"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Thursday, March 10, 2016

It does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish - part next

I wrote in several previous blogs that New York state courts, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, being busy courts, do not distinguish between my husband and myself when punishing either one of us for actions of the other.

Gary L. Sharpe of the NDNY punished my husband for my conduct in lawful actions unrelated to my husband, and for actions of my friend in her pro se proceedings unrelated to both of us.

Gary L. Sharpe of NDNY punished me for actions of my husband unrelated to me.

Carl F. Becker of Delaware County Supreme Court punished me for actions of my husband that led to his disbarment (before I was admitted to the bar) and for my husband's motion to recuse in an environmental administrative proceedings where I was not allowed to participate as a party, before I became an attorney.

The 2nd Department heaped it all together and claimed I am a party in my husband's pro se actions where he was the only party.

The 3rd Department joined my already disbarred husband as a party to my disciplinary proceedings in 2014 in its order of transfer to the 4th Department.

The 4th Department suspended me from the practice of law for actions of my husband at the time I was not admitted to the bar in 2008, even after its Committee withdrew the charge.

On March 3, 2016, in Neroni v Follender, the Appellate Division 3rd Department, against whom my husband just filed a motion for sanctions for frivolous conduct in the U.S. District of New York, retaliated against me by stating, on page 2 of the decision, "[t]he action culminated in a default judgment against plaintiff's [that is me] clients and an award of sanctions for frivolous conduct against plaintiff; both determinations were affirmed by this court".

That statement was an intricate combination of truth and lies.

The action that culminated in a default judgment was against my husband's clients, I was not an attorney at the time the motion for that default judgment as made and did not represent those people at that time. The 3rd Department knew about it, but still piled it all up into one heap, whether it was about my husband or myself, does not matter.

I was an attorney for those people only on motions to vacate the default judgment and on appeals from denials of such motions.

The 3rd Department did not - and could not - affirm the judgment of default, such judgments are not appealable.  The 3rd Department dismissed that appeal specifically on those reasons, which means that the judgment of default was not affirmed on appeal.

The sanctions imposed upon me for making motions to vacate were imposed for allegedly delaying satisfaction of money judgment, which the 3rd Department affirmed in 2012.

The "delaying" was the motion to compel attorney Jonathan Follender to do what statutory law required him to do in the first place - make the record of a case where he obtained a default judgment complete by, if not filing the transcript of deposition of an expert that he did not properly notice to Mr. Neroni as the attorney on the case, then at least to disclose the identity of the testifying expert and the court stenographer, so that I would be able to obtain that transcript myself.

The motion was denied, so the default judgment based on incomplete record in the underlying case is not valid until now, but I stand punished multiple times, and my law license suspended, for trying to make the record of a court case complete, as required by statutory law, where attorney Jonathan Follender continues to conceal the identity of the expert and of the stenographer who took the deposition that Mr. Follender never filed with the court, but instead obtained a default judgment without a full record.

The sanctions in Neroni v Follender were imposed upon me for suing people who first said I caused the delay in satisfaction of money judgment and then said that I caused premature satisfaction of that same judgment, asking for more sanctions.

The defendants asked for sanctions for suing them.  Sanctions were granted and affirmed by the 3rd Department on appeal.  So, I was sanctioned, and lost my law license, for delaying satisfaction of a money judgment and for causing that satisfaction too soon.

It appears that in New York, sanctions for frivolous conduct depend entirely upon the identity of those against whom the sanctions are requested.

If that is a judge or a relative of a judge, or a connected attorney, courts will bend over backwards to invent ways not to sanction.

If it is an attorney they want punished, financially bled and gone, they will bend over backwards to ignore evidence that attorney's claims are legitimate and will sanction the attorney anyway.

And especially if people to be sanctioned are Frederick Neroni or Tatiana Neroni.  We have laws personally carved out against us in the State of New York.

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