On November 6, 2026, The Reporter published J. Lawrence-Bauer's article, “No License, No Transit, No Choice? Public Defender Estimates Half of Delaware County Drivers Lack Valid Licenses,” reporting on the November 4, 2026 meeting of the Delaware County Legislative Committee.
According to Lawrence-Bauer, Delaware County Public Defender Joseph Ermeti estimated that approximately 50% of the county's drivers lack valid driver's licenses. District Attorney Shawn Smith agreed that the estimate sounded about right.
The article describes the officials' acknowledgment that public transportation is virtually nonexistent in this vast rural county, that financial hardship contributes to license suspensions, and that police sometimes refrain from enforcing licensing violations because doing so could cost residents their jobs.
At the same meeting, Lawrence-Bauer reported, Smith proposed increasing the charge for participation in the county's traffic diversion program from $317 to $350 per ticket.
The article specifically connects the proposal to increased revenue for Delaware County and participating municipalities, with the county retaining approximately 20% of the program's revenue.
Thus, the county's own prosecutor acknowledged the financial hardship and transportation dependence of local residents while advocating increased charges through a program that generates substantial government revenue.
Since when does a district attorney have authority to establish the price of disposing of a judicial proceeding, collect that price, and increase it to generate more government revenue?
A Poor County Turned Into a Prosecutor's Revenue Source
The economic conditions underlying this arrangement were acknowledged months before the November 2026 discussion. In “Caseloads, Funding, and ‘Poaching’ Discussed at County Legislative Committee Meeting,” published by The Reporter on March 10, 2026, J. Lawrence-Bauer reported that Smith and Public Defender Ermeti described Delaware County as a “poorer county,” where approximately two-thirds of criminal cases are handled by the public defender.
The November 6, 2026 article added the extraordinary estimate that approximately half of county drivers lack valid licenses. Lawrence-Bauer reported that Ermeti and Smith recognized the economic cycle in which residents lose driving privileges, continue driving because they must work, and face additional financial burdens. In a county without meaningful public transportation, losing a driver's license may mean losing employment, income, access to medical care, and the ability to pay outstanding fines.
Yet the prosecutor's traffic diversion program has become a substantial source of government revenue.
In “Traffic Diversion Program Generates $247K Year-to-Date,” published September 3, 2025, J. Lawrence-Bauer reported that Eric Northrup, appearing on behalf of Smith, informed the Legislative Committee that the program had generated $66,750 through 267 diversion agreements in August 2025 alone, bringing year-to-date revenue to $247,750. Northrup described applications as increasing dramatically.
In “Traffic Diversion Program Gains Speed After Strong First Year,” published February 11, 2026, Lawrence-Bauer reported that the program, officially launched in January 2025 following a December 2024 pilot, had processed 2,544 cases and generated $478,750 during 2025. Eighty percent of the reported proceeds went to municipalities, while Delaware County retained 20%. Northrup described the program as a major success, with monthly revenue rising from $7,250 in January 2025 to $65,000 in January 2026.
The financial figures continued to grow. In “Caseloads, Funding, and ‘Poaching’ Discussed at County Legislative Committee Meeting,” published March 10, 2026, Lawrence-Bauer reported Smith's March 4 statement that the program had generated approximately $485,000 in 2025 and that the county had budgeted approximately $750,000 for 2026. Smith expected the program to remain approximately on track to meet that projection.
These figures reveal the financial scale of a program built around traffic prosecutions. Smith's office reported nearly half a million dollars in 2025 revenue, anticipated three-quarters of a million dollars in 2026, and subsequently proposed increasing the charge to motorists.
The question is no longer merely how much money Smith can collect. It is who authorized him to sell favorable prosecutorial dispositions in the first place.
A Traffic Ticket Is a Judicial Proceeding, Not an Invoice From Shawn Smith
A traffic ticket initiates a proceeding governed by New York law.
A motorist accused of violating the Vehicle and Traffic Law is entitled to contest the charge before a court.
If convicted, the motorist is sentenced by a judge, and any fine must be authorized by statute and imposed through the judicial process. The district attorney does not possess independent sentencing authority, cannot establish his own schedule of criminal fines, and cannot independently enter a judicial order dismissing a pending prosecution.
Yet Delaware County's traffic diversion program requires motorists to pay a predetermined amount in exchange for the opportunity to obtain dismissal. According to the district attorney's published fee schedule, the $317 charge consists of a $250 district attorney fee, a $55 traffic course charge, and a $12 processing charge. The $250 is not a fine imposed by a judge following conviction. It is money charged by the DA for his prosecutorial services - charged ILLEGALLY.
THE BULK of the illegal "traffic diversity" charge - 80.44% of it - is illegally charged by Delaware County District Attorney Shawn Smith for his services as a SALARIED PUBLIC prosecutor.
The February 11, 2026 Reporter article described the program as permitting eligible motorists to complete an online safety course and pay a reported $312, after which their charges would be dismissed without license points.
The November 6, 2026 article reported a $317 charge, which Smith proposed increasing to $350.
What statute authorizes Smith to impose this charge, increase it, or make payment a condition of obtaining a favorable prosecutorial disposition? What statute authorizes him to treat the resulting proceeds as a revenue source to be expanded according to the financial expectations of county and municipal governments?
Prosecutorial discretion is not legislative authority somehow changing what a prosecutor may or may not do financially with the defendants he is prosecuting.
The power to prosecute is not the power to impose monetary penalties, and the authority to recommend dismissal is not the authority to sell it. Nor does the existence of a program supply the legal authority that the program itself requires.
Smith's Financial Interest Is Not Hidden: He Openly Reports It to the County Legislature
The financial character of this program is not something critics must infer from secret documents. It has been repeatedly reported by The Reporter, with specific attribution to Smith and his staff.
In her September 3, 2025 report, Lawrence-Bauer described ADA Richard Northrup's presentation of the program's revenue, including the $66,750 collected in August and $247,750 year-to-date. She also reported that Hancock received $16,500 for August, while several municipalities received nothing.
In her February 11, 2026 article, Lawrence-Bauer identified Hancock, Colchester, and Sidney as major beneficiaries. ADA Richard Northrup reported that Hancock was averaging approximately $20,000 monthly, and local supervisors praised the program's financial returns.
The February 9, 2026 article, “Fiscal Realities and Public Rebuttals: Inside the Delaware County Legislative Committee,” also by Lawrence-Bauer, reported that Smith described January 2026 as an unexpectedly busy month for traffic diversion, generating approximately $68,000 despite winter conditions that ordinarily reduce traffic enforcement activity. Walton Supervisor Joe Cetta requested a comprehensive year-end accounting of the distributions to towns, which Smith agreed to provide.
The March 10, 2026 article reported that Smith had prepared individualized accounting reports for supervisors showing how much money was returning to their municipalities. Hancock reportedly received $142,250 in 2025, while Bovina and Tompkins received $500 each.
In that article, Lawrence-Bauer placed Smith's financial disclosures under the heading “The DA's Ledger: Rising Revenue and Rising Felonies.”
By November 6, 2026, The Reporter was describing Smith's proposal to increase diversion charges and the committee's discussion of administrative expenses, municipal distributions, and the county's retained share.
The prosecutor's office was openly reporting the financial yield of traffic prosecutions, shared with municipalities employing adjudicating judges, and projecting further growth.
Where, in these discussions, was the prosecutor's obligation of impartiality?
Where was an explanation as to what law allows a public prosecutor to charge defendants for his "services" of prosecuting them? There is NONE!
Where was the discussion of the judiciary's exclusive authority to dispose of pending prosecutions? And where was the recognition that the people paying these charges live in a county whose own officials acknowledge a transportation crisis driven substantially by poverty? That the County and DA Smith are openly GOUGING?
The district attorney is supposed to administer justice, not report the financial productivity of prosecutions as though he were managing a commercial enterprise.
The Town and Village Justices: Who Delivers the Dismissals Smith's Program Promises?
Smith cannot dismiss pending judicial proceedings himself.
The judicial act of dismissing a pending prosecution belongs to the court.
Smith's revenue-generating program therefore depends upon town and village justices exercising their judicial authority to deliver the dismissals.
New York permits town and village justices to serve without being admitted attorneys, and many are non-attorneys.
The author of this article, a longtime criminal defense counsel in the past, who practiced in Delaware County justice courts, has personally observed non-attorney town and village justices openly looking to local prosecutors for legal advice concerning the disposition of cases pending before them.
That practice presents a fundamental problem of judicial independence even when the prosecutor has no financial interest in the disposition.
The prosecutor is an advocate appearing before the judge, not the judge's independent legal adviser.
Now consider the situation where the same prosecutor administers a program generating hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, 80.44% of it for the DA's office itself - as is openly stated on DA's office's website.
The district attorney establishes monetary conditions, his office determines eligibility, the motorist pays, and the prosecutor then seeks dismissal.
The town or village justice must exercise the judicial authority necessary to complete the arrangement.
The prosecutor who benefits institutionally from the revenue-producing program may also be the person to whom the non-attorney justice looks for legal guidance about its dispositions.
What understandings exist between Smith's office and the participating town and village justices?
Were they negotiated, and are they written?
Were the justices consulted about the program's operation?
Do they independently examine the legal authority for the fees and determine whether dismissal is appropriate in each case, or do they routinely enter the dismissals requested by the prosecutor once the program's financial conditions have been satisfied?
The answers go directly to judicial independence, to legality of traffic ticket proceedings, and, possibly raise issue of state and federal ticket-fixing criminality.
A non-attorney justice who looks to the prosecutor for legal advice is already placed in a position of potential dependence upon an advocate appearing before the court.
When that advocate administers a revenue-generating program whose operation requires judicial dismissals, the danger becomes acute.
The prosecutor cannot be both the financially interested architect of a disposition and the effective legal adviser to the judge who must approve it. A judicial dismissal is not a receipt issued after payment, and a town or village justice is not Smith's subordinate.
New York Has Already Condemned Ticket-Fixing
New York's highest court has treated improper traffic-ticket dispositions as grave judicial misconduct.
In Matter of Conti, 70 N.Y.2d 416 (1987), the Court of Appeals addressed ticket-fixing misconduct by a town justice and sustained removal from judicial office.
The seriousness of ticket-fixing does not depend upon the monetary value of the underlying traffic offense. It concerns the integrity of judicial proceedings and the prohibition against privately appropriating the court's authority to dispose of prosecutions.
New York Penal Law §§ 200.00 and 200.10 criminalize bribery and bribe receiving involving public servants where benefits are conferred or received pursuant to corrupt agreements or understandings intended to influence official judgment.
Penal Law § 195.00 addresses official misconduct involving knowing unauthorized exercises of official authority undertaken with the requisite intent.
Federal criminal statutes also reach certain corrupt arrangements involving public officials, including qualifying bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666 and honest-services fraud involving bribery or kickbacks under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346.
A lawful diversion agreement is not criminal ticket-fixing merely because it results in dismissal after payment.
But the label “traffic diversion program” cannot immunize an otherwise corrupt arrangement.
If judicial outcomes are improperly predetermined through understandings between prosecutors and judges, the existence of an organized program does not make those understandings lawful.
If fixing a single traffic ticket can result in removal from judicial office, what scrutiny should be applied to a countywide system collecting hundreds of dollars per ticket and depending upon judicial dismissals?
How many of those dismissals have been independently adjudicated? How many have been processed as a matter of routine? What has been communicated to participating judges, and who is examining the relationship between the prosecutor's revenue objectives and the courts' disposition of cases?
New York's Judicial Ethics Authorities Have Already Warned About Prosecutor-Operated Diversion Programs
New York's Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics has repeatedly considered traffic diversion programs administered by district attorneys.
Joint Opinion 10-32/10-48 examined arrangements involving payments by motorists, prosecutorial requests for dismissal, revenue distributions, and even payments associated with cases disposed of through participating courts.
Opinion 19-145 addressed a prosecutor's traffic program involving administrative fees and recommended dismissals.
Opinion 20-165 examined concerns about upfront payments, judicial discretion, and the possibility that motorists might believe payment guaranteed a favorable judicial outcome.
Opinion 25-62 again considered the proper judicial role in prosecutor-administered diversion.
These opinions reinforce the independence of judicial decision-making.
Judges cannot allow prosecutorial administrative arrangements to dictate judicial dispositions, and the legality of a prosecutor's monetary conditions remains a separate question that cannot be answered by pointing to the convenience of diversion.
The court is not an administrative extension of the district attorney's office. A judicial dismissal must remain a judicial act, not the final step in a prosecutor's payment-processing system.
Berger v. United States: The Prosecutor Must Govern Impartially, Not Maximize Revenue
In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), the United States Supreme Court explained the special responsibility of a government prosecutor.
The prosecutor represents the sovereign, whose obligation is to govern impartially. The government's interest in a criminal prosecution is not merely to win, but to see that justice is done.
Justice Sutherland famously declared: “He may strike hard blows, [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”
That obligation reaches beyond courtroom advocacy.
It concerns the character of prosecutorial authority itself.
A district attorney is entrusted with coercive governmental power, not with a franchise to monetize that power.
In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized the dangers arising when prosecutorial judgment is affected by conflicting interests.
Here, Smith's financial objectives are expressly documented in the county proceedings reported by Lawrence-Bauer on September 3, 2025, February 9, February 11, March 10, and November 6, 2026.
Smith administers the diversion program, charges an express fee, 80.44% of the it for his own "services", reports the resulting revenue to county legislators, and proposes increasing the charge to generate still more money - for himself, from his public elected office.
That is CRIMINAL.
The prosecutor's duty to govern impartially cannot be converted into a duty to maximize the financial return from prosecuting motorists.
His obligation is to justice, not revenue targets, municipal budgets, or producing ever-increasing receipts from people threatened with the loss of their ability to drive in an area where no alternative to driving exists.
Gouging a Poor County's Transportation-Dependent Residents
The most damning feature of the November 6, 2026 disclosures is their blunt cynicism.
As Lawrence-Bauer reported, Smith and Ermeti acknowledged that Delaware County is a rural jurisdiction where many residents cannot survive economically without driving.
They recognized the connection between financial hardship and the loss of driving privileges, estimated that approximately half of drivers lack valid licenses, and acknowledged that police sometimes refrain from enforcing licensing violations because doing so could cost people their jobs.
Smith's response is to propose charging motorists more money to participate in his diversion program.
Not because a judge determined that a particular defendant deserved a higher fine, and not because the Legislature increased the statutory penalty for a particular offense, but because the increased charge would produce more government revenue.
This is a county where poverty threatens residents' ability to drive, and the prosecutor's office has turned the fear of losing driving privileges into a lucrative government revenue stream.
The county does not provide meaningful public transportation to replace the vehicles upon which residents depend.
It does not solve the economic problem that leaves people unable to maintain valid licenses.
Instead, its prosecutor charges struggling motorists hundreds of dollars for de facto ticket-fixing with local non-attorney judges who the same prosecutor advises and, according to public record, shares the illegal revenues with - through their municipalities.
The motorists are not customers shopping for a convenient service from DA Smith or ADA Northrup (formerly Delaware County DA, formally Delaware County Judge). They are people facing the coercive authority of the state.
That authority threatens consequences affecting their ability to work and survive, while the prosecutor offers a paid route to avoiding those consequences and the county celebrates the proceeds.
Poverty becomes a source of government revenue. The threat of losing transportation becomes leverage. And the prosecutor becomes the administrator of the payment system.
Where Has the Money Gone?
As reported by Lawrence-Bauer on March 10, 2026, Smith described approximately $485,000 in 2025 revenue and a $750,000 budget estimate for 2026.
Those figures represent approximately $1.235 million in reported 2025 receipts and projected 2026 receipts combined.
How much of the money actually collected has been spent on transportation assistance for the residents who need it?
How much has been used to establish rural shuttle services, provide transportation to people unable to drive, or reduce the dependence upon private automobiles that county officials themselves acknowledge?
Even a portion of the proceeds could potentially support demand-responsive rural public transportation in Delaware County.
This author came to live in Delaware County in 1999, left it to live in South Carolina in 2015, and now it is the year of 2026.
Taxes go up.
Smith is gouging poor motorists now.
Yet, no public transportation exists - it is not a priority for the County.
Instead, county officials are discussing how to increase the price of diversion for the already struggling victims of Smith's illegal gouging.
A public prosecutor illegally charges high financial fees against defendants in traffic ticket program as a condition of obtaining dismissals from local non-attorney judges in cahoots with the DA. In full knowledge that losing a driving license in the area may mean loss of a job, of any means to maintain a livelihood, get sustenance or medical help.
The public deserves a full accounting—not merely how much money was collected, but where it went, who benefited, and why the district attorney is treating the disposition of traffic prosecutions as a revenue-generating operation.
Conclusion: Who Authorized Shawn Smith to Sell Justice?
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Sources and Authorities
Reporting by J. Lawrence-Bauer, The Reporter (Catskills Today)
1. “No License, No Transit, No Choice? Public Defender Estimates Half of Delaware County Drivers Lack Valid Licenses,” November 6, 2026.
Reporting on the November 4, 2026 Legislative Committee meeting, Ermeti's estimate that approximately half of county drivers lack valid licenses, Smith's agreement, the absence of practical public transportation, and Smith's proposed increase from $317 to $350.
2. “Traffic Diversion Program Generates $247K Year-to-Date,” September 3, 2025.
Reporting Northrup's presentation of $66,750 in August revenue from 267 diversion agreements, $247,750 year-to-date, and the distribution of proceeds to municipalities.
3. “Traffic Diversion Program Gains Speed After Strong First Year,” February 11, 2026.
Reporting 2,544 cases processed in 2025, $478,750 in annual revenue, the 80/20 distribution, the $312 participation charge reported at that time, and increasing monthly collections.
4. “Fiscal Realities and Public Rebuttals: Inside the Delaware County Legislative Committee,” February 9, 2026.
Reporting Smith's February 4 disclosure of approximately $68,000 in January diversion revenue and the request for comprehensive municipal distribution reports.
5. “Caseloads, Funding, and ‘Poaching’ Discussed at County Legislative Committee Meeting,” March 10, 2026.
Reporting Smith's March 4 statements concerning approximately $485,000 in 2025 revenue, the $750,000 budget estimate for 2026, municipal distributions, and the characterization of Delaware County as a poorer jurisdiction.
Judicial Decisions, Statutes, and Ethics Opinions
6. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
7. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
8. Matter of Conti, 70 N.Y.2d 416 (1987).
9. New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics, Joint Opinion 10-32/10-48; Opinions 19-145, 20-165, and 25-62.
10. New York Penal Law §§ 195.00, 200.00, 200.10.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 666, 1341, 1343, 1346.
12. Delaware County District Attorney's Office, published Traffic Diversion Program fee schedule.
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