THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Sunday, November 22, 2026

FRASER BESS project: WRITE public comments to the Town of Hamden, NY Planning Board NOW - BEFORE the November 24, 2026 meeting, and demand adding your comments to the file of the project

I did just that - here.

Instead of "community meetings" which will give you absolutely nothing, you can do the same - EMAIL your comments, it creates a public electronic paper trail, and DEMAND that your comments be added to the file of the Fraser BESS project by the Town of Hamden Planning Board.

Do not listen to the various diffusers of the opposition to the Fraser BESS project - including pretense do-gooders.

It is time sensitive.

It must be documented.

It must have a paper trail.

It must be made by people with personal interest to oppose the Fraser BESS project - either by residents or property owners of the Town of Hamden, NY.

Do it.  Now.

The diffusers of the opposition won't save you when it is too late.


FRASER BESS project: a virtual public hearing, Town of Hamden?

I asked the Town of Hamden for such a hearing on November 4, 2026, in writing - no answer.

I asked again today.

The Town may not exclude from the hearing people with disabilities, without dependable transportation, in a poor rural mountain area without ANY public transportation to get them to and from such a meeting, and out of the area (including out of state) property owners, like me, including disabled out of the area property owners (like me and my husband).

There are, according to the Town's published tax rolls for 2026, over 50% of out of the area property owners in the Town of Hamden actually.

I will report as to the Town's answer to my second request, if any.

Stay tuned.

Saturday, November 21, 2026

The sermons of the Town of Hamden insider about the Fraser BESS project - do not protest, you are scaring "good people" away from the Planning Board. Eh?

There is something fascinating about the public discussion surrounding the proposed Fraser Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in the Town of Hamden, Delaware County, New York.

A project involving hundreds of industrial lithium-ion battery units, potential fire hazards, environmental consequences, and the future of surrounding residential properties has generated considerable public concern.

Yet, as I already wrote before, some local residents appear considerably more upset about my reporting on a possible Hamden insider than about the information that insider brought into the public discussion.

Enter Chrissy Reynolds.

The Insider Who Volunteered Information

Chrissy Reynolds entered the public discussion of the Fraser BESS project on social media with some interesting information.





First, she attacked me for even filing a federal lawsuit seeking an injunction against construction of the dangerous Fraser BESS project.

She tried to put me on the spot for bringing the lawsuit "too late" - after negotiations are supposedly under way for a year.  Well, not for a year, Chrissy, the option contract for the site parcel was purchased in 2021.  Behind the public's back.

And, it will not be Chrissy reimbursing me for the loss of my property if it burns down because of a Fraser BESS fire.

So - I did not ask Chrissy's permission to sue the developer.  

Chrissy also attempted to lecture me that the Town of Hamden is afraid THE DEVELOPER will sue the town if the Town of Hamden attempts to wiggle out of non-existing - or existing? - commitments.

No commitments were published on Town's website though.

In fact, the Town's website published only the waiver of conflict of interest by the Town/developer attorneys, and a link to developer's website - the developer now is the provider of whichever information about the project the developer would care to provide. Not the Town.

As to Chrissy, she demonstrated in her comments an interesting awareness of information normally unavailable without insider knowledge.

She discussed actual and pending resignations from the Hamden Planning Board that were not yet announced on the website of the Town, suggested that another parcel of land might be under contract, and stated that she had personally witnessed a Town Board member signing documents without reading them — "as he was told to do."

All of that is extremely interesting.

Chrissy Reynolds did not provide the particulars.

Meanwhile, I received information from a reader identifying Chrissy Reynolds as the wife of Greg Reynolds, Hamden's recent former Highway Superintendent, who held that position from September 1, 2023, through March 21, 2024.

The couple, according to public tax roll information, are also neighbors of Dennis Aikens, a current member of the Hamden Planning Board — the very municipal body involved in reviewing the Fraser BESS project.

Thus, Chrissy Reynolds's self-reported status as a person with inside knowledge of Hamden's municipal affairs is quite credible.

Her husband has direct ties to Hamden's municipal government through his former position. The couple are neighbors of a sitting Planning Board member. And Chrissy Reynolds herself claims to have personally witnessed a Town Board member signing documents without reading them, simply because he was told to do so.

That is a rather interesting combination of circumstances.

So, Chrissy Reynolds shared SOME of her insider knowledge of Hamden's municipal government.

Judging by how actively one particular reader started to attack me - and even follow me on social media with harassment - because I identified Chrissy Reynolds as the Town of Hamden insider who, among other such insiders, infiltrate social media groups with attempts to diffuse opposition to the Fraser BESS project, Chrissy is, indeed, a valuable insider.  Inadvertently revealing more than she - or some other people in the Town of Hamden government - would have wanted.

Mind - Chrissy Reynolds' clumsy attempts to deter people's attention from opposing the Fraser BESS project is matched with Nathaniel Batthany's appeals to the public to "put down pitchforks and torches" and write polite letters to the government instead - who sell out their livelihoods - and, possibly, their very lives, behind their backs.

It would be interesting to learn from Chrissy Reynolds: what ELSE did her little neighbor bird whisper to her or her husband and what else does she know about the Fraser BESS approval process? That the public doesn't?

And what is really going on with the Fraser BESS project?

Dancing on the grave of Aliza Oliver continues - Ira Fyfe is hiring nurses to Delco jail now

 

Nothing changes in Delaware County.

After the dancing on Aliza Oliver's grave as I described earlier, DelCo Sheriff's Department are doing ... some more of that dancing: they allowed the Head Nurse Ira Fyfe to keep her position and even to hire new nurses - I guess, to "pass the excellence" of Ira Fyfe knowledge and wisdom.

That got Aliza Oliver dead.  

Ira Fyfe did not lose her license either.

Everything apparently is hunky-dory.  Standards of medical care fully observed.

Supervisory position kept.

She is SUED FOR deliberate-indifference medical neglect death of Aliza Oliver.  Yes, I understand that a lawsuit is an allegation and not proof.

But - as with any death of an inmate, some investigation had to be in order.  Btw, I tried to get that information through FOIL, and every single agency that must handle these records stalled me.

Which tells me: something is FISHY here. 

What is fishy to me is that Ira Fyfe kept her medical license, her job and her supervisory position and is now allowed to select new nurses.

THE Ira Fyfe who, according to documents referenced in the federal lawsuit, "documented" without providing urgent medical care - how the 22-year-old woman, denied hydration and medical care, deteriorated, weakened, started to walk wobbly, started to vomit all over the floor of her cell without anybody cleaning it up, started eventually to cough up curdled blood, and eventually died on that floor of the cell while head nurse Ira Fyfe continued, until her death, to accuse her of pretending.

Once again - no medical care.

No infirmary.

No hospitalization.

No 911 call - until they needed to evacuate a dead body.





So, people, beware - whenever your loved one is detained or incarcerated in DELCO jail - DEMAND transfer.  Inmates are not medically safe in the care of Delco Sheriff.  Under supervision of THIS kind of nursing team.

DELHI, NEW YORK: TOO BUSY PUNISHING THE DISABLED TO MAKE VILLAGE HALL AND THE POST OFFICE ACCESSIBLE? MAYBE A FEDERAL LAWSUIT OR TWO WOULD CURE THE PROBLEM?

Thirty-six years after Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act, residents of Delhi, New York, are still discussing whether disabled people really need designated accessible parking.

A local resident of Delhi, NY recently asked on social media why there is no handicapped parking on the same side of the street as the Delhi post office.  A perfectly reasonable question.

One commenter wondered whether designated handicapped parking was necessary at all, since angled parking spaces are located directly in front of the building.

Seriously?

The entire purpose of designated accessible parking is that people without qualifying disabilities cannot legally occupy those spaces. An ordinary parking space, however conveniently located, can be occupied by anybody. A person without a disability can park there, leaving someone using a wheelchair, walker, cane, or other mobility aid to search for another space, possibly across the street.

And angled parking directly in front of a building is not necessarily accessible parking. Is there a curb ramp? Is there an accessible route to the entrance? Is there sufficient room to deploy a wheelchair lift? Can a person using a walker reach the building without negotiating curbs or traffic?

A parking space does not become accessible simply because it is close to the building. And a space available to everybody is not a space reserved for people with disabilities. That is precisely why designated accessible parking exists.


 IF YOU ARE SERIOUS ABOUT BEING DISABLED, GO TO A VILLAGE BOARD MEETING!

Another commenter offered this brilliant solution: "If you're serious you need to go to a village meeting and bring it up."

Of course! If you cannot conveniently access the post office because of your disability, the obvious solution is to attend a government meeting and complain.

There is just one little problem.  Have you ever tried to reach Delhi Village Hall with a mobility disability?

Village Hall is located on Court Street, which climbs at a very steep angle.  A person using a wheelchair, walker, or cane must first negotiate that incline just to approach the building.  And then comes a steep flight of stairs leading to the entrance.

The Village offices are on the first floor.  Wonderful.  Except that a wheelchair user cannot simply climb a steep street and then climb a flight of stairs to reach that first floor. Neither can many people who use walkers or have serious mobility limitations.

So the proposed solution to inaccessible parking at the post office is to send disabled residents uphill, along a steep street, to a government building whose entrance presents yet another physical barrier.

Cannot access the post office? Climb the hill, climb the stairs, and complain to the Village Board!

Welcome to Delhi, New York, thirty-six years after the ADA.

PUBLIC HEARINGS ARE FOR THE PUBLIC. INCLUDING THE DISABLED PUBLIC.

The problem with Village Hall is considerably more serious than an inconvenient entrance.  Village Board meetings and public hearings concern VALIDITY of municipal budgets, taxes, zoning, land use, public expenditures, and decisions directly affecting residents and property owners.

If people with mobility disabilities cannot physically reach or enter the building where those proceedings take place, they are excluded from participating in their own local government on equal terms with their nondisabled neighbors, and the validity of ALL of Village decisions requiring public hearing is thus in question.

New York Public Officers Law § 103(b) expressly requires public bodies to make reasonable efforts to ensure that meetings are held in facilities permitting barrier-free physical access.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, prohibits public entities from excluding qualified individuals with disabilities from their services, programs, and activities by reason of disability. Under 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1), public entities may not deny disabled individuals the opportunity to participate in public services or provide unequal opportunities to participate. And 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 requires public services, programs, and activities, viewed in their entirety, to be readily accessible to individuals with disabilities.

Public hearings are not meaningfully open to the public when disabled residents cannot get to the meeting room.

The Village should explain how a wheelchair user is supposed to negotiate the steep approach to Village Hall, enter the building, and participate in public hearings.  Where is the accessible route? Where is the accessible entrance? What arrangements are available to residents who cannot negotiate the hill and stairs?

And why should disabled taxpayers have to ask these questions thirty-six years after the enactment of the ADA?

THE ADA IS FEDERAL LAW, NOT A FAVOR FROM THE VILLAGE BOARD

The Americans with Disabilities Act was enacted in 1990. That was thirty-six years ago.

Federal accessibility standards regulate designated parking spaces, access aisles, accessible routes, signage, and other features necessary for people with mobility disabilities to use public facilities. The United States Postal Service is also subject to federal disability-access requirements, including Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

The specific obligations concerning the parking outside the Delhi post office depend on who controls those spaces and which accessibility standards apply. But the fundamental distinction is elementary: ordinary parking is available to everybody; designated accessible parking is reserved for people who qualify to use it.

That is the whole point. And it should not require a village board meeting to explain it, especially a meeting in a building that disabled residents may be unable to reach or enter.

TOO BUSY PUNISHING DISABLED TAXPAYERS TO ADDRESS ACCESSIBILITY?

Perhaps the Village of Delhi's attorneys have simply been too busy arranging for the punishment of a disabled property owner, taxpayer, and investigative journalist who brought litigation trying to return money to the municipal treasuries.

Apparently, there was time and public money for that.  But was there time to examine whether disabled residents can safely access the post office or whether they can even reach Village Hall to attend public hearings?

For details of how the Village of Delhi and Delaware County pursued punishment of a disabled property owner, taxpayer, and investigative journalist for trying to return money to the municipal treasuries, read here.

The contrast is breathtaking.  Public resources are available for lawyers, motions, hearings, and litigation against disabled property owners, including to punish them for their disabilities, while access to basic public facilities remains in question.  Nice priorities, Village of Delhi.

HOW MUCH DOES ACCESSIBILITY COST COMPARED WITH LITIGATION AGAINST DISABLED PEOPLE?

Consider the economics.  Designating and properly configuring accessible parking may require signs, pavement markings, an access aisle, a curb ramp, or other modifications depending on the location. Providing accessible entry to Village Hall, or arranging public meetings at an accessible location, also involves identifiable expenses.

Now consider the public resources consumed by litigation against disabled residents. Government attorneys must be paid.  Court appearances require preparation.  Motions require research and drafting. Public employees spend time administering and defending proceedings.  And when government conduct produces additional litigation, the expenses continue.

How much public money has been spent fighting a disabled taxpayer who was trying to return money to the municipal treasuries?  And how much would it cost to ensure that disabled residents can access the post office and participate in public hearings at Village Hall?

These are questions taxpayers should be asking.  Public money is not unlimited. Every dollar devoted to defending governmental misconduct is a dollar unavailable for public services. And accessibility is not an optional public service. It is a legal obligation.

MAYBE A FEDERAL LAWSUIT OR TWO WOULD CURE THE PROBLEM?

Perhaps the responsible public authorities need a federal disability discrimination lawsuit concerning access to the post office.  And perhaps another concerning access to Village Hall and public hearings.

After all, a public hearing held in a building that disabled residents cannot reach or enter raises questions extending far beyond the convenience of a few individuals. 

It concerns the right to participate in government, address elected representatives, object to proposed budgets, taxes, zoning changes, and public expenditures, and be heard before decisions affecting one's property and community are made.

It ultimately concerns validity of all decisions of the Village of Delhi made at public meeting excluding mobility-disabled residents and voters.

How is a wheelchair user supposed to participate in the government of a village where that person lives and pays taxes if the route to Village Hall is a steep uphill climb followed by a flight of stairs?

Perhaps litigation would finally persuade the responsible officials to take their heads out of the place where the sun does not shine.


We are not discussing a new or experimental legal requirement.  The ADA has been federal law for thirty-six years.  A person with a mobility disability should not have to compete with every other driver for the few parking spaces that may permit access to a public building.  A person who cannot cross the street safely should not have to do so merely because the spaces nearest the entrance have been occupied by people who do not need them.

And a person seeking accessible parking should not have to demonstrate seriousness by climbing a steep hill and a flight of stairs to attend a government meeting.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS ITS PRIORITIES BACKWARD

The purpose of federal disability-rights legislation is to ensure that people with disabilities can participate in public life without having to beg for accommodations. Yet here we are, thirty-six years after the ADA, debating whether designated accessible parking is necessary at a post office and whether disabled residents can physically reach and enter the building where their local government conducts public business.

It takes money to accommodate disabled people.  It also takes money to punish them.**

The difference is that the first is a legal obligation, while the second can generate years of litigation and additional public expense.

Perhaps it is time for Delhi and Delaware County taxpayers to ask why public resources are so readily available for fighting disabled property owners and taxpayers while access to basic public facilities remains an unresolved problem.

And perhaps the next time someone asks why there is no designated accessible parking outside the post office, the answer should come from the officials responsible for accessibility, not from a neighbor wondering whether disabled people really need it, not from someone instructing them to attend another meeting, and certainly not from a government whose attorneys have found the time and public resources to pursue punishment of a disabled taxpayer and journalist for trying to return money to the municipal treasuries, while accessibility at Village Hall and the post office remains in question.

Maybe a federal lawsuit or two would finally get their attention.

After all, if taxpayers are going to pay lawyers, perhaps those lawyers could spend some time ensuring compliance with federal disability law instead of fighting the disabled people whom that law was enacted to protect.


Politicizing law deprives clients of fair adjudication: the case of Amy Wax, a University of Pennsylvania law professor

If law professors represented by top notch lawyers cannot get a fair shake in the courtroom, what chances does an average person have?

That is the issue with Amy Wax's employment discrimination case currently navigating its way through the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.

In that case, Professor Wax is represented by John Eastman whose identity as a former Trump attorney who was "Guilianied" by the California State Bar - remember, occupational licensing may not be political, but it is in both "democractic" states - but was apparently under-Giulianied and can still practice law in the 3rd Circuit - is the subject of more lively discussion of the legal profession than legal issues raised by Professor Wax's lawsuit - academic freedom in teaching law, a matter of public concern.

When Amy Wax, a tenured professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, brought an employment discrimination lawsuit against her employer, she probably did not anticipate that one of her principal difficulties would be persuading federal judges to address the lawsuit she actually filed.  Especially that she TEACHES civil procedure in law school.  In an Ivy League law school.  So she is herself a top notch law professor.

Wax asserted racial discrimination under Title VI, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, identified university employees who had received different treatment for their public statements, and challenged disciplinary proceedings that resulted in substantial financial and professional sanctions against her - but not against them. 

She also asserted that Penn had violated the academic-freedom guarantees incorporated directly into her employment contract.

By the time her case reached the Third Circuit on November 17, 2026, however, the discussion had acquired a distinctly different character. 

Appellate federal Judge Thomas M. Hardiman reportedly suggested that Wax's attorney, John Eastman, was trying to “shoehorn” a free-speech case into an employment discrimination lawsuit. 

The following day, the ABA Journal published a headline announcing that the Third Circuit had determined the case was about free speech rather than employment discrimination.  At that time, and up to now, the appellate court had issued no such decision.  It had merely heard oral argument.

The remarkable feature of this progression is that the legal theory attributed to Wax by the judges and the press had nothing to do with the theory she had actually pleaded. 

A plaintiff can challenge discriminatory enforcement of an employment policy without asserting that every statement implicated by that policy enjoys independent constitutional protection. 

A private university can violate a contractual promise to respect academic freedom without becoming a state actor. 

And a lawyer representing such a plaintiff can invoke federal antidiscrimination statutes without converting the litigation into a First Amendment action. 

These distinctions are elementary, particularly for institutions whose business is teaching, practicing, and interpreting law.

The underlying dispute began with Penn's decision to discipline Wax for statements concerning race, affirmative action, academic performance, and other subjects she discussed both inside and outside the classroom. 

Law Dean Theodore Ruger's March 2, 2022 charging document also cited her invitation of Jared Taylor, founder of "American Renaissance", to speak in a course on conservative legal thought.  The invitation became part of the university's disciplinary case against her.  

There is something peculiar about a law school treating the invitation of a writer to speak to law students as evidence of professional misconduct of the law professor who invited the speaker.   The purpose of legal education includes examining arguments, identifying their factual premises, testing their reasoning, and learning to respond to propositions with which one disagrees.  In a civilized, thoughtful, law-based manner.  Inviting a speaker to present his views supplies students with an opportunity to question those views.  It does not transform the professor into the speaker's advocate.

More importantly, Penn had adopted written rules addressing precisely this situation. 

Its Guidelines on Open Expression protect the presentation and examination of alternative theories, the expression of competing views, and criticism of prevailing practices. Section I.D expressly provides that when those principles conflict with another university policy, the Guidelines take precedence.  The university's interpretive guidelines also protect members of its community against official reprisals for hosting speakers whose views prompt objections (ECF No. 26-4 at 2, 5).

These were not promises invented by Professor Wax's lawyers for litigation.  Penn's own counsel, Michael L. Banks, authenticated and submitted the Faculty Handbook and Guidelines on Open Expression as exhibits supporting the university's March 12, 2025 motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 26-2, 26-3, 26-4). Thus, the contractual protections Wax invoked were before the federal court in the university's own submissions.

The disciplinary record presented another substantial problem.  Penn had commissioned former Northwestern Law Dean Daniel Rodriguez to investigate Professor Wax's treatment of students.  

According to Professor Wax's verified amended complaint, Rodriguez found no evidence that she graded minority students differently, denied them professional opportunities, or singled them out for special ridicule or disparagement. 

Professor Wax further maintained that the university withheld the report from her and her lawyers (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 42–43). Nevertheless, the disciplinary proceedings continued, culminating in a one-year suspension at half pay, loss of her named professorship, loss of summer compensation, and a public reprimand.

Penn's Faculty Handbook required clear and convincing evidence to support a major disciplinary sanction. 

 It also classified knowingly false or recklessly unsupported disciplinary charges as major infractions in their own right (ECF No. 26-3 at 55–56). 

The significance of those provisions, the Rodriguez investigation, and the procedures followed by the Hearing Board was central to Professor Wax's contractual claims.  Indeed, Jules van Binsbergen, dissenting from the university's internal academic-freedom review, criticized the proceedings as a Kafkaesque process designed to punish speech through accusations of professional misconduct  (ECF No. 22-1, Exhibit 12).

Professor Wax's federal discrimination theIory raised a related but distinct sticky question: 

why did Penn discipline her while declining to impose comparable sanctions on other employees whose public statements concerned racial or ethnic groups?

Professor Wax's amended complaint identified seven university employees and described the statements attributed to them. 

One example was Dwayne Booth, whose cartoon depicted Jewish figures as Nazis drinking the blood of Palestinians.  Professor Wax expressly identified that imagery as a modern recasting of the medieval blood libel—the accusation that Jews murdered Christian children to obtain their blood, a fabrication used for centuries to incite persecution and violence against Jewish communities (ECF No. 22, ¶ 100).

That cartoon was intensely and deliberately insulting to a person of Jewish identity.

That historical connection was central to Professor Wax's comparator evidence.  The complaint did not simply attach the label “antisemitic” to Booth's cartoon.  It identified the imagery and explained its relationship to a specific historical form of antisemitic propaganda.

Other comparators included Ahmad Almallah, who reportedly chanted, “There is only one solution: intifada revolution,” and Julia Alekseyeva, a Penn professor who posted a video celebrating the fact that the person accused of murdering UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson was a Penn alumnus.  Alekseyeva called him “the icon we all need and deserve” and declared that she had never been prouder to be a professor at the University of Pennsylvania (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 17–21).

Professor Wax's complaint asserted that Penn had not imposed comparable disciplinary sanctions on these employees.  Her theory was selective disciplinary enforcement: Penn punished her for speech concerning Black Americans while tolerating statements by other employees concerning Jewish people, Israel, and political violence. 

She identified herself as white and Jewish, and her January 31, 2025 EEOC charge expressly accused Penn of racially discriminatory and antisemitic enforcement of its speech policies (ECF No. 26-5 at 3).

The question for the federal court was whether those pleaded facts supported a plausible inference of discrimination against Professor Wax because of her protected characteristics.  That inquiry necessarily involved examining Penn's treatment of other employees, the standards applicable to them, and the reasons for the different disciplinary outcomes.

On August 27, 2025, District Judge Timothy Savage dismissed the federal discrimination claims with prejudice. Although he recognized that university employees outside the law school could serve as comparators because Penn's disciplinary policies operated university-wide, he concluded that the identified employees were insufficiently similar to Professor Wax.  He distinguished their statements by subject matter, severity, frequency, and audience.

In discussing the comparators, Judge Savage wrote:

“The remarks of her purported comparators were not antisemitic; they were critical of Israel's treatment of Palestinians.” (ECF No. 55 at 11.), emphasis added.

That pronouncement deserves particular attention.  Professor Wax had pleaded that Booth's cartoon depicted Jewish figures drinking Palestinian blood, invoking the medieval blood libel.   Judge Savage replaced that historical characterization and perception of the cartoon by a person of Jewish identity - identity to which the cartoon was deliberately addressed - with his own determination that the comparators' remarks were political criticism rather than antisemitism.

That was a judgment call that only a fact-finder - a jury - may make.

The historical blood libel did not cease to be relevant because the cartoon employed its imagery in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Nor did Judge Savage's characterization account for Alekseyeva's celebration of a man accused of murdering an American insurance executive, which had nothing to do with Israel's treatment of Palestinians.

The court was deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), assessing legal sufficiency of a pleading before discovery, not conducting a trial instead of a jury, in violation of the 7th Amendment.

Under Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009), well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences favorable to the plaintiff must be accepted at the pleading stage.

Judge Savage recited that standard in his own opinion (ECF No. 55 at 5), then proceeded to adopt unfavorable factual characterizations of Professor Wax's comparator evidence.

The distinction between testing whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim and resolving disputed factual inferences is fundamental.  Determining what Booth's imagery meant, whether the statements of the identified employees were comparable, and whether Penn's different disciplinary treatment reflected discriminatory enforcement were factual questions central to Professor Wax's case.

Judge Savage's decision to resolve those questions against her before discovery directly implicates the Seventh Amendment.

The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in suits at common law. That protection extends to statutory discrimination claims seeking legal damages. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1974); Lytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550–52 (1990).

A judge may dismiss a legally insufficient complaint.  He may not convert a pleading motion into a substitute for jury adjudication by resolving disputed facts and competing factual inferences against the plaintiff.

In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002), the Supreme Court rejected requiring an employment discrimination plaintiff to plead a complete prima facie evidentiary case merely to survive dismissal.

Professor Wax identified her protected characteristics, the adverse employment sanctions imposed on her, seven comparators, and the differential treatment she attributed to Penn.  Judge Savage engaged in imperissible fact-finding, assessed the comparators' statements, determined their relative seriousness, rejected the inference of discriminatory enforcement, and treated the absence of additional pleaded incidents as a reason to find them insufficiently similar.

He did all of this before discovery had even begun.

He did that, as an ultimate insult, to an Ivy League law professor who taught civil procedure.

He HIMSELF acted as a raging anti-semite in reducing the OPENLY antisemitic cartoon to "political speech" - that was a deliberate slap in the face of an already insulted and subjected to antisemitic discrimination 73-year-old prominent law professor.

Professor Wax had no opportunity to obtain Penn's internal disciplinary records, examine the treatment of the identified employees, question the university's decisionmakers, or develop evidence concerning the reasons for the differences in disciplinary treatment.

Judge Savage (an appropriate last name - he DID act as a complete savage in this case) usurped Professor Wax's Seventh Amendment right to jury factfinding by resolving contested factual inferences against her at the pleading stage, before she could obtain the evidence through discovery.

And then he dismissed her federal discrimination claims with prejudice, declaring:

“There is nothing Wax can add that would make her discrimination claims plausible.” (ECF No. 55 at 14–15.)

He could just as well use "Professor Wax", for once.  Or Plaintiff.  Professor Wax was not dirt under his feet as he openly and disdainfully tried to show.

That conclusion is extraordinary when the dismissal itself identified factual matters on which additional evidence could bear directly: the comparators' conduct, the frequency of their statements, their employment circumstances, and the university's disciplinary treatment of them.

The Third Circuit held in Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), that curative amendment must be permitted unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Futility concerns whether an amended pleading could state a legally sufficient claim, not a judge's prediction that the plaintiff cannot ultimately prevail.

Judge Savage's declaration that nothing Professor Wax could add would make her claims plausible converted his assessment of the pleaded comparator evidence into a final district-court disposition of her federal discrimination claims, without discovery and without a jury.

The consequences extended beyond those claims.

Professor Wax's contractual claims arose from the same disciplinary proceedings and concerned Penn's obligations under its Faculty Handbook, tenure provisions, and Guidelines on Open Expression.  Her complaint invoked supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and alternatively asserted federal-question jurisdiction over the contract claim because Penn had incorporated constitutional principles into its contractual obligations (ECF No. 22, ¶¶ 32–33).

After dismissing the federal discrimination claims with prejudice, Judge Savage declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

Section 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to decline supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing all claims within its original jurisdiction. The disappearance of federal claims does not automatically extinguish supplemental jurisdiction, but Savage chose not to exercise it.

Professor Wax's alternative assertion of original jurisdiction over the contract claim rested on the incorporation of constitutional protections into Penn's contractual commitments.  Those commitments included freedom of expression and principles of equal treatment.  The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause directly constrains state action, but Penn's private status did not prevent it from voluntarily undertaking contractual obligations modeled on constitutional protections.

The contract claim nevertheless also pleaded independent breaches of Penn's disciplinary procedures that could be adjudicated without resolving a federal constitutional question.  Which Judge Savage did not reach.

The federal discrimination claims, however, unquestionably supplied original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  And only their improper dismissal with prejudice by the anti-semitic judge with a political agenda supplied the basis for Judge Savage's refusal to adjudicate the remaining contractual dispute.

That sequence makes the validity of the federal dismissal decisive.  Judge Savage resolved contested comparator inferences before discovery, dismissed the federal discrimination claims with prejudice, and then relied on their dismissal to decline adjudication of the contractual claims arising from the same disciplinary proceedings.

Against this background, appellate Judge Hardiman's reported remark during the November 17, 2026 Third Circuit oral argument is particularly revealing, and continuing the antisemitic stance of Judge Savage toward Professor Wax.

Judge Hardiman reportedly told attorney John Eastman:

“You're trying to shoehorn a free speech case into something else. We are dealing with a private university.”

Shoehorn.

Utterly disrespectful and utterly unworthy of the federal appellate judicial office.

Professor Wax did not need to convert a free-speech claim into a discrimination claim. She pleaded federal discrimination claims based on asserted selective disciplinary enforcement, alongside contractual claims concerning academic freedom and disciplinary procedures.

Penn's private status did not exempt it from federal antidiscrimination laws or from contractual obligations it voluntarily undertook.

Nor did Judge Hardiman's observation answer the pertinent questions on appeal - whether Judge Savage had improperly resolved disputed comparator evidence against Professor Wax, usurped the jury's factfinding function, dismissed the federal claims before discovery, or denied amendment contrary to Third Circuit precedent.

The question before the appellate court was whether the district court properly dismissed the federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6), including whether it drew impermissible factual inferences against Wax and properly denied leave to amend.

Calling the lawsuit a free-speech case, contrary to its pleaded theory, does not resolve any of those questions.

The coverage of the appellate argument introduced another issue deserving particular attention and public concern: the political treatment of Professor Wax through the identity of her attorney and the identity of his former client.

The recent Bloomberg Law's social-media presentation placed John Eastman, rather than Amy Wax, at the center of the story.  Its headline described Eastman as being “Grilled by Third Circuit."  Its post identified him as a former Trump attorney and emphasized that the appellate panel appeared wary of his arguments.  The accompanying photograph was of Eastman, not of Professor Wax.

Donald Trump was neither a party nor a witness in Professor Wax's employment discrimination lawsuit.  His political positions had no bearing on the statutory elements of her claims, the comparator evidence, the Seventh Amendment, or supplemental jurisdiction.

Yet Bloomberg Law introduced Trump through Eastman's former representation of him.

Professor Wax was the plaintiff.  Fighting in court against anti-semitic discrimination in an Ivy League law school.  John Eastman was her attorney.  Trump had been Eastman's client.  The political identity of that former client had NOTHING to do with the case.  

The discussion beneath the Bloomberg Law post, nevertheless, centered on the political associations of counsel rather than the substantive legal issues before the Third Circuit.

All that lawyer-commentators were concerned about is how could Eastman continue to practice in the 3rd Circuit after (political) disbarment in California.

Apparently, nobody was concerned about elementary procedural violations by the district court in the actual Professor Wax's case.

Yet, the token American Bar Association's Model Rule 1.2(b) expressly provides that a lawyer's representation of a client does not constitute endorsement of the client's political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.

That principle is supposed to protect the independence of lawyers and the ability of clients to obtain representation without having their claims judged through their attorneys' previous professional associations.

The parallel with Penn's treatment of Professor Wax is striking. 

Penn cited Professor Wax's invitation of Jared Taylor as part of its disciplinary case.

Bloomberg Law highlighted Eastman's former representation of Trump when reporting his advocacy for Professor Wax.

In both situations, derogatory treatment of professional activity was framed through association with another person.  By prominent entities serving the legal profession.

A client is not her lawyer.  A lawyer is not his former client. And Professor Wax's employment discrimination lawsuit is not a referendum on Donald Trump.


Then came the ABA Journal, whose November 18 headline presented the appellate judges' oral-argument observations as though the Third Circuit had already decided the nature of Professor Wax's lawsuit.  The article itself reported only suggestions made during oral argument. It also described Professor Wax as claiming she had been fired, although the sanctions imposed on her did not terminate her tenured employment.  And, none of these prominent outlets - or the court - addressed Professor Wax by her status name - as a Professor.  As an open show of disrespect.

The ABA Journal simply lied about Professor Wax's employment status, adding to her injury.  I wonder if she will sue them for defamation.  She should.

The difference between suspension and termination matters in employment law, just as the difference between questions from the bench and a judicial holding matters in appellate practice.

There is a broader institutional irony here.  Penn Carey Law School trains lawyers to distinguish legal claims, identify governing rules, examine evidence, and advocate for clients. 

Its disciplinary proceedings against Professor Wax placed the university's own academic-freedom commitments in question.  The resulting federal litigation placed the judiciary's adherence to pleading standards and the Seventh Amendment in question.  The treatment of attorney Eastman's representation placed the independence of counsel in question.  And the reporting of the appellate argument placed the legal press's commitment to accuracy in question.

These are interconnected problems.  Academic freedom protects the ability to examine ideas without institutional punishment for their content.  The right to counsel protects a litigant's ability to obtain professional advocacy without having her claims discredited through her lawyer's associations.  Antidiscrimination law protects employees against adverse treatment based on protected characteristics.  The Seventh Amendment preserves the jury's factfinding function in actions carrying that right.  Judicial independence requires judges to decide the claims presented under the law governing those claims and on the record in front of them.

None of these principles can be replaced by an assessment of whether the individuals involved are popular, agreeable, or professionally fashionable.

Professor Wax's case demonstrates why the independence of the legal profession cannot be separated from the rights of its clients. 

If a lawyer's representation of one person becomes a reason to discount his advocacy for another, no client can be safe in such a scheme of things and no client can be guaranteed a fair adjudication.

That is a major access to justice problem. 

If an Ivy League law school's law professor's invitation to a speaker becomes evidence of her professional wrongdoing, the quality of the high-costing education at that school becomes a big question.

If a judge's characterization of a complaint replaces examination of its pleaded claims, the professional competence of that judge becomes a big question.

And when a judge resolves disputed factual inferences against a plaintiff before discovery, dismisses her federal claims with prejudice, and thereby supplies the basis for declining jurisdiction over her remaining contractual claims, the professional competence of the judge - presiding over a case of an Ivy League law professor teaching civil procedure - becomes truly Kafkaesque.

Professor Wax filed an employment discrimination lawsuit, supported it with identified comparators, and retained counsel to prosecute it. 

The district court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice, without discovery, and left her contractual claims undecided.  At oral argument, the appellate discussion reportedly turned to whether counsel was attempting to force a free-speech dispute into an antidiscrimination framework.  Before the Third Circuit ruled, a legal publication had already converted that discussion into a headline announcing the court's supposed conclusion.

The case deserves an appellate decision addressing the statutory claims Professor Wax actually pleaded, the comparator evidence she presented, the Seventh Amendment implications of Judge Savage's factual determinations, and the standards governing dismissal with prejudice.

It also deserves reporting that distinguishes the claims, the lawyers, and the judicial proceedings without conflating them.

An employment discrimination lawsuit does not disappear because a judge calls it a free-speech case.  A lawyer's argument does not lose its legal force because of a former client. A jury's constitutional function may not be usurped by a judge's merely because he wants it.  And an oral-argument remark does not become appellate precedent because the ABA Journal puts it in a headline.

That is rather a lot of elementary factual and law errors for one case for an Ivy League law school, a federal district and then federal appellate court, and the legal press and the regulator of the American legal profession to overlook.

Perhaps the shoehorn would be more useful for fitting the proceedings back into the law than for forcing Professor Wax's complaint out of it.


Taxpayer alert for Delco and Town of Hamden, NY: these municipalities have just had a court sanction a taxpayer (and her husband) for TRYING to have the municipal insurer return potentially hundreds of thousands of unlawfully paid out public moneys. So that you know before your next budget hearing

Delaware County is poor. The Town of Hamden is poor. Property taxes keep rising, while public services desperately need funding.

In October 2026, I filed a taxpayer lawsuit in Nassau County under General Municipal Law § 51, seeking to return potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars to Delaware County's and the Town of Hamden's coffers.

Before that lawsuit was even served, attorney Frank W. Miller, acting on behalf of the Town of Hamden, its Supervisor Wayne Marshfield, Delaware County, its Board of Supervisors Chairperson, County Attorney, and County Clerk as defendants, demanded that I be punished for filing it.

On November 9, 2026, Justice Christopher P. Baker obliged and inflicted the requested punishment.

All without notice or an opportunity to oppose.  

You know what the kicker was?  The much feared lawsuit survived and still proceeds - it was filed in another county and was out of reach for Miller or Baker.  Or Merklen.  Or Gransbury.  Or Marshfield.

And what was the purpose of the lawsuit for which we were so severely punished?  At the request of Tina Mole, Amy Merklen, Wayne Marshfield, Shawn Smith, Haley Gransbury and other local public officials?

Because I tried to have, through court, to return moneys - not to myself, not to my husbnad - to the treasuries of the local municipalities, to finance local public services and prevent the further raising of property taxes.

I understand, that behavior was very, very bad and sanctionable.

So - with the budget hearings a-coming the local taxpayers should ask their elected public officials - WHY did they NOT want me to have those potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars of wasted public funds RETURNED back to the TAXPAYERS, into the public treasuries?

Do you see one legitimate reason WHY the municipalities sought - and achieved - punishment against me as a taxpayer for my attempts to put moneys back into THEIR OWN - and YOUR POCKETS?   

I guess Delco and Town of Hamden have become very, very rich.  And you, my dear co-taxpayers, have become very, very rich.  And simply do not need those hundreds of thousands of dollars.  And your leaders rightfully consider it an insult that I even tried having those moneys returned.  TO THEM.  TO YOU.

Of course, I have another theory.   Discovery is a ... wonderful lady.  It can show something - the extent of public financing of private ventures - that the local municipalities do not want you to see.

Whether I will get to discovery - we will see.  The lawsuit has been filed.  And it proceeds.