Justice Joseph A. McBride to ADA: disappear when I need to take care of these nasty investigative journalists, disabled or not. Part II.

On July 14, 2026, New York State Supreme Court Justice Joseph A. McBride issued a Decision and Order in Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc. , Delaware County Index No. EF2026-106, NYSCEF Doc. No. 166.

In that decision, Justice McBride acknowledged my legitimate disability-related needs for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He then denied the additional preparation time I requested, relying expressly upon my legal education, litigation activities, and journalism.

The significance of his ruling extends beyond the denial of an adjournment.  Justice McBride substituted his personal assessment of how a disabled attorney, civil-rights litigant, and journalist should manage her affairs for the individualized disability-access analysis required by federal law.

He also expressly treated my exercise of constitutional rights as a reason to deny an accommodation intended to permit me to exercise those very rights.

I. Justice McBride Acknowledged My Legitimate Need for ADA Accommodation

On page 6 of his July 14, 2026 Decision and Order, Justice McBride expressly acknowledged my:

“legitimate requests and needs for certain ADA accommodations”

This acknowledgment is legally important.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, prohibits public entities, including state courts, from denying qualified individuals with disabilities the benefits of public services or subjecting them to discrimination by reason of disability.

Its implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i), requires reasonable modifications to policies, practices, and procedures when necessary to avoid disability discrimination, unless the public entity demonstrates that the modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.

Justice McBride therefore was not deciding whether I deserved special treatment. He was administering a public judicial service subject to federal disability-discrimination law.

The issue was whether the court's scheduling practices required modification to permit me meaningful participation in litigation despite my disabilities.

Instead of undertaking that analysis, Justice McBride relied on considerations having nothing to do with my functional limitations.

II. Justice McBride Used My Legal Education, Litigation Activity, and Journalism Against My Request for Accommodation

Justice McBride wrote:

“Given Plaintiff’s background as a licensed attorney in New York, a frequent pro se litigant, her propensity to name several defendants within one action, and her noted journalism activity, it would be reasonable for Plaintiff to anticipate early, and even pre-answer, motion practice that would lead a reasonable person to anticipate this workload and therefore make necessary plans to litigate in a reasonable time period.”

Decision and Order dated July 14, 2026, NYSCEF Doc. No. 166, at 6.*\

Consider what the judge actually did.

He identified four personal characteristics or activities:

1. My background as a New York attorney.

2. My frequent participation in litigation without counsel.

3. My supposed propensity to name multiple defendants.

4. My journalism.

He then used those characteristics to reason that I should have anticipated the workload and arranged my affairs accordingly.

None of these four considerations measures my disability, my functional limitations, or the effectiveness of the accommodation I requested.

The ability to understand legal procedure is not the physical or neurological ability to work continuously.

Experience in litigation does not eliminate disability.

Commencing civil actions does not eliminate disability.

Publishing investigative journalism does not eliminate disability.

The ADA contains no exception for educated disabled people, professionally experienced disabled people, disabled litigants who commence multiple actions, or disabled journalists.

Yet Justice McBride's reasoning effectively imposed precisely such an exception.

III. Justice McBride Converted My Exercise of the Right to Petition the Government Into a Reason to Deny Disability Accommodation

Justice McBride went further.

In footnote 10, he wrote:

 “The Court wishes to note here that most, if not all, of the cases that Plaintiff cites as contributing to her workload were cases in which pro se Plaintiff, either alone or with her husband and co-plaintiff, Mr. Frederick Neroni, commenced actions before the Court.”

*Id., at 6 n.10.*

What legal significance does the fact that I commenced those actions have for the question of whether my disability requires accommodation?

The First Amendment protects the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Access to the courts is one recognized means of exercising that right.

Title II of the ADA protects meaningful access to public judicial services by qualified individuals with disabilities.

These protections operate together. A disabled litigant does not surrender disability protections by exercising the right to commence litigation.

Justice McBride nevertheless treated my initiation of lawsuits as an adverse consideration in deciding whether I should receive accommodation.

His reasoning shifted responsibility for the workload from the court's scheduling decisions to my exercise of the right to sue.

The distinction matters.

I chose to commence civil actions, a protected activity.  I did not choose to have sixteen motions calendared for the same day, May 20, 2026.

Nor did I choose to be afforded approximately three weeks to respond to motion practice that included a nearly 2,475-page record from Matter of Ryan (prior case of Watershed Defendants, FOIL-related - my case had nothing to do with FOIL), developed over approximately two years and already familiar to the opposing attorneys.

I requested additional time because of my disabilities and the actual demands of that calendar.

Justice McBride answered by pointing out that I had commenced lawsuits.

That is not an individualized assessment of reasonable accommodation. It is the use of protected litigation activity as a negative factor in an ADA determination.

IV. Justice McBride Substituted Professional Competence for Disability-Related Functional Capacity

A lawyer can be legally competent and physically disabled.

A journalist can be intellectually capable and neurologically disabled.

A litigant can understand a motion perfectly well yet be unable to read thousands of pages, conduct research, dictate responses, and prepare legal submissions within an artificially compressed schedule.

Justice McBride's reliance on my professional background confused these separate questions.

My education and legal experience may explain my ability to identify legal issues and prepare pleadings. They do not determine how many hours per day my neurological disabilities permit me to function.

In Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District, 132 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2025), the Second Circuit addressed the distinction between an individual's ability to perform despite a disability and the right to reasonable accommodation.

The relevant principle is that the ability to function under strain does not, by itself, eliminate the need for accommodation.

Justice McBride's reasoning ran in the opposite direction: because I was experienced, he considered it reasonable to expect me to anticipate and manage the workload.

He treated competence as a substitute for physical capacity and foreseeability as a substitute for accessibility.

Neither substitution appears in Title II of the ADA.

V. Justice Joseph A. McBride Deliberately Omitted the Specific, Quantifiable Workload That Necessitated My ADA Accommodation

Perhaps the most revealing aspect of Justice Joseph A. McBride's July 14, 2026 Decision and Order in Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc., Delaware County Index No. EF2026-106, is not merely what he said about my disability and request for accommodation, but what he omitted.

Justice McBride expressly acknowledged my “legitimate requests and needs for certain ADA accommodations.”

He nevertheless denied the additional preparation time I requested, invoking my legal education, litigation activity, supposed propensity to name multiple defendants, and journalism.

What he omitted was the actual, quantifiable workload that necessitated the accommodation.

A. Sixteen motions calendared for a single day by two Supreme Court justices

On May 20, 2026, I faced sixteen motions returnable on the same day, calendared by two New York State Supreme Court justices: Joseph A. McBride and Christopher P. Baker.

These were not sixteen identical motions requiring repetitive responses.

They arose in different proceedings, involved different defendants, different procedural histories, different legal issues, and different factual records.

Each required separate examination, legal research, and preparation of an appropriate response.

The sixteen-motion calendar was not something I imposed upon myself. It resulted from the scheduling decisions of the courts.

Yet Justice McBride did not meaningfully address that extraordinary concentration of motion practice in his stated ADA analysis.

Instead, he attributed responsibility for the workload to my having commenced litigation.

In footnote 10 of his July 14 decision, he wrote:

“The Court wishes to note here that most, if not all, of the cases that Plaintiff cites as contributing to her workload were cases in which pro se Plaintiff, either alone or with her husband and co-plaintiff, Mr. Frederick Neroni, commenced actions before the Court.”

Decision and Order dated July 14, 2026, NYSCEF Doc. No. 166, at 6 n.10.

The distinction is fundamental.

I commenced lawsuits. I did not schedule sixteen motions for the same day. Justices McBride and Baker did.

And the ADA does not authorize a court to deny a disabled litigant reasonable accommodation because she exercised her constitutional right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

B. One motion alone required examination of approximately 2,000 pages from another proceeding

The sixteen-motion calendar included Motion No. 4 filed by the Watershed Agricultural Council defendants.

That motion relied upon a voluminous record from Matter of Ryan v. Watershed Agricultural Council.

The record comprised 2,475 pages of material developed over roughly two years of litigation.

The attorneys representing the defendants had participated in the underlying proceedings or had access to the record over that extended period.

I had not litigated Ryan.

Nevertheless, I was expected to review the record, identify relevant facts, examine the procedural history, research the applicable law, distinguish the underlying litigation from my own claims, and prepare a substantive opposition.

I was afforded approximately three weeks.

Two years of familiarity with the record on the defendants' side. Approximately three weeks for me to examine and answer it.

And that was only one motion among sixteen returnable on the same day.

Justice McBride omitted this concrete disparity from his stated reasoning.

He did not analyze the 2,475 pages. He did not address the competing demands of the remaining fifteen motions. He did not explain how my disability-related limitations affected the time necessary to complete the work.

Instead, he reasoned that my experience as an attorney and frequent litigant meant that I should have anticipated substantial motion practice.

C. The work required more than reading: I needed to prepare an evidentiary affirmation under Carr v. Wegmans

The requested accommodation was not an attempt to delay litigation indefinitely.

I sought time to prepare an evidentiary affirmation opposing the defendants' CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion.

Under Carr v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 182 A.D.3d 667 (3d Dept. 2020), a plaintiff may submit evidentiary material in opposition to a motion attacking the sufficiency of a pleading.

Preparing that affirmation required more than simply reading the Ryan record.

It required identifying relevant portions of the record, comparing those materials with the allegations of my own complaint, researching the applicable legal principles, and explaining why the defendants' reliance upon Ryan did not defeat my causes of action.

These activities required sustained concentration, document review, legal analysis, and preparation of a coherent evidentiary submission.

My neurological disabilities substantially restrict the amount of sustained work I can perform.

Justice McBride's reliance upon my legal education did not address that limitation.

Professional knowledge does not create additional neurological capacity.

Nor does experience in litigation transform three weeks of calendar time into three weeks of uninterrupted, productive legal work for a disabled person.

D. Justice McBride disregarded the difference between calendar time and disability-limited working time

The ADA requires attention to actual functional limitations.

For a person with significant neurological disabilities, twenty-one calendar days cannot simply be equated with twenty-one full working days.

My ability to read, research, dictate, review, and prepare legal documents is limited by my medical conditions.

My request for additional time reflected those limitations, compounded by the simultaneous sixteen-motion calendar and the extraordinary volume of the Ryan record.

Justice McBride did not undertake a functional analysis of that workload in his quoted reasoning.

Instead, he invoked what he believed a person with my legal background and litigation experience should have anticipated.

This substituted an expectation of professional performance for an individualized examination of disability-related capacity.

The Second Circuit's reasoning in Tudor v. Whitehall Central School District, 132 F.4th 242 (2d Cir. 2025), is particularly relevant: the ability to perform despite disability-related hardship does not itself eliminate entitlement to reasonable accommodation.

A disabled litigant does not become less disabled by being knowledgeable, experienced, persistent, or professionally competent.

E. I requested a defined accommodation of approximately four months

I requested an adjournment until approximately the end of September 2026.

The requested modification was concrete and limited.

It concerned the time necessary to address sixteen simultaneous motions, including one resting upon approximately 2,000 pages from another lawsuit, while functioning within my disability-related restrictions.

Justice McBride did not explain in the quoted passage why that accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of the court's services.

Instead, he relied upon my background and activities:

“Given Plaintiff’s background as a licensed attorney in New York, a frequent pro se litigant, her propensity to name several defendants within one action, and her noted journalism activity, it would be reasonable for Plaintiff to anticipate early, and even pre-answer, motion practice that would lead a reasonable person to anticipate this workload and therefore make necessary plans to litigate in a reasonable time period.”

Decision and Order dated July 14, 2026, NYSCEF Doc. No. 166, at 6.

This reasoning answers a question different from the one presented under Title II of the ADA.

Whether I could anticipate litigation is not the same question as whether I could meaningfully participate in that litigation under the court's imposed schedule despite my disabilities.

F. Justice McBride replaced the statutory inquiry with a judgment about my personal activities

The actual ADA question was straightforward:

Could a disabled litigant with significant neurological limitations meaningfully prepare responses to sixteen motions returnable on the same day, including an evidentiary opposition requiring review of 2,475 pages from another proceeding, within three weeks?

Justice McBride answered a different question:

Should a legally educated, experienced litigant and journalist have anticipated that two judges would simultaneously create an unmanageable motion calendar and deny her reasonable time to prepare?  BECAUSE I am a pro se civil rights plaintiff and BECAUSE I am an investigative journalist - and, while we are at it, BECAUSE of WHAT KIND of investigative journalist I am, reporting for over a decade on JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, including McBride's own.

The first question concerns disability, reasonable modification, functional capacity, and meaningful access to court.

The second deliberately proclaims that a state court may deny a disabled litigant ADA accommodations based on the content of his speech and based on the quality and frequency of his protected activity.  In other words, McBride said - if you are disabled, sit at home, do not sue, and do not be a journalist.  If you dare sue and if you dare engage in journalism, SUCK IT UP - BECAUSE ADA IS OUT OF YOUR REACH.

BUT, newsflash for McBride:  ADA does not have McBride-invented exceptions for ADA coverage for civil rights plaintiffs or journalists.

G. The consequences extended to dismissal and sanctions

The denial of accommodation had direct procedural consequences.

I requested additional time to prepare an evidentiary affirmation.

The requested time was denied.

I was unable to complete the intended affirmation.

Justice McBride proceeded to decide the defendants' motion, relying upon the Ryan record that I had requested additional time to examine and answer.

He also initiated sanctions proceedings under 22 NYCRR Part 130.

The sequence is legally significant.

The court denied the disability-related modification necessary for preparation of my intended submission, proceeded to adjudicate the case without that submission, and imposed punitive consequences.

The authority to manage a court calendar and sanction litigation conduct does not supersede the obligations imposed by Title II of the ADA.

A court cannot disregard the disability-related consequences of its own procedural decisions and then treat the resulting litigation disadvantage as though the denied accommodation played no role.

H. Why the omissions matter under federal disability law

Justice McBride had before him a specific accommodation request arising from a specific workload.

The material circumstances included:

• Sixteen motions returnable on May 20, 2026, calendared by Justices Joseph A. McBride and Christopher P. Baker.
• 2,475 pages of material from Matter of Ryan underlying just one of those motions.
• Approximately two years during which the underlying record had developed and opposing counsel had access to it.
• Approximately three weeks afforded to me to review and answer that material while addressing the remaining motions.
• My significant disability-related restrictions on sustained work.
• My request for approximately four months to prepare an adequate response.

Justice McBride's quoted reasoning did not address those circumstances as an individualized disability-access problem.

He instead invoked my professional qualifications, litigation activity, and journalism.

Those omissions are not merely defects in the thoroughness of his written decision.

They are central to the legal characterization of what occurred.

The actual workload supplied the factual basis for my accommodation request. By excluding it from his stated analysis and substituting considerations unrelated to disability, Justice McBride applied a rationale fundamentally different from the one required by 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i).

The resulting decision raises substantial questions of failure to make reasonable modifications, discriminatory administration of judicial services, and denial of meaningful access to court.

It also raises a separate First Amendment question because Justice McBride expressly identified my litigation and journalism as considerations supporting his refusal.

Sixteen motions. One day.  2,475 pages in one motion alone. Three weeks to respond. Four months requested.

Those were the concrete facts requiring disability-related analysis.

Justice McBride chose to discuss my education, my lawsuits, and my journalism instead.

That is the central legal defect in his July 14, 2026 ADA ruling.

VI. Justice McBride's Denial of Accommodation Affected My Ability to Oppose the Motion on Its Merits

The denial was not merely an inconvenience.

Under Carr v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 182 A.D.3d 667 (3d Dept. 2020), a plaintiff opposing a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion may submit evidentiary material in support of the sufficiency of the pleading.

I sought additional time to review the Matter of Ryan record and prepare the evidentiary affirmation necessary to respond to the defendants' arguments.

Without the requested time, I was unable to complete that affirmation.

Justice McBride then proceeded to adjudicate the defendants' motion upon a record I had been denied sufficient time to address.

This produced a direct sequence:

- I requested disability-related additional preparation time.

- The judge denied the requested accommodation.

- I was unable to complete the intended evidentiary opposition.

- The judge proceeded to decide the motion and imposed sanctions.

The legal issue is not simply that the court denied an adjournment.

The court denied disability-related access to the time necessary to prepare my opposition, then adjudicated my case and imposed punishment in the procedural circumstances resulting from that denial.

That sequence raises a serious question of denial of meaningful access under Title II, independently of whether the court's substantive determination on the motion was correct.

VII. Justice McBride Expressly Used My Journalism as a Factor in the ADA Decision

The reference to my “noted journalism activity” deserves separate examination.

Journalism is protected expressive activity under the First Amendment.

My reporting concerns public officials, judicial conduct, local government, and matters of public concern.

Justice McBride's own July 14 decision recognized that my action alleged retaliation arising from litigation, witness participation, investigations, and journalistic reporting concerning municipal conduct.

Yet the same decision expressly invoked my journalism in explaining why I should have anticipated the litigation workload and arranged to meet it.

In other words, the activity that formed part of the subject matter of my retaliation claims became an adverse consideration in the judicial determination of my disability accommodation request.

This raises a distinct First Amendment question.

A public official may not impose adverse treatment because a person engages in protected expression or petitions the government.

A retaliation claim requires examination of the protected activity, the adverse action, and the causal relationship between them. Justice McBride's express reference to my journalism supplies a particularly significant factual basis for examining that relationship.

His language does not merely reveal that he knew I was a journalist.

He affirmatively incorporated my journalism into his stated rationale for denying the accommodation I requested.

That is the legally significant act.

VIII. Justice McBride Effectively Created Categories of Disabled People Entitled to Less Protection

The practical effect of Justice McBride's reasoning was to divide disabled litigants according to characteristics not recognized by the ADA as grounds for reducing their statutory protection.

Under his rationale, an experienced attorney should anticipate the workload.

A frequent litigant should anticipate the workload.

A person who names multiple defendants should anticipate the workload.

A journalist should anticipate the workload.

But the ADA protects qualified individuals with disabilities regardless of whether they are inexperienced or sophisticated, passive or active, professionally trained or untrained.

The statutory inquiry concerns disability-related access, not whether the court approves of the individual's choices, activities, or degree of experience.

Justice McBride's reasoning therefore amounted to an unauthorized narrowing of the class of disabled individuals entitled to effective accommodation.

He did not formally amend the ADA. He did something with immediate practical consequences: he applied an exception of his own making to my request for accommodation.

IX. The ADA Violation and the Subsequent Sanctions Must Be Examined Together

The July 14 ruling did not occur in isolation.

Justice McBride denied the additional time I requested, decided the defendants' motion to dismiss, and initiated sanctions proceedings under 22 NYCRR Part 130.

The relationship between these actions is legally material.

A court's authority to regulate litigation and impose sanctions does not displace its independent obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access under federal disability law.

The existence of judicial discretion over adjournments does not mean that discretion may be exercised on grounds inconsistent with Title II.

Likewise, sanctions authority does not authorize a court to disregard the effect of its own denial of disability accommodation upon a litigant's ability to prepare and present a case.

The procedural sequence must be examined as a whole, particularly where the court was expressly informed of the disability-related limitations and acknowledged the legitimacy of accommodation needs.

The relevant question is whether the court's refusal to modify its procedures denied me meaningful access and whether the subsequent adjudication and sanctions compounded the consequences of that denial.

X. What Justice McBride Actually Did, in Legal Terms

The conduct reflected in the July 14, 2026 ruling can be characterized through several distinct legal doctrines.

First, failure to make reasonable modifications under Title II of the ADA.  Justice McBride denied the requested scheduling modification while relying on my professional and expressive activities rather than the disability-related necessity and effectiveness of the requested accommodation.

Second, discriminatory administration of a public judicial service.  His reasoning applied personal criteria unrelated to disability-related access in determining whether I would receive the requested modification. This implicates 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130.

Third, denial of meaningful access to the courts.  The refusal of additional preparation time prevented me from completing the evidentiary opposition I intended to submit, and the court proceeded to adjudicate the motion notwithstanding that consequence.

Fourth, adverse consideration of constitutionally protected activity.  Justice McBride expressly relied upon my litigation activity and journalism when explaining his refusal of accommodation. That reasoning implicates the First Amendment's protections of petitioning and expression and warrants analysis under retaliation doctrine.

Fifth, the use of disability-related procedural disadvantage in subsequent adjudication. The denial of additional time, the resulting inability to complete my evidentiary submission, and the subsequent dismissal and sanctions are connected events, not unrelated exercises of judicial discretion.

What can I say.

When McBride ruled against me, declaring that I am not entitled to ADA coverage because I am a pro se civil rights plaintiff and an investigative journalist, McBride was ALREADY disqualified from presiding - because he prejudged the action, as I described in the previous article (which I knew and brought out on a motion to disqualify him) and because he was a material witness in two of the pending cases he prejudged (which I did not know at the time).

Yet, little did I know that, when McBride, on July 14 2026, in his decision in Neroni v Watershed in Delaware County Supreme Court was taking an axe to the ADA bill-of-attainder style barring a disabled journalist (me) from its mandatory benefits, there was a SECOND investigative journalist - with a vision impairment - to whom McBride ALSO denied ADA coverage, not in such an open way as with me, but did it nevertheless.

The story will continue.

Stay tuned.

What a spectacular disappointment: I AM NOT UNIQUE - in anti-disability discrimination by Chenango County Supreme Court Justice Joseph A. McBride. Part I.

 There are dirty public officials.  And - there are beyond-dirty public officials.

Chenango County Supreme Court Justice (former Chenango County DA Joseph A. McBride) is very, very dirty - that I knew for decades.

I already wrote on this blog that he paved the path to his judicial election by three (3) murder trials against Peter Wlasiuk where, after two (2) reversals, one of them - because he "maligned" (Appellate Division's language, not mine) my husband, the second defense counsel in the first murder trial.

He had no right to (1) bring this case to the grand jury, or (2) try it - any time.

Why?

Because his close blood relative - a brother, I understand, Peter McBride, was the first defense counsel for Wlasiuk in the first trial.

And because his 1st ADA Dunshee was a blood relative of the alleged murder victim - and was nevertheless actively participating in the prosecution.  That was according to Wlasiuk's habeas corpus petition in federal court.

And then comes the year 2014 when I, as a journalist and a then-practicing criminal defense counsel, criticized McBride's DA office's misconduct = ex parte communications with a non-attorney justice court-judge, attempting to influence him and apply pressure upon me after McBride's office missed speedy trial deadlines.  The McBride-office's-influenced judge went so far as to call me ex parte personally attempting to have me waive (forgive) the missed deadlines.  When I refused, the judge, in open court, claimed that I do not deserve respect.  Well, I survived that.  Defense attorneys survive a lot of flack for their clients.  I got for my client a dismissal on speedy trial grounds nevertheless.

And then comes the year 2023 when my husband and I, South Carolina residents, were sued in New York by a New York neighbor for an alleged easement dispute.

McBride was assigned, and, of course, had no dignity or integrity to step down immediately given the years of hatred and malicious gossip spewed by him against my husband in and out of courtroom.

And - what did he do?  But of course - without looking at the record: whether we were served or not (we were not), he ordered us to appear to oppose a motion (also were not served with it) from South Carolina to New York - a 1500 mile roundtrip.  I must add that in another litigation in 2026, McBride repeatedly refused to give me any hearing where I was entitled to it.

But, in 2023, McBride engaged in a classic bait-and-switch.

He FIRST ordered us (again, we were not served with the complaint, or with the motion, McBride had no jurisdiction over us, but anyway) to appear physically, in person, in New York from South Carolina to oppose an unserved motion where it was clear on the face of the motion that it was frivolous.

We did not go - naturally.

We then receive an order saying - because we did not appear (did not have to), McBride granted everything plaintiff asked for (never bothered to look whether the standard of proof was satisfied for those particular types of motion, CPLR 306-b, CPLR 308(5) ).  The pertinent issue was - the order was false and misleading.  It stated on its face that the motion hearing was held at the courthouse at 3 Court Street, Delhi, NY 13753 in person.

So, we had no basis to suspect that it was not true, and we gave McBride, as a judge, the benefit of the doubt, and moved to vacate it on other grounds.

We only asked for certain disability accommodations, and plaintiff's counsel bitterly opposed it, asking McBride to punish us both for my husband's complaint against McBride to the Judicial Conduct Commission - and to deny us ADA accommodations in retaliation.

Well, that was uniquely unlawful.

My husband pointed out that he will simply sue for ADA violations.  So, McBride - thankfully - recused.  

And, even then we did not suspect anything.  We made a motion to vacate before the new judge, and won both the motion to vacate and the motion to dismiss that action for facial insufficiency of service.  And - as I understand it now - that may have been the whole calculation, that we will simply "go away" with the whole controversy of McBride's trying to drag us from South Carolina to New York despite never having been served.

But we do not leave pertinent questions in litigation unanswered.  So we asked for a transcript of that motion hearing before McBride.  What we discovered blew our minds.

The hearing was not - as it was portrayed on the face of McBride's order - held in the courthouse.

It was held virtually, online, by Microsoft Teams.

While there is nothing wrong per se to hold virtual court hearings, in this situation, there was no rescheduling order filed, we were not notified at all, and the order said it was held in the physical courtroom, thus claiming that we knew, we at least were notified by mail (insufficient service where we were not initially served by the complaint, but still).

So, McBride LIED and ALTERED a court document in order to declare a default against us and to order unlawful alternative service by e-mail.  He said we did not appear - which presupposes notification.

There is nothing in the docket showing that (1) McBride rescheduled the hearing to be held on Teams - like it WAS actually held; and (2) that we were notified of the rescheduling.

The interesting thing was though that the plaintiff's counsel WAS there, on Teams - so HE knew, so that means McBride notified plaintiff's counsel ex parte, and then both of them pretended on record that we were notified, but did not appear, in full knowledge we were never notified of the change of the place of the hearing (from physical courtroom to Teams).

Well, ok, he recused, his decision was vacated, the case was dismissed.  It was refiled, a new judge was assigned, we fought and won it now on the merits, a summary judgment dismissing the case.

Nothing prepared me for 2026 when McBride re-entered my case and our (my husband's and my own) other case - with a literal vengeance.

In the case where both of us were plaintiffs, McBride disregarded that I was e-filing and my husband was not, did not send my husband any notifications whatsoever, disregarded the fact that the  defendant did not serve - at all - his pre-answer motion to dismiss upon my husband, disregard my e-filed Notice of Rejection of the motion and notice of default and, acting ex parte and sua sponte, not only granted the unserved motion to dismiss, but also changed the caption protecting the defendant and then claimed that all actions we filed over 3 years (without mentioning them or analyzing them) are frivolous, and imposed a district-wide permanent anti-filing injunction upon us.

That was on June 26, 2026.

On June 29, 2026, I made a motion in another case where McBride was presiding asking him to step down because of pre-judgment of the case - because the pending case squarely fell within the universe of cases he prejudged on June 26, 2026 as frivolous simply because they were filed by either one of us within the last 3 years.

McBride ignored the submitted, unopposed motion to disqualify for prejudgment, ruled against me, dismissed the case and again imposed sanctions and anti-filing injunction, not only upon me, but also upon my husband who - in that court case - was not a party.

After that a complete circus began.  I filed notices of appeal.

I also filed post-judgment notices of motion to vacate - since decisions on sanctions were made without notice, without opportunity to oppose them and without a hearing.

So far, McBride ERASED - simply erased - four of them, one in the first action and three in the second action (made before dismissal, and two made after dismissal, the latest one made on an order to show cause).

Erasing Motion # 1 (addressing prejudging) in Case # 2 (where my husband is not a party) had an additional problem - McBride erased a motion that has become part of the record on appeal of the order of dismissal (he denied the motion in the text of the order).

Thus, I needed to go back to McBride and make motions to restore the appellate record - but he is erasing motions, a circular problem.

Next, since his imposition of sanctions upon us in Case # 1 where both of us were parties and in Case # 2 where only I was a party, was without notice, under New York law such decisions are not appealable as of right and require to first bring a motion to vacate and then appeal from the denial of such a motion.  But, McBride erases motions to vacate, thus foreclosing our path to appeal.

While figuring out how to get out of this situation that McBride put us in, I received documents from Delaware County that were withheld from us for two years, and, lo and behold, within them, I find information that McBride was connected to two of the cases he prejudged on June 26, 2026 as a material witness.

He had to disclose that and to recuse.

But, not for him.

So, now I have in my lap a new set of evidence entitling me to move - again - to vacate and recuse - Motion # 2 in Case # 1 and Motion # 4 in Case # 2 - but he is erasing these motions as they come in.  

And - the question remains, and this is what I am figuring out right now - do I move to vacate, or do I sue the State of New York for ADA discrimination, obtaining all damages that ensued after McBride's dismissal of my meritorious claims?

Because of the way HOW he dismissed them.

What happened is - a motion to dismiss was brought upon a 16-motion calendar.  I had 3 weeks to address those motions.  One of the motions was the defendants' in Case # 2, and defendants based that motion on their own prior case (unrelated to me, so I was not a party and did not know the record), with a record of 2,475 pages (counted based on NYSCEF filings).

That was a humanly impossible workload.  I am also disabled, severely so.  I asked McBride for ADA accommodations - MULTIPLE times.  He brooded, and brooded, and brooded, and I asked, and asked, and asked - at least an answer required by ADA.

Then, he first prejudges Case # 1, then comes to Case # 2, ignores pending motion to recuse based on prejudgment, dismisses Case # 2 as I described above, and imposes ex parte sua sponte sanctions.

But, in order to dismiss Case # 2, McBride had to rule that my pleadings were legally insufficient.

And, to do that, he had to skip over my sworn statement saying that McBride denied me ADA accommodations, did not give me enough time to prepare an opposition, violated my rights set by a 3rd Department  binding precedent that allows me to oppose a pre-answer motion to dismiss with an affidavit, and to prepare that affidavit, I had to have time to read those 2475 pages (that opposing counsel had for nearly 3 years to digest and I had, in my disabled state, 3 weeks, on top of other 15 pending motions for the same motion calendar).

And DID he skip over that sworn ADA statement!

He made a ruling that was UNIQUE in its ... well, be the judge.

In Neroni v. Watershed Agricultural Council of the New York City Watersheds, Inc., Delaware County Supreme Court, Index No. EF2026-106, Justice Joseph A. McBride wrote the following in his Decision and Order dated July 14, 2026, NYSCEF Doc. No. 166, page 6.

After acknowledging my “legitimate requests and needs for certain ADA accommodations,” he stated:

"Given Plaintiff’s background as a licensed attorney in New York, a frequent pro se litigant, her propensity to name several defendants within one action, and her noted journalism activity, it would be reasonable for Plaintiff to anticipate early, and even pre-answer, motion practice that would lead a reasonable person to anticipate this workload and therefore make necessary plans to litigate in a reasonable time period."

Further, in footnote 10, page 6, McBride added:

"The Court wishes to note here that most, if not all, of the cases that Plaintiff cites as contributing to her workload were cases in which pro se Plaintiff, either alone or with her husband and co-plaintiff, Mr. Frederick Neroni, commenced actions before the Court.:

HUH?!

The critical language is McBride's express acknowledgment of my legitimate disability-related accommodation needs, followed by his reliance on my professional background, litigation activity, and journalism in denying my ADA accommodation request.

In other words, McBride has carved an exception to the federally mandated Americans with Disabilities Act by saying - it does not cover disabled pro se plaintiffs, and it does not cover disabled journalists.  If you are a disabled journalist and a disabled pro se plaintiff, you must "make necessary plans" for any impossible workloads an ADA-covered entity (the state court) imposes on you.

And THAT, ladies and gentlement, brings me to the earlier-announced disappointment.

I thought that that crazily unlawful ruling was the result of McBride's crazy and vicious hatred of my husband, developed over many decades of opposition in the courtroom when McBride was DA and my husband was criminal defense counsel and wiped the court floor with McBride - who is NOT a legal whiz.

Yesterday I learnt that it is not so.

Because, yesterday, i learnt that McBride was assigned, EARLIER than to my cases in 2026, to a case of ANOTHER disabled investigative journalist, John Solak, in Broome County Supreme Court, and did in that case the functional equivalent of what he did in my case in regards to discrimination based on disability.

And that story will come next.

Stay tuned.

The Hamden BESS project - YAY! Found the buried secret. Will reveal soon in a lawsuit

 

WHO OWNS HAMDEN? NEW YORK CITY'S $8.88 MILLION FOOTPRINT IN A SMALL CATSKILL TOWN The 2026 Hamden Assessment Roll reveals 86 New York City property interests—including conservation easements—while local landowners continue to bear the consequences of watershed restrictions.

 For decades, property owners in Delaware County, New York, have lived with an extraordinary arrangement: their land is situated in the watershed that supplies drinking water to New York City, hundreds of miles away.

New York City benefits from the Catskill/Delaware water supply system, which operates without filtration under a conditional regulatory arrangement. The surrounding rural communities have accommodated land-use restrictions, conservation programs, and limitations on development intended to protect that water.

But how much property does New York City actually own or control in the Town of Hamden?

I examined the 2026 Final Assessment Roll for the Town of Hamden, a 304-page public document identifying the Town's taxable properties, their owners, assessed values, exemptions, and other information.

The findings deserve public attention.

$8,884,520 IN NEW YORK CITY PROPERTY INTERESTS

The assessment-roll analysis identified 86 entries associated with the City of New York, including properties recorded under the City, its Bureau of Water Supply, and NYC DEP-related designations.

Their combined stated full market value is:

$8,884,520.

The entries fall into two categories:

Category	Entries	Full market value
NYC-owned land and other non-easement entries	48	$6,833,623
NYC conservation easement entries	38	$2,050,897
TOTAL	86	$8,884,520

The assessment roll uses a valuation date of July 1, 2025, and a taxable-status date of March 1, 2026.

These figures concern assessed property interests, not the City's annual tax payments. Conservation easements represent interests in land that may remain privately owned; they should not be confused with outright ownership of the underlying parcels.

Nevertheless, they reveal something important about the extent of New York City's involvement in Hamden's real estate.

New York City is not merely a distant consumer of the region's water. It is a substantial landowner and holder of property rights within the Town.

LAND OWNERSHIP IS ONLY PART OF THE STORY

The importance of these figures cannot be measured solely in dollars.

New York City purchases land and acquires conservation easements in the watershed to protect the quality of its drinking-water supply.

A conservation easement can impose lasting restrictions on development and land use even when the property remains in private ownership.

Such restrictions can shape what a landowner may build, how the land may be used, and what opportunities remain available to future purchasers.

The result is a landscape in which New York City's water-supply interests are embedded not only in public regulation but also in private property rights.

The economic consequences are experienced locally.

Hamden residents pay property taxes, maintain roads and buildings, operate farms and businesses, and attempt to preserve or sell their properties in a region whose development has long been shaped by the requirements of a distant metropolitan water system.

AND NOW COMES THE FRASER BATTERY STORAGE PROJECT

Against that background, consider the proposed Fraser battery energy storage facility.

According to the developer's December 2025 Emergency Response Plan, the project is designed around 196 Tesla Megapack 2 XL units, with a stated facility rating of 135 MW / 540 MWh.

The same document identifies a nominal capacity of 3,916 kWh per unit—producing an aggregate equipment figure of approximately 767.536 MWh if all 196 units have that nominal capacity.

The difference between the stated facility capacity and the aggregate unit specifications deserves a clear explanation.

But the central question is broader.

How does a region historically subjected to extensive watershed-protection restrictions now accommodate a proposed industrial battery installation with foreseeable fire, smoke, and contaminated-runoff hazards?

Does the proposed facility fall within the same watershed-protection framework that has governed other forms of development?

Which governmental agencies have reviewed its potential effects on water quality?

What standards are being applied?

And are those standards consistent with the restrictions imposed upon ordinary property owners?

The assessment roll does not answer these questions. It demonstrates why they matter.

THE COUNTY LANDFILL ADDS ANOTHER DIMENSION

There is another environmental controversy unfolding in the same region.

In August 2026, Delaware County opposed proposed NYSDEC regulations concerning landfill leachate, including requirements addressing PFAS and other contaminants.

According to The Mountain Eagle, County Attorney Kevin M. Young participated in presenting the County's opposition, while County officials warned that compliance could require approximately $50 million in infrastructure improvements.

On September 2, 2026, the Town of Hamden adopted its own resolution opposing the proposed regulations.

My husband and I own approximately 40 acres of residential property along State Highway 10, about one mile from the Delaware County landfill.

We have repeatedly experienced noxious odors reaching our property, sometimes in overpowering concentrations.

We live in South Carolina now and want to sell our New York property.

The scenic beauty of a wooded Catskill mountain valley is a substantial part of its attraction. Recurring landfill odors are hardly a selling point.

The landfill-leachate controversy concerns water pollution, while our firsthand experience concerns airborne odors. They are distinct problems, but both illustrate why environmental regulation matters to property owners.

AND WHO IS THE ATTORNEY INVOLVED IN THESE MATTERS?

Here is another remarkable overlap.

Kevin M. Young of Young/Sommer LLC has represented Delaware County in environmental and watershed matters, including negotiations concerning New York City's watershed restrictions.

Young/Sommer also represents the Town of Hamden.

And Young/Sommer represents Fraser Storage, LLC, the private developer proposing the battery facility.

On March 4, 2026, the Hamden Town Board approved a conflict-of-interest waiver permitting the firm's concurrent representation of the Town and Fraser. This conflict is NOT reconcilable. I wonder what kind of "arrangements" were involved to get that conflict agreement to be signed, but whoever did it should be impeached and barred from ever holding public office. It is not for sale.

The firm has also been involved in selecting consultants to review the Fraser application.

These are documented relationships. Their precise scope, the disclosures accompanying the waiver, and the legal consequences of the concurrent representations warrant examination.

The public is entitled to ask how independent municipal review is maintained when the same law firm represents both the municipality and the private developer seeking its approval.

And the firm's involvement in County landfill and watershed matters makes those questions all the more important.

WHOSE ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS COUNT?

The 2026 assessment roll supplies a useful starting point for a much larger examination of land ownership, environmental policy, and economic development in Delaware County.

New York City has accumulated millions of dollars in assessed land and conservation interests in Hamden.

For decades, the need to protect its unfiltered drinking-water supply has influenced the economic opportunities available to local landowners.

Meanwhile, Delaware County and Hamden have opposed additional landfill-leachate regulations, and a major industrial battery project is moving through the local review process.

Why should ordinary landowners bear watershed restrictions while major industrial proposals receive consideration without a publicly demonstrated reconciliation of their hazards with the same watershed-protection objectives?

That is not an argument against protecting New York City's drinking water.

It is an argument for consistent environmental protection, independent governmental decision-making, and equal consideration of local property owners' interests.

New York City's drinking water matters.

So do Hamden's residents, their wells, their homes, their land, and their ability to sell property without having its value undermined by industrial pollution or environmental hazards.

The watershed cannot be treated as too precious for ordinary economic development and, at the same time, as an acceptable location for industrial hazards without a rigorous, transparent explanation.

The public deserves that explanation.

---

Primary source: Town of Hamden, 2026 Final Assessment Roll, taxable section, valuation date July 1, 2025.

Additional sources: Fraser Storage, LLC, Emergency Response Plan, Revision 1, December 14, 2025; Town of Hamden Town Board minutes, March 4 and September 2, 2026; Town of Hamden Planning Board minutes, July 28, 2026; The Mountain Eagle, August 31, 2026, “New Regulations Could Force Early Landfill Closure, Officials Say”; Delaware County Department of Public Works, September 2026 landfill-leachate regulatory materials.

The figures in the article have been checked against the uploaded assessment roll: 86 NYC-listed entries totaling $8,884,520, including 38 conservation-easement entries valued at $2,050,897.

HAMDEN: THE BATTERY PROJECT, THE COUNTY LANDFILL, THE STINKING FOGS - AND YOUNG/SOMMER LLC — THE SAME LAW FIRM KEEPS TURNING UP!

I have just posted information from Fraser Storage, LLC's own Emergency Response Plan concerning the actual size of the proposed battery facility, its fire hazards, and the extraordinary limitations imposed upon firefighters responding to a battery fire.

AND VOILA, ANOTHER DISCOVERY.

The law firm representing Fraser Storage, LLC, the private developer seeking permission to construct this massive industrial battery facility - and the Town of Hamden whose (I will drop my comments) leadership agreed to be run by the developer through Young/Sommer LLC as Town Attorneys - apparently has a finger in every pie, and represents ALSO the County!

The same law firm also represents the Town of Hamden, is responsible for reviewing and potentially approving Fraser's application - and picking "independent" consultants to assess the safety of Fraser project.

On March 4, 2026, the Hamden Town Board approved a conflict-of-interest waiver allowing Young/Sommer to represent both the municipality and the developer.

BUT WAIT. YOUNG/SOMMER ALSO REPRESENTS DELAWARE COUNTY!

And Kevin M. Young, of that very firm, has been actively involved in the County's efforts to oppose additional environmental regulation of its landfill.

That stinking site that exudes whatever mostly at night in the hopes that - well, not many people live around, so they can just as well choke on the stink for all they care.

THE LANDFILL — AND THE FIGHT AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

The Delaware County Solid Waste Management Center is located at 32230 State Highway 10, Walton, within a mile from our property in Hamden.

According to the County's own website, the landfill opened in 1977, received an expansion permit modification in 2021, and has approximately 60 years of remaining capacity.

It accepts municipal waste, construction and demolition debris, asbestos, contaminated soil, and certain industrial waste.

Our property is approximately one mile from the landfill.

We have experienced recurring noxious odors reaching our land, sometimes in overpowering concentrations.

We live in South Carolina now and want to sell our New York property in Hamden. BUTBUTBUTBUT: Who would want to purchase a scenic mountain property when some mornings you come out and choke on stinking fog from the landfill?

And now, with a planned Fraser BESS fire hazard, a disaster waiting to happen, within 5 wooded miles?

And what are our local governments doing about environmental protection?

FIGHTING ADDITIONAL REGULATION OF THE LANDFILL!

In August 2026, Delaware County opposed proposed NYSDEC requirements concerning landfill leachate, including PFAS and other potentially hazardous contaminants.

According to The Mountain Eagle, County Attorney Kevin M. Young participated in presenting the County's opposition. County officials argued that compliance could require approximately $50 MILLION in infrastructure improvements and potentially force closure of the landfill.

Then, on September 2, 2026, THE TOWN OF HAMDEN ADOPTED ITS OWN RESOLUTION OPPOSING THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS.

The landfill odors and the proposed leachate requirements concern different environmental pathways—air and water—but both matter to people who own property here.

AND NOW CONNECT THE DOTS

YOUNG/SOMMER LLC represents:

1. FRASER STORAGE, LLC — the private developer seeking authorization for the industrial battery storage facility.

2. THE TOWN OF HAMDEN — the municipality reviewing that very developer's application, which approved a conflict waiver allowing the concurrent representation.

3. DELAWARE COUNTY — which has opposed additional landfill-leachate regulations, with Kevin Young participating in that opposition.

And Kevin Young has also represented Delaware County in negotiations concerning New York City's watershed regulations and the Filtration Avoidance Determination.

THE SAME LAW FIRM IS INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT, THE LOCAL REGULATORY REVIEW, THE COUNTY'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE WATERSHED NEGOTIATIONS.

These overlapping representations are documented. Whether all of them are legally compatible—and what conflicts were disclosed and consented to—deserves examination.

AND WHAT ABOUT THE NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED?

For decades, economic development in the Catskills has been restricted in the name of protecting New York City's drinking-water supply.

Landowners have lived with those restrictions. Businesses and farmers have had to accommodate them.

New York City is permitted to supply water from its Catskill/Delaware system without filtration only under conditions requiring continuing watershed protection.

Yet now we have a proposed industrial battery storage facility in this region, a County opposing additional landfill-leachate controls, and a Town joining that opposition.

And the same law firm appears throughout these arrangements.

WHO IS PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OWNERS?

Who independently represents the Town when its attorney also represents the developer?

Who examines the cumulative environmental burdens on residents already affected by the County landfill?

Who ensures that the watershed protections historically imposed upon ordinary landowners are applied consistently to major industrial development?

And who decided that the same law firm should occupy so many positions in these overlapping matters?

THESE ARE PUBLIC QUESTIONS ABOUT PUBLIC DECISIONS, PUBLIC MONEY, AND PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS.

The documents are available for everyone to examine.

SOURCES:

• The Mountain Eagle, August 31, 2026: “New Regulations Could Force Early Landfill Closure, Officials Say.”

• Delaware County Department of Public Works, September 2026 landfill-leachate regulatory opposition materials.

• Hamden Town Board minutes, March 4 and September 2, 2026.

• Hamden Planning Board minutes, July 28, 2026.

• Young/Sommer LLC's published attorney biography and practice descriptions.

• Delaware County Department of Public Works, Solid Waste Management Center information.

Hamden residents deserve independent representation, meaningful environmental review, and answers before another major industrial project proceeds.

CONGRATULATIONS, DELAWARE COUNTY! YOU HAVE JUST CREATED A BRAND-SPANKING-NEW FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM. How to deny a disabled journalist access to evidence, seek sanctions against her, and disclose the evidence one day after the hearing.

 

Congratulations are in order for Delaware County, New York.

Its officials have accomplished something remarkable.

While I was fighting for disability accommodations, adequate time to prepare my court submissions, and access to evidence concerning governmental coordination in retaliation against my family, the County and its associates were busy seeking sanctions against me.

They portrayed my litigation as frivolous. They invoked my disciplinary history. They sought judicial punishment for my persistence in challenging government misconduct.

And all the while, the County possessed records directly relevant to the very governmental relationships and coordinated activities that I was attempting to expose.

Yesterday, October 28, 2026, the Court heard the motions.

Today, October 29, 2026, Delaware County's FOIL production placed the evidence in my hands.

One day too late for the hearing.

Just in time for a brand-spanking-new First Amendment retaliation claim.

THE GOVERNMENT'S FAVORITE GAME: PUNISH THE JOURNALIST, THEN RELEASE THE EVIDENCE

For years, I have investigated and published criticism of Delaware County officials, their attorneys, their relationships with publicly funded nonprofit organizations, and their conduct in litigation.

My daughter, an accomplished environmental engineering and watershed planning professional, provided sworn evidence concerning law enforcement misconduct in the treatment of a violent drug dealer who was a potential confidential informant.

She was employed by the Watershed Agricultural Council.

In December 2025, she received unconditional notice of a layoff.

On February 25, 2026, she was told not to return to work.

Her formal termination date was March 31, 2026.

She holds a master's degree in environmental engineering, a Juris Doctor degree, a law license, and GIS expertise. She is trilingual and has successful professional experience in watershed planning.

And what was happening in Delaware County after she was ordered out of her workplace?

Government officials and their institutional partners were organizing a program to recruit inexperienced engineering students to perform overlapping watershed functions.

THE DATES ARE BEAUTIFUL. THE COUNTY SUPPLIED THEM ITSELF.

Here is the chronology assembled from the County's own documents.

Date	Event
December 2025	WAC gave my daughter an unconditional notice of layoff - while pushing sanctions against me for litigation where she provided an affidavit in our support about misconduct of local police
February 25, 2026	My daugher, with a JD, law license, and MA in environmental engineering, is told not to return to work at WAC, removed from the premises of WAC with a 45 minutes' notice
March 26, 2026	SUNY ESF and Soil and Water personnel schedule recurring engineering internship planning meetings
March 27, 2026	First scheduled planning meeting
March 31, 2026	Formal termination of my daughter's employment
April 3, 2026	County Planning Commissioner Shelly Johnson-Bennett circulates the internship proposal
May 19, 2026	Jerry Vernold gives committee approval to the County's workforce-development resolution
June 5, 2026	County Grants Manager confirms submission of the grant application
September 2, 2026	Catskill Watershed Corporation reports a recommendation for $36,463.75 in funding
October 28, 2026	Court hearing on motions in litigation involving Delaware County
October 29, 2026	County FOIL production supplies the underlying records

The March 26 planning correspondence is especially revealing.

The initiative was being organized after my daughter had been removed from active employment but before her formal termination date.

The program was designed to provide three undergraduate engineering students with paid work in watershed assessment, conservation engineering, data collection, mapping, erosion control, stormwater management, and interactions with landowners.

The same kinds of professional work for which my daughter already possessed advanced education and practical experience.

The County's application declared a shortage of qualified watershed engineers.

Apparently, Delaware County's solution to a shortage of qualified professionals was to participate in a regional arrangement that had just removed one from the workforce, then seek public money to train beginners.

What a splendid example of governmental efficiency.

AND LOOK WHO WAS INVOLVED.

The newly disclosed documents identify an extensive institutional network:

Delaware County Planning, Parks and Watershed Affairs, headed by Commissioner Shelly Johnson-Bennett, prepared and administered the grant application.

Delaware County Soil and Water Conservation District, headed by Graydon Dutcher, would supervise the students and provide technical field training.

SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry participated in planning, academic supervision, and research.

Catskill Watershed Corporation administered the grant program.

New York City Department of Environmental Protection was CWC's governmental partner in that program, with an express role in reviewing applications and approving funding.

The CWC grant guidelines require approval by both DEP and CWC's Board of Directors.

An August 24, 2026 email confirms that CWC had received DEP's review comments.

And who is the DEP Commissioner named as a defendant in my pending litigation?

Garcia.

The state-action allegations in my Amended Verified Complaint were not invented after these disclosures. They were already pleaded.

I had already identified substantial CPLR 3211(d) issues concerning governmental involvement, institutional relationships, financing, and coordinated activity.

Now the County has produced contemporaneous documents identifying additional governmental and institutional participants in the very network I was seeking to investigate.

ENTER JERRY VERNOLD — AND THE COUNTY'S OVERLAPPING COMMITTEES.

The May 19, 2026 resolution identifies Jerry Vernold as the official granting committee approval to the workforce-development initiative.

Vernold chairs the County's Planning, Recreation and Culture Committee, which oversees Planning, Soil and Water Conservation, and Watershed Affairs.

His committee's August 20, 2024 minutes document ongoing coordination with WAC concerning New York City watershed negotiations, farm-transition proposals, and WAC's internal decision-making arrangements.

Vernold also serves on Delaware County's Social Services Committee.

That committee is chaired by Wayne Marshfield, with Maya Boukai also serving as a member.

These relationships become particularly interesting in light of another disclosure.

County Board Chair Tina Molé reportedly revealed pressure upon Marshfield and Boukai, as directors of Delaware Opportunities, Inc., to do what was "right" for the County and suspend an executive director who was preparing to sue Delaware County for approximately $300,000 owed in connection with the senior meals program.

That controversy became a public debacle.

I covered it extensively and scathingly.

I was the only journalist on the County's media distribution list who subjected the County's conduct in that controversy to such sustained criticism, to my knowledge.

So we now have another example of alleged County pressure operating through the governance of a nominally separate nonprofit organization, directed at an executive whose intended actions threatened County financial interests.

And we have a new documentary trail involving the removal of my daughter from WAC and the rapid development of a publicly funded workforce initiative involving overlapping professional functions.

This is precisely why discovery into state action, joint participation, and governmental entwinement matters.

NOW LET US DISCUSS THE ADA.

I am disabled.

I have repeatedly requested accommodations necessary to participate meaningfully in judicial proceedings, including adequate time, accessible procedures, and remote participation.

Instead, the court system imposed compressed schedules and restrictions upon my ability to prepare and present evidence.

I expressly explained that my disabilities limited my capacity to produce submissions within the imposed deadlines.

I requested the opportunity to present evidentiary opposition under Carr v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc., 182 A.D.3d 667 (3d Dep't 2020).

I also repeatedly identified discovery issues under CPLR 3211(d).

The County and its litigation associates knew that I was seeking evidence concerning their relationships, financing arrangements, and governmental coordination.

Yet they continued pursuing sanctions and other adverse relief.

The result was a grotesque procedural inversion: the disabled journalist was being punished for pursuing allegations concerning information that governmental institutions themselves possessed and that she was still trying to obtain.

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act protects meaningful access to state judicial services.

That protection is not satisfied by permitting a disabled person to file documents while denying accommodations necessary to prepare and present her case.

Nor is meaningful access achieved by forcing a litigant to defend against sanctions before she has had an accessible opportunity to obtain and present material evidence.

The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional importance of access to courts in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).

A judicial proceeding does not become accessible merely because the courthouse door is technically open.

AND THEN CAME THE OCTOBER 28 HEARING.

On October 28, 2026, motions involving Delaware County were before the Court.

Among the matters being pursued were sanctions and other adverse relief against me and my husband.

The County and its associates had invoked litigation positions attacking the factual foundation of our claims and our entitlement to pursue them.

The newly disclosed records would have been directly relevant to my response.

They document governmental relationships, institutional participation, financial arrangements, and the development of a publicly funded workforce program following the removal of my daughter from employment.

They also bear upon the credibility of representations that allegations of coordinated governmental conduct were frivolous.

But the County produced the records on October 29.

One day after the hearing.

The government was seeking punishment while the evidence necessary to answer its attacks remained in government hands.

The timing is now part of the factual basis for my claim of retaliation and denial of meaningful access to the courts.

THE COUNTY'S LAWYERS HAVE BEEN BUSY TOO.

Recent disclosures by Shrewsberry identified Delaware County as the behind-the-scenes financier and driving force of Wayne Marshfield's litigation defense and affirmative litigation activity against me.

That is particularly significant because Marshfield's litigation activities have been conducted in his own name while the County's financial and operational involvement remained outside the public presentation of those proceedings.

The newly produced workforce-development records add another dimension to the same issue.

The County's institutional involvement is not confined to one department, one nonprofit, or one lawsuit.

The disclosed arrangements reach County Planning, Soil and Water, CWC, SUNY ESF, and NYC DEP.

The reported Molé disclosure supplies another example involving County influence over nonprofit governance and personnel decisions.

Taken together, these facts support my inference that nominally separate institutions have been used to advance coordinated governmental objectives, including retaliation against persons who challenge County officials.

And the very litigation in which I sought to investigate those relationships became the vehicle for demands that I be punished.

CONGRATULATIONS ON THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM.

The First Amendment prohibits government retaliation against protected journalism and petitioning activity.

It also prohibits government officials from using their authority to impose adverse consequences because a person has criticized the government.

Retaliation can operate through governmental decisions, financial arrangements, coordinated conduct, and the use of institutional intermediaries.

It can also operate through litigation when governmental power is employed to punish protected expression.

Here, I allege that Delaware County and associated actors pursued sanctions and adverse judicial relief against me in retaliation for my journalism and litigation challenging official misconduct.

The October 29 disclosure supplies new factual support for that claim.

The County's own records show the institutional coordination I was attempting to investigate. They identify governmental participants, funding mechanisms, and a workforce initiative developed immediately after my daughter's removal from active employment.

The production occurred one day after a hearing at which the evidence could have been used to oppose the County's positions.

The combination of the retaliatory sanctions demands, denial of meaningful disability accommodations, and delayed disclosure supports a new and distinct First Amendment retaliation theory concerning the use of governmental litigation activity to punish investigative journalism and petitioning.

The County has now furnished the documentary foundation for examining the very conduct it sought to characterize as frivolous to investigate.

And it has furnished that foundation after pursuing judicial punishment against the person who sought it.

A WORD ABOUT PUBLIC MONEY

The workforce-development initiative sought $36,463.75.

The proposed interns would receive $20 per hour for ten weeks of work.

The application also included faculty compensation, graduate research assistance, equipment, travel, and matching contributions from participating public institutions.

All of this was justified by a claimed shortage of trained environmental engineers.

Meanwhile, a highly qualified professional had been removed from employment in the same regional watershed system.

The County's application also praises equitable workforce opportunities, including opportunities for individuals with disabilities.

Apparently, equity is an excellent subject for grant applications.

Providing meaningful access to a disabled journalist challenging County misconduct in court is another matter.

THE NEW LAWSUIT WILL HAVE A VERY INTERESTING CHRONOLOGY.

December: notice of layoff.

February: removal from active employment.

March: engineering internship planning.

April: County participation.

May: committee approval.

June: grant submission.

August: DEP review.

September: funding recommendation.

October 28: sanctions hearing.

October 29: disclosure.

The County supplied the dates. The County supplied the documents. The County supplied the institutional connections.

I supplied the criticism.

And for that criticism, I allege, the County and its associates sought to punish me through litigation while I was denied the disability accommodations and evidence necessary to respond.

So congratulations, Delaware County.

You wanted sanctions against the journalist.

You wanted her allegations treated as frivolous.

You wanted the litigation to proceed while the relevant governmental records remained outside her reach.

And then, one day after the hearing, you delivered the records.

You have just given me the factual basis for a brand-spanking-new First Amendment retaliation claim.

The next question is not whether the journalist should have stopped investigating.

It is whether Delaware County officials and their associates can account for what they did while trying to make her stop.