"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Monday, April 27, 2015

A correction - Stephen R. Sirkin amended the New York State Constitution, and CPLR 5524(a), and 22 NYCRR 1000.17(a), and will amend more if given the chance

In my earlier blog, I indicated that the referee in my disciplinary case, the retired Wayne County judge Stephen R. Sirkin, has amended the New York State Constitution by "deciding" (I put it in quotes because it was unlawful, but Sirkin named his Decision without any quotes), again, by "deciding" a motion on liability in my disciplinary case instead of the required 4 appellate justices for quorum and 3 appellate justices for concurrence.

Of course, Sirkin was not authorized by law, New York State Constitution or court order of appointment to decide any motions, but such trifles as restrictions of the law never deterred judges, retired judges, referees and hearing officers covered by absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts during performance of their judicial or quasi-judicial duties.

Really, will you be deterred from doing anything if you know that nobody can do anything to you or against you if you do what you are not supposed to, but what you still can do with impunity?

But once again, my previous story on this blog was that Sirkin has amended the New York State Constitution.

I was wrong.

Sirkin has amended actually a lot more than New York State Constiution, Article VI paragraph 4 subsection b.  He also amended CPLR 5524(a) and 22 NYCRR 1000.17(a).  The more the merrier, I guess.  From my personal impression of Sirkin, he is so old and frail and has such memory, perception and concentration problems that he would readily rubber stamp anything that is put in front of him, as long as it is put in front of him by a member of the government.

Yet, back to Sirkin's amendments.

This is the rule of the New York State Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department about entries of decisions made BY THE COURT on motions (not by retired county judges appointed as referees to hear and report facts in evidentiary hearings).

Well, at least the 4th Department recognized in the rule quoted above that it is "this Court" (and not Sirkin and referees like him) that must determine motions in "this Court" and not anybody else.

On that point, "this Court" is in agreement with the New York State Constitution, Article VI, paragraph 4 subsection b that provides:

                    "...In each appellate division, four justices shall          
                    constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of three 
                    shall be necessary to a decision... "

Yet, "this Court" has loosened the constitutional requirement by delegating the non-delegable duty to make appellate court decisions, whether on appeals or on motions, to the clerk of the court.  Of course, the rule "only" says that the court orders the clerk to "draft" "this Court"'s decisions.

Yet, you know, ladies and gentlemen, as well as I do, that where the clerk of the court - who was never elected as an appellate judge - is given permission by the court to "draft" decisions, the clerk simply makes them, signs them, and judges who are located in their own chambers far away from where the clerk is located, can do whatever they are doing there while they have delegated all that they are supposed to do to their non-judicial personnel.

Judges of the Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department are simply too busy to be bothered to do their job, as it appears from the decisions that the clerk of "this Court" has drafted, or, rather, crafted, in my case - decisions providing no explanation, no legal authorities and punishing me for requesting an explanation  for the court's decisions on issues pertaining to my ability to earn a living for myself and for my family and minor child, in accordance with constitutional guarantees of due process of law.

Of course, the word combination "due process of law" has become nowadays a swear-word in the courtroom inviting sanctions for frivolous conduct from judges who took the bench by swearing to uphold the due process of law, so no surprises there.

But let's go back to Rule 22 NYCRR 1000.17(a).

The rule actually relied on New York CPLR (Civil Practice Law and Rules) Section 5524(a) which says absolutely nothing about the right of retired county judges to craft, draft or make decisions for and instead of appellate judges.

So, by crafting, drafting and making such a decision on an appellate motion that was never made in front of him, Sirkin not only amended the New York State Constitution in how decisions are made in the Appellate Division 4th Department, but also amended CPLR 5524(a) requiring the Clerk of the court to enter the decisions of the appellate division on motions and appeals, and amended the requirements of the Appellate Division, 22 NYCRR 1000.17(a) that the clerk of the court should actually draft such decisions.

Halleluja, when people bend over one another trying to outdo each other in violating my rights and please somebody up above who wants my license taken, by law or by ... claw?, sometimes they get confused as to who and how should violate my rights better, faster and more effectively.  

Hey, guys (and gals, no gender discrimination here) who have being clawing me for 6 years and are preparing to claw me more! The end of the line of those who want my blood drawn is right there, disappearing around the corner.  Hope you do not collapse waiting in line.  Or rather, I hope you will.

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