"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Thursday, September 22, 2016

What is judicial misconduct in Tennessee, is business as usual in New York

I wrote on this blog about a judge who signed an order based on hearing conducted by another judge, who recused.

The name of the judge is Mary Rita Connerton, of Binghamton, New York, see my blogs about what Judge Connerton did, here and here.

Here is Judge Connerton's decision in the entirety.

In that decision, Connerton confirms that I was not present at the time when she claimed she had a headache even thinking about reading my motion. 

Connerton acknowledges that she denied the oral argument, and instead relied upon the transcript of the oral argument in front of a judge who recused before rendering a decision after that argument. 

The required procedure under such circumstances - which Connerton did not follow - is to hold another hearing, in front of Connerton herself.

Connerton's claim that I was not present the October 2, 2014 hearing (which was true) and am not, thus, entitled to the transcript containing Connerton's ex parte statements about my motion (which is not true, since my motion was discussed, I was entitled to such access), is contrary to what the later-cooked transcript says.

The later-cooked transcripts shows that I AM present at the October 2, 2014 hearing - which was not true, and Connerton confirmed it in her decision, but appearances were cooked nevertheless to prevent me from using the transcript in my defense.  This is not the first time when Delaware County Family Court stenographers cook appearances where the issue of judicial misconduct is concerned.  The first time on my memory it was when Becker stated that a female child (who was present) is not "college material" while the child wanted to go to college.  After I raised the issue of judicial misconduct, the transcript was cooked not showing the child's appearance, which blocked a possibility to appeal the issue.

Here is the front page of the cooked transcript of the October 2, 2014 proceeding where I was not present, but am shown as present.

And here is the ex parte communication that Connerton later denied and claimed I was "misinformed" - and blocked my access to the transcript, and then had the stenographer cook the appearances on the transcript:

In the decision, Connerton relies upon the hearing in front of a recused judge and refuses to give me her own hearing.

And, in that decision, Connerton refuses to recuse because there is "no merit" in seeking her recusal, and because she claims she can continue to be impartial.  Right.

So, Connerton issued an order based on a hearing that was held in front of another judge.

And, in New York it is apparently, business as usual.

Yet, in Tennessee recently, Judge Rachel Bell was subject of a disciplinary investigation for signing orders after hearings were held in front of somebody else.

That's the same Judge Rachel Bell who was previously subject of a disciplinary investigation for having no time to do her job and kept a person in jail longer than the statute allows, because she had a meeting with schoolchildren somewhere, see here and here.

In New York, Judge Connerton who has a peculiar disability of developing a headache from reading constitutional arguments in a motion that concerns a person's livelihood, and who then lie about it in official papers, and relies upon a transcript of a hearing in front of a recused judge to decide a motion - is not subject to any investigation.

New York State Commission for judicial conduct tossed my complaint against Judge Connerton,  as it tossed my 3 complaints against Judge Revoir, see my blogs here, here and here, while Judge Revoir promptly retaliated against the indigent mother after the complaint was filed.

Judge Revoir's retaliation resulted in a criminal proceeding of a year and a half against the mother that ended with a jury acquittal, and in a year and a half of criminal proceedings against the maternal grandmother which resulted in dismissal of charges because of invalid arrest warrant and perjury of Judge Richard Gumo of Delhi, NY about that warrant.  By the way, Judge Gumo, according to my information, continues with his tricks of using rubber-stamped warrants in felony cases, I will run a separate blog about that.

After the dismissal of fabricated criminal charges against the mother and grandmother,

  1. their two dogs were killed, on two separate occasions, see here and here,
  2. their house burnt down where both the then-pregnant mother and the grandmother escaped death in that fire only by sheer luck, while
  3. the Delhi Fire Department
    1. refused to extinguish the fire,
    2. refused to investigate and
    3. refused to release reports of the fire (see here, herehere, here, here and here), while the same Fire Department recently followed the protocol to the last "t" when a building on Main Street, Delhi, NY burnt, destroying the local mason lodge's archive (I wonder what was there worth destroying).
  4. Departments of Social Services of two counties, Otsego and Delaware, attempted - unsuccessfully - to take the mother's new baby after the pregnant mother escaped the fire meant to kill her and the baby (reportedly, a propelled burning explosive device landed on the then-pregnant mother's bed while the mother was, luckily, away).  DSS claimed they are attempting to take the baby BECAUSE of the house fire, because allegedly the mother has nowhere to live.  So, the policy apparently is not to HELP victims of an apparent arson, but to hurt them more.
All of that was, of course, "coincidental".
And, of course, the Delaware County District Attorney's office refuses to investigate the attempted murder of the mother and grandmother -

  1. because the mother and grandmother committed the mortal sin of suing the now-quickly-allegedly-retired judge (Carl Becker) who was the law partner of the Acting District Attorney John Hubbard.  Neither Hubbard, nor Becker ever disclosed the connection, thus having contaminated ALL criminal cases litigated by the Delaware County District Attorney's office between January 1, 2002 and July 31, 2015 in front of Carl Becker as the County Judge, and
  2. because the Delaware County DA's office employs as investigator, the uncle of one of the suspects, Jeff Bowie.

So, as opposed to Tennessee, where at least some judicial accountability is shown in Judge Bell's case, in New York we deal with zero accountability of judges for misconduct, and a methodical campaign to use taxpayers' money in order to wield retaliation, in every possible way, against those who raise issues of judicial misconduct.

And, in New York, we have an unspoken policy where judges, like Mary Rita Connerton, refuse to even read motions containing evidence of misconduct and undisclosed conflicts of interest of a judge, no matter what reasoning, what evidence and what mandatory law is cited in support of the motion.

To New York judges, if you do not provide a lot of supporting evidence, you've made a frivolous motion and must be sanctioned.

If you provided a lot of supporting evidence, on the other hand, it gives the presiding judge a headache, and they simply do not read it - and deny it without reading it, as Judge Connerton did, relying on the transcript from the motion hearing in front of Judge Revoir.

Tennessee investigates a judge for the exact same conduct which is allowed in New York for Judge Connerton.

And, in New York,

  • calling constitutional argument lying (Revoir);
  • issuing arrest orders after claiming the court has no jurisdiction (Revoir);
  • engaging in ex parte communications (Connerton);
  • lying about it in official papers when confronted with a motion to recuse (Connerton);
  • causing the court clerk to refuse to provide the injured party a transcript where her case was discussed (Connerton);
  • then, cooking the transcript when another party requested it, so that it appears that I was present at the hearing where I was not present (Connerton), and
  • denying motion to recuse herself as being without merit (Connerton) -
is all business as usual.

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