1) Judge Rumsey can schedule and conduct a trial where no trial note of issue has been filed or served by the party requesting the trial. Dolores Fogarty, attorney for the Plaintiff, did not file a trial note of issue, but the trial on behalf of her client was still commenced by Judge Rumsey - without authority to do so;
2) discovery in Judge Rumsey's court proceeds during the trial of divorce proceedings continue (even though New York law requires that the party filing the trial note of issue must state under oath that discovery has been completed at the time the trial note of issue is filed, and a trial MAY NOT commence without such a trial note of issue being filed and served); Dolores Fogarty, filed (finally) the trial note of issue where she stated that discovery is complete - at the same time as she filed what is supposed to be a PRE-TRIAL motion to compel continuing discovery, and such a pre-trial motion to compel MUST be, in accordance to court rules, preceded by several good faith efforts to ensure compliance with discovery, and evidence of such good faith efforts MUST be provided to the court - Ms. Fogarty did none of that;
3) Judge Rumsey allows some attorneys to replace Judge Rumsey in issuing judicial supboenas duces tecum for public records (which can be done as a matter of law only by a judge and only by motion on notice to all parties and to the custodian of the public records) - while continuing to claim that he is not biased in favor of such attorneys and their clients; see below the published copy of Ms. Fogarty's judicial subpoena duces tecum upon a public official signed by Ms. Fogarty alone - and, according to Mr. Shtrauch, endorsed by judge Rumsey;
4) Judge Rumsey denies interim relief (spousal maintenance, attorney fees, expert fees) to non-moneyed pro se indigent parties in divorce proceedings where the indigence of the non-moneyed party, as well as the lucrative employment of the moneyed party are obvious, and where expert valuation of assets is necessary, despite having ample proof of the parties' income through the multi-page notarized statements of net worth on file with the court. Judge Rumsey did that to Mr. Shtrauch, even though New York statute requires to grant interim relief to non-monied spouses in divorce litigation as a matter of right.
5) Judge Rumsey allows oral motions for frivolous conduct by attorneys against pro se parties. According to Mr. Shtrauch, Judge Rumsey allowed an oral motion for frivolous conduct against him made by Ms. Fogarty in court and gave him about 3 or 4 days to consider the "motion" - obviously, Mr. Shtrauch had to memorize Ms. Fogarty's "motion" to oppose it.
6) Judge Rumsey decides motions and cross-motions "asynchronically" - motions by attorneys are granted immediately while Judge Rumsey do not have time to review and decide at the same time cross-motions by pro se parties claiming (well documented) attorney misconduct of opposing counsel. Mr. Shtrauch indicated to me that Judge Rumsey granted Ms. Fogarty's motion to compel discovery during the trial, after Ms. Fogarty finally filed the note of issue stating in black and white that discovery was completed and even though Ms. Fogarty made no efforts to provide proof of her good faith efforts to ensure compliance with discovery - which means, if any non-compliance took place, Ms. Fogarty waived it and proceeded to trial.
7) Judge Rumsey never recuses himself as a point of principle when the previous judge recused on a motion from a party, no matter how warranted that recusal is. According to Mr. Shtrauch, Judge Rumsey stated to him in court that he will not be "forced" out of the case the way Mr. Shtrauch "forced" Judge Dowd out of the case.
In fact, Judge Dowd voluntarily recused from the case after Mr. Shtrauch's motion pointing out that Judge Dowd's law clerk was communicating with his children without his knowledge or consent, without knowledge or consent of the attorney for the child and outside of any court settings.
8) Judge Rumsey considers as "factors" in divorce litigation evidence submitted in previously dismissed cases - if such evidence is against the party who asked for the judge's recusal. According to Mr. Shtrauch, Judge Rumsey first was confused as to who Mr. Shtrauch was - a Plaintiff or a Defendant in litigation, because, event though Judge Rumsey was handling a trial where Mr. Shtrauch's spouse was the plaintiff and Mr. Shtrauch was the defendant, Judge Rumsey at the same time ruled (initially) that the previous discontinued divorce proceeding, where Mr. Shtrauch was the Plaintiff and Rebecca Shtrauch was the Defendant, were not discontinued correctly.
Judge Rumsey then ruled that the valuation of marital assets stopped accruing at the time the previous ("improperly" discontinued) divorce action started, and not when the present action started.
In the previous action, Rebecca Shtrauch did not file a counterclaim, and in the present action she is the Plaintiff and Mr. Shtrauch did file a counterclaim.
The discontinuance of the previous divorce action was recognized by the previously presiding judge Dowd - which did not deter Judge Rumsey from his ruling that, even though he is handling a trial for Rebecca Shtrauch as a plaintiff, he is considering that the previous case is still pending where Rebecca Shtrauch is a defendant - indicating that it is then Mr. Shtrauch who has a right during the trial to proceed first with his case, even though Judge Rumsey allowed Dolores Fogarty to proceed first.
When a motion to recuse Judge Rumsey and to dismiss the current action because, if the previous one is still legal, the current one may not be legal, Judge Rumsey relented and issued an order saying that, yes, the previous action was discontinued properly, but he will still consider orders issued in that discontinued and dismissed action as factors in litigation - for which, in my legal opinion, Judge Rumsey had no authority.
This case has been reported to me by Mr. Shtrauch, the victim of judicial misconduct and apparent misconduct by the attorney for the opposing counsel, Dolores Fogarty. Mr. Shtrauch gave me full permission to write about misconduct of Judge Rumsey and attorney Fogarty in court and to publish documents he provided to me.
Here is the latest shenanigan of Ms. Fogarty against a pro se party - a subpoena duces tecum for public records which the law requires to be a JUDICIAL subpoena duces tecum - that is, such a subpoena may only be obtained this way, according to New York state law - Civil Practice Law and Rules 2307:
- A written motion consisting of a proper notice of motion (or a signed Order to Show Cause) and of the supporting affidavit and other evidence upon which the records are sought, should be served upon all opposing parties and the custodian of the record (in this case, the court clerk);
- That same motion must be filed with the court.
- Service of the motion for a subpoena duces tecum on a public entity is set by statute. A private attorney has no authority to sign such subpoenas, it is clear abuse of subpoena power and attorney misconduct.
- All motions contesting such a subpoena, such as a motion to be served and for a protective order, have to be filed with the court and served upon the opposing party.
He first learnt that any motion was filed by Mr. Wentworth when he came to trial and saw Mr. Wentworth there - while Mr. Wentworth's art in litigation was long concluded.
- proceed to a trial without filing or serving a trial note of issue;
- file the note of issue in the middle of the trial and not strike the testimony that was accepted by the court before such trial note of issue was filed;
- compel discovery while continuing the trial;
- allow Ms. Fogarty to act as if she is a judge, issuing judicial subpoenas duces tecum upon a public entity;
- allow Ms. Fogarty to make oral motions for frivolous conduct, which motions can only be done in writing and on notice to parties, with strict service requirements;
- review and grant Ms. Fogarty's motions that are not warranted by law or facts - to compel discovery during trial, without indicating that she made good faith efforts to ensure compliance with discovery (I've seen Ms. Fogarty's motion) while at the same time stating that the judge did not have time to even review Mr. Shtrauch's cross-motion - and then deny the cross-motion in its entirety in perfunctory manner, some time later.