At the end of this article you can read an interesting decision of the New York State Court of Appeals that just came out - and is very important to every single New Yorker.
It is about the right to self-defense if you are assaulted by a person under the age of majority. A "child". Even if the said "child" may be a mountain of muscle towering over you.
This is the INSULTINGLY SHORT decision deciding a person's liberty and life - consider the consequences of SUCH a conviction!
The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Stephen Mears, Appellant.
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P. Mazzei, J.), rendered January 10, 2024.
Matthew W. Brissenden, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Shiry Gaash and Marion Tang of counsel), for respondent.
Iannacci, J.P., Christopher, Wan and Love, JJ., concur.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Timothy P. Mazzei, J.), rendered January 10, 2024, convicting him of endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
780*780 For his actions during a physical altercation between himself and the child of his former girlfriend, the defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child.
The trial court properly declined to charge the jury with the defense of justification for the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, the intent of which "is to protect the physical health, morals and well-being of children" (People v Bergerson, 17 NY2d 398, 401 [1966]), and to which the defense of justification generally does not apply (see People v Williams, 102 AD3d 566, 567 [2013]; People v Varela, 164 AD2d 924, 924 [1990]; People v Fields, 134 AD2d 365, 365-366 [1987]). Moreover, there was no reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, that supported a justification defense (see People v Williams, 102 AD3d at 567).
The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
The absurdity of this decision is facially apparent: it DOES NOT MATTER WHO tries to maim or kill you - you have a RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE, PERIOD!
Apparently, such a simple truth did not sink into the heads of the learned panel of judges.
As I always do with especially disgusting court decisions, and this is ESPECIALLY ESPECIALLY disgusting -
it de facto ruled that you must allow a "baby" to seriously injure or kill you but MAY NOT defend yourself if the baby is trying to do harm to you - because he is a baby -
- I make the faces of judges who made this decision and their hypocritical "achievements" PUBLIC.
Here we go, the panel is: Iannacci, J.P., Christopher, Wan and Love, JJ., concur.
J.P.: Justice Presiding; JJ. - associate justice of the panel.
Once again already in searchable text, information about every judge on this panel - published by the 2nd Department itself:
Presiding Judge Iannacci:
Associate Justice Angela G. Iannacci
Judicial Offices
Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department, Designated May 2017
Acting Presiding Justice of the Appellate Term, 9th & 10th Judicial Districts, 2013-2014
Associate Justice of the Appellate Term, 9th & 10th Judicial Districts 2009 to 2017
Justice of the Supreme Court, State of New York, 10th Judicial District 2006
Acting Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Appointed by Chief Judge Judith Kaye, 2004-2005
Back-up Judge in the Integrated Domestic Violence Part (IDV) 2006-2008
Judge of the Family Court, Elected to Family Court 2004-2006
Other Professional Experience
Principal Court Attorney to Hon. Allan L. Winick
Justice of the Supreme Court, Associate Justice of the Appellate Term 2002-2003
Hearing Officer
Small Claims Assessment Review Proceedings 1996-2001
Angela G. Iannacci, P.C., Great Neck, New York
Litigation and general practice 1996-2001
Rossano, Mose, Hirschhorn & Corleto, P.C., Garden City, New York
Litigation associate 1990-1996
Gordon & Silber, P.C., New York, New York
Litigation associate 1990
Rossano, Mose, Hirschhorn & Corleto, P.C., Garden City, New York
Litigation associate 1987-1990
American International Group, New York, New York
Professional Liability Division 1986-1987
Admission to the Bar
New York State, Appellate Division, Second Department
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York
Education
Pace University School of Law, J. D., 1986
George Washington University, B. A., 1983
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London, England, Fellow International Commercial Arbitration (FCIArb 2012)
Other Employment
St. John’s University, Adjunct Associate Professor, 2013 - Spring 2020
Professional & Civic Activities
*NYS Science and Technology Resource Judge, National Courts and Sciences Institute, 2023
*Outstanding Women in Law Award 2018, Hofstra University, Maurice A. Deane School of Law
*NYS Special Fiduciary Commission Regarding Appointments & Recommendations to Administrative Board, 2017
*Advisory Committee on the Appointment of the Nassau County Commissioner of Jurors, 2008
*NYS Domestic Violence Task Force, 2007-present
*NYS Anti-Discrimination Panel, 2005-present
*NYS Court Administration’s Best Practices Committee for Matrimonial Judges, 2005
*Model Custody Court, NYS Supreme Court, 2005
*Member, Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts, 2004-present
*Distinguished Service Award, Nassau County Columbian Lawyers Association, 2018
*Distinguished Service Award, Queens County Columbian Lawyers Association, 2018
*International Association of Women Judges Selected , “Jurisprudence in Equality Program” Washington, D.C. 2010
*Nassau-Suffolk Women's Bar Association, Special Recognition Award, 2004
*Association of Italian American Educators 6th Annual Educators Awards & Scholarship Celebration, 2004
*Town of North Hempstead, Special Recognition Award, 2004
*Town of Brookhaven, Certificate of Congratulations Award, 2004
*Invited Speaker Award Nassau County Columbian Lawyers Association, 2005
*Appointed, Ladies of the Holy Sepulchre Eastern Lieutenancy Equestrian, Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem, 2016-present
*Elected, President, George Washington University Parent’s Association Advisory Council, Washington, D.C. 2014 - 2015
*Elected, Chairman, St. Mary Gate of Heaven Academy, 2015
*Westchester Italian Cultural Center, member 2011-2016
*American Bar Association, Appointed, Vice-Chair, Professional Liability, Insurance Committee, 2017-2018
*American Bar Association, Appointed, Chair-Elect, Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee 2016
*Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, North American Branch, Appointed, Executive Committee, 2013
*Association of Supreme Court Justices of the State of New York, member 2006-present
*National Association of Women Judges, member 2004-2016
*Nassau County Bar Association, member 1990's to present
*Columbian Lawyers' Association of Nassau County, member 1990's to present
*International Association of Woman Judges, member 2008-2016
*American Bar Association, member 2009-present
*New York State Bar Association, member 2012-present
*Nassau County Women’s Bar Association 1990's to present
*American Bar Association, Co-Chair, Lloyd of London Market Structure, Litigation & ADR to Manage Disputes, 2016 & 2017
*Hofstra Law School, Continuing Education CLE Seminar, 2014
*New York State Judicial Institute, Educational Broadcasts, 2014
*Invited Lecturer: Hofstra Law School, Nassau County Bar Association, Nassau County
*Women’s Bar Association, National Business Institute, Theodore Roosevelt Inn of Court Inn of Court, Women in the Courts
Associate Justice Linda Christopher
Justices of the Court
Associate Justice Linda Christopher
Judicial Offices
Associate Justice, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, Appointed by Governor Andrew Cuomo, May, 2017 to present.
Justice, Supreme Court, Ninth Judicial District; November 2010 - May 2017
Supervising Judge, Matrimonial Part, Ninth Judicial District, January 2014 - May 2017.
Judge, Family Court, Rockland County, 2005 - 2010.
Acting Supreme Court Justice, 2006 - 2010.
Integrated Domestic Violence Court Judge, October 2006 - 2010.
Village Justice, Village of Grandview, 2003 - 2005.
Acting Village Justice, Village of Upper Nyack, 2003 - 2005.
Other Professional Experience
Trial Counsel, Law Offices of Linda Christopher, P.C., 1996 - 2004.
Partner, Christopher & Draine, Esqs., 1992 - 1996.
Trial Counsel, Law Offices of Linda Christopher, P.C., 1986 - 1992.
Law Clerk and Associate, Jerome Trachtenberg, Esq., Nyack, NY 1981 - 1986
Village Attorney, Village of Nyack - 1987 - 1994
Law Clerk, Hon. Orrelle R. Weeks, Family Court, Denver, CO, 1980
Admission to the Bar
New York State - Appellate Division, Second Department,1982
United States Supreme Court, 1988
Education
J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1980
B.A., University of Colorado, Honors Program, 1976.
Publications & Leading Cases
B. W. v. R. F., 53 Misc3d 366 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
L. E. A. v. C. P. A., 51 Misc3d 489 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2015).
M. C. v. D. C., 52 Misc3d 1222(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
D. E. v. P. A., 52 Misc3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
G. D. v. D. D., 52 Misc3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
K. K. v. P. K. M., 52 Misc3d 1220(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
E. R. S. v. B. C. S., 51 Misc3d 1210(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
G. D. v. D. D., 50 Misc3d 1223(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2016).
K. K. v. P. M., 50 Misc3d 1225(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2015).
S. H. v. E. S., 52 Misc3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2014).
William I. v. Kathleen K., 50 Misc3d 1224(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2013).
Continental Casualty Company v. Naegele Incorporated Bakery Systems , 55 Misc3d 1204(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2017).
Santaiti v. Town of Ramapo, Inc., 54 Misc3d 1222(A) (Sup. Ct., Rockland Cty. 2017).
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Watts Water Technologies, Inc., 53 Misc3d 1213(A) (Sup Ct., Rockland Cty., 2017).
E. G. v. D. G., 63 Misc3d 1201(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty. 2014).
D. B. v. M. B., 39 Misc3d 1205(A) (Sup. Ct., Westchester Cty., 2013).
W. A. v. D. A., 34 Misc3d 552 (Sup Ct., Westchester Cty. 2011).
Professional & Civic Activities
Lecturer, Summer Seminars, NYS Judicial Institute - “Credibility Issues in Custody Cases” - June 20, 2017
Lecturer, International Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers - “A View From and Presentation to the Bench: Hague and International Law Issues and Assessing Flight Risk” - April 29, 2017
Lecturer, Westchester Women’s Bar, Matrimonial Committee - “Whatever Happened to PRICHEP?: Counsel Fees in Matrimonial Actions and in Family Court” - March 22, 2017
Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Equitable Distribution and Net Worth Statements” - January, 2017
Lecturer, Westchester County Bar Association Family Law Section - “Settling Matrimonial Actions” - 2016
Lecturer, New York Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers - “MMPI-2 RF, MCMI-III, SCL-90-R and Other Psychological Testing: Passe Or Still of Value in Child Custody Disputes?” - 2016
Lecturer, Rockland County Women’s Bar Association -“Retaining Liens and Charging Liens” - 2016
Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Post Judgment Relief and Uncontested Divorces” - January 8, 2016
Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Domestic Violence - For Family and Matrimonial Judges Including Use of Risk Assessment Instruments” - January 7, 2016
Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Pro Se Litigants” - January 7, 2016
Lecturer, Westchester County Bar Association regarding “Civility in the Courtroom” - December 2, 2015
Lecturer, NYSBACLE - “So Custody Is an Issue: What Do We Do Now? - The Roles and Responsibilities of the Judge” - November 2015
Lecturer, Westchester Women’s Bar Association Program - “The New Maintenance Guidelines” - September 30, 2015
Lecturer, Family Violence Task Force - “Ethical Challenges for Jurists in Domestic Violence Cases” - September 2015
Lecturer, NYSBA Family Law Section - “Bullying From Both Sides of the Bench” - July, 2015
Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Domestic Violence - Order of Protection Basics for Matrimonial Judges” - January 7, 2015
Lecturer, New Judges Seminar, NYS Judicial Institute - “Child Support” - July, 2014
Lecturer, NYS Bar Association CLE - “Trial of a Custody Case” - May 9, 2014
Lecturer, Training for NYS Court Attorney Referees - Child Custody Trials - December 4, 2013
Lecturer, Westchester County Women’s Bar Association Program -“ Court Enforced Visitation” - November 26, 2013
Associate Justice Lillian Wan
Justices of the Court
Associate Justice Lillian Wan
Judicial Offices
Associate Justice, New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, Appointed by Governor Kathy Hochul, May 25, 2022
Justice, Supreme Court, Kings County, Elected November 2021, Term: 2022 to 2035
Acting Justice, Supreme Court, Kings County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2020 to 2021
Acting Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, Appointed by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2018 to 2020
Judge, New York State Court of Claims, Appointed by Governor Andrew Cuomo, 2018 to 2021
Judge, Family Court of the City of New York, Kings County, Appointed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 2013 to 2018
Judge, Family Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge A. Gail Prudenti, 2012 to 2012
Judge, Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, Appointed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, 2012 to 2012
Other Professional Experience
New York State Unified Court System, Court Attorney-Referee in Surrogate's Court, 2009 to 2012
New York City Administration for Children’s Services, Executive Agency Counsel, 2000 to 2009
Admission to the Bar
NYS, Appellate Division, Second Department, 2001
Education
J.D., Albany Law School, 2000
B.A., Binghamton University, 1997
Professional & Civic Activities
Immediate Past President, Asian American Judges Association of New York
Co-Chair, Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics
Board Member, Brooklyn Women's Bar Association
Member, New York City Bar Association
Member, Columbian Lawyers Association of Brooklyn
Associate Justice Lawrence Love
Justices of the Court
Justice Laurence L. Love
Judicial Offices
Associate Justice, New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, Appointed by Governor Kathy Hochul, August 14, 2023
Co-coordinator for Child Victims Act (CVA) cases throughout New York City Court System, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks 2022 to 2023
Justice, Supreme Court, New York County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2020 to Present
Justice, Supreme Court, Queens, County, Elected, 2019 to 2033
Acting Justice, Supreme Court, Queens County, Designated by Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, 2016 to 2018
Judge, Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, Elected, 2013 to 2022
Other Professional Experience
Law Offices of Laurence L. Love, Private Practice, 1994 to 2012
Legal Counsel to Assemblywoman Audrey I. Pheffer, 1993 to 2011
Law Offices of Marvin H. Bergman, 1992 to 1994
Legislative Assistant to Assemblywoman Audrey I. Pheffer, 1987 to 1993
Admission to the Bar
NYS, Appellate Division, First Department, 1993
United States, District Court, Eastern District of New York, 1993
United States, District Court, Southern District of New York, 1993
Education
J.D., Hofstra Law, 1992
B.A., City University of New York, Queens College, 1989
Professional & Civic Activities
Board Member, Brandeis Association, 2015 to Present
Member, Brandeis Association, 1995 to Present
Member, Queens County Bar Association, 1994 to Present
These are all ACCOMPLISHED, EDUCATED men and women.
The are also HIGHLY PAID public officials who do not have any WORRY - as well as their family members - as to either financial security, or medical benefits.
Unlike most people in the State of New York for whom, very often, employment in public entities and non-profits associated with care for children and seniors are the ONLY decent or ANY employment available in the area.
A CARELESS, THOUGHTLESS decision like this - CONVICTING THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE simply because he DEFENDED himself from being KILLED or MAIMED by a ROBUST 15-year-old - condemns such a man not only for a temporary loss of liberty. It condemns him to unemployment and HUNGER.
CONVICT THE VICTIM. DESTROY HIS LIVELIHOOD. COLLECT YOUR JUDICIAL SALARY.
People v. Mears, at intermediate appellate level, 2nd Department: Four Highly Paid Appellate Judges, a Few Paragraphs of Judicial Indifference, and the Economic Death Sentence They Were Willing to Uphold
What does it cost four New York appellate judges to affirm a criminal conviction without bothering to apply the governing law correctly? Without bothering what kind of consequences their sloppy insulting one-page writing will visit on a real human being?
Their salaries continue. Their health insurance continues. Their retirement benefits continue. Their professional honors accumulate. Their judicial biographies grow longer. They can continue to SIT ON BOARDS, LECTURE about their "experiences" and "public service" - INSTEAD of doing THE ONLY JOB that people entrust to them and pay through their noses for them to do it.
Consider that judicial salaries are, probably, 8 or more times
The defendant, meanwhile, may lose his liberty, employment, professional opportunities, medical insurance, and ability to feed his family.
And in People v. Mears, 235 A.D.3d 779 (2d Dept. 2025), the defendant's supposed crime arose from conduct he testified was necessary to defend himself against a fifteen-year-old who was repeatedly punching him.
THE CHILD ATTACKS. THE MAN DEFENDS HIMSELF. THE STATE CONVICTS THE MAN. FOUR APPELLATE JUDGES AFFIRM.
Their explanation? The law is intended to protect children.
How intellectually impressive.
How professionally accomplished.
How utterly indifferent to the consequences of their own SLOPPY decision.
I. A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS ALSO AN ECONOMIC WEAPON
In poor communities throughout New York, the best employers are frequently public institutions and nonprofit organizations: school districts, hospitals, nursing homes, childcare centers, social-service agencies, and county governments.
These institutions offer what many private employers in economically depressed areas do not: dependable wages, health insurance, retirement plans, paid leave, and a reasonable prospect of long-term employment.
They are also precisely the institutions that conduct extensive criminal-background screening.
And what conviction did the four judges affirm against Mears?
ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD.
A conviction particularly damaging to employment prospects in institutions serving children and other vulnerable people.
A school district may question whether to hire him.
A childcare provider may reject him.
A nursing home or healthcare institution may subject him to heightened scrutiny.
A public employer may decide that his conviction presents an unacceptable risk.
Some employment restrictions are statutory. Others result from discretionary decisions following background checks. The practical result can be the same: rejection.
And where are the alternative jobs?
In a rural community where the school district, hospital, nursing home, and county government are among the few employers offering decent wages and benefits, losing access to those institutions can mean losing access to the local middle class.
The judges did not merely uphold the possibility of jail time. They upheld a conviction capable of turning a working man into an unemployable man.
A man without wages.
Without employer-sponsored medical insurance.
Without retirement contributions.
Without the means to support his family.
Without the means to move somewhere else and start over.
The New York Correction Law provides protections against unjustified employment discrimination based on criminal convictions. But statutory protections do not automatically produce a job, and challenging an adverse hiring decision requires time, money, and resources.
A man cannot feed his children with the theoretical right to challenge an employer's rejection.
II. THE JUDGES WILL NEVER HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR OWN DECISION
Now consider the four judges.
Angela G. Iannacci.
Linda Christopher.
Lillian Wan.
Laurence L. Love.
All highly educated. All professionally accomplished. All holding prestigious, publicly compensated judicial offices.
Their salaries and employment benefits are financed by taxpayers.
They have the security of judicial compensation and access to public employee benefit and retirement systems.
They do not have to apply for a minimum-wage job at a nursing home because the local factory closed.
They do not have to wonder whether a school district will reject their applications after a criminal-background check.
They do not have to choose between paying for medication and buying groceries because an employer has denied them health insurance.
They are paid by the very public whose members can be financially ruined by their judicial errors.
And what does the public receive in return?
In Mears, a perfunctory appellate decision affirming a conviction obtained after the jury was denied a legally required justification instruction.
Not a serious examination of the statutory language.
Not a meaningful reconciliation of the two criminal charges arising from the same physical conduct.
Not a proper application of the governing standard for determining whether the defendant was entitled to a justification charge.
A few paragraphs.
PAGES OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS FOR THE JUDGES. A FEW PARAGRAPHS FOR THE MAN WHOSE FUTURE WAS AT STAKE.
Justice Iannacci's official biography meticulously catalogues judicial appointments, professional affiliations, lectures, awards, committees, task forces, and honors.
The panel's published explanation for affirming Mears's conviction is a fraction of that length.
There is apparently unlimited space to celebrate judicial accomplishment.
But when a man's liberty and livelihood depend on the faithful application of the Penal Law, the panel could barely spare a paragraph for the justification issue.
III. THE LEGISLATURE HAD ALREADY PROVIDED THE ANSWER
Penal Law § 35.00 expressly provides that justification is a defense "in any prosecution for an offense."
The Court of Appeals had explained in People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541 (1986), that justification is not limited to particular crimes.
Yet the Second Department relied on appellate decisions that had improperly restricted the defense in child-endangerment prosecutions.
On October 27, 2026, the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed.
It explained that the statutory text was clearly contrary to the restriction endorsed by the lower courts.
CLEARLY CONTRARY.
That is the assessment of the state's highest court.
Four experienced appellate judges affirmed a conviction on a theory contrary to the governing statutory text.
And who paid the price for that error?
Not the judges.
The defendant.
The man who had to pursue another appeal to obtain recognition of a defense the Legislature had already provided.
IV. WHAT EXACTLY ARE TAXPAYERS PAYING FOR?
The public does not finance judicial salaries, benefits, pensions, chambers, clerks, and court administration so that judges can mechanically repeat defective precedents.
The public pays judges to read the law.
To examine the record.
To distinguish controlling authority from inapplicable decisions.
To recognize when a defendant's testimony requires submission of a defense to the jury.
And, above all, to understand that their decisions have consequences for actual human beings.
A criminal conviction is not an administrative entry on a judicial productivity report.
It can deprive a person of the ability to work.
It can deprive his family of medical insurance.
It can deprive his children of financial support.
It can turn a previously employable person into someone who must repeatedly explain a criminal record to prospective employers.
And it can do all of this long after any sentence of incarceration has ended.
The four judges were paid to recognize and apply the law before allowing those consequences to stand.
They failed to do so correctly.
Their collective professional distinction makes that failure more inexcusable.
What good are decades of judicial experience, domestic-violence expertise, child-protection credentials, prestigious appointments, and professional awards if four judges cannot correctly apply the statutory right of self-defense?
V. CONVICT THE VICTIM — THEN LEAVE HIM TO FIND A JOB
The grotesque irony of Mears is that the conviction itself concerned the welfare of a child.
Mears testified that a fifteen-year-old had attacked him.
The prosecution relied on Mears's use of force.
The jury was permitted to consider justification on the strangulation charge and acquitted him.
The jury was denied that defense on the child-endangerment charge and convicted him.
The Second Department affirmed.
And that conviction, had it remained in force, could have followed Mears into employment applications at the very institutions that dominate many local economies.
A man who claimed he was defending himself against a child could be excluded from employment because he carried a conviction for endangering a child — a conviction obtained without permitting the jury to consider his defense.
That is the economic absurdity produced by the legal absurdity.
The Court of Appeals eventually reversed and ordered a new trial.
But appellate correction does not automatically restore lost employment opportunities, income, insurance coverage, or years spent living under a conviction.
VI. JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE IS NOT A LICENSE FOR INDIFFERENCE
These four judges occupy positions of public trust.
Their professional achievements are not substitutes for the performance of their duties.
Their compensation is not a prize for having impressive résumés.
Their public offices are not honorary titles.
They are paid to administer justice according to law.
And the public is entitled to demand that they exercise the care necessary to do so.
The judges' economic security is protected by the public treasury. The defendant's economic security may be destroyed by their judgment.
That disparity imposes a particularly grave responsibility on those who wield judicial power.
The defendant cannot afford their errors.
His family cannot afford their errors.
The taxpayers who finance the judicial system should not be expected to accept those errors as an inevitable byproduct of prestigious public employment.
IF YOU ARE PAID TO DECIDE WHETHER A MAN'S CRIMINAL CONVICTION SHOULD STAND, READ THE LAW.
IF HIS LIVELIHOOD MAY DEPEND ON YOUR DECISION, EXAMINE THE RECORD.
IF HIS DEFENSE IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED BY STATUTE, DO NOT INVENT AN EXCEPTION.
AND IF YOU ARE ENTRUSTED WITH THE POWER TO AFFIRM A CONVICTION THAT MAY COST A MAN HIS JOB, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND ABILITY TO FEED HIS FAMILY — PAY ATTENTION.
That is not an extraordinary demand.
It is the minimum the public is entitled to expect from the highly compensated judges it employs.
CONVICT THE VICTIM. COLLECT YOUR $250,100 SALARY.
The economic gulf between four New York appellate judges and the people whose livelihoods their decisions can destroy
Four justices of the Appellate Division, Second Department — Angela G. Iannacci, Linda Christopher, Lillian Wan, and Laurence L. Love — unanimously affirmed Stephen Mears's conviction for endangering the welfare of a child after the trial court refused to allow the jury to consider his self-defense claim on that charge.
Mears testified that a fifteen-year-old attacked him with repeated, unprovoked punches.
The judges upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed on October 27, 2026.
These judges receive salaries more than four times the median individual earnings in Suffolk County, where Mears was prosecuted.
ONE APPELLATE JUSTICE
$250,100
2026 annual statutory salarySUFFOLK MEDIAN EARNER
$58,202
Annual individual earnings, ACS 2020–2024Graph 1. One judge's salary versus local earnings
Judicial salary effective April 2026; Suffolk County median individual earnings from ACS 2020–2024.
One judge earns $191,898 more per year than Suffolk County's median individual earner. The judicial salary is 4.30 times that median, before accounting for benefits.
Graph 2. Judicial salary versus earnings throughout the Second Department
■ Median individual earnings
■ Judicial salary
Annual judicial salary: 2026. County earnings: ACS 2020–2024. Selected counties with comparable available figures.
Even in affluent Nassau and Westchester Counties, the statutory salary of one appellate justice approaches four times median individual earnings. In Queens, the multiple exceeds five.
Graph 3. Four judges versus ordinary earners in Suffolk County
Four annual judicial salaries total $1,000,400 at 2026 rates. Seventeen Suffolk median individual earnings total $989,434.
Four appellate justices collectively receive more in annual statutory salaries than seventeen Suffolk County residents earning the county's median individual income.
That is $1,000,400 annually in judicial base salaries, excluding benefits.
The employment consequences of the conviction they affirmed
In economically distressed communities, schools, hospitals, nursing homes, childcare centers, and public agencies may be among the few employers offering reliable wages, health insurance, and retirement benefits.
These are also sectors in which criminal-history screening is common or legally required.
A conviction for endangering the welfare of a child can expose an applicant to additional scrutiny, employment denial, or occupational restrictions, depending on the job and governing law.
New York Correction Law Article 23-A provides protections against unjustified employment discrimination, but it does not guarantee a job or eliminate the consequences of a criminal record.
A person excluded from the principal stable employers in his community may face unemployment, loss of health insurance, depleted savings, and an inability to support his family.
And in Mears, the conviction arose from conduct the defendant testified was necessary to protect himself from a physical attack.
THE TAXPAYERS PAY JUDGES TO APPLY THE LAW CORRECTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH
The four appellate justices were each entitled to $245,100 annually when they decided Mears in February 2025. Their statutory salaries increased to $250,100 in April 2026.
Their employment and benefits did not depend on the outcome of Mears's appeal.
His liberty and potentially his livelihood did.
Yet the Second Department affirmed his conviction in a insultingly brief opinion that the Court of Appeals subsequently reversed unanimously.
The Court of Appeals held that the justification defense was available in endangering welfare of a child case, and that a reasonable view of the evidence required the instruction.
The PROBLEM that I am seeing here is - WHY WAS NOT THE "CHILD" CHARGED WITH ASSAULT? WHY WAS HIS VICTIM CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE CHILD?
WHAT KIND OF GARBAGE IS THAT?
WHY IS THERE NO OUTRAGE WITH THE PROSECUTOR?
As to the grandstanding judges:
WE, THE TAXPAYERS, PAY THESE JUDGES TO DO THEIR JOBS.
THEY MUST PAY ATTENTION.
THE FULL BLASTING DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BELOW. BOLD FONT AND HIGHLIGHTS ARE MINE.
====================
People v Mears
2026 NY Slip Op 06237
October 27, 2026
Court of Appeals
Halligan, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
The People & c., Respondent,
v
Stephen Mears, Appellant.
Decided on October 27, 2026
No. 80
Matthew Brissenden, for appellant.
Shiry Gaash, for respondent.
Halligan, J.
[*1]Following a physical altercation with his girlfriend's fifteen-year-old son, the defendant was charged with two offenses, endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10) and strangulation in the second degree (id. § 121.12). The trial court gave a justification charge under Penal Law § 35.15 for the strangulation count, but denied the charge for the endangerment offense. A jury convicted the defendant of endangerment, but acquitted on strangulation. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on prior cases holding the defense inapplicable to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, and further found that no reasonable view of the evidence supported giving a justification instruction.
We reverse. The relevant statutory text and our precedent confirm that a justification instruction pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 may be available for a charge of endangering the welfare of a child that is premised on the use of force. We also conclude that there is a reasonable view of the evidence here in support of the defense, and the refusal to charge the justification defense was not harmless.
I.In September 2022, the defendant shared a home with his girlfriend, J.L., and her fifteen-year-old son, R.T. During a night out, the defendant and J.L. argued and returned home. Each went back out to a bar, and they eventually returned home again, still quarreling. A physical altercation between the defendant and R.T. ensued, leaving R.T. on the floor, seemingly unconscious.
The defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10)FN1 and strangulation in the second degree (id. § 121.12)FN2. At trial, the People relied on the same conduct—the defendant's use of force against R.T.—to prove both the endangering and the strangulation charges. J.L., R.T., and the defendant each recounted their versions of the altercation. The People also called a forensic nurse, who testified about the abrasions found on R.T.'s neck and a strangulation assessment she performed on R.T., and a forensic scientist, who testified about a DNA swab of R.T.'s neck that showed likely evidence of the defendant's DNA.
After the People rested, the defendant sought a trial order of dismissal on the ground that the People's evidence did not establish guilt of either charge. In response, the People pointed to the same evidence for both charges: that the defendant had placed his hands on R.T.'s neck, causing him to become unconscious. In their summation, the People again confirmed that they were relying on the same evidence for the endangerment and strangulation counts, stating that "[R.T.'s] testimony on that witness stand establishes every element of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."
Defense counsel requested a justification charge under section 35.15. The court denied the instruction with respect to the endangering count, but allowed it for the strangulation count. The jury proceeded to convict defendant on endangerment but acquitted him on the strangulation charge.
The Appellate Division affirmed (235 AD3d 779, 780 [2d Dept 2025]). Relying on People v Varela (164 AD2d 924 [2d Dept 1990]), People v Fields (134 AD2d 365 [2d Dept 1987]), and People v Williams (102 AD3d 566 [1st Dept 2013]), the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly declined to charge justification, since that defense "generally does not apply" to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child (235 AD3d at 780). It further held that, regardless, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that supported the defense (see id.).
A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (43 NY3d 1057 [2025]). We now reverse and remit for a new trial.
II.Article 35 of the Penal Law sets forth various justification defenses that are available "[i]n any prosecution for an offense" (Penal Law § 35.00). The provision at issue here, section 35.15 (1), states that a person may "use physical force upon another when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself . . . from what he or [*2]she . . . reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person." "[B]y recognizing the use of force to be privileged under certain circumstances, [this defense] renders such conduct entirely lawful" (People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 546 [1986]).
In denying this justification charge for the endangerment count, the Appellate Division relied on past precedent, including Fields (134 AD2d 365), Varela (164 AD2d 924), and Williams (102 AD3d 566). The starting point, Fields, held that a separate parental justification defense found in section 35.10 (1), which is not at issue here, was inapplicable to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child because a parent who knowingly acted in a manner injurious to a child's welfare could not have reasonably believed their actions necessary to promoting that child's welfare (134 AD2d at 365-366)FN3. Varela extended the rule from Fields to the self-defense justification defense under section 35.15 without any substantive explanation (164 AD2d at 924 ["The defense of justification is not applicable to the misdemeanor of endangering the welfare of a minor"]). The First Department reached a similar conclusion in Williams, albeit with the unexplained qualification that the defense "generally" does not apply to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child (102 AD3d at 567).
The statutory text, however, is clearly contrary. Article 35 instructs that, "[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense" (§ 35.00 [emphasis added]). And the self-defense justification defense, set forth in section 35.15, includes no limiting or qualifying language regarding the availability of the defense. We thus see no basis in Article 35's broad language for denying a section 35.15 justification defense in a prosecution involving a charge of endangering the welfare of a child.
We have consistently held that there is "no basis for limiting the application of the defense of justification to . . . any particular crime" (McManus, 67 NY2d at 547), and stressed that a justification charge is available "whenever the defendant claims that 'he engaged in forceful conduct in avoidance of a perceived attack' " (id., quoting People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 146 [1983] [alterations omitted]). Contrary to the People's contentions, a self-defense justification defense is not limited to offenses that include the use of force as one of the statutory elements. Even if the prosecution could prove their case without establishing a defendant's use of force, the justification defense is available if the prosecution chooses to argue its case on a use-of-force theory, and a reasonable view of the evidence supports the defense (see e.g. id. [depraved indifference murder]; People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96, 104 n 2 [1986] [reckless endangerment before a grand jury]). Although endangering the welfare of a child can be prosecuted based on a defendant's actions that do not involve the use of force, here, the prosecution premised their case on defendant's use of force.
When a prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child is based on the use of force, a charge of justification pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 is available if there is a reasonable view of the [*3]evidence to support it. To the extent that Varela and Williams are inconsistent with that holding, they should not be followed.
III.The Appellate Division found in the alternative that no reasonable view of the evidence could support the justification charge (235 AD3d at 780). Where "there is any reasonable view of the evidence that defendant was justified in his actions," an instruction must be given (People v Castillo, 42 NY3d 628, 631 [2024]). In making that assessment, a court must "examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant" (id.). Applying that standard here, we conclude that a reasonable view of the evidence supported a justification defense, and the Appellate Division erred in concluding otherwise.
The evidence relied on by the People to prove the endangerment charge was identical to that underlying the strangulation charge. Even though non-violent conduct may provide a basis for an endangerment charge, the People relied on defendant's use of force in support of both charges. The People did not differentiate between the endangerment and strangulation charges in their complaint, opening statement, or summation, and in their response to the trial order seeking dismissal, the People's evidence for both charges focused on the defendant placing his hands on R.T.'s neck.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is a reasonable view supporting a justification instruction. According to the defendant's testimony, the defendant was reacting to multiple unprovoked punches from R.T., with the apparent expectation that more punches would follow. The defendant testified that he might have ended up grabbing R.T.'s neck accidentally while protecting his glass contact lenses. While R.T. and J.L. provided accounts that sharply diverged from the defendant's, the "charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence which, if credited, would negate it" (People v. J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 119 [2020], quoting People v McKenzie, 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]).
Our conclusion is bolstered by the court's decision to give an instruction on justification for the strangulation charge without objection. The only discernible explanation the People offer for why the justification instruction would be available for one charge but not the other is that a jury could have construed the defendant's other actions that did not involve force as "injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare" of R.T. While the People might have been able to prove their case that way, that is not the path they pursued at trial. Instead, the People relied on the defendant's use of force in support of both charges.
IV.Because a reasonable view of the evidence supports the justification defense, the court was without discretion to deny the charge (see Padgett, 60 NY2d at 144-145). We reject the People's contention that the error was harmless.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Singas, J. (Concurring):
I join the majority in full and write to provide additional observations regarding difficulties that will likely arise in cases where use of physical force is not an essential element of the crime, but the People seek to prove a defendant's guilt with evidence of the defendant's use of force that may have been justified.
First, when the People seek to establish a defendant's guilt using—among other evidence—proof of the defendant's use of physical force, and when there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant's use of that force was justified, trial courts should specify the count to which justification defense applies (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 35.15 [1], https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/Defenses/CJI2d.Justification.
Person.Physical_Force.pdf [last accessed Oct. 21, 2026]) and should also identify the specific conduct to which that defense applies. This will permit the factfinder to evaluate the defense and, if the People fail to disprove it, to consider whether the People's other evidence nonetheless proves the defendant's guilt.
Second, when analyzing whether the trial court's failure to give a justification instruction to the jury was harmless error in such a case, appellate courts should similarly consider whether the evidence not subject to the justification defense overwhelmingly established the defendant's guilt and whether there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the instruction been given (see People v Jones, 3 NY3d 491, 497 [2004]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; see also People v J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 124 [2020]).
I agree with the majority that the error was not harmless here (see majority op at 8). Although the People offered some non-use-of-force evidence at trial tending to establish defendant's guilt of endangering the welfare of a child, that evidence was not overwhelming. Moreover, given [*4]that the People focused almost exclusively throughout this prosecution on defendant's use of force to prove the endangerment charge (see majority op at 7), there was certainly a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it been properly instructed on justification as a defense to that conduct.
Order reversed and a new trial ordered. Opinion by Judge Halligan. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro and Troutman concur, Judge Singas in a concurring opinion.
Decided October 27, 2026
Footnotes
Footnote 1
Penal Law § 260.10 (1) provides that an individual is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when "[h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his or her life or health."
Footnote 2
Penal Law § 121.12 provides that "[a] person is guilty of strangulation in the second degree when he or she commits the crime of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation . . . and thereby causes stupor, loss of consciousness for any period of time, or any other physical injury or impairment." The defendant was also charged with one count under Penal Law § 121.11 (a), but that count was dismissed before trial.
Footnote 3
Section 35.10 (1) provides that "[a] parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one . . . may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person." The defendant requested this instruction at trial, but he does not challenge its denial before this Court. Thus, we do not address the issue decided in Fields.
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