"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Saturday, February 7, 2015

Since there is no way to keep attorney licensing and discipline to even appear lawful and not stupid and insane, like it is in my case, shouldn't we simply abolish attorney licensing?

If I bring an Article 78 writ of mandamus and prohibition against a Referee, CPLR 7804(i) presupposes representation of the court-appointed Referee by the New York State Attorney General, obviously, at public expense, even if the Referee is sued for usurping an elected public office.  As I said before in this blog, New York does not have an effective legal remedy to enjoin unauthorized actions of appellate courts and their court-appointed referees or judicial hearing officers because the only venue where one can sue those courts is in those same courts.

  (i)  Appearance  by  judicial  officer.  Notwithstanding   any   other
  provision  of  law,  where  a  proceeding  is brought under this article
  against a justice, judge, referee or judicial hearing officer  appointed
  by  a  court  and  (1)  it  is brought by a party to a pending action or
  proceeding, and (2) it is based upon an act or  acts  performed  by  the
  respondent  in  that  pending  action  or  proceeding either granting or
  denying relief sought by a party thereto, and (3) the respondent is  not
  a  named  party  to  the  pending  action  or proceeding, in addition to
  service on the respondent, the petitioner shall  serve  a  copy  of  the
  petition  together  with  copies  of  all  moving  papers upon all other
  parties to the pending action or proceeding. All such parties  shall  be
  designated  as respondents. Unless ordered by the court upon application
  of a party the respondent justice, judge, referee  or  judicial  hearing
  officer  need not appear in the proceeding in which case the allegations
  of the petition shall not be deemed admitted or denied  by  him.    Upon
  election  of the justice, judge, referee or judicial hearing officer not
  to appear, any ruling, order or judgment of the court in such proceeding
  shall bind said respondent. If such  respondent  does  appear  he  shall
  respond  to  the petition and shall be entitled to be represented by the
  attorney general. If such respondent does not elect to appear all  other
  parties shall be given notice thereof.

CPLR 506(1)(b) provides that any justice of the Supreme 
Court can only be sued under Article 78 for a writ of 
prohibition in the Appellate Division of the Judicial District 
where the judge or justice serves.
    1. a proceeding against a justice of the supreme court or a judge of a
  county  court or the court of general sessions shall be commenced in the
  appellate division in the judicial department where the action,  in  the
  course  of  which  the  matter  sought  to  be  enforced  or  restrained
  originated, is triable, unless a term of the appellate division in  that
  department  is  not  in  session,  in  which  case the proceeding may be
  commenced in the appellate division in an adjoining judicial department;
Therefore, the only way to sue an appellate judge and an appellate court
is in that same court - which is counter-productive, if not outright stupid,
or both, for obvious reasons.
What remains when the New York State Attorney General wears these hats:
(1) the one of an elected public official and my representative
who is duty-bound to protect me from fraudulent actions and deceptive
tactics of the government;
(2) the attorney for the State of New York and for each and every
one of its subdivisions, which representation includes my
disciplinary prosecutor and my disciplinary court (in the literal
sense - an appeal from the remand is still pending
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, with the
NYS Attorney General representing the disciplinary
court and the disciplinary prosecutors);
(3) an New York State officer with an exclusive authority to
bring a writ of quo warranto (ousting) proceedings 
pursuant to Executive Law 63-B
to oust Stephen R. Sirkin for usurping the power to act as if
he was elected as a Supreme Court Justice and appointed
by the NYS Governor to serve as a justice of the Appellate Division
before Sirkin retired (which never happened), because otherwise
Sirkin cannot be authorized in any way, shape or form to
decide motions in attorney disciplinary proceedings (which he
nevertheless did in my proceeding);
(4) an attorney designated by statute to represent Sirkin if I bring 
an Article 78 writ of prohibition against him to stop/enjoin him
from acting in usurpation of powers of duly elected and duly 
appointed by the Governor appellate justices, CPLR 7804(i).
So, NYS Attorney General represents everybody in town,
individuals and entities with diametrically opposite and 
irreconcilably conflicting interests, and acts as a prosecutor,
a witness, a counsel and a protector to the same people
in various related proceedings.  Apparently,
all of these actions of the NYS Attorney General,
including representation, at public expense, of individuals
sued for exceeding their authority, acting without authority,
or acting in malicious and corrupt manner, and representing
at the same time clients with irreconcilable conflicts of interest
is apparently "authorized by statute" in New  York.
The same behavior, at the same time, is prohibited to
all attorneys by New  York Rules of Professional Conduct,
begging, once again, the question. 
If NYS Attorney General, wielding tremendous
power in the State of New York and who can wreak
real havoc in people's lives with this power, is not amenable
to attorney discipline because he is "designated by statute"
to de facto violate Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys, 
why do those Rules and attorney licensing and
discipline based on alleged violations of those Rules 
even exist? 
Simply as a means of social control and quashing competition
by powerful and politically connected law firms?
Attorney disciplinary against me proceedings are handled, 
allegedly, in order to protect the public from me, but the public is not allowed to see how it is being protected from me, and I am being criminally charged for allegedly attempting to tell the public about how it is being "protected" from me.  

And this secret "protection of the public" without
public participation is getting stupider and stupider
by the day.

Isn't THAT proof that attorney licensing should be abolished?


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