"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Thursday, September 4, 2014

With their hands in the cookie jar - and continuing to grab the cookies

If a judge recuses from a case, that means, to any objective reasonable disinterested observer that something is wrong and that the judge recused because the judge could not deem it possible to judge the case fairly.

Courts invented for themselves a "presumption of integrity" of judges.

Well, that presumption, which is a laughable matter to begin with because judges ALSO created FOR THEMSELVES the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity FOR MALICIOUS AND CORRUPT ACTS (which cancels any presumptions of integrity in any mind not affected by a lobotomy) - again, this alleged "presumption of integrity" goes out the door when the judge recuses from a party's case.

In my experience, when a judge recuses from a party's case, he must recuse from all cases of the same party.

Logical? Fair? 

There is case law indicating that a judge may not re-enter a case from which the judge recused, it is a due process violation making every decision of that judge void.

And, Judges John F. Lambert and Brian D. Burns, when recused from my cases (even though they did not have to - they recused because of federal lawsuits where I was not a party and where they were named in their official capacity only, on issues of constitutionality of statutes, not because they did anything wrong), they recused from ALL cases in ALL courts at the same time, and never came back on any cases.  That is what I call integrity.

Yet, judges I will enumerate below in a table in this blog decided differently.  I encourage you to word-search names of judges from the table in this blog, there is a "search" window on the left.  I wrote about each one of them at length here, detailing their misconduct, with documentary evidence.

And all decisions that are now under review of my disciplinary court were made by disqualified judges who re-entered my cases after recusals.  Federal courts rejected that argument without review based on the concept of judicial immunity.

Don't you think it looks a like a pattern and a policy of how New York State courts operate?  And that federal courts help them operate that way?
And by the way - one of the appellate cases to be reviewed by the disqualified Appellate Division 3rd Department, and argued in front of this court by the court's own attorney (a disciplinary violation on both sides) is going to happen tomorrow.  I made a motion to recuse - and got no answer so far.  And, of course, I will not go for the oral argument tomorrow - I am not participating in this farce.
Yet, I got an answer on another motion to recuse - motion denied without an explanation, I will run it in a separate blog.
The case to be heard on appeal tomorrow involves the issue how the New York Department of Environmental conservation defrauds New Yorkers into paying fines and doing costly environmental remediation on their property when DEC has absolutely no right to do that - and yet, it continues to do that with the blessing of state courts, federal courts and the New York State Attorney General, who, instead of prosecuting fraud in the government, defends fraudsters in court.
I will shortly publish a separate blog about DEC fraud upon New Yorkers, with documentary evidence.

Name of judge
Name of court
When recused
Recused after reentry?
Carl F. Becker
Delaware County Family Court,  Surrogate’s Court, Supreme Court
October 2009, Delaware County Family Court
Assigned himself to all my cases in
February 2011, in Delaware County Supreme Court (after I complained about him to the Judicial Conduct Commission and asked to take him off the bench)
Yes, in August of 2012, after sanctioning me for suing him and referring his own sanctions to disciplinary authorities
Kevin D. Dowd
Chenango County Supreme Court, Delaware County Supreme Court
In the fall of 2012 in Neroni v. Harlem (Delaware),  but failed to recuse in Mokay v. Mokay, with the same party, and claimed it was because of his policy of not presiding over cases of attorneys appearing in front of him, but failed at the same time to recuse from a Chenango case where I was a party
After I confronted him with inconsistent application of his policy, he recused from the Chenango case, but failed to vacate parts of his decisions that were against me
James C. Tormey
Chenango County Supreme Court
Delaware County Supreme Court
Recused in Chenango County in the fall of 2013 from the case where Dowd was the judge previously, but refused to recuse in Delaware County and sanctioned me for making a motion to recuse
I qualify non-recusal from a Delaware County case after recusal from a Chenango County case as a re-entry
No, sanctioned me for making a motion to recuse, for bringing a federal case AGAINST HIMSELF, and referred the case to disciplinary authorities
Michael Coccoma
Delaware County Supreme Court, all upstate courts
2007, recused from Mokay v. Mokay
Michael Coccoma’s wife was part of the prosecuting team in the disciplinary action of my husband, based on the case from which Michael Coccoma recused – I consider that a re-entry by Michael Coccoma,
Michael Coccoma as the chief administrative judge of upstate New York continues supervising assignment of judges to all cases involving me and my husband as parties, despite requests to transfer all of our cases to downstate, outside of the reach of Michael Coccoma and his direct subordinates;
Michael Coccoma assigned Judge Dowd (who is close to retirement and will soon be eligible for financial post-retirement perks from Michael Coccoma) to the case where Michael Coccoma’s wife was a private attorney and where I requested sanctions against her – sanctions were, naturally, denied
The entire court, Karen Peters as a presiding judge (Karen Peters was a member of the Commission for Judicial Conduct that rejected my documented complaints against Judge Becker and allowed him to ascend to the bench of the Supreme Court)
Appellate Division Third Judicial Department
June 11, 2014
Recused from my disciplinary case and from the “case” of my husband (he has no pending disciplinary case in that court, but was on the caption of the order of transfer anyway)
Refused, without an explanation, to recuse from four more actions (appeals) pending in the same court with me, my husband, or me and my husband as parties.
All appellate cases involve decisions by similarly disqualified judges (Dowd, Tormey, Becker) regarding our property or reputation.  So, AppDiv3rd ceded one case, but rounded up a protective wall around the 3 above judges

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