly and disdainfully tried to show.
That conclusion is extraordinary when the dismissal itself identified factual matters on which additional evidence could bear directly: the comparators' conduct, the frequency of their statements, their employment circumstances, and the university's disciplinary treatment of them.
The Third Circuit held in Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), that curative amendment must be permitted unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Futility concerns whether an amended pleading could state a legally sufficient claim, not a judge's prediction that the plaintiff cannot ultimately prevail.
Judge Savage's declaration that nothing Professor Wax could add would make her claims plausible converted his assessment of the pleaded comparator evidence into a final district-court disposition of her federal discrimination claims, without discovery and without a jury.
The consequences extended beyond those claims.
Professor Wax's contractual claims arose from the same disciplinary proceedings and concerned Penn's obligations under its Faculty Handbook, tenure provisions, and Guidelines on Open Expression. Her complaint invoked supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and alternatively asserted federal-question jurisdiction over the contract claim because Penn had incorporated constitutional principles into its contractual obligations (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 32–33).
After dismissing the federal discrimination claims with prejudice, Judge Savage declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction. The disappearance of federal claims does not automatically extinguish supplemental jurisdiction, but Savage chose not to exercise it.
Professor Wax's alternative assertion of original jurisdiction over the contract claim rested on the incorporation of constitutional protections into Penn's contractual commitments. Those commitments included freedom of expression and principles of equal treatment. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause directly constrains state action, but Penn's private status did not prevent it from voluntarily undertaking contractual obligations modeled on constitutional protections.
The contract claim nevertheless also pleaded independent breaches of Penn's disciplinary procedures that could be adjudicated without resolving a federal constitutional question. Which Judge Savage did not reach.
The federal discrimination claims, however, unquestionably supplied original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. And only their improper dismissal with prejudice by the anti-semitic judge with a political agenda supplied the basis for Judge Savage's refusal to adjudicate the remaining contractual dispute.
That sequence makes the validity of the federal dismissal decisive. Judge Savage resolved contested comparator inferences before discovery, dismissed the federal discrimination claims with prejudice, and then relied on their dismissal to decline adjudication of the contractual claims arising from the same disciplinary proceedings.
Against this background, appellate Judge Hardiman's reported remark during the November 17, 2026 Third Circuit oral argument is particularly revealing, and continuing the antisemitic stance of Judge Savage toward Professor Wax.
Judge Hardiman reportedly told attorney John Eastman:
“You're trying to shoehorn a free speech case into something else. We are dealing with a private university.”
Shoehorn.
Utterly disrespectful and utterly unworthy of the federal appellate judicial office.
Professor Wax did not need to convert a free-speech claim into a discrimination claim. She pleaded federal discrimination claims based on asserted selective disciplinary enforcement, alongside contractual claims concerning academic freedom and disciplinary procedures.
Penn's private status did not exempt it from federal antidiscrimination laws or from contractual obligations it voluntarily undertook.
Nor did Judge Hardiman's observation answer the pertinent questions on appeal - whether Judge Savage had improperly resolved disputed comparator evidence against Professor Wax, usurped the jury's factfinding function, dismissed the federal claims before discovery, or denied amendment contrary to Third Circuit precedent.
The question before the appellate court was whether the district court properly dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6), including whether it drew impermissible factual inferences against Wax and properly denied leave to amend.
Calling the lawsuit a free-speech case, contrary to its pleaded theory, does not resolve any of those questions.
The coverage of the appellate argument introduced another issue deserving particular attention and public concern: the political treatment of Professor Wax through the identity of her attorney and the identity of his former client.
The recent Bloomberg Law's social-media presentation placed John Eastman, rather than Amy Wax, at the center of the story. Its headline described Eastman as being “Grilled by Third Circuit." Its post identified him as a former Trump attorney and emphasized that the appellate panel appeared wary of his arguments. The accompanying photograph was of Eastman, not of Professor Wax.
Donald Trump was neither a party nor a witness in Professor Wax's employment discrimination lawsuit. His political positions had no bearing on the statutory elements of her claims, the comparator evidence, the Seventh Amendment, or supplemental jurisdiction.
Yet Bloomberg Law introduced Trump through Eastman's former representation of him.
Professor Wax was the plaintiff. Fighting in court against anti-semitic discrimination in an Ivy League law school. John Eastman was her attorney. Trump had been Eastman's client. The political identity of that former client had NOTHING to do with the case.
The discussion beneath the Bloomberg Law post, nevertheless, centered on the political associations of counsel rather than the substantive legal issues before the Third Circuit.
All that lawyer-commentators were concerned about is how could Eastman continue to practice in the 3rd Circuit after (political) disbarment in California.
Apparently, nobody was concerned about elementary procedural violations by the district court in the actual Professor Wax's case.
Yet, the token American Bar Association's Model Rule 1.2(b) expressly provides that a lawyer's representation of a client does not constitute endorsement of the client's political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.
That principle is supposed to protect the independence of lawyers and the ability of clients to obtain representation without having their claims judged through their attorneys' previous professional associations.
The parallel with Penn's treatment of Professor Wax is striking.
Penn cited Professor Wax's invitation of Jared Taylor as part of its disciplinary case.
Bloomberg Law highlighted Eastman's former representation of Trump when reporting his advocacy for Professor Wax.
In both situations, derogatory treatment of professional activity was framed through association with another person. By prominent entities serving the legal profession.
A client is not her lawyer. A lawyer is not his former client. And Professor Wax's employment discrimination lawsuit is not a referendum on Donald Trump.
Then came the ABA Journal, whose November 18 headline presented the appellate judges' oral-argument observations as though the Third Circuit had already decided the nature of Professor Wax's lawsuit. The article itself reported only suggestions made during oral argument. It also described Professor Wax as claiming she had been fired, although the sanctions imposed on her did not terminate her tenured employment. And, none of these prominent outlets - or the court - addressed Professor Wax by her status name - as a Professor. As an open show of disrespect.
The ABA Journal simply lied about Professor Wax's employment status, adding to her injury. I wonder if she will sue them for defamation. She should.
The difference between suspension and termination matters in employment law, just as the difference between questions from the bench and a judicial holding matters in appellate practice.
There is a broader institutional irony here. Penn Carey Law School trains lawyers to distinguish legal claims, identify governing rules, examine evidence, and advocate for clients.
Its disciplinary proceedings against Professor Wax placed the university's own academic-freedom commitments in question. The resulting federal litigation placed the judiciary's adherence to pleading standards and the Seventh Amendment in question. The treatment of attorney Eastman's representation placed the independence of counsel in question. And the reporting of the appellate argument placed the legal press's commitment to accuracy in question.
These are interconnected problems. Academic freedom protects the ability to examine ideas without institutional punishment for their content. The right to counsel protects a litigant's ability to obtain professional advocacy without having her claims discredited through her lawyer's associations. Antidiscrimination law protects employees against adverse treatment based on protected characteristics. The Seventh Amendment preserves the jury's factfinding function in actions carrying that right. Judicial independence requires judges to decide the claims presented under the law governing those claims and on the record in front of them.
None of these principles can be replaced by an assessment of whether the individuals involved are popular, agreeable, or professionally fashionable.
Professor Wax's case demonstrates why the independence of the legal profession cannot be separated from the rights of its clients.
If a lawyer's representation of one person becomes a reason to discount his advocacy for another, no client can be safe in such a scheme of things and no client can be guaranteed a fair adjudication.
That is a major access to justice problem.
If an Ivy League law school's law professor's invitation to a speaker becomes evidence of her professional wrongdoing, the quality of the high-costing education at that school becomes a big question.
If a judge's characterization of a complaint replaces examination of its pleaded claims, the professional competence of that judge becomes a big question.
And when a judge resolves disputed factual inferences against a plaintiff before discovery, dismisses her federal claims with prejudice, and thereby supplies the basis for declining jurisdiction over her remaining contractual claims, the professional competence of the judge - presiding over a case of an Ivy League law professor teaching civil procedure - becomes truly Kafkaesque.
Professor Wax filed an employment discrimination lawsuit, supported it with identified comparators, and retained counsel to prosecute it.
The district court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice, without discovery, and left her contractual claims undecided. At oral argument, the appellate discussion reportedly turned to whether counsel was attempting to force a free-speech dispute into an antidiscrimination framework. Before the Third Circuit ruled, a legal publication had already converted that discussion into a headline announcing the court's supposed conclusion.
The case deserves an appellate decision addressing the statutory claims Professor Wax actually pleaded, the comparator evidence she presented, the Seventh Amendment implications of Judge Savage's factual determinations, and the standards governing dismissal with prejudice.
It also deserves reporting that distinguishes the claims, the lawyers, and the judicial proceedings without conflating them.
An employment discrimination lawsuit does not disappear because a judge calls it a free-speech case. A lawyer's argument does not lose its legal force because of a former client. A jury's constitutional function may not be usurped by a judge's merely because he wants it. And an oral-argument remark does not become appellate precedent because the ABA Journal puts it in a headline.
That is rather a lot of elementary factual and law errors for one case for an Ivy League law school, a federal district and then federal appellate court, and the legal press and the regulator of the American legal profession to overlook.
Perhaps the shoehorn would be more useful for fitting the proceedings back into the law than for forcing Professor Wax's complaint out of it.