"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Friday, February 13, 2015

The quid pro quo a la Mary Gasparini and the disciplinary court, or more food for thought to Jonathan Lippman for his upcoming "State of the Judiciary" address

On February 6, 2015 I've written on this blog about Mary Gasparini's corrupt attempt to urge the referee in my case to file a fraudulent Referee Report and submit a falsified transcript to the court.  

I know Mary Gasparini is an active reader of my blog, based on copies of my blogposts she submits to my disciplinary court.  So, Mary Gasparini read my blog and got enraged.

On approximately February 11, 2015 Mary Gasparini got enraged even more, because she received copies of two letters that I provide below.

On February 9, 2014 I notified the Referee that I cannot in good faith file a "Proposed Referee Report" of my own because there is nothing to report  - the Referee did not do his job and did not hold the evidentiary hearing that the court ordered him to conduct, so he has nothing to report to the court.

On the same date of February 9, 2015 I asked the court to allow me to file a number of motion - due to the court's "anti-filing injunction" prohibiting me even to address ongoing misconduct of the Grievance Committee, the Referee, the cooking of the transcripts of the stenographer - and misconduct of the court itself.   One of the motions that I asked the court to allow me to make was for sanctions against the Grievance Committee and its attorney Mary Gasparini and to dismiss due to egregious misconduct of the prosecution.

After receiving my letters, the court did not allow me to make the motions.

Instead, the enraged court and the enraged Grievance Committee engaged in an ex parte communication with the Grievance Committee advising the Grievance Committee as to how to cure defects of their purported criminal contempt proceedings against me.  

I am not sure who initiated that "discussion", but I have a funny feeling it might be the court, even though whoever initiated it, it is equally bad.

As a result of the court's legal advice to the Grievance Committee, the following masterpiece was born on February 11, 2015.

Based on that piece of legal advice by the court to the hopelessly incompetent Grievance Committee, I have sent to the court a request to step down.  We will see if the court has any remnants of integrity to actually do that.

Oh, and by the way, on January 30, 2015 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, its elderly judges who are usually assigned to the "fast-and-sloppy" track to decide civil rights appeal through "non-precedential summary orders", produced this masterpiece of legal thought in my husband's pro se federal appeal:

In that masterpiece, the three elderly judges (see the table of the names and ages of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit here) "resolved" the issue whether it is constitutional for a disciplinary committee to be considered "an arm of the court" (which then clearly undermines legality of attorney disciplinary proceedings because the court then is the same as the prosecutor).

Here is how these three brilliant jurists resolved the issue:

Because the 2nd Circuit "consistently extended quasi-judicial immunity" to attorney disciplinary committees based on the doctrine that an attorney disciplinary committees are "an arm of the Appellate Division", the claim that such an extension is unconstitutional due to merging of judge and prosecutor, is somehow wrong.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, therefore, thinks that if it has a history of making unconstitutional decisions, they must be constitutional just because the court did it for a long time. 

Which begs the question - should those elderly judges finally retire and absolve litigants of their presence, with such senile logic?

In fact, a rule as ancient as the ancient Rome, provides:

"Abusus non tollit usum", which means that if somebody does something wrong (for a long time), doing something wrong (for a long time) does not set the wrongdoing as a new right.  

Yet, courts keep doing exactly that - do it wrong, do it wrong for a long time, and then claim that since they were doing it this way (right or wrong) for such a long time, it must be right.

As to attorney disciplinary proceedings, it is one slippery slope:

(1) From allowing courts and judges whose misconduct attorneys must challenge on behalf of their clients if they see such misconduct in front of them, to "regulate", or, in other words, control livelihood and reputation of those same attorneys who are criticizing the courts;

(2) To allowing the courts to actually make procedural and substantive rules pertaining to disciplinary proceedings against attorneys, appoint prosecutors, shape the structure of the disciplinary committees with super-majority of lawyers over lay public members;

(3) To "granting immunity" to both courts and the disciplinary prosecutors for malicious and corrupt acts during those proceedings, while the grant of immunity to prosecutors is based on the concept that prosecutors are "arms of the court" TO, finally, what the court did in my case on February 11, 2015 - 

(4) openly giving the incompetent Grievance Committee advice as to how to nail me better.

Food for thought for Jonathan Lippman for his upcoming "State of the Judiciary" address on February 17, 2015

Something is profoundly rotten in how attorney disciplinary proceedings are handled in New York.

Something stinks very badly.

In fact, it is the "arms of the court" that stink very badly.

And it is the courts themselves that stink very badly, together with their various "arms".

Hiding that fact and punishing those who inhale the stink for not professing that they smell roses, will not help.

Putting band-aids to treat this gangrene, as Judge Lippman appears to be planning to propose in his speech on February 17, 2015, will not help either.

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