WHO OWNS HAMDEN? NEW YORK CITY'S $8.88 MILLION FOOTPRINT IN A SMALL CATSKILL TOWN The 2026 Hamden Assessment Roll reveals 86 New York City property interests—including conservation easements—while local landowners continue to bear the consequences of watershed restrictions.

 For decades, property owners in Delaware County, New York, have lived with an extraordinary arrangement: their land is situated in the watershed that supplies drinking water to New York City, hundreds of miles away.

New York City benefits from the Catskill/Delaware water supply system, which operates without filtration under a conditional regulatory arrangement. The surrounding rural communities have accommodated land-use restrictions, conservation programs, and limitations on development intended to protect that water.

But how much property does New York City actually own or control in the Town of Hamden?

I examined the 2026 Final Assessment Roll for the Town of Hamden, a 304-page public document identifying the Town's taxable properties, their owners, assessed values, exemptions, and other information.

The findings deserve public attention.

$8,884,520 IN NEW YORK CITY PROPERTY INTERESTS

The assessment-roll analysis identified 86 entries associated with the City of New York, including properties recorded under the City, its Bureau of Water Supply, and NYC DEP-related designations.

Their combined stated full market value is:

$8,884,520.

The entries fall into two categories:

Category	Entries	Full market value
NYC-owned land and other non-easement entries	48	$6,833,623
NYC conservation easement entries	38	$2,050,897
TOTAL	86	$8,884,520

The assessment roll uses a valuation date of July 1, 2025, and a taxable-status date of March 1, 2026.

These figures concern assessed property interests, not the City's annual tax payments. Conservation easements represent interests in land that may remain privately owned; they should not be confused with outright ownership of the underlying parcels.

Nevertheless, they reveal something important about the extent of New York City's involvement in Hamden's real estate.

New York City is not merely a distant consumer of the region's water. It is a substantial landowner and holder of property rights within the Town.

LAND OWNERSHIP IS ONLY PART OF THE STORY

The importance of these figures cannot be measured solely in dollars.

New York City purchases land and acquires conservation easements in the watershed to protect the quality of its drinking-water supply.

A conservation easement can impose lasting restrictions on development and land use even when the property remains in private ownership.

Such restrictions can shape what a landowner may build, how the land may be used, and what opportunities remain available to future purchasers.

The result is a landscape in which New York City's water-supply interests are embedded not only in public regulation but also in private property rights.

The economic consequences are experienced locally.

Hamden residents pay property taxes, maintain roads and buildings, operate farms and businesses, and attempt to preserve or sell their properties in a region whose development has long been shaped by the requirements of a distant metropolitan water system.

AND NOW COMES THE FRASER BATTERY STORAGE PROJECT

Against that background, consider the proposed Fraser battery energy storage facility.

According to the developer's December 2025 Emergency Response Plan, the project is designed around 196 Tesla Megapack 2 XL units, with a stated facility rating of 135 MW / 540 MWh.

The same document identifies a nominal capacity of 3,916 kWh per unit—producing an aggregate equipment figure of approximately 767.536 MWh if all 196 units have that nominal capacity.

The difference between the stated facility capacity and the aggregate unit specifications deserves a clear explanation.

But the central question is broader.

How does a region historically subjected to extensive watershed-protection restrictions now accommodate a proposed industrial battery installation with foreseeable fire, smoke, and contaminated-runoff hazards?

Does the proposed facility fall within the same watershed-protection framework that has governed other forms of development?

Which governmental agencies have reviewed its potential effects on water quality?

What standards are being applied?

And are those standards consistent with the restrictions imposed upon ordinary property owners?

The assessment roll does not answer these questions. It demonstrates why they matter.

THE COUNTY LANDFILL ADDS ANOTHER DIMENSION

There is another environmental controversy unfolding in the same region.

In August 2026, Delaware County opposed proposed NYSDEC regulations concerning landfill leachate, including requirements addressing PFAS and other contaminants.

According to The Mountain Eagle, County Attorney Kevin M. Young participated in presenting the County's opposition, while County officials warned that compliance could require approximately $50 million in infrastructure improvements.

On September 2, 2026, the Town of Hamden adopted its own resolution opposing the proposed regulations.

My husband and I own approximately 40 acres of residential property along State Highway 10, about one mile from the Delaware County landfill.

We have repeatedly experienced noxious odors reaching our property, sometimes in overpowering concentrations.

We live in South Carolina now and want to sell our New York property.

The scenic beauty of a wooded Catskill mountain valley is a substantial part of its attraction. Recurring landfill odors are hardly a selling point.

The landfill-leachate controversy concerns water pollution, while our firsthand experience concerns airborne odors. They are distinct problems, but both illustrate why environmental regulation matters to property owners.

AND WHO IS THE ATTORNEY INVOLVED IN THESE MATTERS?

Here is another remarkable overlap.

Kevin M. Young of Young/Sommer LLC has represented Delaware County in environmental and watershed matters, including negotiations concerning New York City's watershed restrictions.

Young/Sommer also represents the Town of Hamden.

And Young/Sommer represents Fraser Storage, LLC, the private developer proposing the battery facility.

On March 4, 2026, the Hamden Town Board approved a conflict-of-interest waiver permitting the firm's concurrent representation of the Town and Fraser. This conflict is NOT reconcilable. I wonder what kind of "arrangements" were involved to get that conflict agreement to be signed, but whoever did it should be impeached and barred from ever holding public office. It is not for sale.

The firm has also been involved in selecting consultants to review the Fraser application.

These are documented relationships. Their precise scope, the disclosures accompanying the waiver, and the legal consequences of the concurrent representations warrant examination.

The public is entitled to ask how independent municipal review is maintained when the same law firm represents both the municipality and the private developer seeking its approval.

And the firm's involvement in County landfill and watershed matters makes those questions all the more important.

WHOSE ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS COUNT?

The 2026 assessment roll supplies a useful starting point for a much larger examination of land ownership, environmental policy, and economic development in Delaware County.

New York City has accumulated millions of dollars in assessed land and conservation interests in Hamden.

For decades, the need to protect its unfiltered drinking-water supply has influenced the economic opportunities available to local landowners.

Meanwhile, Delaware County and Hamden have opposed additional landfill-leachate regulations, and a major industrial battery project is moving through the local review process.

Why should ordinary landowners bear watershed restrictions while major industrial proposals receive consideration without a publicly demonstrated reconciliation of their hazards with the same watershed-protection objectives?

That is not an argument against protecting New York City's drinking water.

It is an argument for consistent environmental protection, independent governmental decision-making, and equal consideration of local property owners' interests.

New York City's drinking water matters.

So do Hamden's residents, their wells, their homes, their land, and their ability to sell property without having its value undermined by industrial pollution or environmental hazards.

The watershed cannot be treated as too precious for ordinary economic development and, at the same time, as an acceptable location for industrial hazards without a rigorous, transparent explanation.

The public deserves that explanation.

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Primary source: Town of Hamden, 2026 Final Assessment Roll, taxable section, valuation date July 1, 2025.

Additional sources: Fraser Storage, LLC, Emergency Response Plan, Revision 1, December 14, 2025; Town of Hamden Town Board minutes, March 4 and September 2, 2026; Town of Hamden Planning Board minutes, July 28, 2026; The Mountain Eagle, August 31, 2026, “New Regulations Could Force Early Landfill Closure, Officials Say”; Delaware County Department of Public Works, September 2026 landfill-leachate regulatory materials.

The figures in the article have been checked against the uploaded assessment roll: 86 NYC-listed entries totaling $8,884,520, including 38 conservation-easement entries valued at $2,050,897.

HAMDEN: THE BATTERY PROJECT, THE COUNTY LANDFILL, THE STINKING FOGS - AND YOUNG/SOMMER LLC — THE SAME LAW FIRM KEEPS TURNING UP!

I have just posted information from Fraser Storage, LLC's own Emergency Response Plan concerning the actual size of the proposed battery facility, its fire hazards, and the extraordinary limitations imposed upon firefighters responding to a battery fire.

AND VOILA, ANOTHER DISCOVERY.

The law firm representing Fraser Storage, LLC, the private developer seeking permission to construct this massive industrial battery facility - and the Town of Hamden whose (I will drop my comments) leadership agreed to be run by the developer through Young/Sommer LLC as Town Attorneys - apparently has a finger in every pie, and represents ALSO the County!

The same law firm also represents the Town of Hamden, is responsible for reviewing and potentially approving Fraser's application - and picking "independent" consultants to assess the safety of Fraser project.

On March 4, 2026, the Hamden Town Board approved a conflict-of-interest waiver allowing Young/Sommer to represent both the municipality and the developer.

BUT WAIT. YOUNG/SOMMER ALSO REPRESENTS DELAWARE COUNTY!

And Kevin M. Young, of that very firm, has been actively involved in the County's efforts to oppose additional environmental regulation of its landfill.

That stinking site that exudes whatever mostly at night in the hopes that - well, not many people live around, so they can just as well choke on the stink for all they care.

THE LANDFILL — AND THE FIGHT AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

The Delaware County Solid Waste Management Center is located at 32230 State Highway 10, Walton, within a mile from our property in Hamden.

According to the County's own website, the landfill opened in 1977, received an expansion permit modification in 2021, and has approximately 60 years of remaining capacity.

It accepts municipal waste, construction and demolition debris, asbestos, contaminated soil, and certain industrial waste.

Our property is approximately one mile from the landfill.

We have experienced recurring noxious odors reaching our land, sometimes in overpowering concentrations.

We live in South Carolina now and want to sell our New York property in Hamden. BUTBUTBUTBUT: Who would want to purchase a scenic mountain property when some mornings you come out and choke on stinking fog from the landfill?

And now, with a planned Fraser BESS fire hazard, a disaster waiting to happen, within 5 wooded miles?

And what are our local governments doing about environmental protection?

FIGHTING ADDITIONAL REGULATION OF THE LANDFILL!

In August 2026, Delaware County opposed proposed NYSDEC requirements concerning landfill leachate, including PFAS and other potentially hazardous contaminants.

According to The Mountain Eagle, County Attorney Kevin M. Young participated in presenting the County's opposition. County officials argued that compliance could require approximately $50 MILLION in infrastructure improvements and potentially force closure of the landfill.

Then, on September 2, 2026, THE TOWN OF HAMDEN ADOPTED ITS OWN RESOLUTION OPPOSING THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS.

The landfill odors and the proposed leachate requirements concern different environmental pathways—air and water—but both matter to people who own property here.

AND NOW CONNECT THE DOTS

YOUNG/SOMMER LLC represents:

1. FRASER STORAGE, LLC — the private developer seeking authorization for the industrial battery storage facility.

2. THE TOWN OF HAMDEN — the municipality reviewing that very developer's application, which approved a conflict waiver allowing the concurrent representation.

3. DELAWARE COUNTY — which has opposed additional landfill-leachate regulations, with Kevin Young participating in that opposition.

And Kevin Young has also represented Delaware County in negotiations concerning New York City's watershed regulations and the Filtration Avoidance Determination.

THE SAME LAW FIRM IS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT, THE LOCAL REGULATORY REVIEW, THE COUNTY'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE WATERSHED NEGOTIATIONS.

These overlapping representations are documented. Whether all of them are legally compatible—and what conflicts were disclosed and consented to—deserves examination.

AND WHAT ABOUT THE NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED?

For decades, economic development in the Catskills has been restricted in the name of protecting New York City's drinking-water supply.

Landowners have lived with those restrictions. Businesses and farmers have had to accommodate them.

New York City is permitted to supply water from its Catskill/Delaware system without filtration only under conditions requiring continuing watershed protection.

Yet now we have a proposed industrial battery storage facility in this region, a County opposing additional landfill-leachate controls, and a Town joining that opposition.

And the same law firm appears throughout these arrangements.

WHO IS PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OWNERS?

Who independently represents the Town when its attorney also represents the developer?

Who examines the cumulative environmental burdens on residents already affected by the County landfill?

Who ensures that the watershed protections historically imposed upon ordinary landowners are applied consistently to major industrial development?

And who decided that the same law firm should occupy so many positions in these overlapping matters?

THESE ARE PUBLIC QUESTIONS ABOUT PUBLIC DECISIONS, PUBLIC MONEY, AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS.

The documents are available for everyone to examine.

SOURCES:

• The Mountain Eagle, August 31, 2026: “New Regulations Could Force Early Landfill Closure, Officials Say.”

• Delaware County Department of Public Works, September 2026 landfill-leachate regulatory opposition materials.

• Hamden Town Board minutes, March 4 and September 2, 2026.

• Hamden Planning Board minutes, July 28, 2026.

• Young/Sommer LLC's published attorney biography and practice descriptions.

• Delaware County Department of Public Works, Solid Waste Management Center information.

Hamden residents deserve independent representation, meaningful environmental review, and answers before another major industrial project proceeds.

CONGRATULATIONS, DELAWARE COUNTY! YOU HAVE JUST CREATED A BRAND-SPANKING-NEW FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM. How to deny a disabled journalist access to evidence, seek sanctions against her, and disclose the evidence one day after the hearing.

 

Congratulations are in order for Delaware County, New York.

Its officials have accomplished something remarkable.

While I was fighting for disability accommodations, adequate time to prepare my court submissions, and access to evidence concerning governmental coordination in retaliation against my family, the County and its associates were busy seeking sanctions against me.

They portrayed my litigation as frivolous. They invoked my disciplinary history. They sought judicial punishment for my persistence in challenging government misconduct.

And all the while, the County possessed records directly relevant to the very governmental relationships and coordinated activities that I was attempting to expose.

Yesterday, October 28, 2026, the Court heard the motions.

Today, October 29, 2026, Delaware County's FOIL production placed the evidence in my hands.

One day too late for the hearing.

Just in time for a brand-spanking-new First Amendment retaliation claim.

THE GOVERNMENT'S FAVORITE GAME: PUNISH THE JOURNALIST, THEN RELEASE THE EVIDENCE

For years, I have investigated and published criticism of Delaware County officials, their attorneys, their relationships with publicly funded nonprofit organizations, and their conduct in litigation.

My daughter, an accomplished environmental engineering and watershed planning professional, provided sworn evidence concerning law enforcement misconduct in the treatment of a violent drug dealer who was a potential confidential informant.

She was employed by the Watershed Agricultural Council.

In December 2025, she received unconditional notice of a layoff.

On February 25, 2026, she was told not to return to work.

Her formal termination date was March 31, 2026.

She holds a master's degree in environmental engineering, a Juris Doctor degree, a law license, and GIS expertise. She is trilingual and has successful professional experience in watershed planning.

And what was happening in Delaware County after she was ordered out of her workplace?

Government officials and their institutional partners were organizing a program to recruit inexperienced engineering students to perform overlapping watershed functions.

THE DATES ARE BEAUTIFUL. THE COUNTY SUPPLIED THEM ITSELF.

Here is the chronology assembled from the County's own documents.

Date	Event
December 2025	WAC gave my daughter an unconditional notice of layoff - while pushing sanctions against me for litigation where she provided an affidavit in our support about misconduct of local police
February 25, 2026	My daugher, with a JD, law license, and MA in environmental engineering, is told not to return to work at WAC, removed from the premises of WAC with a 45 minutes' notice
March 26, 2026	SUNY ESF and Soil and Water personnel schedule recurring engineering internship planning meetings
March 27, 2026	First scheduled planning meeting
March 31, 2026	Formal termination of my daughter's employment
April 3, 2026	County Planning Commissioner Shelly Johnson-Bennett circulates the internship proposal
May 19, 2026	Jerry Vernold gives committee approval to the County's workforce-development resolution
June 5, 2026	County Grants Manager confirms submission of the grant application
September 2, 2026	Catskill Watershed Corporation reports a recommendation for $36,463.75 in funding
October 28, 2026	Court hearing on motions in litigation involving Delaware County
October 29, 2026	County FOIL production supplies the underlying records

The March 26 planning correspondence is especially revealing.

The initiative was being organized after my daughter had been removed from active employment but before her formal termination date.

The program was designed to provide three undergraduate engineering students with paid work in watershed assessment, conservation engineering, data collection, mapping, erosion control, stormwater management, and interactions with landowners.

The same kinds of professional work for which my daughter already possessed advanced education and practical experience.

The County's application declared a shortage of qualified watershed engineers.

Apparently, Delaware County's solution to a shortage of qualified professionals was to participate in a regional arrangement that had just removed one from the workforce, then seek public money to train beginners.

What a splendid example of governmental efficiency.

AND LOOK WHO WAS INVOLVED.

The newly disclosed documents identify an extensive institutional network:

Delaware County Planning, Parks and Watershed Affairs, headed by Commissioner Shelly Johnson-Bennett, prepared and administered the grant application.

Delaware County Soil and Water Conservation District, headed by Graydon Dutcher, would supervise the students and provide technical field training.

SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry participated in planning, academic supervision, and research.

Catskill Watershed Corporation administered the grant program.

New York City Department of Environmental Protection was CWC's governmental partner in that program, with an express role in reviewing applications and approving funding.

The CWC grant guidelines require approval by both DEP and CWC's Board of Directors.

An August 24, 2026 email confirms that CWC had received DEP's review comments.

And who is the DEP Commissioner named as a defendant in my pending litigation?

Garcia.

The state-action allegations in my Amended Verified Complaint were not invented after these disclosures. They were already pleaded.

I had already identified substantial CPLR 3211(d) issues concerning governmental involvement, institutional relationships, financing, and coordinated activity.

Now the County has produced contemporaneous documents identifying additional governmental and institutional participants in the very network I was seeking to investigate.

ENTER JERRY VERNOLD — AND THE COUNTY'S OVERLAPPING COMMITTEES.

The May 19, 2026 resolution identifies Jerry Vernold as the official granting committee approval to the workforce-development initiative.

Vernold chairs the County's Planning, Recreation and Culture Committee, which oversees Planning, Soil and Water Conservation, and Watershed Affairs.

His committee's August 20, 2024 minutes document ongoing coordination with WAC concerning New York City watershed negotiations, farm-transition proposals, and WAC's internal decision-making arrangements.

Vernold also serves on Delaware County's Social Services Committee.

That committee is chaired by Wayne Marshfield, with Maya Boukai also serving as a member.

These relationships become particularly interesting in light of another disclosure.

County Board Chair Tina Molé reportedly revealed pressure upon Marshfield and Boukai, as directors of Delaware Opportunities, Inc., to do what was "right" for the County and suspend an executive director who was preparing to sue Delaware County for approximately $300,000 owed in connection with the senior meals program.

That controversy became a public debacle.

I covered it extensively and scathingly.

I was the only journalist on the County's media distribution list who subjected the County's conduct in that controversy to such sustained criticism, to my knowledge.

So we now have another example of alleged County pressure operating through the governance of a nominally separate nonprofit organization, directed at an executive whose intended actions threatened County financial interests.

And we have a new documentary trail involving the removal of my daughter from WAC and the rapid development of a publicly funded workforce initiative involving overlapping professional functions.

This is precisely why discovery into state action, joint participation, and governmental entwinement matters.

NOW LET US DISCUSS THE ADA.

I am disabled.

I have repeatedly requested accommodations necessary to participate meaningfully in judicial proceedings, including adequate time, accessible procedures, and remote participation.

Instead, the court system imposed compressed schedules and restrictions upon my ability to prepare and present evidence.

I expressly explained that my disabilities limited my capacity to produce submissions within the imposed deadlines.

I requested the opportunity to present evidentiary opposition under Carr v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 182 A.D.3d 667 (3d Dep't 2020).

I also repeatedly identified discovery issues under CPLR 3211(d).

The County and its litigation associates knew that I was seeking evidence concerning their relationships, financing arrangements, and governmental coordination.

Yet they continued pursuing sanctions and other adverse relief.

The result was a grotesque procedural inversion: the disabled journalist was being punished for pursuing allegations concerning information that governmental institutions themselves possessed and that she was still trying to obtain.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act protects meaningful access to state judicial services.

That protection is not satisfied by permitting a disabled person to file documents while denying accommodations necessary to prepare and present her case.

Nor is meaningful access achieved by forcing a litigant to defend against sanctions before she has had an accessible opportunity to obtain and present material evidence.

The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional importance of access to courts in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

A judicial proceeding does not become accessible merely because the courthouse door is technically open.

AND THEN CAME THE OCTOBER 28 HEARING.

On October 28, 2026, motions involving Delaware County were before the Court.

Among the matters being pursued were sanctions and other adverse relief against me and my husband.

The County and its associates had invoked litigation positions attacking the factual foundation of our claims and our entitlement to pursue them.

The newly disclosed records would have been directly relevant to my response.

They document governmental relationships, institutional participation, financial arrangements, and the development of a publicly funded workforce program following the removal of my daughter from employment.

They also bear upon the credibility of representations that allegations of coordinated governmental conduct were frivolous.

But the County produced the records on October 29.

One day after the hearing.

The government was seeking punishment while the evidence necessary to answer its attacks remained in government hands.

The timing is now part of the factual basis for my claim of retaliation and denial of meaningful access to the courts.

THE COUNTY'S LAWYERS HAVE BEEN BUSY TOO.

Recent disclosures by Shrewsberry identified Delaware County as the behind-the-scenes financier and driving force of Wayne Marshfield's litigation defense and affirmative litigation activity against me.

That is particularly significant because Marshfield's litigation activities have been conducted in his own name while the County's financial and operational involvement remained outside the public presentation of those proceedings.

The newly produced workforce-development records add another dimension to the same issue.

The County's institutional involvement is not confined to one department, one nonprofit, or one lawsuit.

The disclosed arrangements reach County Planning, Soil and Water, CWC, SUNY ESF, and NYC DEP.

The reported Molé disclosure supplies another example involving County influence over nonprofit governance and personnel decisions.

Taken together, these facts support my inference that nominally separate institutions have been used to advance coordinated governmental objectives, including retaliation against persons who challenge County officials.

And the very litigation in which I sought to investigate those relationships became the vehicle for demands that I be punished.

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM.

The First Amendment prohibits government retaliation against protected journalism and petitioning activity.

It also prohibits government officials from using their authority to impose adverse consequences because a person has criticized the government.

Retaliation can operate through governmental decisions, financial arrangements, coordinated conduct, and the use of institutional intermediaries.

It can also operate through litigation when governmental power is employed to punish protected expression.

Here, I allege that Delaware County and associated actors pursued sanctions and adverse judicial relief against me in retaliation for my journalism and litigation challenging official misconduct.

The October 29 disclosure supplies new factual support for that claim.

The County's own records show the institutional coordination I was attempting to investigate. They identify governmental participants, funding mechanisms, and a workforce initiative developed immediately after my daughter's removal from active employment.

The production occurred one day after a hearing at which the evidence could have been used to oppose the County's positions.

The combination of the retaliatory sanctions demands, denial of meaningful disability accommodations, and delayed disclosure supports a new and distinct First Amendment retaliation theory concerning the use of governmental litigation activity to punish investigative journalism and petitioning.

The County has now furnished the documentary foundation for examining the very conduct it sought to characterize as frivolous to investigate.

And it has furnished that foundation after pursuing judicial punishment against the person who sought it.

A WORD ABOUT PUBLIC MONEY

The workforce-development initiative sought $36,463.75.

The proposed interns would receive $20 per hour for ten weeks of work.

The application also included faculty compensation, graduate research assistance, equipment, travel, and matching contributions from participating public institutions.

All of this was justified by a claimed shortage of trained environmental engineers.

Meanwhile, a highly qualified professional had been removed from employment in the same regional watershed system.

The County's application also praises equitable workforce opportunities, including opportunities for individuals with disabilities.

Apparently, equity is an excellent subject for grant applications.

Providing meaningful access to a disabled journalist challenging County misconduct in court is another matter.

THE NEW LAWSUIT WILL HAVE A VERY INTERESTING CHRONOLOGY.

December: notice of layoff.

February: removal from active employment.

March: engineering internship planning.

April: County participation.

May: committee approval.

June: grant submission.

August: DEP review.

September: funding recommendation.

October 28: sanctions hearing.

October 29: disclosure.

The County supplied the dates. The County supplied the documents. The County supplied the institutional connections.

I supplied the criticism.

And for that criticism, I allege, the County and its associates sought to punish me through litigation while I was denied the disability accommodations and evidence necessary to respond.

So congratulations, Delaware County.

You wanted sanctions against the journalist.

You wanted her allegations treated as frivolous.

You wanted the litigation to proceed while the relevant governmental records remained outside her reach.

And then, one day after the hearing, you delivered the records.

You have just given me the factual basis for a brand-spanking-new First Amendment retaliation claim.

The next question is not whether the journalist should have stopped investigating.

It is whether Delaware County officials and their associates can account for what they did while trying to make her stop.

DELAWARE COUNTY HAS MONEY TO TRAIN ENGINEERS — BUT NO JOB FOR A QUALIFIED ONE WHO EXPOSED LAW ENFORCEMENT MISCONDUCT When a journalist exposes government misconduct, how far will public officials go to punish her? Will they reach for her children?

 

There is something particularly ugly about a government that 

• (1) claims to suffer from a shortage of qualified professionals, 
• 
  
• (2) seeks public money to remedy that shortage, and 
• 
  
• (3) simultaneously refuses employment to a highly qualified professional - whose family, quite coincidentally, has exposed misconduct by that same government.

That is the question now confronting Delaware County, New York.

Documents obtained by me under the Freedom of Information Law on October 29, 2026 - a lot of them this time, Delaware County did not consider release of THESE bombshell documents a threat, obviously - reveal that Delaware County officials spent months preparing an application for public funding to address what they describe as a shortage of environmental engineering professionals.

They wanted money to train three undergraduate environmental engineering students.

Meanwhile, Delaware County had denied employment to a ready environmental engineer living within a walking distance from the county building - BECAUSE she is a daughter of a journalist (me) who have spent years investigating and publishing accounts of official misconduct in the County.

The daughter is trilingual: English, Spanish, Russian.  

She holds a Juris Doctor degree and a law license, a master's degree in environmental engineering, and expertise in geographic information systems (GIS). 

She has successful professional experience in watershed planning.  In fact, they quoted in official reports that HER performance in the stream protection program (for which she defended a graduation THESIS in her MA degree for environmental engineering) was THE ONLY successful performance in the ENTIRE watershed region.

She also had a bad, fatal flaw - for THIS County.  She provided a personal firsthand witness account affidavit concerning law enforcement misconduct in the treatment of a violent drug dealer who was a potential confidential informant.

The County says it needs expertise. The applicant had expertise. The applicant also had evidence against County.  So the County (1) orchestrated that she was canned from her employment with a County-entwined non-profit (Watershed Agricultural Council, Inc.), imported her job into County Planning Department - at taxpayer expense, split the job into two positions, doubling the pay - not for her though, and then DENIED her employment into either one of these position.

Quite a screwy plan - don't you think?

And that is where the employment decision becomes a matter of public accountability.

THE COUNTY'S OWN DOCUMENTS EXPOSE THE CONTRADICTION

In April through June 2026, Delaware County Planning, Parks and Watershed Affairs worked with the Delaware County Soil and Water Conservation District and SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry to prepare an application for the Building the Engineering Workforce Summer Internship Program.

The stated problem was a shortage of trained environmental engineers capable of supporting watershed conservation, agricultural infrastructure, and environmental protection.

The proposed solution?

Three undergraduate interns, employed for ten weeks during the summer of 2027.

The budget included $24,000 in intern wages, faculty compensation, graduate research assistance, Apple tablets, field equipment, travel, and other expenses.

On September 2, 2026, the Catskill Watershed Corporation notified the County that its Public Education Committee had recommended approval of $36,463.75 in grant funding.

The County was prepared to mobilize government personnel, a public university, a conservation district, and a regional funding organization to introduce three students to professional work.

Yet it had rejected a candidate already trained in the very disciplines it claimed were in short supply.

How much education must a person possess before Delaware County considers her qualified?

A master's degree in environmental engineering?

GIS expertise?

A law degree?

A law license?

Successful watershed planning experience?

Three languages?

Or is there another qualification, one that never appears in the job announcement: a family sufficiently agreeable to County officials?

THE AFFIDAVIT THAT MAKES THE EMPLOYMENT DECISION PARTICULARLY TROUBLING

The rejected applicant was not merely the daughter of a government critic.

She had provided sworn evidence concerning the conduct of law enforcement officials in their treatment of a violent drug dealer who was a potential confidential informant.

The underlying matter involved serious questions about the handling of a person with a substantial criminal history, drug-related offenses, and a record of violence and threats.

The affidavit brought firsthand evidence into a controversy concerning the conduct of public officials.

That matters.

A sworn affidavit is not a social-media comment. It is evidence offered under penalty of perjury. Its purpose is to place facts before a tribunal where they can be tested against other evidence.

A government committed to accountability should welcome truthful evidence of official misconduct, investigate it, and correct wrongdoing where established.

A government hostile to accountability has another option: make participation in exposing misconduct professionally expensive.

And where the witness is the daughter of a journalist already investigating the same government, the possibility of retaliation takes on an additional dimension.

Punishing a journalist through her family would be an especially pernicious form of retaliation: the government need not silence the journalist directly if it can make the consequences of reporting fall upon her children.

The question is whether that is what happened here.

Delaware County owes an explanation grounded in its actual employment records, not a generic invocation of managerial discretion.

THE GOVERNMENT THAT CANNOT FIND ENGINEERS — EXCEPT WHEN ONE APPLIES

The County's grant documents are revealing because they were not written in response to a discrimination complaint.

They were written to obtain money.

When seeking funding, the County describes a need for engineering expertise, technical competence, watershed planning, environmental monitoring, and communication with landowners.

When evaluating a candidate possessing advanced qualifications in those areas, the County's actual selection criteria become crucial.

It cannot have one definition of professional need when soliciting public funds and an entirely different, unexplained definition when deciding whom to employ.

The grant application also repeatedly celebrates equitable workforce opportunities, including opportunities for people with disabilities.

How convenient to discover the virtues of inclusion when inclusion helps justify a grant application.

How much less convenient when a real, identifiable applicant seeks an actual job.

Public officials should be judged by whom they hire, whom they reject, and why — not by the fashionable vocabulary they insert into funding applications.

THE TAXPAYERS PAY FOR BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONTRADICTION

Consider the machinery involved.

Delaware County's Planning Department employed a grants manager to assemble the application.

Its commissioner participated in coordinating the effort.

Soil and Water personnel supplied proposed matching contributions, salaries, equipment specifications, and project information.

SUNY ESF personnel contributed research proposals, curricula, budgets, and evaluation methods.

The County prepared resolutions and a memorandum of agreement.

All of this administrative activity was directed toward obtaining approximately $36,000 for a program serving three undergraduate interns.

And the public should ask: What happened when an already qualified professional sought employment?

How much public money was expended on the hiring process? Who reviewed the application? What criteria were used? Who made the decision? What was the successful applicant's comparative experience, if another person was hired?

These are questions about the administration of public employment and public resources.

They are also questions about whether a government's professed need for expertise corresponds to its actual conduct.

RETALIATION DOES NOT BECOME ACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IS INDIRECT

The First Amendment protects criticism of government. It also protects the right to petition government for redress of grievances.

The constitutional problem does not disappear merely because the person who suffers an adverse employment decision is related to the government's critic.

A government employer cannot lawfully use hiring authority to punish protected expression through an applicant's family relationship. Nor may it retaliate against an applicant for constitutionally protected participation in exposing government misconduct.

The applicable legal claims depend upon the actual decision-makers, their knowledge, the nature of the protected activity, and evidence connecting that activity to the employment decision.

That is precisely why the employment records matter.

Who knew about the affidavit?

Who knew the applicant was the journalist's daughter?

Who participated in the hiring decision?

What reasons were given at the time?

Were those reasons consistent with the position's actual requirements?

Were the criteria applied consistently to other applicants?

The County's own records concerning its claimed workforce shortage make those questions especially difficult to dismiss.

THE AFFIDAVIT WAS ABOUT PUBLIC MISCONDUCT. THE JOB WAS PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.

There is an additional reason this situation warrants scrutiny.

The affidavit concerned the treatment of a person whose criminal history and possible relationship with law enforcement raised questions of direct public importance.

The journalist's investigation concerned government conduct.

The applicant's employment prospects concerned government conduct.

And the newly disclosed workforce-development initiative also concerns government conduct.

These matters intersect at the same fundamental issue: whether public officials exercise public authority for legitimate governmental purposes or use it to protect themselves from scrutiny.

A county government is not a private club.

Its employment opportunities are not favors to be distributed among people whose families refrain from criticizing officials.

Its professional qualifications are not supposed to change according to the political convenience of the applicant.

And its publicly funded programs are not supposed to become exercises in congratulating officials for addressing problems that their own employment decisions may perpetuate.

DELAWARE COUNTY SHOULD PRODUCE THE HIRING RECORDS

The County's workforce-development documents are now available for examination.

The employment decision should receive the same scrutiny.

The relevant records include the vacancy announcement, job requirements, applicant evaluations, interview records, selection criteria, communications among decision-makers, and contemporaneous reasons for rejection.

They should be compared with the County's statements about the scarcity of environmental engineering and watershed planning expertise.

If the County had legitimate, consistently applied reasons for rejecting the candidate, those reasons should withstand examination.

If the evidence instead shows that a highly qualified candidate was rejected because she supplied sworn evidence of misconduct, because of her relationship to a journalist, or because of other protected activity, the implications extend far beyond one employment decision.

They concern the use of government employment authority to suppress accountability.

WHEN GOVERNMENT RETALIATION REACHES THE CHILDREN

There is a particularly disturbing possibility at the center of this matter.

A journalist investigates government misconduct.

Her daughter supplies sworn evidence relevant to that misconduct.

The daughter, professionally qualified in fields the government itself identifies as understaffed, is denied employment.

The same government then seeks public funding to develop the expertise she already possesses.

That sequence demands investigation.

It also illustrates why retaliation through family members, when established, is so destructive to freedom of expression.

A journalist can choose to continue investigating despite personal consequences.

Her children did not choose her profession. They are entitled to pursue their own careers, offer truthful evidence, and compete for public employment without having their opportunities determined by official hostility toward their parent.

A public employer that punishes a child for a parent's reporting is not merely retaliating against an individual. It is communicating a warning to everyone who might expose government misconduct:

Speak, and the consequences may follow your family.

That is the very antithesis of constitutional government.

THE COUNTY'S OWN WORDS SHOULD NOW BE USED TO MEASURE ITS CONDUCT

Delaware County has put its alleged shortage of qualified environmental engineering professionals into a formal grant application.

It has described the professional skills it values.

It has identified the public benefits those skills supposedly provide.

It has requested public funding to develop them.

And it has rejected a known applicant already possessing an unusually strong combination of those qualifications.

The public should not be asked to accept the County's workforce-shortage narrative on faith while its actual hiring decisions remain unexplained.

Nor should a government that has been accused of misconduct expect the public to ignore the professional consequences experienced by a witness who supplied sworn evidence against it.

The County's hiring records should be examined. Its decision-makers should be identified. Its stated reasons should be tested.

Because the ultimate question is no longer simply whether Delaware County needs environmental engineers.

It is whether Delaware County wants qualified professionals — or only qualified professionals whose families know better than to expose the government.

Of course - the daughter in question could be TRAINING those interns... But - to give a job to the daughter of A NERONI????!!!!!

---

Based on documents that were already on file with the author before today's FOIL disclosure, and documents produced by Delaware County on October 29, 2026, including the CWC Workforce Development Grant application, correspondence among Delaware County Planning, DCSWCD, and SUNY ESF, and the September 2, 2026 CWC funding recommendation.

Hamden residents - you STILL have hope, but your ONLY hope is YOU

Hamdenites!

Why do you have to start with THIS?

And THIS?

When you can DEMAND your local government - especially now when you can STILL CHANGE it on November 3 by VOTE - 

to start from THIS

and naturallly arrive at this

Young and Sommer does not own your Town.

Wayne Marshfield does not own your Town.

Wayne Shepard does not own your Town.

Developers do not own your Town.

YOU DO.

Act like it - while you still have time.

The Only Thing That Grows Well Here Is ROCKS! So Why Is Hamden Preparing to Grow a 500 MWh Lithium Battery Farm? A Snowbelt Town, Glacial Rocks, Seasonal Roads, No Town Fire Department — and a Law Firm Representing Both the Developer and the Municipality

There is an old joke in the Catskills:

“The only thing that grows well here is ROCKS!”

I learned the meaning of that joke when I was planting a vegetable garden at our property in the Town of Hamden, Delaware County, New York.

The ground was full of stones. I spent an entire gardening season removing them. The following year, I discovered that the rocks had apparently returned.

I removed them again.

And again, the rocks came back.

The locals laughed. They knew something I didn't.

What I had encountered was a familiar characteristic of our glacial landscape. Much of the Catskills is covered by glacial till — a mixture of rocks, boulders, gravel, sand, silt, and clay deposited by ancient glaciers.

Repeated freezing and thawing can also move buried stones toward the surface, a phenomenon known as stone heaving.

Now, why am I talking about rocks?

Because someone wants to build an enormous industrial battery energy storage facility on Cobbe Cross Road in Hamden.

125 megawatts. 500 megawatt-hours of energy storage.

And I have a few questions.

I. What Exactly Is Going to Be Sitting on Those Rocks?

The proposed Fraser Battery Energy Storage System, promoted by Fraser Storage and EDF Renewables, is intended to store electricity in industrial-scale lithium-ion battery installations.

According to the project information available to us, the proposed technology is lithium iron phosphate, commonly called LFP.

Lithium is element number 3 on the periodic table.

It is the lightest metal, with an atomic mass of approximately 6.94 and a density of only 0.534 grams per cubic centimeter.

Elemental lithium is highly reactive. Metallic lithium can react with water, generating substantial heat and flammable hydrogen.

But there is an important distinction: lithium-ion batteries do not consist of large blocks of metallic lithium. Their principal fire hazards arise from electrochemical failures, thermal runaway, combustible electrolytes, and the release of flammable and toxic gases.

And LFP does not mean explosion-proof.

In December 2024, Oxford University researchers Peter P. Edwards and Peter J. Dobson published an article in Fire Technology addressing the dangers of large-scale lithium-ion battery installations.

They explained that although LFP chemistry has relatively favorable thermal stability, gases released during thermal runaway can present serious explosion hazards.

They also recommended pausing widespread BESS deployment until appropriate safety standards and regulatory protections are established.

This is not a warning from opponents of renewable energy. It is published scientific analysis.

II. The Ground Beneath Fraser BESS: Has Anyone Investigated It?

Before constructing a pharmaceutical plant, an industrial production facility, or any other substantial industrial installation, engineers must investigate the site.

I spent years working as a technical translator on turnkey pharmaceutical plant design and construction projects.

I am not an engineer. But I am familiar with the interdisciplinary coordination required to design and construct complex industrial facilities.

Geotechnical engineers, civil engineers, structural engineers, hydrologists, electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, and safety specialists do not operate in separate universes.

Their work must fit together.

A foundation cannot be designed independently of the ground supporting it.

Drainage cannot be designed independently of geology and groundwater conditions.

Fire protection cannot be designed independently of emergency access and water availability.

And electrical infrastructure cannot be designed independently of the structures and ground conditions supporting it.

So where is the geotechnical investigation for Fraser BESS?

Has the developer investigated the actual subsurface conditions on Cobbe Cross Road?

What do the soil borings show?

Are there glacial till deposits, buried boulders, frost-susceptible soils, shallow bedrock, or seasonal groundwater fluctuations?

What foundations are proposed for the battery containers?

How will buried electrical connections, drainage systems, and containment structures accommodate differential ground movement?

The annual reappearance of stones in my Hamden garden does not establish the soil conditions at the Fraser site. But it illustrates why those conditions should be investigated rather than assumed.

These are elementary questions for an industrial construction project.

And I have not seen the answers.

III. Welcome to the Snowbelt. We Don't Maintain All Our Roads in Winter.

Now comes the particularly interesting part.

Cobbe Cross Road appears in the Town of Hamden's November 6, 2024 Town Board minutes among roads designated as seasonal and excluded from winter maintenance.

Think about that.

The developer proposes an industrial battery installation with 500 MWh of storage capacity in a mountainous region characterized by heavy snow, ice, freezing temperatures, and winter storms.

Yet the municipality itself identifies Cobbe Cross Road as a seasonal road without winter maintenance.

The precise seasonal segment and its relationship to the proposed facility's access route must be established.

But the question is unavoidable:

WHO IS GOING TO CLEAR THE ROAD WHEN THE BATTERIES CATCH FIRE IN FEBRUARY?

Will the developer maintain the road?

Will the Town change its maintenance policy?

Will private snow-removal equipment be available around the clock?

What happens during a major snowstorm?

And what happens during spring thaw, when frost-damaged rural roads can lose bearing capacity under heavy vehicles?

These are not minor inconveniences.

Industrial fire response may require heavy apparatus, tanker trucks, hazardous-materials personnel, specialized equipment, and sustained access for many hours.

And Hamden has another problem.

IV. Hamden Has No Fire Department of Its Own

The Town of Hamden does not operate its own municipal fire department.

Fire protection depends on outside or independently organized fire-service resources and mutual-aid arrangements.

This makes the proposed facility's emergency-response plan particularly important.

Which department will respond?

Where will the responding apparatus come from?

How long will the journey take under winter conditions?

Can the roads accommodate the vehicles?

Where will the firefighting water come from?

Who will maintain access while an incident is underway?

And who will be responsible for collecting, treating, and disposing of contaminated firefighting water?

A fire does not wait for the snowplow.

A thermal-runaway event does not wait until the spring thaw.

And a major industrial installation does not become safe merely because someone has written the words Emergency Response Plan on a document.

V. The Insurance Industry and Safety Engineers Already Know These Risks

The Hartford, in its February 2026 technical publication concerning BESS fire hazards, identifies thermal runaway, gas accumulation, explosion hazards, fire propagation, and the importance of suitable fire protection.

UL Research Institutes has identified the importance of emergency access, firefighter preparedness, toxic emissions, environmental contamination, and regulatory review.

The Maryland Department of Natural Resources commissioned a study addressing BESS siting and safety, including vegetation, terrain, fire suppression, and emergency-response planning.

DNV GL, in its 2019 report Quantitative Risk Analysis for Battery Energy Storage Sites, explained that the probability and consequences of battery failures must be evaluated through quantitative risk assessment.

DNV GL also expressly identified the need to consider local wind patterns, toxic plume dispersion, the vulnerability of surrounding residents, and the effectiveness of multiple protective systems.

Its relatively low risk estimates depended upon the assumed presence and performance of those protective systems.

But what protective systems are actually proposed for Fraser BESS?

What equipment has been selected?

What testing has been performed?

What explosion analysis exists?

What site-specific emergency-response assumptions have been used?

What happens when one of the assumed protective systems is unavailable because the road is impassable?

Until those questions are answered, generic assurances about the safety of modern batteries do not establish the safety of this particular installation.

VI. And Who Is Independently Reviewing All This?

This brings us to Young/Sommer LLC.

Young/Sommer is involved in the BESS industry and, according to the municipal records we have examined, simultaneously represents the Town of Hamden and the developer of Fraser BESS.

On March 4, 2026, the Town Board approved a conflict-of-interest waiver permitting the concurrent representation to continue.

Let us consider what this means in practical terms.

The developer wants authorization to construct the facility.

The Town is supposed to independently evaluate whether the proposed facility satisfies applicable requirements and adequately protects neighboring property owners.

The Town may need to demand additional geological investigations, hydrological studies, fire-safety assessments, engineering reports, road-access evaluations, and environmental analyses.

Each additional investigation may uncover problems.

Each additional requirement may cost the developer money.

And a sufficiently serious problem may require redesigning the facility, relocating it, or denying an application.

WHY WOULD A MUNICIPALITY ENTRUST ITS INDEPENDENT REGULATORY REVIEW TO A LAW FIRM THAT ALSO REPRESENTS THE PARTY SEEKING APPROVAL?

The question is not simply whether an ethics waiver was signed.

The question is whether the Town is exercising genuinely independent judgment in determining what technical information must be produced and whether the proposed facility is safe.

Who selects the experts?

Who determines the scope of their assignments?

Who decides whether their reports are adequate?

Who identifies missing investigations?

Who insists on further testing when the developer says enough has already been done?

And who protects the interests of surrounding property owners when those interests conflict with the developer's commercial objectives?

A conflict waiver does not perform a geotechnical investigation.

It does not model toxic gas dispersion.

It does not clear a snow-covered road.

And it certainly does not put out a battery fire.

VII. Where Are the Studies?

Here is what I would like to see before construction of Fraser BESS is authorized:

1. A complete site-specific geotechnical investigation, including soil borings, subsurface conditions, groundwater observations, frost susceptibility, and foundation recommendations.
2. A hydrological and hydrogeological assessment identifying surface drainage, groundwater movement, and potential contamination pathways.
3. A complete fire and explosion hazard assessment applicable to the actual battery equipment and installation configuration.
4. Atmospheric dispersion modeling considering local terrain and meteorological conditions.
5. A year-round emergency-access study identifying road conditions, seasonal restrictions, heavy-apparatus accessibility, and maintenance responsibilities.
6. A detailed emergency-response plan developed with the fire-service organizations expected to respond.
7. An independently reviewed plan for collecting, containing, testing, treating, and disposing of contaminated firefighting water.
8. Documentation identifying the independent specialists who evaluated these matters on behalf of the municipality.

These are not exotic demands.

They are the ordinary kinds of technical questions that arise when a complex industrial facility is proposed for a challenging location.

VIII. The Rocks Will Keep Growing. Will the Town Start Asking Questions?

The residents of Hamden are not laboratory specimens.

Our homes, wells, forests, roads, and property values are not disposable components of an industrial experiment.

We live in a mountainous landscape shaped by glaciers, with difficult winters, scattered residences, and limited emergency-response infrastructure.

The developer proposes to introduce an industrial installation storing 500 MWh of electrical energy into that landscape.

And the public is entitled to know how the developer proposes to manage the consequences of an equipment failure, fire, explosion, or environmental release.

I am considering litigation seeking to prevent construction and operation of Fraser BESS at this location.

Meanwhile, I invite local residents, engineers, contractors, excavators, geologists, firefighters, and anyone familiar with Cobbe Cross Road to share firsthand information about the site, the surrounding terrain, the roads, and the project review process.

Because in Hamden, the only thing that grows well may be rocks.

But that is no reason to let a 500 MWh industrial battery installation grow on top of them without independent scientific and engineering scrutiny.

---

Principal technical references: Edwards & Dobson, Fire Technology (2024); DNV GL, Quantitative Risk Analysis for Battery Energy Storage Sites (2019); Maryland Department of Natural Resources, Siting and Safety Best Practices for Battery Energy Storage Systems (2022); The Hartford, BESS Fire Hazards (2026); UL Research Institutes, Electrochemical Safety Research Institute technical materials.

An interesting new decision of NY Court of Appeals - sometimes reason prevails, even though after a LONG fight - comment

At the end of this article you can read an interesting decision of the New York State Court of Appeals that just came out - and is very important to every single New Yorker.  

It is about the right to self-defense if you are assaulted by a person under the age of majority.  A "child".  Even if the said "child" may be a mountain of muscle towering over you.

This is the INSULTINGLY SHORT decision deciding a person's liberty and life - consider the consequences of SUCH a conviction!

235 A.D.3d 779 (2025)227 N.Y.S.3d 4022025 NY Slip Op 00881

The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Stephen Mears, Appellant.

2024-00734. Ind. No. 73771/22.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department.

Decided February 13, 2025.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P. Mazzei, J.), rendered January 10, 2024.

Matthew W. Brissenden, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Shiry Gaash and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.

Iannacci, J.P., Christopher, Wan and Love, JJ., concur.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P. Mazzei, J.), rendered January 10, 2024, convicting him of endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

780*780 For his actions during a physical altercation between himself and the child of his former girlfriend, the defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child.

The trial court properly declined to charge the jury with the defense of justification for the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, the intent of which "is to protect the physical health, morals and well-being of children" (People v Bergerson, 17 NY2d 398, 401 [1966]), and to which the defense of justification generally does not apply (see People v Williams, 102 AD3d 566, 567 [2013]; People v Varela, 164 AD2d 924, 924 [1990]; People v Fields, 134 AD2d 365, 365-366 [1987]). Moreover, there was no reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, that supported a justification defense (see People v Williams, 102 AD3d at 567).

The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

The absurdity of this decision is facially apparent: it DOES NOT MATTER WHO tries to maim or kill you - you have a RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE, PERIOD!

Apparently, such a simple truth did not sink into the heads of the learned panel of judges.

As I always do with especially disgusting court decisions, and this is ESPECIALLY ESPECIALLY disgusting - 

it de facto ruled that you must allow a "baby" to seriously injure or kill you but MAY NOT defend yourself if the baby is trying to do harm to you - because he is a baby -

 - I make the faces of judges who made this decision and their hypocritical "achievements" PUBLIC.

Here we go, the panel is: Iannacci, J.P., Christopher, Wan and Love, JJ., concur.

J.P.:  Justice Presiding; JJ. - associate justice of the panel.

Once again already in searchable text, information about every judge on this panel - published by the 2nd Department itself:

Presiding Judge Iannacci:

Associate Justice Angela G. Iannacci

Judicial Offices

Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department, Designated May 2017

Acting Presiding Justice of the Appellate Term, 9th & 10th Judicial Districts, 2013-2014

Associate Justice of the Appellate Term, 9th & 10th Judicial Districts 2009 to 2017

Justice of the Supreme Court, State of New York, 10th Judicial District 2006

Acting Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Appointed by Chief Judge Judith Kaye, 2004-2005

Back-up Judge in the Integrated Domestic Violence Part (IDV) 2006-2008

Judge of the Family Court, Elected to Family Court 2004-2006

Other Professional Experience

Principal Court Attorney to Hon. Allan L. Winick
Justice of the Supreme Court, Associate Justice of the Appellate Term 2002-2003

Hearing Officer
Small Claims Assessment Review Proceedings 1996-2001

Angela G. Iannacci, P.C., Great Neck, New York
Litigation and general practice 1996-2001

Rossano, Mose, Hirschhorn & Corleto, P.C., Garden City, New York
Litigation associate 1990-1996

Gordon & Silber, P.C., New York, New York
Litigation associate 1990

Rossano, Mose, Hirschhorn & Corleto, P.C., Garden City, New York
Litigation associate 1987-1990

American International Group, New York, New York
Professional Liability Division 1986-1987

Admission to the Bar

New York State, Appellate Division, Second Department

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York

U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York

Education

Pace University School of Law, J. D., 1986

George Washington University, B. A., 1983

Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London, England, Fellow International Commercial Arbitration (FCIArb 2012)

Other Employment

St. John’s University, Adjunct Associate Professor, 2013 - Spring 2020

Professional & Civic Activities

*NYS Science and Technology Resource Judge, National Courts and Sciences Institute, 2023

*Outstanding Women in Law Award 2018, Hofstra University, Maurice A. Deane School of Law

*NYS Special Fiduciary Commission Regarding Appointments & Recommendations to Administrative Board, 2017

*Advisory Committee on the Appointment of the Nassau County Commissioner of Jurors, 2008

*NYS Domestic Violence Task Force, 2007-present

*NYS Anti-Discrimination Panel, 2005-present

*NYS Court Administration’s Best Practices Committee for Matrimonial Judges, 2005

*Model Custody Court, NYS Supreme Court, 2005

*Member, Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts, 2004-present

*Distinguished Service Award, Nassau County Columbian Lawyers Association, 2018

*Distinguished Service Award, Queens County Columbian Lawyers Association, 2018

*International Association of Women Judges Selected , “Jurisprudence in Equality Program” Washington, D.C. 2010

*Nassau-Suffolk Women's Bar Association, Special Recognition Award, 2004

*Association of Italian American Educators 6th Annual Educators Awards & Scholarship Celebration, 2004

*Town of North Hempstead, Special Recognition Award, 2004

*Town of Brookhaven, Certificate of Congratulations Award, 2004

*Invited Speaker Award Nassau County Columbian Lawyers Association, 2005

*Appointed, Ladies of the Holy Sepulchre Eastern Lieutenancy Equestrian, Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem, 2016-present

*Elected, President, George Washington University Parent’s Association Advisory Council, Washington, D.C. 2014 - 2015

*Elected, Chairman, St. Mary Gate of Heaven Academy, 2015

*Westchester Italian Cultural Center, member 2011-2016

*American Bar Association, Appointed, Vice-Chair, Professional Liability, Insurance Committee, 2017-2018

*American Bar Association, Appointed, Chair-Elect, Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee 2016

*Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, North American Branch, Appointed, Executive Committee, 2013

*Association of Supreme Court Justices of the State of New York, member 2006-present

*National Association of Women Judges, member 2004-2016

*Nassau County Bar Association, member 1990's to present

*Columbian Lawyers' Association of Nassau County, member 1990's to present

*International Association of Woman Judges, member 2008-2016

*American Bar Association, member 2009-present

*New York State Bar Association, member 2012-present

*Nassau County Women’s Bar Association 1990's to present

*American Bar Association, Co-Chair, Lloyd of London Market Structure, Litigation & ADR to Manage Disputes, 2016 & 2017

*Hofstra Law School, Continuing Education CLE Seminar, 2014

*New York State Judicial Institute, Educational Broadcasts, 2014

*Invited Lecturer: Hofstra Law School, Nassau County Bar Association, Nassau County

*Women’s Bar Association, National Business Institute, Theodore Roosevelt Inn of Court Inn of Court, Women in the Courts

Associate Justice Linda Christopher 

Justices of the Court

Associate Justice Linda Christopher

Judicial Offices

Associate Justice, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, Appointed by Governor Andrew Cuomo, May, 2017 to present.

Justice, Supreme Court, Ninth Judicial District; November 2010 - May 2017

Supervising Judge, Matrimonial Part, Ninth Judicial District, January 2014 - May 2017.

Judge, Family Court, Rockland County, 2005 - 2010.

Acting Supreme Court Justice, 2006 - 2010.

Integrated Domestic Violence Court Judge, October 2006 - 2010.

Village Justice, Village of Grandview, 2003 - 2005.

Acting Village Justice, Village of Upper Nyack, 2003 - 2005.

Other Professional Experience

Trial Counsel, Law Offices of Linda Christopher, P.C., 1996 - 2004.

Partner, Christopher & Draine, Esqs., 1992 - 1996.

Trial Counsel, Law Offices of Linda Christopher, P.C., 1986 - 1992.

Law Clerk and Associate, Jerome Trachtenberg, Esq., Nyack, NY 1981 - 1986

Village Attorney, Village of Nyack - 1987 - 1994

Law Clerk, Hon. Orrelle R. Weeks, Family Court, Denver, CO, 1980

Admission to the Bar

New York State - Appellate Division, Second Department,1982

United States Supreme Court, 1988

Education

J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1980

B.A., University of Colorado, Honors Program, 1976.

Publications & Leading Cases

B. W. v. R. F., 53 Misc3d 366 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

L. E. A. v. C. P. A., 51 Misc3d 489 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2015).

M. C. v. D. C., 52 Misc3d 1222(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

D. E. v. P. A., 52 Misc3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

G. D. v. D. D., 52 Misc3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

K. K. v. P. K. M., 52 Misc3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

E. R. S. v. B. C. S., 51 Misc3d 1210(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

G. D. v. D. D., 50 Misc3d 1223(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).

K. K. v. P. M., 50 Misc3d 1225(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2015).

S. H. v. E. S., 52 Misc3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2014).

William I. v. Kathleen K., 50 Misc3d 1224(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2013).

Continental Casualty Company v. Naegele Incorporated Bakery Systems , 55 Misc3d 1204(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2017).

Santaiti v. Town of Ramapo, Inc., 54 Misc3d 1222(A) (Sup. Ct., Rockland Cty. 2017).

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Watts Water Technologies, Inc., 53 Misc3d 1213(A) (Sup Ct., Rockland Cty., 2017).

E. G. v. D. G., 63 Misc3d 1201(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty. 2014).

D. B. v. M. B., 39 Misc3d 1205(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2013).

W. A. v. D. A., 34 Misc3d 552 (Sup Ct., Westchester Cty. 2011).

Professional & Civic Activities

Lecturer, Summer Seminars, NYS Judicial Institute - “Credibility Issues in Custody Cases” - June 20, 2017

Lecturer, International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers - “A View From and Presentation to the Bench: Hague and International Law Issues and Assessing Flight Risk” - April 29, 2017

Lecturer, Westchester Women’s Bar, Matrimonial Committee - “Whatever Happened to PRICHEP?: Counsel Fees in Matrimonial Actions and in Family Court” - March 22, 2017

Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Equitable Distribution and Net Worth Statements” - January, 2017

Lecturer, Westchester County Bar Association Family Law Section - “Settling Matrimonial Actions” - 2016

Lecturer, New York Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers - “MMPI-2 RF, MCMI-III, SCL-90-R and Other Psychological Testing: Passe Or Still of Value in Child Custody Disputes?” - 2016

Lecturer, Rockland County Women’s Bar Association -“Retaining Liens and Charging Liens” - 2016

Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Post Judgment Relief and Uncontested Divorces” - January 8, 2016

Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Domestic Violence - For Family and Matrimonial Judges Including Use of Risk Assessment Instruments” - January 7, 2016

Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Pro Se Litigants” - January 7, 2016

Lecturer, Westchester County Bar Association regarding “Civility in the Courtroom” - December 2, 2015

Lecturer, NYSBACLE - “So Custody Is an Issue: What Do We Do Now? - The Roles and Responsibilities of the Judge” - November 2015

Lecturer, Westchester Women’s Bar Association Program - “The New Maintenance Guidelines” - September 30, 2015

Lecturer, Family Violence Task Force - “Ethical Challenges for Jurists in Domestic Violence Cases” - September 2015

Lecturer, NYSBA Family Law Section - “Bullying From Both Sides of the Bench” - July, 2015

Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Domestic Violence - Order of Protection Basics for Matrimonial Judges” - January 7, 2015

Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Child Support” - July, 2014

Lecturer, NYS Bar Association CLE - “Trial of a Custody Case” - May 9, 2014

Lecturer, Training for NYS Court Attorney Referees - Child Custody Trials - December 4, 2013

Lecturer, Westchester County Women’s Bar Association Program -“ Court Enforced Visitation” - November 26, 2013

Associate Justice Lillian Wan

Justices of the Court

Associate Justice Lillian Wan

Judicial Offices

Associate Justice, New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, Appointed by Governor Kathy Hochul, May 25, 2022

Justice, Supreme Court, Kings County, Elected November 2021, Term: 2022 to 2035

Acting Justice, Supreme Court, Kings County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2020 to 2021

Acting Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, Appointed by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2018 to 2020

Judge, New York State Court of Claims, Appointed by Governor Andrew Cuomo, 2018 to 2021

Judge, Family Court of the City of New York, Kings County, Appointed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 2013 to 2018

Judge, Family Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge A. Gail Prudenti, 2012 to 2012

Judge, Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, Appointed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 2012 to 2012

Other Professional Experience

New York State Unified Court System, Court Attorney-Referee in Surrogate's Court, 2009 to 2012

New York City Administration for Children’s Services, Executive Agency Counsel, 2000 to 2009

Admission to the Bar

NYS, Appellate Division, Second Department, 2001

Education

J.D., Albany Law School, 2000

B.A., Binghamton University, 1997

Professional & Civic Activities

Immediate Past President, Asian American Judges Association of New York

Co-Chair, Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics

Board Member, Brooklyn Women's Bar Association

Member, New York City Bar Association

Member, Columbian Lawyers Association of Brooklyn

Associate Justice Lawrence Love

Justices of the Court

Justice Laurence L. Love

Judicial Offices

Associate Justice, New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, Appointed by Governor Kathy Hochul, August 14, 2023

Co-coordinator for Child Victims Act (CVA) cases throughout New York City Court System, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks 2022 to 2023

Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2020 to Present

Justice, Supreme Court, Queens, County, Elected, 2019 to 2033

Acting Justice, Supreme Court, Queens County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2016 to 2018

Judge, Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, Elected, 2013 to 2022

Other Professional Experience

Law Offices of Laurence L. Love, Private Practice, 1994 to 2012

Legal Counsel to Assemblywoman Audrey I. Pheffer, 1993 to 2011

Law Offices of Marvin H. Bergman, 1992 to 1994

Legislative Assistant to Assemblywoman Audrey I. Pheffer, 1987 to 1993

Admission to the Bar

NYS, Appellate Division, First Department, 1993

United States, District Court, Eastern District of New York, 1993

United States, District Court, Southern District of New York, 1993

Education

J.D., Hofstra Law, 1992

B.A., City University of New York, Queens College, 1989

Professional & Civic Activities

Board Member, Brandeis Association, 2015 to Present

Member, Brandeis Association, 1995 to Present

Member, Queens County Bar Association, 1994 to Present

These are all ACCOMPLISHED, EDUCATED men and women.

The are also HIGHLY PAID public officials who do not have any WORRY - as well as their family members - as to either financial security, or medical benefits.

Unlike most people in the State of New York for whom, very often, employment in public entities and non-profits associated with care for children and seniors are the ONLY decent or ANY employment available in the area.

A CARELESS, THOUGHTLESS decision like this - CONVICTING THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE simply because he DEFENDED himself from being KILLED or MAIMED by a ROBUST 15-year-old - condemns such a man not only for a temporary loss of liberty.  It condemns him to unemployment and HUNGER.

CONVICT THE VICTIM. DESTROY HIS LIVELIHOOD. COLLECT YOUR JUDICIAL SALARY.

People v. Mears, at intermediate appellate level, 2nd Department: Four Highly Paid Appellate Judges, a Few Paragraphs of Judicial Indifference, and the Economic Death Sentence They Were Willing to Uphold

What does it cost four New York appellate judges to affirm a criminal conviction without bothering to apply the governing law correctly?  Without bothering what kind of consequences their sloppy insulting one-page writing will visit on a real human being?

Their salaries continue. Their health insurance continues. Their retirement benefits continue. Their professional honors accumulate. Their judicial biographies grow longer.  They can continue to SIT ON BOARDS, LECTURE about their "experiences" and "public service" - INSTEAD of doing THE ONLY JOB that people entrust to them and pay through their noses for them to do it.

Consider that judicial salaries are, probably, 8 or more times 

The defendant, meanwhile, may lose his liberty, employment, professional opportunities, medical insurance, and ability to feed his family.

And in People v. Mears, 235 A.D.3d 779 (2d Dept. 2025), the defendant's supposed crime arose from conduct he testified was necessary to defend himself against a fifteen-year-old who was repeatedly punching him.

THE CHILD ATTACKS. THE MAN DEFENDS HIMSELF. THE STATE CONVICTS THE MAN. FOUR APPELLATE JUDGES AFFIRM.

Their explanation? The law is intended to protect children.

How intellectually impressive.

How professionally accomplished.

How utterly indifferent to the consequences of their own SLOPPY decision.

I. A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS ALSO AN ECONOMIC WEAPON

In poor communities throughout New York, the best employers are frequently public institutions and nonprofit organizations: school districts, hospitals, nursing homes, childcare centers, social-service agencies, and county governments.

These institutions offer what many private employers in economically depressed areas do not: dependable wages, health insurance, retirement plans, paid leave, and a reasonable prospect of long-term employment.

They are also precisely the institutions that conduct extensive criminal-background screening.

And what conviction did the four judges affirm against Mears?

ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD.

A conviction particularly damaging to employment prospects in institutions serving children and other vulnerable people.

A school district may question whether to hire him.

A childcare provider may reject him.

A nursing home or healthcare institution may subject him to heightened scrutiny.

A public employer may decide that his conviction presents an unacceptable risk.

Some employment restrictions are statutory. Others result from discretionary decisions following background checks. The practical result can be the same: rejection.

And where are the alternative jobs?

In a rural community where the school district, hospital, nursing home, and county government are among the few employers offering decent wages and benefits, losing access to those institutions can mean losing access to the local middle class.

The judges did not merely uphold the possibility of jail time. They upheld a conviction capable of turning a working man into an unemployable man.

A man without wages.

Without employer-sponsored medical insurance.

Without retirement contributions.

Without the means to support his family.

Without the means to move somewhere else and start over.

The New York Correction Law provides protections against unjustified employment discrimination based on criminal convictions. But statutory protections do not automatically produce a job, and challenging an adverse hiring decision requires time, money, and resources.

A man cannot feed his children with the theoretical right to challenge an employer's rejection.

II. THE JUDGES WILL NEVER HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR OWN DECISION

Now consider the four judges.

Angela G. Iannacci.

Linda Christopher.

Lillian Wan.

Laurence L. Love.

All highly educated. All professionally accomplished. All holding prestigious, publicly compensated judicial offices.

Their salaries and employment benefits are financed by taxpayers.

They have the security of judicial compensation and access to public employee benefit and retirement systems.

They do not have to apply for a minimum-wage job at a nursing home because the local factory closed.

They do not have to wonder whether a school district will reject their applications after a criminal-background check.

They do not have to choose between paying for medication and buying groceries because an employer has denied them health insurance.

They are paid by the very public whose members can be financially ruined by their judicial errors.

And what does the public receive in return?

In Mears, a perfunctory appellate decision affirming a conviction obtained after the jury was denied a legally required justification instruction.

Not a serious examination of the statutory language.

Not a meaningful reconciliation of the two criminal charges arising from the same physical conduct.

Not a proper application of the governing standard for determining whether the defendant was entitled to a justification charge.

A few paragraphs.

PAGES OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR THE JUDGES. A FEW PARAGRAPHS FOR THE MAN WHOSE FUTURE WAS AT STAKE.

Justice Iannacci's official biography meticulously catalogues judicial appointments, professional affiliations, lectures, awards, committees, task forces, and honors.

The panel's published explanation for affirming Mears's conviction is a fraction of that length.

There is apparently unlimited space to celebrate judicial accomplishment.

But when a man's liberty and livelihood depend on the faithful application of the Penal Law, the panel could barely spare a paragraph for the justification issue.

III. THE LEGISLATURE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED THE ANSWER

Penal Law § 35.00 expressly provides that justification is a defense "in any prosecution for an offense."

The Court of Appeals had explained in People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541 (1986), that justification is not limited to particular crimes.

Yet the Second Department relied on appellate decisions that had improperly restricted the defense in child-endangerment prosecutions.

On October 27, 2026, the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed.

It explained that the statutory text was clearly contrary to the restriction endorsed by the lower courts.

CLEARLY CONTRARY.

That is the assessment of the state's highest court.

Four experienced appellate judges affirmed a conviction on a theory contrary to the governing statutory text.

And who paid the price for that error?

Not the judges.

The defendant.

The man who had to pursue another appeal to obtain recognition of a defense the Legislature had already provided.

IV. WHAT EXACTLY ARE TAXPAYERS PAYING FOR?

The public does not finance judicial salaries, benefits, pensions, chambers, clerks, and court administration so that judges can mechanically repeat defective precedents.

The public pays judges to read the law.

To examine the record.

To distinguish controlling authority from inapplicable decisions.

To recognize when a defendant's testimony requires submission of a defense to the jury.

And, above all, to understand that their decisions have consequences for actual human beings.

A criminal conviction is not an administrative entry on a judicial productivity report.

It can deprive a person of the ability to work.

It can deprive his family of medical insurance.

It can deprive his children of financial support.

It can turn a previously employable person into someone who must repeatedly explain a criminal record to prospective employers.

And it can do all of this long after any sentence of incarceration has ended.

The four judges were paid to recognize and apply the law before allowing those consequences to stand.

They failed to do so correctly.

Their collective professional distinction makes that failure more inexcusable.

What good are decades of judicial experience, domestic-violence expertise, child-protection credentials, prestigious appointments, and professional awards if four judges cannot correctly apply the statutory right of self-defense?

V. CONVICT THE VICTIM — THEN LEAVE HIM TO FIND A JOB

The grotesque irony of Mears is that the conviction itself concerned the welfare of a child.

Mears testified that a fifteen-year-old had attacked him.

The prosecution relied on Mears's use of force.

The jury was permitted to consider justification on the strangulation charge and acquitted him.

The jury was denied that defense on the child-endangerment charge and convicted him.

The Second Department affirmed.

And that conviction, had it remained in force, could have followed Mears into employment applications at the very institutions that dominate many local economies.

A man who claimed he was defending himself against a child could be excluded from employment because he carried a conviction for endangering a child — a conviction obtained without permitting the jury to consider his defense.

That is the economic absurdity produced by the legal absurdity.

The Court of Appeals eventually reversed and ordered a new trial.

But appellate correction does not automatically restore lost employment opportunities, income, insurance coverage, or years spent living under a conviction.

VI. JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE IS NOT A LICENSE FOR INDIFFERENCE

These four judges occupy positions of public trust.

Their professional achievements are not substitutes for the performance of their duties.

Their compensation is not a prize for having impressive résumés.

Their public offices are not honorary titles.

They are paid to administer justice according to law.

And the public is entitled to demand that they exercise the care necessary to do so.

The judges' economic security is protected by the public treasury. The defendant's economic security may be destroyed by their judgment.

That disparity imposes a particularly grave responsibility on those who wield judicial power.

The defendant cannot afford their errors.

His family cannot afford their errors.

The taxpayers who finance the judicial system should not be expected to accept those errors as an inevitable byproduct of prestigious public employment.

IF YOU ARE PAID TO DECIDE WHETHER A MAN'S CRIMINAL CONVICTION SHOULD STAND, READ THE LAW.

IF HIS LIVELIHOOD MAY DEPEND ON YOUR DECISION, EXAMINE THE RECORD.

IF HIS DEFENSE IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED BY STATUTE, DO NOT INVENT AN EXCEPTION.

AND IF YOU ARE ENTRUSTED WITH THE POWER TO AFFIRM A CONVICTION THAT MAY COST A MAN HIS JOB, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND ABILITY TO FEED HIS FAMILY — PAY ATTENTION.

That is not an extraordinary demand.

It is the minimum the public is entitled to expect from the highly compensated judges it employs.

CONVICT THE VICTIM. COLLECT YOUR $250,100 SALARY.

The economic gulf between four New York appellate judges and the people whose livelihoods their decisions can destroy

Four justices of the Appellate Division, Second Department — Angela G. Iannacci, Linda Christopher, Lillian Wan, and Laurence L. Love — unanimously affirmed Stephen Mears's conviction for endangering the welfare of a child after the trial court refused to allow the jury to consider his self-defense claim on that charge.

Mears testified that a fifteen-year-old attacked him with repeated, unprovoked punches.

The judges upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed on October 27, 2026.

These judges receive salaries more than four times the median individual earnings in Suffolk County, where Mears was prosecuted.

ONE APPELLATE JUSTICE

$250,100

2026 annual statutory salary

SUFFOLK MEDIAN EARNER

$58,202

Annual individual earnings, ACS 2020–2024

Graph 1. One judge's salary versus local earnings

Judicial salary effective April 2026; Suffolk County median individual earnings from ACS 2020–2024.

One judge earns $191,898 more per year than Suffolk County's median individual earner. The judicial salary is 4.30 times that median, before accounting for benefits.

Graph 2. Judicial salary versus earnings throughout the Second Department

■ Median individual earnings

■ Judicial salary

Annual judicial salary: 2026. County earnings: ACS 2020–2024. Selected counties with comparable available figures.

Even in affluent Nassau and Westchester Counties, the statutory salary of one appellate justice approaches four times median individual earnings. In Queens, the multiple exceeds five.

Graph 3. Four judges versus ordinary earners in Suffolk County

Four annual judicial salaries total $1,000,400 at 2026 rates.  Seventeen Suffolk median individual earnings total $989,434.

Four appellate justices collectively receive more in annual statutory salaries than seventeen Suffolk County residents earning the county's median individual income.

That is $1,000,400 annually in judicial base salaries, excluding benefits.

The employment consequences of the conviction they affirmed

In economically distressed communities, schools, hospitals, nursing homes, childcare centers, and public agencies may be among the few employers offering reliable wages, health insurance, and retirement benefits.

These are also sectors in which criminal-history screening is common or legally required.

A conviction for endangering the welfare of a child can expose an applicant to additional scrutiny, employment denial, or occupational restrictions, depending on the job and governing law.

New York Correction Law Article 23-A provides protections against unjustified employment discrimination, but it does not guarantee a job or eliminate the consequences of a criminal record.

A person excluded from the principal stable employers in his community may face unemployment, loss of health insurance, depleted savings, and an inability to support his family.

And in Mears, the conviction arose from conduct the defendant testified was necessary to protect himself from a physical attack.

THE TAXPAYERS PAY JUDGES TO APPLY THE LAW CORRECTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH

The four appellate justices were each entitled to $245,100 annually when they decided Mears in February 2025. Their statutory salaries increased to $250,100 in April 2026.

Their employment and benefits did not depend on the outcome of Mears's appeal.

His liberty and potentially his livelihood did.

Yet the Second Department affirmed his conviction in a insultingly brief opinion that the Court of Appeals subsequently reversed unanimously.

The Court of Appeals held that the justification defense was available in endangering welfare of a child case, and that a reasonable view of the evidence required the instruction.

The PROBLEM that I am seeing here is - WHY WAS NOT THE "CHILD" CHARGED WITH ASSAULT?  WHY WAS HIS VICTIM CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE CHILD?

WHAT KIND OF GARBAGE IS THAT?

WHY IS THERE NO OUTRAGE WITH THE PROSECUTOR?

As to the grandstanding judges: 

WE, THE TAXPAYERS, PAY THESE JUDGES TO DO THEIR JOBS.

THEY MUST PAY ATTENTION.

THE FULL BLASTING DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BELOW.  BOLD FONT AND HIGHLIGHTS ARE MINE.

====================

People v Mears

2026 NY Slip Op 06237

October 27, 2026

Court of Appeals

Halligan, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

The People & c., Respondent,

v

Stephen Mears, Appellant.

Decided on October 27, 2026

No. 80

Matthew Brissenden, for appellant.

Shiry Gaash, for respondent.

Halligan, J.

[*1]

Following a physical altercation with his girlfriend's fifteen-year-old son, the defendant was charged with two offenses, endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10) and strangulation in the second degree (id. § 121.12).  The trial court gave a justification charge under Penal Law § 35.15 for the strangulation count, but denied the charge for the endangerment offense. A jury convicted the defendant of endangerment, but acquitted on strangulation. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on prior cases holding the defense inapplicable to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, and further found that no reasonable view of the evidence supported giving a justification instruction.

We reverse. The relevant statutory text and our precedent confirm that a justification instruction pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 may be available for a charge of endangering the welfare of a child that is premised on the use of force. We also conclude that there is a reasonable view of the evidence here in support of the defense, and the refusal to charge the justification defense was not harmless.

I.

In September 2022, the defendant shared a home with his girlfriend, J.L., and her fifteen-year-old son, R.T.  During a night out, the defendant and J.L. argued and returned home.  Each went back out to a bar, and they eventually returned home again, still quarreling.  A physical altercation between the defendant and R.T. ensued, leaving R.T. on the floor, seemingly unconscious.

The defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10)^FN1 and strangulation in the second degree (id. § 121.12)^FN2. At trial, the People relied on the same conduct—the defendant's use of force against R.T.—to prove both the endangering and the strangulation charges. J.L., R.T., and the defendant each recounted their versions of the altercation. The People also called a forensic nurse, who testified about the abrasions found on R.T.'s neck and a strangulation assessment she performed on R.T., and a forensic scientist, who testified about a DNA swab of R.T.'s neck that showed likely evidence of the defendant's DNA.

After the People rested, the defendant sought a trial order of dismissal on the ground that the People's evidence did not establish guilt of either charge. In response, the People pointed to the same evidence for both charges: that the defendant had placed his hands on R.T.'s neck, causing him to become unconscious. In their summation, the People again confirmed that they were relying on the same evidence for the endangerment and strangulation counts, stating that "[R.T.'s] testimony on that witness stand establishes every element of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defense counsel requested a justification charge under section 35.15. The court denied the instruction with respect to the endangering count, but allowed it for the strangulation count. The jury proceeded to convict defendant on endangerment but acquitted him on the strangulation charge.

The Appellate Division affirmed (235 AD3d 779, 780 [2d Dept 2025]). Relying on People v Varela (164 AD2d 924 [2d Dept 1990]), People v Fields (134 AD2d 365 [2d Dept 1987]), and People v Williams (102 AD3d 566 [1st Dept 2013]), the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly declined to charge justification, since that defense "generally does not apply" to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child (235 AD3d at 780). It further held that, regardless, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that supported the defense (see id.).

A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (43 NY3d 1057 [2025]). We now reverse and remit for a new trial.

II.

Article 35 of the Penal Law sets forth various justification defenses that are available "[i]n any prosecution for an offense" (Penal Law § 35.00). The provision at issue here, section 35.15 (1), states that a person may "use physical force upon another when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself . . . from what he or [*2]she . . . reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person." "[B]y recognizing the use of force to be privileged under certain circumstances, [this defense] renders such conduct entirely lawful" (People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 546 [1986]).

In denying this justification charge for the endangerment count, the Appellate Division relied on past precedent, including Fields (134 AD2d 365), Varela (164 AD2d 924), and Williams (102 AD3d 566). The starting point, Fields, held that a separate parental justification defense found in section 35.10 (1), which is not at issue here, was inapplicable to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child because a parent who knowingly acted in a manner injurious to a child's welfare could not have reasonably believed their actions necessary to promoting that child's welfare (134 AD2d at 365-366)^FN3. Varela extended the rule from Fields to the self-defense justification defense under section 35.15 without any substantive explanation (164 AD2d at 924 ["The defense of justification is not applicable to the misdemeanor of endangering the welfare of a minor"]). The First Department reached a similar conclusion in Williams, albeit with the unexplained qualification that the defense "generally" does not apply to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child (102 AD3d at 567).

The statutory text, however, is clearly contrary. Article 35 instructs that, "[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense" (§ 35.00 [emphasis added]). And the self-defense justification defense, set forth in section 35.15, includes no limiting or qualifying language regarding the availability of the defense. We thus see no basis in Article 35's broad language for denying a section 35.15 justification defense in a prosecution involving a charge of endangering the welfare of a child.

We have consistently held that there is "no basis for limiting the application of the defense of justification to . . . any particular crime" (McManus, 67 NY2d at 547), and stressed that a justification charge is available "whenever the defendant claims that 'he engaged in forceful conduct in avoidance of a perceived attack' " (id., quoting People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 146 [1983] [alterations omitted]). Contrary to the People's contentions, a self-defense justification defense is not limited to offenses that include the use of force as one of the statutory elements. Even if the prosecution could prove their case without establishing a defendant's use of force, the justification defense is available if the prosecution chooses to argue its case on a use-of-force theory, and a reasonable view of the evidence supports the defense (see e.g. id. [depraved indifference murder]; People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96, 104 n 2 [1986] [reckless endangerment before a grand jury]). Although endangering the welfare of a child can be prosecuted based on a defendant's actions that do not involve the use of force, here, the prosecution premised their case on defendant's use of force.

When a prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child is based on the use of force, a charge of justification pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 is available if there is a reasonable view of the [*3]evidence to support it. To the extent that Varela and Williams are inconsistent with that holding, they should not be followed.

III.

The Appellate Division found in the alternative that no reasonable view of the evidence could support the justification charge (235 AD3d at 780). Where "there is any reasonable view of the evidence that defendant was justified in his actions," an instruction must be given (People v Castillo, 42 NY3d 628, 631 [2024]). In making that assessment, a court must "examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant" (id.). Applying that standard here, we conclude that a reasonable view of the evidence supported a justification defense, and the Appellate Division erred in concluding otherwise.

The evidence relied on by the People to prove the endangerment charge was identical to that underlying the strangulation charge. Even though non-violent conduct may provide a basis for an endangerment charge, the People relied on defendant's use of force in support of both charges. The People did not differentiate between the endangerment and strangulation charges in their complaint, opening statement, or summation, and in their response to the trial order seeking dismissal, the People's evidence for both charges focused on the defendant placing his hands on R.T.'s neck.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is a reasonable view supporting a justification instruction. According to the defendant's testimony, the defendant was reacting to multiple unprovoked punches from R.T., with the apparent expectation that more punches would follow. The defendant testified that he might have ended up grabbing R.T.'s neck accidentally while protecting his glass contact lenses. While R.T. and J.L. provided accounts that sharply diverged from the defendant's, the "charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence which, if credited, would negate it" (People v. J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 119 [2020], quoting People v McKenzie, 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]).

Our conclusion is bolstered by the court's decision to give an instruction on justification for the strangulation charge without objection. The only discernible explanation the People offer for why the justification instruction would be available for one charge but not the other is that a jury could have construed the defendant's other actions that did not involve force as "injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare" of R.T. While the People might have been able to prove their case that way, that is not the path they pursued at trial. Instead, the People relied on the defendant's use of force in support of both charges.

IV.

Because a reasonable view of the evidence supports the justification defense, the court was without discretion to deny the charge (see Padgett, 60 NY2d at 144-145). We reject the People's contention that the error was harmless.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Singas, J. (Concurring):

I join the majority in full and write to provide additional observations regarding difficulties that will likely arise in cases where use of physical force is not an essential element of the crime, but the People seek to prove a defendant's guilt with evidence of the defendant's use of force that may have been justified.

First, when the People seek to establish a defendant's guilt using—among other evidence—proof of the defendant's use of physical force, and when there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant's use of that force was justified, trial courts should specify the count to which justification defense applies (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 35.15 [1], https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/Defenses/CJI2d.Justification.

Person.Physical_Force.pdf [last accessed Oct. 21, 2026]) and should also identify the specific conduct to which that defense applies. This will permit the factfinder to evaluate the defense and, if the People fail to disprove it, to consider whether the People's other evidence nonetheless proves the defendant's guilt.

Second, when analyzing whether the trial court's failure to give a justification instruction to the jury was harmless error in such a case, appellate courts should similarly consider whether the evidence not subject to the justification defense overwhelmingly established the defendant's guilt and whether there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the instruction been given (see People v Jones, 3 NY3d 491, 497 [2004]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; see also People v J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 124 [2020]).

I agree with the majority that the error was not harmless here (see majority op at 8). Although the People offered some non-use-of-force evidence at trial tending to establish defendant's guilt of endangering the welfare of a child, that evidence was not overwhelming. Moreover, given [*4]that the People focused almost exclusively throughout this prosecution on defendant's use of force to prove the endangerment charge (see majority op at 7), there was certainly a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it been properly instructed on justification as a defense to that conduct.

Order reversed and a new trial ordered. Opinion by Judge Halligan. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro and Troutman concur, Judge Singas in a concurring opinion.

Decided October 27, 2026

Footnotes

Footnote 1

Penal Law § 260.10 (1) provides that an individual is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when "[h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his or her life or health."

Footnote 2

Penal Law § 121.12 provides that "[a] person is guilty of strangulation in the second degree when he or she commits the crime of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation . . . and thereby causes stupor, loss of consciousness for any period of time, or any other physical injury or impairment." The defendant was also charged with one count under Penal Law § 121.11 (a), but that count was dismissed before trial.

Footnote 3

Section 35.10 (1) provides that "[a] parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one . . . may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person." The defendant requested this instruction at trial, but he does not challenge its denial before this Court. Thus, we do not address the issue decided in Fields.