"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Thursday, May 14, 2015

Will judge Mulvey tolerate open insubordination to his orders by a judge and clerks of two courts? Will Judge Mulvey lose his own face as the court administrator and judge to save face of his subordinate who does not seem to be able to read Judge Mulvey's orders?

An order was made by the Chief Administrative Judge in the 6th Judicial District:

The order was clear and unambiguous and was copied to Judge Mulvey's superior Judge Coccoma.

Neither Judge Mulvey nor Judge Coccoma found the order erroneous or made any corrections.

It is clear from the order that the Clerk of the Surrogate's Court should have transferred the file to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, based on the order of transfer/removal dated April 3, 2015.

The clerk of the Surrogate's Court did not do that.

The judge assigned to the Supreme Court, instead of complying with the order and presiding over the removed case in the court where the judge was assigned, claimed to the Petitioner and his attorney that he was assigned to the Surrogate's Court and kept pressuring Petitioner's attorney to serve in accordance with the rules of the Surrogate's Court.

Even after the assigned judge was notified that Petitioner's attorney is aware of the change of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, the assigned judge arrogantly continued to disregard the clear and unambiguous order of removal and of assignment made by Judge Mulvey on April 3, 2015 and directed the Supreme Court Clerk Kelly Sanfilippo to send me a letter advising me that the case was in the Surrogate's Court despite the order of April 3, 2015, and that the order of April 3, 2015 is "erroneous".

So, I guess, what is happening in the 6th Judicial District is that clerks of two courts - the transferor and the transferee court, together with the judge assigned to the transferee court - collectively defy Judge Mulvey's order of removal and of assignment.

Will Judge Mulvey "correct" the order which is not erroneous on its face and indicates what Judge Mulvey wanted and directed to do - a transfer of the case to the Supreme Court and an assignment of judge Guy to the removed Supreme Court case?

Will Judge Mulvey concede that he "made an error" with his order of removal and remand it to the Surrogate's Court - simply because Judge David H. Guy does not appear to be able to read that order of removal and messed up the case by acting, without authority, as if it is still pending in the Surrogate's Court?

So, to save Judge Guy from rightful accusations of misconduct, Judge Mulvey will present himself as not knowing what he is doing when he is issuing orders of removal and transfer?

I bet the safest way for Judge Mulvey to act is to leave things as they are - and remove Judge Guy from the case where he has already shown his incompetence through inability to read and comprehend even the order of his own assignment - to the Supreme Court case.

If a judge cannot comprehend a written order clearly stating that he is assigned to a Supreme Court and not to any other court - that judge should not be on the bench, and it is the incompetence of Judge Guy that should be Judge Mulvey's concern as the court administrator of the 6th Judicial District, and not the concern of how to save Judge Guy from prosecution for misconduct by acknowledging that it is Judge Mulvey who made an "erroneous" decision of transfer and not Judge Guy who does not seem to be able to read and comprehend court orders of assignment.

Not only Judge Guy committed insubordination to Judge Mulvey's order by failing to follow it, but he coerced clerks of two courts, the transferor and the transferee court, to deem Judge Mulvey's clear and unambiguous orders as "erroneous" and to disregard them and direct other people (parties in litigation and Delaware County Clerk) to disregard them.

Will Judge Mulvey tolerate such an insubordination that makes him look like he does not have the court administration in his judicial district under control?

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