"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Enemies (critics) of the court are not entitled to the rule of law - NDNY and Janet DiFiore jointly strike against the Neronis

I wrote here that in November of 2014 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York has imposed an anti-filing injunction on my husband Frederick J. Neroni for filing civil rights lawsuits with constitutional cases, based on five civil rights lawsuits, two of them still pending and counseled (by me) and without notification of counsel.

I blogged here about some circumstances of how that anti-filing injunction was imposed, by a court that stubbornly continues to preside over our cases despite its incestuous relationship with powerful attorneys involved in the other sides of my husband's and my own cases in that court.

Not that the NDNY court would be expected to know and/or apply the law, especially if it is in my husband's favor or my favor.

Enemies of the court are not entitled to the rule of law.

Nevertheless, at the time of the injunction, as I said above, there were two pending counseled cases - Neroni v Zayas, Case No. 3:13-cv-127-LEK-DEP and Neroni v Grannis, Case No. 3:11-cv-1485.

On November 13, 2015 my New York state law license was suspended, without a hearing, because of sanctions imposed by the now-retired Judge Carl Becker because:

1) in one case I asked Becker to recuse for bias, misconduct, multiple conflicts of interest and lack of legitimacy (he did not file a certificate of election as required by law at that time); some conflicts of interest were revealed long after the sanctions were imposed, in 2012 and later, and one conflict was revealed in January of 2016, after Becker was no longer a judge and after my suspension;

2) in the second case, I also asked Becker to recuse for bias, misconduct and conflict of interest (Becker's ex parte communication with a party's counsel is part of the transcript, Becker did not disclose that one of the parties is likely his close friend or girlfriend - that was revealed after sanctions were affirmed on appeal);

All three sanctions of Becker were rendered unconstitutional as a matter of law of June 18, 2015 by Reed v Town of Gilbert as content-based regulation done without application of strict scrutiny.

Yet, the Town of Gilbert decision did not prevent the Appellate Division 4th Department to suspend my law license on November 13, 2015 "for lack of remorse" as to unconstitutional sanctions imposed by Becker.  The suspension was without a public hearing that I requested, and was based entirely on Becker's sanctions rendered unconstitutional as of June of 2015 by Reed v Town of Gilbert.

The Town of Gilbert decision did not prevent the NDNY to take my federal law license "by rule of reciprocity", also without a hearing, on November 18, 2015.

NDNY continues to play games with whether I am or am not a licensed attorney, by the way. 

For example, in my husband's Neroni v Zayas case where he recently filed a motion to recuse and supplemental documents for the previously filed motion to vacate - filed by me before the suspension in October of 2015 - I am still listed, as of today, as my husband's "lead attorney", even though that court suspended me, and my husband already appeared in that case after my suspension pro se.

This is as of today.

By the way, I never registered a "Neroni Law Office" in South Carolina, this is the flight of imagination of the Northern District of New York.  I only had a mailing P.O. Box in my own name, since I lived there.

The Town of Gilbert decision did not prevent the New York State Court of Appeals, Janet DiFiore (as I've learnt only yesterday, through an order received by mail) to dismiss my constitutional appeal of my law license suspension "as of right" because "no substantial constitutional question was involved" on March 24, 2016

(see my blog about illegality of such "substantial-insubstantial" dichotomy of cases by the New York State Court of Appeals, based on a law review article and a dissent from a judge of that same court, published just 3 days ago on March 26, 2016, when, unbeknownst to me, Janet DiFiore's order tossing my appeal "as of right" on unlawful grounds was already made and was in the mail - it takes a long time to get mail from New York to South Carolina, so I am surprised I even got it in four days yesterday, usually it takes a week or more).

Apparently, violation of the 1st Amendment, clearly outlined in my disciplinary case, is not a "substantial constitutional question" for Janet DiFiore.

I will publish DiFiore's order of March 24, 2016, with a comment, in a separate blog.

Here I want to show how Northern District of New York used the anti-filing injunction - illegally, clumsily, stupidly, as is everything that NDNY is doing in our cases - to duck the issues raised in my husband's motion.

Here is what my husband received yesterday in the mail from the Northern District of New York:

But, Mr. Neroni did not file any motions for a LEAVE (permission of the court) to file anything in the "Case No. 3:13-cv-0127", that is Neroni v Zayas.

Mr. Neroni filed:

1) A supplemental Affirmation with exhibits, providing additional support to his earlier-filed Rule 60 motion (which the court acknowledges, is outside of the injunction).

The injunction, as the court concedes, "expressly did not affect" my husband's "rights in any of his currently pending cases", including the Neroni v Zayas case.

So, the supplemental Affirmation with Exhibits had to be accepted by the court.

2) Mr. Neroni's motion was for sanctions for frivolous conduct, to allow him e-filing, to allow him representation by an unlicensed individual (me), for substitution of parties, and to recuse the court.

The motion to recuse was essential for the fair determination of the pending Rule 60 motion, and thus is very much related to jurisdiction and fairness of the court in deciding the Rule 60 motion.

Since some Defendants retired or left the positions in which they were sued in their official capacity, replacement of Defendants was clearly related to determination of the Rule 60 motion.

And, an injunction imposed based on contents of Mr. Neroni's constitutional civil rights cases, has been invalidated by Reed v Town of Gilbert as of June 18, 2015 in the first place.

Not so in the NDNY.

If any law is favorable to Mr. Neroni or myself, it is not to be read.

So, all the motions that I enumerated above, that Mr. Neroni filed, were considered as if they were filed not as of right, but with a request for a leave (permission) to file - to the Chief Judge instead of judge Kahn who was assigned to the case - and such a "leave" was, of course, denied.

And, the supplemental affirmation to Rule 60 motion (that the court said was properly filed and was not within the injunction) also went into the stricken and blocked pile.

How appropriate.

What is also interesting is the timing of these two orders:

1) Mr. Neroni's motion to sanction DiFiore for frivolous conduct in his case was blocked without review on March 23, 2016;

2) DiFiore tossed my constitutional disciplinary appeal "as of right" as if it was discretionary on March 24, 2016, the next day after the motion for sanctions against her made by Mr. Neroni was conveniently blocked.

No retaliation.  No coincidence.

The "honorables" are in their usual glory.

So, when I still had a valid law license and sent a Rule 11 (sanctions) notification in Neroni v Zayas, on behalf of my client Mr. Neroni, to:

1) NYS Attorney General;
2) NYS Governor (DiFiore's friend);
3) NYS Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals (then Lippman),

the solution was easy - my law license was suspended before I could file the motion for sanctions.

When Mr. Neroni tried to pick up the torch from where I left it and carry it on his own, making the motion I was going to make when my law license was suspended - against the very government that suspended my license "as a preventive measure" - he was prevented from filing that motion on contrived grounds.

Now, Mr. Neroni has the blessing of having TWO district court judges (Glenn Suddaby and Lawrence Kahn) deciding his pending motion to vacate.

Kahn did not decide the motion yet, but Suddaby already tossed a supplemental part of it, with exhibits, as well as a motion requesting Kahn and Peebles not to decide any motions based on their misconduct and conflict of interest, and to transfer the case to another, neutral and non-conflicted court.

And, of course, when I indicated to NDNY, in a separate affirmation filed in support of Mr. Neroni's motion that, if my representation of Mr. Neroni, despite my lack of license, is permitted, I am willing, able and ready to prosecute the case further.

Court representation on a pending motion and of further possible pending motions to vacate is very definitely related to that same pending motion to vacate.

Not so - says NDNY to Mr. Neroni.

You cannot appear pro se in a pending case where we stripped you of counsel when your counsel was about to make a motion for sanctions against those who regulate law licenses of every single judge of the NDNY court (that fact was also mentioned in Mr. Neroni's motion to recuse).

So - the counsel was stripped of her law license on the verge of a deadline to make a motion.

The party in a case with a pending motion is not allowed to appear pro se.

His filings are transferred to another judge, filed in another case, under another case number - and then denied, because he did not ask for permission.  Permission to make a motion to recuse, so that an impartial judge would review the pending Rule 60 motion?

Permission to have court representation of one's choice?

Permission to e-file?

Permission to file a motion for sanctions?

Where did NDNY get all this brand new law?

Obviously, it was created on the spot, to deal with the "situation" - the irrefutable evidence provided by Mr. Neroni in the stricken pleadings required to apply the law in his favor and grant the motions.

NDNY could not create such a precedent, admitting to massive misconduct of federal and state public officials.

What is the alternative for Mr. Neroni?

It is not clear.

As of today, he is not allowed to appear pro se in a case where a legitimate motion is pending (that the pending Rule 60 motion is legitimate and not blocked by the anti-filing injunction, even the NDNY conceded), his counsel is suspended, even though listed as still his counsel, 

and he is not allowed to have a court representative of his choice, the court refuses to consider his motion on that subject.

When judges are guided by rage alone, decisions that make no sense from the point of view of applicable law, happen.

The decision to strike Mr. Neroni's legitimate pleadings because, even though the pleadings are not covered by the anti-filing injunction, and even though the injunction has become unconstitutional since June of 2015, the injunction was stretched to punish Mr. Neroni...

And the next day after NDNY issued that decision, blocking Mr. Neroni's motion for sanctions against Neroni v Zayas defendants, including NYS Court of Appeals Chief Judge Janet DiFiore, DiFiore strikes against me and denies my appeal as of right as if it is discretionary.

Please, don't tell me that there is no collusion between NDNY and New York State public officials sued in Neroni v Zayas to do what is done to me and my husband, our licenses and our lives.

To any reasonable person, the collusion between NDNY and Neroni v Zayas defendants is clear as day.

(it is not a usual occurrence where a Chief Judge of the court interferes with a case where another judge is assigned, Glenn Suddaby who tossed the supplemental affirmation to Rule 60 motion pending in Neroni v Zayas case and who said he reviewed the entire docket of Neroni v Zayas case, including the pending motion, is not assigned to that case - Judge Lawrence Kahn is).

It contains all the answers as to why Mr. Neroni receives a medieval treatment as of he is an outlaw.

 Criticism of judicial misconduct in this country is not allowed.  

And critics who violate this taboo (as unconstitutional as it is) are to be viciously punished, as enemies of the court to whom laws simply do not apply.

That's the new law.

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