I am sure that I am not the only person who has experienced on herself, as a litigant and as an attorney, this "phenomenon" - selective inability of judges, state and federal, to read.
The recent most interesting examples of this phenomenon included:
(1) Judge Gary L. Sharpe, the Chief Judge of the Northern District of New York, who sanctioned me for inability to read the 11th Amendment and who directed me to read it and find there that citizens of their own states are prohibited from suing their own states by the text of the 11th Amendment.
I read the 11th Amendment before and after that directive was made to me, before and after sanctions were imposed upon me, and I am still unable to find in it something that is not there. Yet, Judge Sharpe did find there something that is not there - and sanctioned me based on his findings.
(2) The most recent case - Judge David Guy, originally of the Broome Surrogate's Court, assigned to the Delaware County removed Supreme Court case, but fighting an illusion that he was assigned to the Surrogate's Court case and ordering me and clerks of two courts to read the clear and unambiguous order of removal and of assignment of Judge Guy to the assigned case as if the order was erroneous, the case was not removed, and Judge Guy was assigned to the Surrogate's Court case.
(3) Judge Robert Mulvey, the Chief Administrative Judge of the 6th Judicial District, in one of the cases that I had in front of him, could not read submissions of my opponent who admitted that my client was incapacitated and incompetent (in a coma) and submitted to the court a court order of incapacitate from another state. Under such circumstances, by statute, jurisdiction of the court, Judge Mulvey abated, and my authority to represent the incompetent but Judge Mulvey made a decision that I did not provide to the court enough evidence of incapacitation of "my client" and made a decision against a person in a coma whom I could not, as a matter of law, represent, and told Judge Mulvey on record that I am not representing him, because he is adjudged incapacitated and his legal representative was not substituted.
Judge Mulvey was so upset by a lawsuit against him on behalf of my husband (and by my prior lawsuit against him on behalf of my husband, myself and another client) that Judge Mulvey could not even read correctly documents submitted to him by my opponent regarding incapacitation of my former client whom I could not continue to represent, as a matter of law, CPLR 1015, after his incapacitation occurred.
(4) I cannot say enough about selective blindness of Judges Elizabeth Garry, Molly Fitzgerald, Carl F. Becker (after a documented ex parte communication with my client's opponent's counsel), Kevin Dowd (after a documented ex parte communication with my client's opponent' counsel), Ferris Lebous (after a documented ex parte communication with my client's opponent' counsel) and of judges of the Appellate Division 3rd Department who affirmed decisions of judges Garry, Fitzgerald, Becker and Dowd, allowing the case Mokay v. Mokay to proceed - only because it led to the premature disbarment of my husband (without a hearing) and because they wanted to have that disbarment to continue.
Those elaborate 8-year efforts may be screwed at this time.
On April 7, 2015 Judge Dowd held an ex parte, secret bench trial where Judge Dowd, subpoenaed by me as a trial witness,
- presided (which he had no right to do due to his disqualification because he was a subpoenaed trial witness),
- quashed subpoenas of my witnesses,
- disregarded my doctor-ordered medical leave,
- declared that I waived my client's right to a jury trial by not appearing at a scheduled trial when Judge Dowd knew my non-appearance was due to a documented medical disability,
- declared subpoena against himself and his secretary and law clerk "nullities",
- dismissed the jury;
- conducted a non-jury trial himself;
- had the court personnel mislead members of the public who wanted to observe the trial to prevent them from observing it,
- used the Facebook-friend-of-judge's-law-clerk stenographer,
- admitted "documentary exhibits" (based on "non-jury trial minutes" that I obtained from the court clerk) at a sped of 19 seconds per exhibit
- because it was ex parte,
- because it was tainted by secrecy,
- because it was tainted by the judge subpoenaed as a witness presiding over the case (Judge Dowd, by the way, never moved to quash subpoenas against himself or his secretary and law clerk), but also
- because there was no assurance that what the record created by the friend-of-the-law-clerk stenographer has any integrity to it, or that Judge Dowd is not engaging, as we speak, before he made the judgment on the case, in further ex parte communications with the Mokay plaintiffs and/or their counsel, as Judge Dowd and/or his office appeared to have done before - from documents I have on file.
All that mountain of work done by Judge Dowd and by Richared Harlem - with what incentive for Judge Dowd in mind, I do not know, maybe just out of hatred to me and my husband who sued him and exposed his incompetence in a pro se federal lawsuit - may become undone by the perjury of Daniel Mokay who, a month after the Mokay trial concluded, stated under oath that the essence of the case was misconduct of Daniel Mokay's father, the decedent.
On May 6, 2015 Daniel Mokay claimed under oath the following:
Since Richard Harlem and his father, retired judge Robert Harlem undertook to represent the decedent (his Estate) in February of 2006, Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem could not undertake to represent children of the decedent advancing a claim that their father committed misconduct and took what he was obliged to give to them, and ALL of Richard Harlem's legal fees, no matter what the number is, must be forfeited as a matter of law because of that irreconcilable conflict of interest, now confirmed, after the trial, as a new evidence, by Richard Harlem's client in the Mokay action Daniel Mokay.
Now let's see if judges will claim they do not know how to read the confession of Daniel Mokay or do not comprehend its meaning or implications for the Mokay case.