While New York has no money to fund its indigent defense, it has money to pay its retired judges both salary and pension, after mandatory retirement

Meet the Brooklyn judge Betty Williams.

Judge Betty Williams is well known to New Yorkers for her double-dipping, running for re-election after she turned 70, which is a mandatory retirement age for judges, retiring within 8 weeks of election, and then remaining on the bench after "certification" and collecting both her $174,000 a year salary, and her $135,902 a year pension.

How did I determine that Judge Williams turned 70 before her re-election?

Judge Williams' attorney registration indicates that she will have to re-register in August of 2018.  Attorney registration rules in New York require attorneys to re-register every two years, within 30 days of their birthdays, and an attorney next registration date shows the month of the attorney's birthday.

The month of Judge Williams' birthday is August.

In New York, judges must retire on January 1 following the year when they turned 70.

Judge Williams' retirement date is listed as December 30, 2013.

The election committees and donors who supported Judge Williams in her re-election bid had to know about this double-dipping scheme.

This scheme alone says a lot about integrity of Judge Betty Williams.

Here are Judge Betty Williams' salary payouts - paid by New York taxpayers - reported by Seethroughny.net since 2009, and her pension payouts reported since 2014, after she retired in 2013:

Betty Williams worked as a judge in 2016, and remains on the bench in 2017, as her attorney registration indicates, even though she is not listed as a judge in the New York State judicial directory:

and, according to an answer of the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct to me about another retired, but still "serving" judge, Judge Betty Williams is not subject to jurisdiction of the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct, so she can do on the bench whatever she likes - and she is covered with judicial immunity, attorney disciplinary committees or criminal authorities will not dare to touch her for any misconduct on the bench, and the New York Judicial Conduct claims it does not have "authority" to discipline misconduct of retired judges - even if they continue to serve.

Reportedly, many judges do what judge Betty Williams does - collecting both her salary and pension after MANDATORY retirement and "certification" allowing, by court rule only, New York judges to remain on the bench for 6 more years after the mandatory age of retirement of 70 - in 3 2-year increments.

Here is attorney registration of the Rockland Surrogate Judge Thomas E. Walsh II

 Here are the salary payouts for Judge Thomas E. Walsh II after retirement:

Here are Judge Thomas E Walsh, II's retirement payouts since 2010:

Judge Thomas E. Walsh, II reportedly draws not only a pension of $105,000, a salary of $170,000 as a state judge, and, an additional salary of $4,200 as a surrogate.

In 2013, after New York Governor Andrew Cuomo complained about double-dipping judges, and while awaiting the vote on the constitutional amendment to raise mandatory retirement age for judges from 70 to 80, New York courts, at that point headed by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman who was the ardent supporter of raising the mandatory retirement age - because it would have allowed him to stay on the bench, while Governor Cuomo was fighting against the amendment, in order to plant his personal friend Janet DiFiore in Jonathan Lippman's stead (Cuomo won) - at that historical time, Lippman's court system tried to cater to the voters and, after Cuomo complained about double-dipping, reportedly stopped paying out judicial salaries to retired judges.

Not for long, though.

First, New York voters did not approve raising mandatory retirement age for judges from 70 to 80.

Second, judges sued.

After the only honest judge in this whole situation, the Acting Supreme Court Justice Gerald W. Connolly of the Albany County Supreme Court,

prohibited the double-dipping, the notoriously corrupt Appellate Division Third Judicial Department, Judges McCarthy, Egan, Devine and Clark - in a court whose Chief Judge Karen Peters, as well as several other judges, is close to retirement herself and stood to benefit from their decision personally - reversed Judge Connolly, claiming that to prohibit "double-dipping" to retired judges means to violate New York State Constitution, Article V, paragraph 7, Judiciary Law 115(3) and Retirement and Social Security Law Section 212.

First, this is the court that usually do not give a damn to whatever State and Federal Constitution, or statutes say - unless, obviously, it concerns judges themselves.

Second, the ruling was plain wrong on its face.

New York State Constitution, Article V, Paragraph 7 says:

"§7. After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired. (New. Adopted by Constitutional Convention of 1938 and approved by vote of the people November 8, 1938.)"

Nobody is taking judges' pensions, but hiring retired judges, after MANDATORY retirement, for a full salaried position from which they HAD TO retire due to their age - while they draw both their pension and their salary, while there is an abundance of young lawyers in the State of New York who could serve as a judge (if there are no enough judges) more effectively than 70+ retired judges - is just plain wrong, as well as wasteful of taxpayer money.

Judiciary Law 115(3) provided:

But, Judiciary Law 115(3) appears to be in conflict with the mandatory retirement age for judges set by the New York State Constitution at 70 - which was reconfirmed by voters in 2013 at a referendum.

That vote, and the New York State constitutional requirement for a mandatory retirement of judges at 70 is rendered meaningless, if judges come out of one door and come back through another door, having the same powers, but now being paid twice what they were paid before retirement.

The 3rd Department, of course, never dreamt of declaring Judiciary Law 115 unconstitutional since the cut-off retirement age for judges in New York is 70, and any "re-certification" after mandatory retirement amounts to an annulment of this constitutional requirement, for which the New York State Legislature had no authority.

And, the Retirement and Social Security Law 212 provides:

"212.  Employment  of  retired  persons.    1.  Notwithstanding  the
  provisions of section one  hundred  one,  two  hundred  eleven  or  four
  hundred  one  of  this  chapter  or of section five hundred three of the
  education law, or the provisions  of  any  local  law  or  charter,  any
  retired  person may continue as retired and, without loss, suspension or
  diminution of his or her retirement allowance, earn  in  a  position  or
  positions in public service in any calendar year an amount not exceeding
  the  amount  set  forth  in the table in subdivision two of this section
  provided such retired person employed under this section  duly  executes
  and files with the retirement system from which he or she is receiving a
  retirement  allowance  a statement that he elects to have the provisions
  of this section apply to him or her. A statement  of  election  executed
  and  filed pursuant to this section may be withdrawn by a retired person
  at any time by a statement similarly executed and filed. However,  there
  shall  be no earning limitations under the provisions of this section on
  or after the calendar year in  which  any  retired  person  attains  age
  sixty-five.  The  retirement  board  of  the  New  York  state teachers'
  retirement system is authorized to adopt  rules  and  regulations  which
  would  allow  retired persons receiving a retirement allowance from such
  system to make such statements of earnings from a position or  positions
  in public service as such board shall determine necessary to enforce the
  provisions  of  this  section  in  lieu  of  the  foregoing statement of
  election".

Subsection 2 of the Retirement and Social Security Law 212, referenced in Subsection 1, sets the limit of $30,000 on salaries in public service to retirees drawing from the public retirement system:

So, under Retirement and Social Security Law 212, judges could only earn $30,000 out of the full judicial salary plus to their retirement benefits.

Yet, under Judiciary Law 115(3) retired judges could earn both their full salary and their retirement benefits - but the mandatory retirement age for judges in New York State set by the New York State Constitution is 70, and any efforts to effectively prolong it until 1976, and allow such "certificated" post-retirement judges to work and to draw any salary at all is unconstitutional.

Moreover, Judiciary Law 115(3) contradicts the earning restriction of Retirement and Social Security Law 212 - and cannot be thus quoted at the same time, which is what the 3rd Department did.

In September of 2016, when Judge Betty Williams came under fire for double-dipping - after she deliberately ran for re-election after she turned 70 and was no longer allowed to become a judge - and was not supposed to be allowed to even RUN for re-election - the 3rd Department decision was still "awaiting scheduling" from the New York State Court of Appeals.

And, later, they sued to collect the "back pay" because of the alleged multi-year salary freeze - which was not granted.

But, what was granted to the judges presently on the bench, is that in 2015 the "Judicial Compensation Commission" consisting mainly of attorneys who derived their livelihood from judges, were regulated by judges, and thus wholly depended on good graces of judges, raised judicial salaries - the law that went into effect in 2016, and judges who are currently double-dipping benefit from the raised salaries.

And, later, judges also sued to collect the "back pay" because of the alleged multi-year salary freeze - which was not granted by the New York State Court of Appeals.

But, what was granted to the judges presently on the bench, is that in 2015 the "Judicial Compensation Commission" consisting mainly of attorneys who derived their livelihood from judges, were regulated by judges, and thus wholly depended on good graces of judges, raised judicial salaries - the law that went into effect in 2016, and judges who are currently double-dipping benefit from the raised salaries.

Here is what one of the double-dipping judges say about their alleged right to double-dip: he is absolutely ok about it, naturally, since it concerns himself personally.

Now we will get a chance to see whether the NYS Court of Appeals, a court that claims that it "gets to pick its cases", will "pick" this case, in which each and every judge of the Court of Appeals has a financial interest, and whether it will decide in favor of its own judges - and to benefit the just-retired Judge Piggott who is benefiting from double-dipping right now.

I will continue to monitor the lawsuit of judges asserting their right to double-dip into taxpayers' pockets.

Meanwhile, I will monitor and publish analysis of decisions of double-dipping judges so that New York taxpayers should decided whether they need to demand from their legal representatives to strictly enforce the mandatory 70-year requirement, or to continue to allow judges to disregard the requirements of the New York State Constitution, act as judges after turning 70, and fleecing the public for substandard work and unlawful decisions. 

Let's note that the raise in judicial salaries and judicial double-dipping after mandatory retirement age continues while New York Governor just vetoed funding of indigent criminal defense out of the state budget - for lack of funds.

Let's also note that retired judges are "certificated" because they are allegedly needed to help promote the business of New York Supreme Court:, according to Judiciary Law 115:

The statute does not indicate whether extra expenditures to pay out salaries of "certificated" judges are provided for in the State budget.

Yet, on December 4, 2016, the very same double-dipping judge Betty Williams was removed from certificated judges and cannot any longer continue to be a judge - even though she did not yet re-register as an attorney and still continues to list herself as a judge - because, reportedly, she could not cope with court caseloads.

It is an interesting decision by State Chief Judge DiFiore who, while having a certificated judge's "double-dipping" lawsuit pending on appeal, is herself dealing with certification and denying certification as the Chief Court administrator - a clear conflict of interest.

As to the decision to deny re-certification to the 74-year-old Judge Betty Williams, reportedly, Judge Betty Williams ripped the decision denying her re-certification and effectively removing her from the bench, which will cost her $174,000 a year in lost earnings.

That was reported on December 4, 2016.

Two weeks after the double-dipping Judge Betty Williams ripped up the decision effectively removing her from the bench - as of January 1, 2017 - Judge Betty Williams took her rage out on a criminal defendant, a national of the State of Israel who needed an interpreter in court proceedings and against his attorney for trying to do his job for his client, and unlawfully changed provisions of Criminal Procedure Law, thus demonstrating that not only she could not handle court caseloads, but she also lacks the very basic competence and integrity.

I will analyze Judge Betty Williams' outrageous December 16, 2016 decision in a separate blog.

I will also continue to analyze in separate blogs the strain on the budget put by the double-dipping judges, and constitutionality of such double-dipping, as well as of judges' acting as judges after the constitutionally mandated retirement.

And, by the way, now Judge Williams, at least theoretically, has a right to sue New York State Judge Janet DiFiore, and Chief Administrative Judge Marks - both in federal, and in state court.

In 2006 such a lawsuit was filed by judge Frank Pontiero - it was denied, but rules were set as to how such a lawsuit should be frame in order to win it.

We will see whether now Judge Williams will sue Judges DiFiore and Marks.  If she does, I will report on that lawsuit, too.

Stay tuned.

The North Carolina decision exempting judges from attorney discipline: Part I - the main opinion

I have recently started a series of blogs about the decision of North Carolina Supreme Court absolving an influential freemason Judge Jerry Tillet who was involved in abuse of office while he was trying to strong-arm police and town authorities who dared to arrest his son to back off his son's case, and who then pursued those public officials in the courtroom, before and even after recusal.

In that decision, 4 days before Christmas, the North Carolina Supreme Court claimed that the only way that judges in North Carolina (including themselves, authors of the decision) can be disciplined is through judicial discipline - even if they remain licensed attorneys while on the bench, and even when being an attorney in good standing is a pre-requisite of getting on the bench and remaining on the bench.

As I promised, I will publish a detailed analysis of the decision, which consists of:

• a main decision by judge Barbara Jackson, with a concurrence from one other judge; and
• separate concurring opinions from five other judges of the court.

This blog is about the main decision in this plurality opinion, by Judge Barbara Jackson.

The main decision includes an interesting insight into the history of attorney regulation, regulation and impeachment of judges in North Carolina, and into the meaning of the "practice of law" in North Carolina.

While lawyers constitute a dominant force in all three branches of the government, being it central or local, state or federal, executive, legislative or judicial, the core issue of what is regulated - what constitutes the "practice of law" is not clearly defined in any of regulating jurisdictions, state or federal.

The North Carolina main decision in Judge Tillett's case makes the murky waters of attorney regulation even murkier - if that was at all possible.

First, the North Carolina State Constitution, Article IV Section 22, declares the following:

"Sec. 22.  Qualification of Justices and Judges.

Only persons duly authorized to practice law in the courts of this State shall be eligible for election or appointment as a Justice of the Supreme Court, Judge of the Court of Appeals, Judge of the Superior Court, or Judge of District Court."

And, as Judge Barbara Jackson points out in the decision, the "practice of law" in North Carolina involves being a judge:

Of course, Judge Jackson's and the statutory definition of the practice of law as being a judge, runs contrary to the claim by the judicial system itself that judges in North Carolina are prohibited to practice law,

which adds even more conceptual mess to Judge Barbara Jackson's convoluted logic in Judge Tillett's case - because the prohibited practice of law was exactly what Judge Tillett was doing when he was trying to pressure police and town officials on behalf of his son.

Thus, since only persons "duly authorized to practice law" can be judges of a certain level in North Carolina, such a constitutional provision must include a provision for removing authorization to practice law for sitting judges.

Yet, that's what North Carolina Supreme Court, themselves judges, and thus, members of class interested in the decision, blocked attorney regulatory authorities from doing in Judge Tillett's case, and, by extension and precedential power, in regards to all other judges in the State of North Carolina.

So, here are some rules about the "practice of law" and judicial practice in the State of North Carolina:

• what constitutes "the practice of law" is not defined in North Carolina by statute, and what constitutes unauthorized practice of law, is decided on a case-by-case basis;
• judges of a certain level are required by the North Carolina Constitution to be attorneys admitted to "practice law";
• after the judge, admitted to practice law, comes to the bench of North Carolina, he is then prohibited to practice law;
• when a judge may no longer practice law, the State Governor must declare a vacancy on the bench, by statute.

This conceptual mess is not of my doing - it naturally flows from the laws and judicial decisions of North Carolina Supreme Court.

And, here are some more points about procedural history of attorney and judicial regulation in North Carolina, and about Judge Barbara Jackson's dishonest and self-serving decision in Judge Jerry Tillett's case.

FRAMING OF THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT

Judge Barbara Jackson claimed that the question before the NC Supreme Court in Judge Tillett's case is:

Yet, the question was not about Judge Tillett's misconduct "while in office".

When Judge Tillett tried to pressure the police and town officials into releasing his son arrested by the police, Judge Tillett did not act as a public official, because, as a judge, he had no say in a case where criminal charges were not yet filed with the court, and even when they would be, had no say in a case involving his own son.

So, misconduct of Judge Tillett was not "misconduct while in office", but misconduct of Jerry Tillett as a private individual who happened to be a licensed attorney, and who, as such, was clearly subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of DHC.

By framing the question before the court the way Judge Barbara Jackson did it, Judge Jackson committed judicial misconduct of her own, since she clearly protected a judge who was also a licensed attorney, from a well deserved disbarment, for private conduct as an attorney - for which another judge, Judge Ethelridge, was disbarred, and while Judge Tillett's private misconduct was clearly within jurisdiction of DHC, as that jurisdiction was described by the same judge Jackson in the same Tillett opinion.

THE HISTORY OF ATTORNEY AND JUDICIAL REGULATION IN NORTH CAROLINA

The opinion indicates that:

• no judges have been removed through impeachment in North Carolina since 1868;
• regulation of attorneys in North Carolina started in 1933, and

North Carolina State Bar being an "agency of the State", and not a trade association.  Notably, the North Carolina State Bar is not an "arm of the court", as federal courts often rule, but an Agency (meaning, administrative agency) of the State - and thus, North Carolina State Bar belongs in the Executive branch of North Carolina government.

• in 1971 the General Assembly enacted the Judicial Standards Commission Act, which was then authorized in 1972 through an amendment to the North Carolina State Constitution, Article IV, Section 17(2).

• in 1975 the General Assembly added a Disciplinary Hearing Commission within the North Carolina State Bar, and vested it with broad jurisdiction to exercise its powers: "any attorney admitted to practice law in this State is subject to disciplinary jurisdiction of this Council".

The establishment of the Disciplinary Hearing Commission, with the wording of the statute giving to DHC authority to discipline "any" attorney admitted to practice law in North Carolina, at a later date than the Judicial Standards Commission (JSC), clearly indicated that JSC does not have exclusive jurisdiction to deal with misconduct of judges, and that DHC can deal with regulating of judges as licensed attorneys, based on violation of rules of professional conduct of attorneys.

THE PRECEDENTS

The two precedents that the North Carolina Supreme Court quoted in its decision: about disbarment of

1. Judge James Ethridge, who was disbarred by DHC for his attorney misconduct committed before he came to the bench (stealing from his client's trust account); and of
2. Judge Mark Badgett who was first removed from the bench by JSC for misconduct in office (racism), and then disbarred by DHC.

First, the NC Supreme Court claimed, while referencing these two precedents and distinguishing them on the merits, that they are not mandatory on the court, because they were decision of a lower appellate court, the Court of Appeals, and not of the NC Supreme Court.

Nevertheless, the NC Supreme Court "distinguished" these precedents, even though they are not really distinguishable.

The court said that:

• in Etheridge, misconduct in question was committed by Judge Etheridge before becoming a judge - even though the disciplinary proceedings commenced while Judge Ehteridge was a judge, Judge Etheridge was disbarred, and then the State of North Carolina dealt with a conundrum of whether it has to pay Judge Etheridge his salary until the end of his term because he was an elected - and not impeached - public official, even though he no longer met constitutional qualifications for a judicial office;
• in Badgett, misconduct was judicial, and committed on the bench, but Judge Budgett was removed from the bench by the JSC (during his re-election campaign, with a prohibition to ever be a judge again), and the former Judge Budgett was only then disbarred by the DHC - so DHC, according to NC Supreme Court, properly had jurisdiction over such proceedings involving a judge's misconduct while on the bench;
• in Tillett, judge Tillett was not removed from the bench, misconduct was both non-judicial (acting as his son's representative and attempting to intimidate the police and town officials into dropping his son's case), and judicial (presiding over complaints against police chief and town officials who did not budge to those threats, then recusing from such cases, and after recusal, trying to influence judges to whom the cases were transferred).

Judge Jackson's mental gymnastics in order to absolve Judge Tillett of attorney discipline despite a clear provision in the statute enacted 3 years after the enactment about judicial disciplinary commission - and, in the same breath, to protect all judges in the State of North Carolina, including herself, from the reach of attorney discipline, while continuing to regulate the "mere mortal" attorneys who are not judges - can be presented in a table:

When did misconduct occur, was misconduct during court proceedings	Before becoming a judge	When a judge	When disciplinary proceedings started	Disciplinary result
Etheridge	X, no		While still on the bench	DHC has jurisdiction, Disbarred
Badgett		X, yes	After resignation	DHC has jurisdiction, Disbarred
Tillett		X, no	While still on the bench	DHC has no jurisdiction

The table shows that there is no logic whatsoever in Judge Jackson's decision about Judge Tillett:

• Judge Badgett was subject to DHC jurisdiction for his misconduct as a judge committed during court proceedings - which, by Judge Jackson's logic, should be exclusively in the hands of JSC.

Judge Tillett's misconduct, on the contrary, was not a misconduct during court proceedings, it was private conduct before those proceedings against his son commenced, and after his recusal from proceedings against public officials who did not budge to his intimidation.

In both of these instances, Judge Tillett did not act as a judge, but as a private individual, and was clearly subject to jurisdiction of DHC.

Moreover, as Judge Jackson must know as a seasoned attorney and judge, the timing of prosecution is not what is relevant to determine rights of parties - the time of the offense is relevant, and Judge Badgett's misconduct was committed while he was still a judge.

Because of Judge Jackson's convoluted logic, the following rule can be discerned from these three cases, and appears to be now the law in the blessed state of North Carolina:

• DHC does have jurisdiction over potential disbarment of Judge Jerry Tillett - but only when Judge Tillett gets off the bench, then, just like in Judge Badgett's case, DHC can disbar him, right on retirement or resignation.

Until then, even though Judge Tillett is a licensed attorney, and being a licensed attorney is the required constitutional qualification for a judge, DHC is prohibited to REVOKE Judge Tillett's LAW LICENSE - because Judge Tillett is a judge.

And, this convoluted logic also explains why, despite the fact that JSC was created because of claims that judges in North Carolina are not disciplined enough (no judges impeached since 1868), the JSC statute is now used by JSC and by the NC Supreme Court, in a self-serving manner, to protect judges committing misconduct, as private individuals, OFF the bench, from disbarment while they are not disciplined by JSC ("public reprimands" do not count as effective discipline -  see the story of Michigan Judge Lisa Gorcyca who received a standing ovation from the local bar after she was publicly reprimanded for egregious conduct, but was allowed to remain on the bench).

But, if the NC Supreme Court allows DHC jurisdiction and discipline after judges leave the bench, for judicial conduct that has led to discipline - and Judge Tillett, just as Judge Badgett before him, was disciplined (public reprimand), just not as severely as Judge Badgett - DHC must be now eagerly waiting the end of term of Judge Jerry Tillett, which ends - ta-da! - in 2018.

Of course, Judge Tillett, to escape disbarment, may run for re-election - but, voters should be forewarned by that time that it is not "public service" that Judge Tillett is seeking by a potential re-election in 2018, but self-protection from disbarment.

And, of cousre, I will eagerly follow, and report, on whether the North Carolina Disciplinary Hearing Council will pursue the discipline of Judge Tillett when he gets off the bench - and into the DHC's open arms.

Stay tuned.

 

Another public reprimand for abuse of judicial office in North Carolina - now, saving the job and the law license of #JudgePeterMack

I recently wrote about North Carolina top court's extraordinarily, and extraordinarily corrupt, decision to absolve an influential judge, as well as all judges in the state, including those who have made the decision, of attorney discipline, despite being licensed attorneys - without a proper court regulation or legislative enactment for such an extraordinary exemption.

As I promised, I will soon publish further analysis of that decision regarding #NorthCarolinaJudgeJerryTillett, which was made on 41 pages and included multiple concurring opinions.

Yet, nearly immediately after the North Carolina top court absolved itself, all judges of the state, and judge Jerry Tillett, of the reach of attorney regulation, despite being licensed attorneys, the North Carolina Supreme Court gave yet another slap on the wrist (just like they did with Judge Tillett) to yet another North Carolina judge who was abusing his office for personal gain: #JudgePeterMack.

Mack has been handpicked and supported for judgeship by "prominent" local attorneys - while the ethics of this "tradition", and of judges too-cozy relationships with the local bar in return for rulings - was questioned since long time ago.

And, when the judge himself became a litigant, he depended on the local bar to deny representation to the judge's opponent - and got what he wanted.

While the Supreme Court gave Judge Mack a "public reprimand", but did not take him off the bench, for only "failing to disclose additional income" from his rental properties, the disciplinary decision raises much more serious misconduct of Judge Mack, which required taking off the bench and disbarring him as an attorney.

Judge Mack had a rental property.

And, he rented it.

And, a tenant trashed it when leaving, causing a lot of damage.

And, Judge Mack had a right to pursue legal remedies under the law, as anybody else in this country and in the State of North Carolina.

Yet, it is HOW Judge Mack pursued his remedies that is a problem.

First, Judge Mack pursued not just civil remedies, but filed a criminal complaint against the tenant.

Moreover, to rub it in with the prosecution that the complainant is a judge, Judge Mack indicated as his return address the address of his court, obviously wielding the power of his office to advance his personal interests.

Such a complaint would likely not have been addressed, had it not been made by a sitting judge.

So, the criminal complaint was turned into criminal charges against the tenant, because of Judge Mack's status as a judge.  So, Judge Mack influenced the prosecutor with his judicial position in order to have criminal charges brought against he tenant, instead of trying to sue the tenant and try his luck, as other landlords have to do, to get any money from a tenant in civil proceedings - facing the potential problem of a deadbeat tenant.

Of course, it is easier to have the tenant pay up for damages if that is the price of getting out of jail, rather than to have him pay up a civil money judgment.

Furthermore, knowing that the judge is the complainant, and is wielding his judicial status by putting his court's address on the complaint, the tenant had a difficulty finding an attorney who would dare represent him against a judge.

The case was even put on the calendar of Judge Mack, so he was both the Plaintiff and the presiding judge in the same case.  Of course, Judge Mack denied knowledge or collusion with the prosecution, but who is going to believe it? Only "brother judges" on the NC Supreme Court, obviously.

Finally, a public defender was assigned to represent the tenant - only to sell the tenant out and to agree for the tenant to meet IN CHAMBERS of the Plaintiff Judge Mack, with the prosecutor being present, but without the presence of that same public defender for restitution negotiations - at the end of which the tenant was pressured enough to produce $3,000 for the judge.

For all of that - the judge was given only a "public reprimand" and was allowed to remain on the bench, while knowing that, according to NC Supreme Court helpful information in Judge Tillett's decision, the last time a judge was impeached in North Carolina was in 1868, and a judge may not be now disciplined as an attorney because NC Supreme Court decided to give itself and all judges in the State such a self-serving gift.

So, North Carolinians, the decision regarding Judge Tillett predictably opened up a floodgate of more corrupt disciplinary decisions that only pretend to discipline judges while in fact are operating as protection for judges committing egregious misconduct for personal gain.

And, unless the public demands more accountability from its judges, through a legislative action making impeachment proceedings easier and specifically providing by a statute that attorney discipline equally applies to judges who are attorneys, corrupt judges will remain on the bench forever.

After all, according to the NC Supreme Court's decision regarding Judge Tillett, it was Judge Tillett's current judicial status that protected him from disbarment - an incentive for the NC Supreme Court to NEVER take a judge off the bench, as it would mean throwing such a judge to the wolves of attorney disciplinary authorities.

Great job, NC Supreme Court.

Could not expect anything less from the "Honorable" judiciary.

Louisiana #JudgeLaurieWhite wastes scarce taxpayer funded judicial resources on wielding her fury against supporter of her opponent in judicial elections

In an extremely rare case, in Louisiana, a judge held a prosecutor in contempt of court for texting the judge and requesting the judge to stop badmouthing the prosecutor.

Of course, how many defense attorneys would know the judge's cell phone number to be able to text her, and it is a big issue that the prosecutor in question did know the judge's cell phone number, raising questions of possible longtime ex parte communications of that particular prosecutor's office with this particular judge, and with other judges, requiring, in my opinion, a disciplinary investigation.

Yet, as to contempt proceedings brought against the prosecutor by that particular judge, there were constitutional prohibitions for such a contempt prosecution that the judge, with an admittedly bad temper,

disregarded in holding the prosecutor in contempt.

Despite the clear due process prohibition for the judge to act as a "witness, prosecutor, judge and jury" in a contempt hearing that she had herself brought and that involved an alleged "insult" to herself, despite a most recent prohibition on being n "accuser and an adjudicator" in the same case issued in 2016 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams v. Pennsylvania, and where her own misconduct was the reason for the text messages, a misconduct that was brought up in testimony of witnesses other than the prosecutor charged with contempt, Judge Laurie White

still held the prosecutor Jason Napoli in contempt of court for texting her.

That judge White was biased against the prosecution, and against that particular prosecutor, is an understatement of the century.

During Jason Napoli's contempt proceedings instituted by Judge White, a witness testified that the judge made the following unsolicited comments about Jason Napoli to his subordinate, attorney Brian Ebarb, during their very first meeting:

First, a judge who holds such views, has no business presiding over proceedings represented by attorneys she so acutely dislikes, it is called a mandatory disqualification for bias.

Second, a judge has no business using four-letter language in court proceedings, that's another point of immediate disqualification.

Third, a judge has an ethical prohibition against badmouthing an attorney to the face of his subordinate in the attorney's absence, where the badmouthed attorneys have no ability to defend themselves, and where the subordinate attorney is used as a captive audience.

And fourth, but definitely not least problem here is that the judge badmouthed attorney Napoli and Cannizzaro, comparing them to "Satan and Lucifer" after the judge has lost her election campaign to a higher, appellate, court, to a "candidate backed by Cannizzaro", Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods.

In the election campaign, which reportedly got "ugly" and where both candidates "took their gloves off", according to Judge White herself, Judge Bartholomew-Woods pointed out the following problems with Judge White's candidacy for a higher judicial seat:

So, Judge White's opinion that prosecutors Napoli and Cannizzaro are "Satan", "Lucifer", "a**holes", lazy and stupid could very well be attributable not only to the judge's admittedly bad temper, but to the fact that attorney Cannizzaro supported Judge White's successful opponent to a seat with higher power and salary, and to attorney Cannizzaro's opinion that Judge White is "unfit for the appellate court" - and, by extension, for any other court as well.

Of course, hell hath no fury as a woman scorned, but that woman should not be on the bench wielding her rage in criminal cases.

Apparently, the state of Louisiana is so strapped for cash that

• public defenders refuse to represent felony cases for lack of personnel and time to be able to provide effective assistance of counsel, and are sued for it,
• and courts, as an escape from the situation, assign any attorney with a pulse and a license, even without any knowledge of criminal law, to represent criminal defendants, in order to satisfy the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate for EFFECTIVE legal representation of the indigent in criminal proceedings - Gideon v Wainright.

Yet, the same State of Louisiana has enough money to allow its criminal judge Laurie White, who admitted to her bad temperament, but was not removed from the bench at the time of her admission, to continue to waste taxpayers' money by instituting and prosecuting a frivolous contempt proceeding against an attorney she hates for personal reasons.

I wonder if the Louisiana judicial disciplinary authorities will have a say against Judge Laurie White - or, whether, like they did in the case of #attorneyChristineMire who exposed egregious misconduct of #JudgePhyllisKeaty (see my blogs about Christine Mire's case as it developed, here, here, here, and here), instead, the attorney disciplinary system will be used against prosecutor Napoli to further retaliate against him for daring to raise the issue of judicial misconduct .

Prosecutor Napoli, once again, raised Judge White's misconduct improperly, in a text message to the judge.

He was supposed to do that in a motion to recuse.

Yet, because attorneys in the State of Louisiana were intimidated against daring to make motions to recuse, even with irrefutable evidence of judicial misconduct in hand, given the recent fate of attorney Christine Mire who was suspended from the practice of law and made to pay tens of thousands of dollars for being prosecuted for seeking for her client a constitutional right for impartial judicial review, after making a proper motion to recuse (while Judge Phyllis Keaty was promoted to an appellate court), who can blame attorney Napoli for seeking more discreet ways to point the judge's misconduct to the judge?

And once again, a question - will Judge Laurie White be investigated and disciplined for her misconduct in this case?

In Kentucky, it is more of a judicial misconduct to fight racism in the courtroom than to playact a judge's book in court proceedings

Kentucky is an interesting state.

Recently, it came on the news several times:

• because its County Clerk defied the U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding legitimizing same sex marriage to the point of going to federal prison - with supporters demonstrating for her in the streets;
• because it suspended its first African-American #judgeOluStevens for fighting against racism in the criminal justice system of the state, and for advancing criminal defendants' federal constitutional right under Batson v Kentucky;
• because after suspending #JudgeOluStevens, the top court of the State of Kentucky defied Batson v Kentucky further by issuing an opinion stating that  judges in Kentucky do not have a right to strike "randomly selected" jury panels lacking racial diversity, because, according to Kentucky highest court, giving a judge such advantages is "short-sighted" and advantages of such power will be "short-lived".  So, the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, on point, issued in 1986 specifically against the State of Kentucky means nothing in the State of Kentucky.

After suspending Judge Olu Stevens for promoting the federal Constitution that every state judge is sworn to uphold in the state court system, the State of Kentucky gave a slap on the wrist of a "public reprimand" to judge Tim Philpot for ordering unnecessary hearings in Family Court to create playacting "research" material for his own book "Biblical analogy of God's love" where he condemns extramarital relationships, promotes marriage and claims that problems of child-rearing can be traced to children being born out of wedlock.

So, the blessed state of Kentucky considers faithfulness to the U.S. Constitution (Judge Olu Stevens) a disqualification for judicial office, and wielding the Bible in the courtroom and holding unnecessary hearings to write a book promoting marriage and condemning the birth of children out of wedlock (Judge Tim Philpot) not to be disqualifying conduct for a Family Court judge.

This forgiveness of Judge Philpot came close in time with North Carolina's forgiveness of a long-time freemason Sudan Shriner Judge Jerry Tillett for case-fixing and intimidating of public officials who dared to arrest his son, in a decision that exempted Judge Tillett and all other NC judges, including the authors of the opinion, all licensed attorneys, from the reach of attorney discipline.

Self-forgiveness is the rule of self-regulation by the judiciary.

We the citizens and taxpayers, as members of the popular sovereign of the United States, should change this attitude by a legislative action.

Soon.

Improper publicity stunts and destruction of evidence of a cozy relationship between the Chicago, Illinois #CookCountyCircuitJudgeMariaKuriakosCiesil and the prosecutor's office

It was reported that an Illinois judge, #MariaKuriakosCiesil,

"chided" the criminal defendants in a case where they were charged with hate crimes accusing them of torturing a mentally disabled white man, at their arraignment:

"Where was your sense of decency"?, and denied them bail, "finding" them a danger to society - before all evidence is in. 

Does the judge not know that all 4 criminal defendants are presumed innocent?

Does the judge not know that, as a judge, she should be not only neutral and impartial, but should also make an appearance of neutrality and impartiality, as a matter of due process of law?

Does the judge not know that, until there is a conviction through a plea bargain or a jury verdict, she has NO RIGHT to "chide" criminal defendants as if the verdict is already in?  No matter how heinous the allegations.  No matter how public the evidence is.

Actually, if a judge cannot constrain herself from making an appearance to the public that she has made up her mind that the defendants who are just being arraigned are guilty, and all the criminal procedure to be afforded them, including the presumption of innocence and the right to an impartial judge, is a mere petty formality on the way to an inevitable conviction, she should get off that case - and off the bench.

At nearly the same time as Judge Ciesil "chided" the arraigned defendants, the State prosecutor #ErinAntonietti

already "presented the evidence" to the "court of public opinion", making statements to the public and claiming in those statements that defendants "did" certain things instead of "alleged to have done" certain things that Antonietti is charging the defendants with.

It is apparent that both the prosecutor and the judge, both white women, are involved in misconduct, and are trying to get political capital while tainting, possibly, irreversibly, the four defendants' right to a fair and impartial trial, and their jury pool.

Judging by publicly available information, Judge Ciesil already has a cozy relationship with the prosecutors, a relationship clearly questioning her impartiality, even without her "rebuke" and denial of bail based on finding that the four defendants are a "danger to the community".

Here is the picture of the former Illinois State Attorney Anita Alvarez who was reportedly in office until December 1, 2016

And here is the photo of the same State Attorney Anita Alvarez handing to the happily smiling Judge Maria Kuriakos Ciesil a "State Attorney's Award" for "community service" in May of 2016.

The problem with this picture is not only a judge receiving an award from a prosecutor for "community service" - making one wonder what kind of "community service" a prosecutor would commend the judge for.

Even more troubling is that the full description about the picture was scrubbed off the Internet, so the only way I could retrieve it was from the still "cached" copy.

After I retrieved it yesterday, today, when I checked the link, even the cached copy was scrubbed from the Internet.

So, somebody with an interest to destroy evidence, is actively monitoring access to even cached evidence, and is destroying evidence of a too-cozy relationship between a judge, former employee of the prosecutor in the currently pending sensational criminal case, and the prosecutor's office - which is a grave issue of public concern.

I wonder if the defendants attorneys will subpoena computers upon which this information has been kept, and evidence as to who ordered scrubbing this information, and the cached file off the Internet - or if they will be scared for their licenses to do that.

The law enforcement community reported on the court proceedings in this case featuring a picture of a very small balance (judicial "scale of justice") and a very large hammer (judicial gavel).

It appears that featuring the scales of justice is an exaggeration in this case.  The judge, the former employee of the prosecutor in the case, who was just last year awarded by that prosecutor for "community service", already made up her mind.

Criminal justice courts and prosecutors in Chicago should be actually extremely cautious in prosecuting African Americans based on confessions, including in sensational cases - in view of the history when Chicago police extracted confessions from African Americans through torture, so under these circumstances

confessions of African American defendants in criminal proceedings are not worth much.

And, let us remember that the Cook County in Chicago, Illinois, is the place where one of the most famous anti-court-corruption FBI "Operation Greylord" happened in the 1980s, and nothing in the way attorneys are regulated and/or promoted through brown-nosing the judiciary, and disciplined for criticizing the judiciary (including in Illinois) has changed the climate that encourages to rather engage in misconduct than zealously and honestly represent clients.

Lanre Amu, a Nigerian attorney, was recently suspended in Illinois for criticizing a judge.

Kenneth Ditkowski, a longtime attorney, was suspended in Illinois for exposing judicial participation in elder abuse, draining the estate of the elderly, blocking them from seeing their loved ones and having them die alone and robbed by the court-appointed "guardians".

JoAnne Marie Denison - an attorney in Illinois recently suspended for exposure of corruption in probate proceedings regarding estates of the living elderly people.

Thus suspensions were in 2011, 2014 and 2015, enough to put a chill on the Illinois bar against doing its job properly.

And, whoever is representing the 4 African American defendants, is chilled from providing them a proper representation - because no motion to disqualify the judge and the prosecutor based on their misconduct and prejudicial statements was reported so far.

In a criminal case, a criminal defendant has a FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL right to:

• a neutral and impartial judge;
• a neutral and impartial prosecutor;
• an effective legal defense;
• a presumption of innocence;
• constitutional protections against forced or coerced confessions;
• constitutional protections regarding identification of the defendants, and as to authentication and admissibility of evidence;
• constitutional protections against tainting the jury pool by pre-trial publicity by the prosecutors and through statements by the judge.

Apparently, all of those protections have already been has been scrapped in the infamous Cook County, Illinois, by the actions of an unscrupulous judge and of an unscrupulous prosecutor already at the time of arraignment.

For the judge and the prosecutor, their two minutes of fame, apparently, mean much more than ensuring a fair trial for the accused.

Yet, no matter how heinous are the charges, if this country wants to claim that it is based on the rule of law - which both the judge and the prosecutor were sworn to uphold and get money (a lot of money) from taxpayers for doing that, the constitutional protections for the accused must be strictly observed.

And, the more sensational is the case, the more protections should the defendants be afforded.

Here, both the evidence, and the jury pool, have been likely irretrievably tainted by the publicity stunts of the judge and the prosecutor.

And such publicity stunts hurt both the chances of the defendants for a fair trial, and the chances of the alleged victim (that is his legal status in the criminal proceeding - an alleged victim) to get justice, if crimes were committed against him.

I will continue to monitor and report on this case.

Stay tuned.

Who is attorney #DanielGoldstein who reportedly badmouthed Ivanka Trump on the plane - an update

I posted a blog in December of 2016, which received several comments regarding the registration status of attorney Daniel Jennings Goldstein in New York that, in my view, deserve and require a special update article.

In my initial article, I pointed out that the "Brooklyn" attorney Daniel Jennings Goldstein is not licensed to practice law in New York.

A reader Jerry B from Arizona gave me a tip that Daniel Jennings Goldstein is registered in California State Bar:

The California State Bar reports that attorney Daniel Jennings Goldstein, of Brooklyn, NY, was admitted to practice law in the State of California in 2002, was relegated to an inactive status in 2012, but is eligible to become active.  As of today, he is listed as "inactive status", meaning that at this time he is not admitted to practice law in California.

A reader "Loo Chee" with a restricted profile

reacted with a tip and pointed out to me the existence of a profile on LinkedIn of attorney "Dan Goldstein" (no middle name) who works for the federal government, in the Labor Relations Department.

While a LinkedIn profile with no middle name is not a positive ID for the same attorney, since reader Loo Chee's opinion was supported by a comment from an "Unknown" reader

who stated the following:

and since this opinion appear to be at cross-points with New York law, I decided to run an update article.

The "Unknown" reader did not point out what are the rules of D.C. bar regarding in-house counsel.

Moreover, that he or she was never prosecuted by the D.C. bar does not mean that he or she did not violate the rule of practice.

And, a policy of a federal agency may well run afoul of the local state law, so I would not rely on it without extra verification of the state law.

In New York, where attorney Daniel Jennings Goldstein lives, there are rules for licensing of attorneys who practice law in the state, and rules of "registration" for in-house counsel existing since April 20, 2011:

The requirement to register exists for those attorneys who "though not admitted to the New York bar, are employed full-time in this state as in-house counsel by a corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity that is not itself engaged in the practice of law or the rendering of legal services outside such organization."

Since Daniel Goldstein resides in Brooklyn, NY and claims to be a lawyer from Brooklyn, NY, he may be working in New York.  The U.S. Labor Department is a "legal entity", and "is not itself engaged in the practice of law or the rendering of legal services outside such organization".

So, even if Daniel Jennings Goldstein may not have to be admitted to practice law in New York, IF his employment answers 22 NYCRR 522, he must, under New York law, nevertheless register as an "in-house counsel" of the U.S. Labor Department.

I checked whether he is so registered.

He is not, with or without a middle name.

So, once again, I do not know whether attorney Daniel Jennings Goldstein was at the time of the incident with Ivanka Trump, or is now working for the U.S. Labor Department - if he works while living in New York, New York law appears to require him to either get admitted to practice law, and I found no registration information on him as an admitted attorney, the list of "Daniel Goldsteins" admitted to practice in New York, as of today, is the same as when I initially research the case in December of 2016,

or at least register as an in-house counsel - which he did not do either.

I found no exemptions in New York law for attorneys employed by federal agencies to work within the state without a full license to practice, or without a registration as an "in-house counsel".

If any readers know of such laws, I welcome that information, which I will also research and publish.