THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Tuesday, October 20, 2026

Drug proliferation in upstate NY and drug courts: Part I. Who authorized drug courts?

I am starting a series of articles about drug proliferation in upstate New York and its potential reasons - including participation of state, federal and local governments in that drug proliferation.

This is Part I.

An important question arises concerning the very existence of New York's so-called Drug Treatment Courts: Who established these courts, under what legislative authority, and where do they fit within the judicial system established by the New York Constitution?

Article VI, § 1 of the New York Constitution establishes the Unified Court System and identifies its constituent courts, including Supreme Court, County Court, Family Court, Surrogate's Court, and the Court of Claims.

There is no Drug Court in that constitutional enumeration.

The Constitution expressly provides for the establishment, jurisdiction, and judicial offices of recognized courts. Article VI, § 13 establishes Family Court. Article VI, § 15 provides for New York City's Civil and Criminal Courts. Article VI, § 16 governs the establishment of District Courts.

Where is the corresponding constitutional or statutory provision establishing Drug Courts?

I. The Legislature Authorized Judicial Diversion, Not a Separate Drug Court

Criminal Procedure Law Article 216 is entitled Judicial Diversion Program for Certain Felony Offenders.

It authorizes eligible defendants to undergo substance-use treatment under judicial supervision.

Crucially, CPL § 216.05(8) provides that the court retains jurisdiction over the defendant during participation in judicial diversion.

The Legislature thus provided for treatment while preserving the criminal court's jurisdiction.

In Delaware County, NY, for example, a criminal proceeding pending before County Court Judge Hubbard is within jurisdiction of the County Court. 

Participation in substance-use treatment does not, by itself, create a new court or transfer the prosecution to another judicial officer.

Yet criminal proceedings have been transferred from Judge Hubbard to Judge Gary A. Rosa, who presided over Delaware County's "Drug Treatment Court".

What statute authorized the creation of this additional court, and what authorized the transfer of criminal proceedings to it?

II. Judiciary Law § 212 Does Not Establish Drug Courts

Judiciary Law § 212(1)(c) authorizes the Chief Administrator of the Courts to establish court hours, terms, and parts and assign judges to them.

Section 212(2)(r) addresses assignment of cases eligible for judicial diversion to suitable court parts, referring to drug-treatment courts as an example.

Neither provision expressly establishes Drug Courts as separate judicial tribunals with independent jurisdiction.

The distinction is fundamental.

A court part is an administrative subdivision of an existing court. It exercises the jurisdiction of that court.

A separately constituted court requires a valid legal basis for its existence and jurisdiction.

The Legislature knows how to authorize the establishment of specialized courts expressly. Judiciary Law § 212(2)(w) addresses the establishment of human-trafficking courts, while § 212(2)(bb) expressly addresses veterans-treatment courts.

Why does the provision concerning drug-treatment courts merely refer to them as existing institutions without expressly establishing them?

III. Court Administration Lacks Authority to Create Drug Courts by Regulation

Under 22 NYCRR § 143.1, the Chief Administrator authorized - UNLAWFULLY, WITHOUT HAVING LEGISLATIVE POWERS - establishment of a Superior Court for Drug Treatment within Supreme Court or County Court by administrative order.

Section 143.2 provides procedures for transferring criminal proceedings to such courts.

But administrative regulations are not statutes enacted by the Legislature.

Article VI, § 28 of the New York Constitution concerns administration of the Unified Court System.

Article VI, § 30 preserves the Legislature's authority over jurisdiction and permits delegation of rulemaking concerning practice and procedure.

Administrative authority to establish court parts and assign judges to those parts is not legislative authority to create new courts or confer independent jurisdiction to those newly created courts.

If a Superior Court for Drug Treatment is merely a designated part of County Court, it possesses no jurisdiction independent of County Court.

If it is a separate court exercising its own jurisdiction and receiving criminal proceedings from another court, the constitutional and statutory authority for that arrangement is missing.

An administrative regulation cannot confer legislative power upon the administrator who promulgated it.

IV. Federal Grants Cannot Establish State Courts

Federal law, including 34 U.S.C. § 10611, authorizes grants supporting drug-court programs.

Thus, it PRESUMES EXISTENCE of drug courts and de facto imposes a strings-attached financing condition upon the state - CREATE THEM, or you will get no money.

And NY State Court system created drug courts - UNLAWFULLY, through ultra vires administrative regulation.

But a federal funding statute does not amend Article VI of the New York Constitution.

Federal congressional authorization to finance a state TREATMENT PROGRAM may not mandate or coerce creation of A SEPARATE COURT - nor DID it coerce NYS LEGISLATURE to create a separate drug court: such legislation ESTABLISHING drug courts DOES NOT EXIST. 


V. Is Delaware County Drug Court a Court, a Treatment Program, or a Contractual Arrangement?

This question becomes particularly important in Delaware County.

Public Defender Ermeti described Drug Court in open court as a contract, some time ago he openly claimed that negotiations for AMENDMENT of that contract are held behind closed doors by Judge Rosa and DA Smith, excluding him, the public defender. 

Yet when I filed a Freedom of Information Law request with Delaware County seeking that contract, the County told me that it has NONE.  

Yet, District Attorney Shawn Smith, in his November 2024 radio interview, separately acknowledged that admission to Drug Court involved agreements signed by his office.

So - the County LIED to me in response to a FOIL request? AGAIN?  Will not be the first time.  Or the second.  Or the third.

These circumstances raise several questions.

What contractual arrangement did Ermeti describe?

Who are the contracting parties?

Where are the executed agreements?

If the arrangement is a treatment program, what legal authority permits the transfer of a pending criminal prosecution to another judge merely because a defendant enters treatment?  There is NO support in the diversion statutes for that proposition.

And if it is simply a part of County Court, why are its criminal-case records treated as confidential medical records?  That is how the County denied me access to drug court files - by quoting federal privacy regulation related to a medical facility.

An UNLICENSED medical facility on state court grounds headed by a NON-MEDICAL individual, Judge Rosa?  He is most definitely not a physician and does not have medical education or license required to head a medical treatment facility.

Medical treatment records may be protected by confidentiality statutes. 

Criminal court records are governed by separate laws concerning public access and sealing.

Calling a criminal court, or its part, a medical facility does not itself establish statutory authority to withhold its judicial records.

The bottom line is very, very disturbing.

With how many local judges elected by chest-thumping that they are so good in creation and promoting drug courts - it appears that no statutory authority for establishment of those "courts" exists.

Which brings us to the next part - the role of drug courts in drug proliferation in communities, OD deaths and exposing the entire populations of local municipalities to increased drug trafficking and violent behavior of released drug addicts and dealers.

TO BE CONTINUED.  ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

Kids for Cash in Delaware County NY - the "legal" way

 

Delaware County DSS Is “In Dire Need” of Foster Parents. But Who Benefits When Foster Children Never Go Home?

The county complains of chronic financial shortages while recruiting foster families, advertising publicly funded payments, and operating a system in which temporary foster placements can become permanent adoptions. The conflicts of interest deserve scrutiny.

On October 13, 2026, Randy Shepard's The Reporter published an article about Delaware County Department of Social Services' efforts to recruit foster parents - that is, an advertisement for foster services of the County where Randy's brother Wayne Shepard toiled since 1991, and recently quickly retired in order to go right back into the County government, at a higher level than before, the Town of Hamden NY Supervisor - with election sought by underhanded help from another sibling, Hamden NY new town clerk Cathy Roloson. 

Kay VanDusen, representing the DSS Foster Care Unit, had appeared before the Hamden Town Council on October 7, 2026, to explain the county's predicament.

“We are in dire need of foster parents,” VanDusen declared.

This announcement deserves examination in the context of Delaware County's perennial complaints about insufficient public funds, the financial incentives embedded in federal foster-care law, and the county's history of litigation involving the removal of children from their parents.

There is also a question the newspaper did not ask: What happens when the people entrusted with temporarily caring for children have a personal interest in ensuring those children never return to their parents?

And what happens when some of those people are politically connected public officials?

I. Delaware County Has Fewer Foster Children Than Before, but Wants More Foster Parents

According to VanDusen, Delaware County currently has 58 children in foster care, compared with more than 100 in previous years.  Gee - is it that the population of the County is shrinking or that the County already satisfied all the scanty multi-hate government officials who wanted to adopt for free from foster care?

I have personal knowledge, as former defense counsel of many years for parents in DSS court proceedings against Delawrae County DSS that this is EXACTLY what Delaware County does with its foster care - while anything related to foster care is barred with a double wall of secrecy: Family Court DSS (Article 10 of Family Court Act) proceedings are barred from public attendance, and FOIL requests regarding foster care are also barred by privacy exemptions.

The county reports 23 traditional foster homes and 27 kinship foster homes. Twenty-five children are placed in traditional foster homes, while 33 are in kinship care.

Nine traditional foster homes, according to Brother Randy's report about Brother Wayne's County troubles, are full, three are on medical hold - an interesting enigmatic statement, and three provide only "respite care", I wonder what kind.

Eight kinship homes are reportedly closing because children are being adopted or returning home.

Notice how adoption and reunification are presented together, without a breakdown of how many children experienced each outcome.

These outcomes are fundamentally different.

Reunification restores a child to the family from which the government yanked that child.  Adoption takes the child from their parents forever.

The distinction is particularly consequential when the biological parents have contested the removal in court and the foster parents have sought to adopt the child.

The screwy laws riddled with federal financial incentives provide that - while the burden of proof is ON THE COUNTY DSS - and while County DSS has proven zilch in court yet, County DSS may first steal the child into foster care, hold him/her there for 11 months and then apply for termination of parental rights based on sheer passage of time while, once again, having proven zilch in court against the parent.  Happens all the time.

Yet the public is given a facially benign story and a single figure: eight homes closing because children are either being adopted or returning home.

How many children returned to their parents? How many were adopted by foster parents? How many adoptions followed contested Article 10 proceedings? Who WERE those foster parents?  Were they the local public officials to whom Delaware County DSS conveniently chose pretty healthy young children, stole them from their parents under false pretenses and allowed their foster-to-adoption for free by those public officials?

Once again, personal knowledge from within such proceedings, happens all the time.

II. Delaware County Is Perpetually Short of Money—Except When It Comes to Financing Foster Care

Delaware County's recurring public complaints about budgetary constraints deserve to be considered alongside the financial structure of foster care.

VanDusen described foster-care payments ranging from about $39 to more than $114 per child per day, depending on the child's level of care.

At those rates, one foster placement maintained for 365 days represents:

Daily paymentAnnual payment
$39$14,235
$75$27,375
$100$36,500
$114$41,610

The reported upper rate exceeds $114, so these calculations do not establish the maximum payment.

For the 25 children currently placed in traditional foster homes, a full year of payments at $39 per day would total $355,875. At $114 per day, the corresponding figure would be $1,040,250.

These are illustrative gross payments, not established expenditures for the current placements or the county's net financial burden.

The county also provides or arranges medical coverage, transportation, training, and other services.

Who pays?

That question leads directly to federal law.

III. Federal Law Creates Perverted Financial Incentives For Nonkinship Adoption Out Of Foster Care 

Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, codified principally at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–679c, establishes federal financial participation in foster care and adoption assistance.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 672, eligible foster-care maintenance payments receive federal reimbursement, subject to statutory conditions.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 674, federal funding also supports qualifying administrative and training expenditures.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 673, adoption-assistance payments may be available for eligible children with special needs.

Federal law also provides adoption and legal-guardianship incentive payments to states under 42 U.S.C. § 673b, based on specified performance measures.

The result is a federally subsidized system in which government agencies administer substantial expenditures associated with removing, placing, maintaining, and sometimes permanently transferring children into adoptive families.

These provisions do not establish that Delaware County makes a profit on any particular placement. Federal reimbursement is subject to eligibility requirements, state administration, and cost-sharing rules. The adoption incentives are paid to states, not automatically to individual counties.

But the existence of this financing structure is beyond dispute.

It raises an obvious fiscal question: How much federal and state money flows through Delaware County's foster-care operations, and how does that compare with expenditures on preventing removal and preserving families?

Also note that parents whom DSS targets with removal of children are predominantly poor, lack money for private legal representation in court, and those attorneys who are assigned depend on further assignments to the point of being "timid" on behalf of their clients. 

One of them - the recently deceased Gregory Kottmeier - scared his assigned clients into running to hire my husband and myself by telling them, at their first meeting, pointing at the bunch of DSS workers crowded before the Family Court courtroom doors: see that?  That is a Las Vegas vanishing act, now you see your child, now you don't.

Summed up precisely - he knew what he was talking about.

Federal law also supports prevention and reunification services, including through Title IV-B and the Family First Prevention Services Act. A complete financial comparison must account for those programs.

The county's budget records should disclose the relevant revenue and expenditure categories.

A government repeatedly pleading poverty should be expected to explain the cost of its child-removal system and the public resources devoted to keeping families together.

IV. Foster-to-Adopt Placements Create an Inherent Conflict When Parents Are Fighting for Reunification

The problem becomes especially serious when foster parents enter the system hoping to adopt.

It is INHERENTLY improper to place a child into foster care - while alleged neglect or abuse of the child at the hands of the parents is still unproven and the statutory goal is to return the child to his parents - into the hands of people whose interests are to SEVER the child's ties with biological parents permanent.

Foster parents have a unique position in the child's life, especially when the child is very young - they are the adults in the child's life, and the parents are away, and the memory may fade, and new, false memories may be installed easily.  And they are installed - by foster parents willing to adopt.

Foster parents routinely - while Delaware County DSS condones or encourages such behaviors, fought it in court many times on behalf of many parents - tell children that THEY, foster parents, are foster children's REAL parents, that "IT WILL END SOON", that "DO NOT WORRY", "YOU WILL NOT HAVE TO LEAVE THIS HOME", "WE WILL KEEP YOU FOREVER", "WE ARE YOUR REAL PARENTS".  While engaging, behind closed doors of their homes, in this illegal self-serving parental alienation, at taxpayer expense, foster parents have a direct conflict of interest: they SAVE MONEY on adoption on top of being PAID for fostering the child.  An easy win-win situation.

And, foster parents seeking adoption often begin undermining the child's relationship with the biological parents, obstructing visitation, or encouraging estrangement, the consequences can be profound.

Many of Delaware County parents who were victims of Delaware County DSS' predatory behavior may identify with what I am saying, on personal knowledge as former defense attorney for such parents.

The child becomes increasingly attached to the foster household while losing ordinary contact with the original family.

As time passes, Delaware County DSS has a yet another trick up its sleeve - it claims that the SEPARATION ITSELF that DSS, together with the foster families willing to adopt, illegally created, may be used to further and perpetuate that separation and argue before the court - in earnest - that DSS- and foster parents-created alienation of the child to his parents is a good ground to terminate parental rights and adopt the child out.

And, in termination proceedings, the poor parent also has the "services" of the Las Vegas Vanishing Act assigned counsel who, in turn, are often playing into DSS's hands, in fear that otherwise they will never be assigned again and the gravy train of income will stop.

V. Weaver v. Lambert: The Use of Foster Care to Coerce Parents into Abandoning Federal Litigation

The problem is not merely theoretical.

In Weaver v. Lambert, federal litigation involving Delaware County DSS, the conduct described by the Weaver parents presents a particularly troubling example.

According to documents in public access on Pacer.gov, DSS deliberately prolonged the children's foster-care placements while federal litigation was pending.

The Weavers were threatened by Delaware County DSS that their children had passed the 11-month mark in foster care and would be taken permanently and adopted out regardless of the trial's outcome unless the parents abandoned their federal lawsuit, settled with DSS, and admitted guilt.

This mechanism of coercion deserves particular attention because federal law IMPROPERLY INTERFERES in state-law issues and mandates, through conditioning of financial assistance to states, how state courts determine guilt in the quasi-criminal Article 10 (child abuse and neglect) proceedings.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E), states generally must initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights when a child has spent 15 of the most recent 22 months in foster care, subject to statutory exceptions.

No guilt proven - yet a petition for termination is supposedly "PROPER". This is Star Chamber justice under the guise of helping children - and it has financial reasons, now practically openly revealed by Delaware County DSS in their call for new recruits into foster parents - hear, hear, we need to steal some more children to help with our budgets, it will be free for you to adopt children we steal for money and we will pay you extra on top.   It is disgusting.

VI. When Public Officials Become Foster Parents Seeking Adoption

There is another conflict that deserves public investigation.

Delaware County DSS - personal knowledge - routinely designates for foster care local prominent public officials willing to adopt for free. Such public officials are allowed to adopt the whole clusters of children, from the same extended families.

Social workers themselves zero in on children they want to first steal using their official position and then adopt.

The arrangement is straightforward: a person with official influence or connections to county government becomes a foster parent, receives a child through the publicly administered placement system, alienates the child from parents, alienation is then used to terminate parents' (poor parents', poorly represented poor parents') parental rights, and subsequently seeks and receives adoption.

Foster-care adoption avoid exorbitant private costs associated with agency-arranged adoption which may cost up to $100,000.

Not for local public officials.  For them, adoption is free plus an added bonus of all the perks of foster care payments, and payments and benefits post-adoption from the government.

The disparity in power is obvious.

On one side stands a parent, potentially impoverished, defending against a government-initiated Article 10 proceeding.

On the other stands a foster parent with governmental connections, seeking to adopt the child.

Backing that governmental foster parent is Delaware County DSS, abusing its position of power, for federal financial incentives, and obtaining termination of parental rights through courts based on false testimony.  The prize justifies the means.

VII. The Public Cannot Easily Investigate Because the Records Are Confidential

There is a particularly frustrating feature of this system.

DSS can publicly announce how many children it has placed, how many foster homes are available, and how much foster parents are paid.

But requests for records identifying foster parents, children, and individual placement histories face formidable confidentiality barriers.

New York Public Officers Law § 87(2)(b) permits withholding records when disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

Family Court Act § 166 restricts public access to Family Court records, while Social Services Law § 422 protects confidential child-abuse and maltreatment information.

These laws, while having their legitimate objectives, are used by Delaware County DSS to bar from public scrutiny their underhanded child-stealing tactics for financial gain.


VIII. The County's Own Statement About Reunification Deserves Examination

VanDusen told the Hamden Town Council:

“It's always the department's goal for the child to return to parent, that's always our goal.”

She also acknowledged that the goal can change depending on circumstances and how long the child remains in foster care.

That qualification is the key.

The "always our goal" is the statutory requirement which VanDusen cites.  

The reality is the opposite.


IX. The Financial Questions Delaware County Must Answer

Delaware County's public narrative contains two recurring themes.

The first is that the county struggles with limited financial resources.

The second is that DSS needs additional foster families and offers substantial publicly funded payments to support placements - which means more, not less money is needed to fund the system where DSS removes children from homes and places them with strangers.

Which starts to really, really beg the question: can't the County use LESS money to do MORE in helping the actual parents so that the usual conditions of supposed neglect used by Delaware County DSS to steal children - POVERTY - would be eased for the parents, at least somewhat?


X. Why Pay Scarce Taxpayer Funds To Strangers to Raise Children Stolen From Their Own Parents When the Same Money Or SIGNIFICANTLY LESS Could Help Their Own Parents Directly?

That is the central financial question missing from Delaware County DSS's public appeal for more foster parents.

According to the October 13, 2026 article in The Reporter, Delaware County pays foster families approximately $39 to more than $114 per child per day.

That translates into $14,235 to more than $41,610 annually for one child, before considering additional publicly funded services.

Why couldn't some of that money be used to help biological parents provide safe housing, food, child care, transportation, and other necessities that would allow their children to remain at home?

Consider a family whose principal difficulties arise from poverty, inadequate housing, unreliable transportation, or the inability to afford child care.

Poverty is not neglect.  It can be helped - with the same taxpayer money, OR MUCH LESS, used to steal the child from the parents.

At $114 per day, the government can spend $3,420 over 30 days on foster-care maintenance for one child.

That same amount could pay a substantial rental arrearage, restore utilities, purchase essential household equipment, or finance child care that enables a parent to work.

Over a year, $41,610 could materially improve the circumstances of many financially distressed households.

These comparisons expose a public-finance question: Why does government maintain a substantial payment mechanism for substitute caregivers while assistance to the child's own parents operates through different, often more restrictive funding programs?

The answer lies partly in how federal child-welfare financing developed.

The Financial Incentives: From Removal to Adoption

Federal law finances several distinct stages of the foster-care process.

Stage

Financial mechanism

Potential beneficiary

Child removed and placed in foster care

Title IV-E maintenance reimbursement

State/local child-welfare system; foster caregiver receives maintenance payments

Child remains in foster care

Continued eligible maintenance, administration, and service expenditures

Foster caregiver and service providers; government receives qualifying reimbursement

Child adopted

Subsidized adoption expenses and qualifying adoption assistance

Adoptive parents

Child adopted with ongoing assistance

Recurring adoption subsidies, potentially through childhood

Adoptive parents

State exceeds adoption performance benchmarks

Federal adoption incentive payments

State government

Child safely remains with biological parents

Prevention programs and other family assistance - constantly denied based on claims of ineligibility or other pretexts

Biological family

The central distinction is that federal foster-care maintenance funding under 42 U.S.C. § 672 is tied to qualifying out-of-home placements.  It directly incentivizes non-kinship care.

The Family First Prevention Services Act went even further, expanded federal funding for qualifying mental-health services, substance-use treatment, and in-home parenting programs.  With children in foster care of Medicaid, a whole host of "providers" vulture on them, overprescribing whole bouquets of dangerous expensive drugs - covered by taxpayers.

That gravy train may also disappear if the child remains at home with his parents.

Thus, a government may have access to a dedicated reimbursement stream after removing a child that is not available to the government if the child remains at home.

Adoption adds another financial dimension

Under 42 U.S.C. § 673, eligible adoptive parents may receive reimbursement of qualifying nonrecurring adoption expenses and ongoing adoption-assistance payments. Recurring assistance cannot exceed the foster-care maintenance payment that would otherwise apply.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 673b, the federal government also makes performance-based - meaning HOW MANY ADOPTIONS AND OUT OF KINSHIP FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS YOU GOT - adoption and guardianship incentive payments to states.

The statutory formulas include:

  • $5,000 for each qualifying foster-child adoption above the applicable benchmark.

  • $7,500 for qualifying pre-adolescent adoptions or guardianships above the relevant benchmark.

  • $10,000 for qualifying older-child adoptions or guardianships above the relevant benchmark.

  • $4,000 for qualifying guardianships above the applicable benchmark.

Imagine such financial incentives for CRIMINAL CONVICTION RATES.  Actually, there were such scandals reported - when convictions were drummed up to fill prisons and provide free labor for certain corporations.

Here - it is sheer, federal government-authorized and incentivized CHILD TRAFFICKING.

Consider the gist of this so-called legislation:  states get more money from the federal government (our own taxpayer pocket, only from another direction, federal) if they get more children separated from their parents.

How do they do that?

Such separations are subject to Family Court Article 10 proceedings where the burden of proof is on DSS - they have to PROVE that something is wrong, they cannot simply tell the court - Your Honor, I have budget constraints, I want that federal money, please do it for me, adjudicate this child as abused or neglected so that I get that money from the feds.

Not openly, they do not say that.  But, both DSS and the judges - who ALSO receive part of the federal grants, I researched the subject extensively - do know it and do make it happen.

NYS Legislature is the culprit, too.  It put into the Family Court Act so many hearsay exceptions and so much discretion into the sole fact-finder, the judge (no jury) that such proceedings may just as well be called summary rubber stamps for DSS.

What must also be noted - U.S. Congress has expressly established financial rewards for states achieving specified adoption-out-of-foster-care outcomes.

There is no equivalent per-child federal adoption-incentive payment for returning a child to biological parents.

Translation: it is more beneficial for DSS to steal the child, lie in court with eyes on the prize - federal money - than to return the child to the parents, which is the hypocritically stated "statutory reunification goal", announced tongue-in-cheek, with a wink and a nod.

Parental rights are supposedly the most sacred rights.

They have NO protection in New York - and across the country, too, I am part of parents' forums, they report the same happening in other states, federal incentives are the same everywhere.

The question voters and taxpayers, state and federal, should ask Delaware County in return to its urgent call for more foster parents is simple.

Consider two possible expenditures of $30,000.

In the first, DSS spends the money maintaining a child in a non-relative foster home while the biological parent contests removal.

In the second, DSS uses $30,000 in lawful, appropriately funded assistance to stabilize the biological family's housing, transportation, child care, and other conditions, allowing the child to remain safely at home.

If both approaches adequately protect the child, what justifies choosing the first?

The county cannot answer that question merely by pointing to the existence of federal reimbursement.  A reimbursed expenditure still consumes public resources, and federal funding rules do not determine which intervention best serves the child.

The larger issue is that financial incentives, permanency deadlines, and foster-to-adopt arrangements create a system where public, taxpayer-supported courts are turned into a criminal child trafficking enterprise.  

A system designed to protect children must have safeguards against allowing those incentives to influence removal decisions, prolong separation, or undermine reunification.

The question is plain and simple: if Delaware County, while constantly claiming budget woes, can find $14,235 to more than $41,610 annually to pay strangers to raise one child removed from  his parents - at the time NO GUILT IS PROVEN - why can't the County find comparable resources to help that same child's own parents raise the child safely, provide actual helping services to them, educate them in proper child care, preventing removal of children from their loving parents?

Do you think Delaware County will answer?

The Shepard Family, Delaware County Government, and the Canceled Town of Hamden (NY) Candidates’ Debates: Questions That Deserve Answers

 

Reportedly, the Town of Hamden (NY) candidates’ forum scheduled for October 20, 2026, has been canceled - and the Shepard siblings are at the center of the controversy.




Also, interesting information about the criminal background surfaced regarding the Shepard's sister 



- the new Town of  Hamden Town Clerk at the center of the debate-canceling controversy - which obviously benefits the Wayne brother.

Given that the Town of Hamden also deliberately hired a convicted felon as Tax Assessor, see here, the tendency to hire politically coddled and favored people with violent criminal background into key positions, those directly affecting who takes the leadership of the town and how much the town property owners have to pay in taxes - and the sheer concentration of such people in the small-town small government is disturbing.

Yet, the controversy surrounding that cancellation raises questions extending beyond the availability of Town Hall for a single evening.

Those questions concern three siblings: Wayne Shepard, a candidate for Hamden Town Supervisor and longtime Delaware County employee; Cathy Roloson, Hamden Town Clerk; and Randy Shepard, publisher of The Reporter and co-owner of Decker Advertising Inc., a company that has conducted business with Delaware County.

The available public statements and federal litigation records establish several important facts. They also leave questions about official discretion, family relationships, municipal contracting, and public accountability.

I. The Canceled Candidates’ Forum

According to organizer Gabrielle Aruta Pierce, she reserved Hamden Town Hall by telephone on August 28, 2026, for a public question-and-answer forum between the two candidates for Town Supervisor.

Pierce states that the reservation was subsequently canceled and the facility rebooked, without direct official notification to her.

The Town Clerk responsible for the facility is Cathy Roloson, Wayne Shepard’s sister.

A public defense of the clerk’s actions disputes Pierce’s account, questions whether a valid reservation existed, and refers to the absence of advance payment.


Yet, what directly pops out of Savannah Wake's public position, see also here:

is double standards.

While accusing opponents of unsubstantiated positions - without any attempts to verify whether they are actually substantiated - Wake refuses to face the reality, the available records, the established familial connections, the INFERENCES that voters may reasonably draw from such connections and actions of the Shepard/Roloson siblings for one-another's benefits using their government positions, and proceeds on sheer emotion.

For example, Wake claims that Pierce did not PAY for the Town Hall.

She does not pay attention to the fact that Pierce said she BOOKED the Town Hall and was told that she will have to tender the payment when getting the key - and then the event was cancelled on her through third parties.

There is no point blaming Pierce for lack of PAYMENT under the circumstances, and doing so is an underhanded attempt to shift the debate from where it belongs: the Shepard/Roloson conflict of interest influencing elections.

II. Wayne Shepard’s Reported Refusal to Participate

Pierce has stated publicly that Wayne Shepard declined to participate in the forum regardless of the proposed date.

His opponent, Jonathan Kilday, has publicly confirmed that the October 20 event was canceled, stated that he accepted the original invitation, and offered to participate on another date before the November 3 election.

Kilday specifically invited Shepard to identify a mutually convenient date.

This creates a separate question from the Town Hall reservation dispute: Why did Wayne Shepard reportedly decline to participate in the proposed public discussion?  At the same time as his sister conveniently forced cancellation of the very public debates that her brother candidate did not want to attend?  And where the prominently gaping hole of his absence would be noted by voters?

So, Shepard did not summon the courage to face the voters in a public debate, but summoned his sister (or so it looks) to make them disappear.

That is a good preview of what his future "leadership", if elected, will look like - the same underhanded tactics that the Town and its residents and taxpayers suffered for 30 years under Marshfield.

III. Wayne Shepard’s Delaware County Employment Since 1991

Wayne Shepard’s history with Delaware County government extends back to 1991.


Wayne Shepard also testified in the Decker Advertising lawsuit, twice, on May 14, 2025, and on October 8, 2025.  You can read all depositions in that case that I purchased from Pacer.gov and published for public benefit, here - including Marshfield's, Merklen's and some other interesting personages.

While you may download for free - or read those depositions without downloading, following the links provided - here are some snippets from Wayne Shepard's first deposition that may interest voters as to the above nepotism debate:










So, brothers have a cordial, fine relationship - and obviously because of that cordial relationship, brother Randy Shepard was constantly getting County business while brother Wayne Shepard was employed there in prominent positions.  Because, OF COURSE, brother Randy's business was the best for the county - not because of the familial connections, nononono.



IV. Randy Shepard, The Reporter, and Decker Advertising

In a sworn declaration filed in Decker Advertising Inc. v. Delaware County, No. 3:23-cv-01531 (N.D.N.Y.), Randy Shepard stated that he had served as publisher of The Reporter since January 2010.

He also identified himself and his wife, Kim Shepard, as owners of Decker Advertising Inc.

The Reporter had served as an official Delaware County newspaper for many decades. According to the federal litigation record, the County designated it again on January 5, 2022, before ending that designation in March 2022.

The newspaper’s official designation generated revenue from the publication of county legal notices.

Another business relationship concerned The Dispatch, a periodical distributed to Delaware County seniors.

Randy Shepard stated under oath that Decker Advertising had handled the layout, printing, and distribution of The Dispatch for more than two decades, generating roughly $30,000 annually.

He further stated that Wayne Shepard informed him and Kim Shepard that the contract would be put out for competitive bidding.

The first bidding process occurred in late 2024. A second request for proposals was issued on April 8, 2025, and bids were publicly opened on April 28, 2025.

These statements are especially significant because they come from Randy Shepard’s own sworn declaration.

V. Family Relationships and Public Contracting

New York General Municipal Law Article 18 governs conflicts of interest involving municipal officers and employees.

GML § 800 expressly includes the designation of an official newspaper within its definition of municipal contracts.

Sections 800 and 801 address direct and indirect interests in municipal contracts, including circumstances involving official authority over contract preparation, approval, and payment.

New York law also recognizes family relationships as grounds for mandatory disqualification in judicial proceedings - of judges and jurors.   Such statutes absolutely disqualify from proceedings judges and jurors who are within 6th degree of consanguinity or affinity to parties, for example.   

It matters very much whether the County - being VERY secretive in answers to FOIL requests and that DOES NOT have an anti-nepotism policy (same as the Town of Hamden, NY), I checked as on both for decades - conducted bidding fairly, if at all, and whether the conflict of interest of Brother-to-Brother Shepards was ever reflected in any County records.

In this case, the LACK of such records is the EVIDENCE of impropriety.


VI. The Missing Records and the Inferences They Raise

Public access to records is essential to evaluating government conduct.

Requests under New York’s Freedom of Information Law provide a means of obtaining contracts, vouchers, correspondence, meeting minutes, payment records, and applicable municipal policies.

Where requested records are withheld, the legal basis for withholding them matters. Where records do not exist, that fact may be significant as well.

The same principle applies to the canceled pre-election candidates debates.

The absence of a public discussion leaves questions unanswered, but raises questions instead as to WHO BENEFITED from the canceled debates - and that is obviously not the candidate who wanted them to happen.


So - dear Town of Hamden, NY voters who - as soon as PROPER questions of public concern surface - are being shamed for making "unsubstantiated allegations" while pertinent records are being hidden and while the conflicted candidate takes cover provided by sister clerk - DO YOU WANT THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS 30 YEARS GOING FORWARD???

Your call at the voting booths.


Friday, October 16, 2026

DELCO (NY) CHILD LABOR AND SEXUAL ABUSE CAMP UNDER PROTECTION OF DELAWARE COUNTY SHERIFF? WHERE CHILDREN WERE DENIED MEDICAL CARE, STARVED AND DRIVEN TO SUICIDE?

 

PART IV.  MEDICAL NEGLECT, PSYCHIATRIC ABUSE, SUICIDE ATTEMPTS, A STUDENT'S DEATH, AND THE ALLEGED DESTRUCTION OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE

The thirty federal lawsuits describe a purported therapeutic institution where children suffering from serious psychiatric conditions, addiction, physical injuries, and medical emergencies allegedly received punishment instead of treatment.

Parents paid substantial sums for professional care.

Public school districts also financed placements on the understanding that children would receive appropriate educational and therapeutic services.

But the complaints repeatedly allege that the Family Foundation School employed insufficiently qualified clinical personnel, discontinued prescribed psychiatric medications, ignored medical emergencies, denied necessary dental care, and punished children who exhibited symptoms of psychiatric distress.

Some plaintiffs describe suicide attempts.

One plaintiff alleges that she personally witnessed a student death by suicide.

Other complaints describe the destruction of institutional records, including documentation of psychiatric treatment, suicide attempts, abuse complaints, and medical emergencies.

The allegation is not merely that FFS failed to provide the treatment for which parents paid. It is that children were allegedly denied essential medical care while the institution concealed their conditions and continued collecting tuition.

I. A sixteen-year-old swallowed cleaning powder. A poison-control professional allegedly ordered hospital treatment. FFS allegedly refused.

One of the most disturbing medical accounts appears in J.K. v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01780, filed September 18, 2026.

J.K. was fifteen when she entered FFS in December 1998.

Her complaint describes a history of serious psychiatric illness, multiple hospitalizations, suicide attempts, and suicidal ideation.

Her family sought a residential institution capable of providing professional psychiatric treatment.

Instead, J.K. alleges that FFS discontinued her psychiatric medications, subjected her to prolonged isolation, and interfered with her communications with her parents.

According to paragraphs 54–57 of her verified complaint, she attempted suicide at sixteen by ingesting Comet powdered cleanser.

Another student brought her to staff member Bob Runge.

Runge allegedly telephoned a regional poison-control center.

J.K. states that she personally heard poison-control personnel instruct Runge to take her to a hospital.

According to the complaint, Runge argued with the professional and terminated the call.

Rather than obtain emergency treatment, he allegedly instructed another student to give J.K. milk and send her to chapel.

She received no hospital examination.

The complaint further alleges that staff members subsequently mocked and publicly humiliated her, and that she was placed in isolation.

A sixteen-year-old allegedly attempted suicide by swallowing a toxic cleaning product. A medical professional reportedly directed immediate hospital care. The institution allegedly refused and punished the child instead.

This allegation identifies a specific potential contemporaneous record: the poison-control telephone call.

The complaint also alleges that FFS concealed the suicide attempt and denial of medical care from J.K.'s parents while continuing to represent that she was receiving appropriate treatment.

In paragraphs 106–108, J.K. further alleges that records concerning her psychiatric treatment, medication discontinuation, suicide attempt, poison-control call, and subsequent isolation were among the institutional documents destroyed around the school's closure.

If substantiated, this would involve not merely medical neglect but the deliberate concealment of a potentially life-threatening incident.

II. Psychiatric medications allegedly discontinued without appropriate evaluation

In Haham v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01735, filed September 14, 2026, plaintiff Daniella Haham describes entering FFS at sixteen after psychiatric hospitalization and substance-abuse treatment.

She had previously attempted suicide.

Her family sought an institution where she could continue recovery while pursuing her education.

According to paragraph 39 of her complaint, FFS discontinued her prescribed Zoloft shortly after admission without an appropriate psychiatric evaluation, adequate medical justification, or informed parental consent specific to that decision.

Haham alleges that she received none of the qualified psychiatric treatment promised to her family.

In Dellinger v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01767, filed September 17, 2026, plaintiff Alex Dellinger describes changes to his lithium and Seroquel treatment and inadequate professional psychiatric supervision.

He alleges that an unlicensed administrator, Jeffrey Brain, provided his only purported anger-management treatment.

In J.K., the plaintiff alleges that she was removed from psychiatric medications despite her extensive history of hospitalization and suicidal behavior.

These allegations raise a fundamental question concerning the institution's advertised therapeutic services.

Who was actually responsible for prescribing, discontinuing, monitoring, and adjusting psychiatric medication for the children in FFS custody?

What professional qualifications did those individuals possess?

What medical records documented their decisions?

And what emergency psychiatric procedures existed for children exhibiting suicidal behavior?

III. A child allegedly lost nearly all her upper teeth after starvation and denial of dental treatment

In Baldwin v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-02076, filed October 7, 2026, plaintiff Emily Baldwin describes severe malnutrition and dental deterioration during her two-year confinement.

Baldwin entered FFS at fifteen after a psychiatric hospitalization.

Her parents allegedly paid approximately $80,000 from money saved for her college education.

According to paragraphs 57–59, she was subjected to a punitive diet consisting of Maypo, tuna, and half a cup of water.

She alleges that the deprivation caused vomiting and that staff compelled her to consume her own vomit.

Baldwin further alleges that she developed extensive dental problems.

A dentist in Hancock reportedly examined her, took X-rays, and determined that she needed a root canal and additional treatment.

According to the complaint, Robin Ducey and a nurse known as Jan Becker told Baldwin's parents that she was lying about her medical condition to obtain release from FFS.

The recommended treatment was allegedly withheld.

Baldwin states that she eventually lost nearly all her upper teeth.

A child allegedly received a professional dental examination establishing the need for treatment, only for institutional personnel to discredit her medical complaints to her parents and deny the care.

This account identifies a potentially independent medical witness, contemporaneous X-rays, treatment recommendations, and communications with the child's parents.

The allegations concern not simply a failure to notice illness but interference with treatment after a professional examination.

IV. A suicide attempt in Paul Geer's basement — followed by return to the same confinement

Baldwin also describes a suicide attempt while confined in the basement of Paul Geer's residence.

According to paragraphs 61–62, she attempted to hang herself, but the fixture involved gave way.

She alleges that staff repaired the fixture and returned her to the same basement without psychiatric evaluation or treatment.

The institution allegedly repaired the fixture involved in a child's suicide attempt while leaving the child in the same conditions without psychiatric intervention.

The account is especially disturbing because FFS purported to provide therapeutic services to adolescents with psychiatric and behavioral difficulties.

The complaint alleges that the institution knew Baldwin was vulnerable and nevertheless failed to provide the treatment her condition required.

V. A student death by suicide — alleged firsthand eyewitness testimony

In Van Arsdale v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01462, filed June 29, 2026, plaintiff Rachele Van Arsdale makes an allegation of exceptional gravity.

Her verified complaint states that the institution's failure to provide promised psychiatric treatment contributed to student deaths by suicide, including one that she personally witnessed.

Van Arsdale alleges that FFS represented itself as providing professional psychiatric, psychological, and therapeutic services while failing to employ the qualified professionals necessary to deliver those services.

She describes children with serious mental-health and substance-abuse conditions receiving no adequate treatment.

The complaint connects that failure to worsening psychiatric conditions, long-term injuries, and deaths by suicide.

The particular student's identity, circumstances of death, and related death-investigation records have not yet been established from the passages examined for this article.

Nevertheless, Van Arsdale's allegation is significant because she identifies herself as a firsthand witness to a student's death, rather than merely repeating a report of an incident she did not observe.

A former student alleges that she personally witnessed a death by suicide at an institution that was being paid to provide therapeutic care.

That allegation demands examination of the contemporaneous medical, institutional, and law-enforcement records.

Who was the student?

What treatment had the student received?

What warnings preceded the death?

What investigation followed?

What records were created?

And what did governmental authorities learn about the conditions at FFS?

VI. Allegations of suppressed evidence and destroyed psychiatric records

The complaints repeatedly allege that the Argiros family destroyed institutional documentation, including student files, abuse complaints, and medical or psychiatric records.

In Jane Doe v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01397, paragraphs 85–86, the plaintiff cites testimony concerning the shredding of student records after civil litigation had begun.

The complaint attributes admissions concerning document destruction to Emmanuel Argiros's sworn testimony.

In J.K., paragraphs 106–108, the plaintiff alleges that records concerning her suicide attempt, poison-control call, psychiatric treatment, and denial of hospital care were destroyed.

In Bartolomeo v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01656, paragraphs 118–120, the plaintiff describes destruction of institutional records and the alleged withholding of surviving records.

In Sarah Sullivan v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01842, paragraphs 109–111, the plaintiff alleges destruction of records concerning her confinement, punishment, treatment, and abuse.

These allegations describe a potential systematic loss of evidence necessary to reconstruct the institution's treatment of children.

They do not, on the passages presently identified, establish that particular evidence concerning the student death described by Van Arsdale was deliberately suppressed.

But they raise a serious question about the completeness of the surviving institutional records.

What medical and psychiatric evidence was destroyed, who ordered its destruction, and what information concerning children's injuries, suicide attempts, and deaths was lost?

VII. Serious physical injuries allegedly left untreated

The complaints also describe physical injuries sustained during compulsory labor and disciplinary punishment.

In Dellinger, paragraph 46, the plaintiff alleges that an adult employee kicked him in the face, breaking his nose.

He states that the injury was not treated.

The complaint identifies institutional yearbook photographs allegedly documenting the injury.

In Candito v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01817, filed September 23, 2026, the plaintiff describes injuring her knee while handling heavy hay bales during compulsory agricultural labor.

She alleges that she received no appropriate treatment.

These accounts connect the alleged forced-labor system to the medical-neglect allegations.

Children were allegedly compelled to perform physically demanding work and then denied treatment when injured.

VIII. Medical appointments allegedly controlled by institutional personnel

In C.R. v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 6:26-cv-01409, filed July 21, 2026, the plaintiff alleges that FFS staff accompanied her to medical appointments and prevented her from speaking privately with healthcare professionals.

According to paragraphs 18 and 35–36, she underwent surgery at UHS Binghamton General Hospital without her parents' knowledge or consent, accompanied by institutional sponsor Debbi Knack.

The complaint also identifies an unidentified dental practice.

These allegations raise questions concerning informed consent, institutional custody, the accuracy of medical histories supplied to treating professionals, and whether children were permitted to disclose abuse during examinations.

If institutional employees controlled children's communications with doctors, medical appointments could become another mechanism for preventing independent detection of abuse.

IX. The financial fraud alleged: parents and school districts paid for treatment children never received

The medical-neglect allegations are inseparable from the alleged financial structure of FFS.

In S.H. v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01412, filed July 21, 2026, the plaintiff alleges that her parents paid approximately $160,000 for residential treatment and education, but that she received no genuine addiction treatment.

In Barley v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-01493, filed August 3, 2026, Adam Barley alleges that his parents and grandmother paid approximately $99,000 during his confinement, while he received virtually no professional addiction treatment.

In Baldwin, the plaintiff alleges that approximately $80,000 from her family's college savings was spent on FFS, without the promised professional care.

In J.K., the plaintiff alleges that a New Jersey public school district financed her placement on representations that she would receive appropriate psychiatric and therapeutic treatment.

In Tell v. Education Plus Corporation, No. 3:26-cv-02087, filed October 8, 2026, the plaintiff describes a New York City educational funding proceeding in which an FFS representative allegedly testified concerning the institution's professional treatment staff.

The complaints assert that the institution received private and public money for services it was not equipped to provide.

The alleged business model was not merely to deny medical care. It was to sell medical and therapeutic services, collect the money, and substitute coercive discipline and unpaid child labor for professional treatment.

X. Where was Delaware County while children were allegedly denied medical care?

The federal complaints do not establish that Delaware County officials personally discontinued psychiatric medication, refused dental treatment, or made the medical decisions described above.

But they allege that County law enforcement received reports of abuse, suppressed complaints, returned escaping children, and participated in institutional protection.

The question is whether County institutions had notice of medical neglect and nevertheless helped preserve the conditions in which it continued.

In Van Arsdale, the plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff's Office received reports of abuse and neglect and returned escaping children without investigation.

In C.R., the complaint alleges that County law-enforcement institutions participated in recovering children and protecting the enterprise.

In Cowan-Johnson, the complaint identifies the July 1998 Deputy Sheriff's letter concerning duct-tape restraints, an alleged contemporaneous record of official notice concerning abusive confinement.

In S.H., the plaintiff alleges that County institutions received financial and political benefits from the Argiros family's influence in exchange for institutional protection.

The question for Delaware County is direct:

Did County law enforcement return children to an institution after receiving complaints of untreated injuries, psychiatric abuse, suicidal behavior, or denial of medical care?

And did economic or political relationships with the institution's operators influence the governmental response?

XI. Federal case inventory — medical neglect, psychiatric abuse, suicide attempts, and concealment

Federal caseCase numberPrincipal allegations
Van Arsdale3:26-cv-01462Absence of qualified treatment; alleged firsthand witness to a student death by suicide
J.K.3:26-cv-01780Suicide attempt by ingesting cleanser; refusal of hospital care; alleged concealment and destruction of medical records
Baldwin3:26-cv-02076Malnutrition, dental deterioration, denied treatment, suicide attempt without psychiatric intervention
Haham3:26-cv-01735Discontinuation of prescribed Zoloft after prior psychiatric hospitalization
Dellinger3:26-cv-01767Psychiatric medication changes, untreated broken nose, inadequate clinical supervision
C.R.6:26-cv-01409Controlled medical appointments, surgery allegedly performed without parental knowledge or consent
Candito3:26-cv-01817Untreated injury sustained during compulsory agricultural labor
S.H.3:26-cv-01412Approximately $160,000 in tuition; alleged absence of genuine addiction treatment
Barley3:26-cv-01493Approximately $99,000 paid; alleged failure to provide professional addiction treatment
Tell3:26-cv-02087Representations concerning therapeutic staff and publicly financed treatment
Jane Doe3:26-cv-01397Destruction of student files and records concerning institutional abuse
Bartolomeo3:26-cv-01656Destruction and alleged concealment of institutional records
Sarah Sullivan3:26-cv-01842Denial of genuine treatment and alleged destruction of records
Cowan-Johnson6:26-cv-01560Institutional abuse, alleged governmental notice, failure to intervene

XII. Questions Delaware County must answer before November 3, 2026

What reports of medical neglect, psychiatric abuse, untreated injuries, or suicidal behavior at FFS were received by the Sheriff's Office?

Were children who reported medical emergencies or abuse returned to FFS without independent examination?

What investigation was conducted into the student death by suicide described in Van Arsdale's verified complaint?

What County law-enforcement records exist concerning that death?

Were any records concerning the death withheld, destroyed, or suppressed?

Did County authorities investigate allegations that children were denied hospital treatment following suicide attempts?

Did law enforcement receive complaints concerning forced discontinuation of psychiatric medication or the denial of necessary dental and medical treatment?

What communications occurred between County officials, FFS administrators, healthcare providers, and state regulatory agencies concerning children's medical care?

What did County officials know about the institution's alleged destruction of student files, medical records, psychiatric documentation, and abuse complaints?

And did the financial and political relationships alleged in multiple federal complaints influence the County's response to reports of medical neglect?

These questions arise from specific federal pleadings identifying children, incidents, institutional employees, healthcare providers, and potential documentary records.

The complaints have not established County liability. But they describe an institution allegedly collecting substantial sums for therapeutic care while children suffered untreated psychiatric emergencies, physical injuries, malnutrition, and serious medical neglect.

The most devastating allegation is that children entrusted to FFS for treatment were allegedly denied that treatment, punished for their suffering, and prevented from obtaining effective outside assistance — while governmental institutions - DELAWARE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE - are accused of PROTECTING the enterprise that profited from their confinement.

If substantiated, that would be more than medical negligence by a private institution.

It would raise more than fundamental questions about the integrity of Delaware County's law-enforcement and governmental oversight institutions.

It would raise questions of CRIMINAL liability of those involved on the Delaware County government side.

And those questions deserve answers before the November 3, 2026 election.