A. Gail Prudenti is retiring or running from the bench?

Another interesting abrupt retirement was recently announced.

A. Gail Prudenti, the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York, retired as of July 30, 2015 after 23 years on the bench, to go and work as an administrator for a law school.

It is notable that her new position, as an administrator of a law school, does not involve either judgeship, or the practice of law.

This woman knows the Chief Judge Lippman very well.

Is she retiring because she wants to, or is she running from the bench while investigations against top New York State officials close to Lippman are getting hotter by the day and while the court administration is sued more and more for corruption, misconduct and refusal to comply with Freedom of Information Laws?

In any event, another question arises - who will replace Prudenti?

Michael V. Coccoma?  Coccoma was recently elevated by Lippman as the "chief fiduciary" in the NYS Court Administration, despite lawsuits involving fraud that were dismissed only because of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts.

It seems that the more corrupt and brazen a judge is in New York (if he got high enough, town justices sometimes get disciplined, justices from the County Court and up nearly never get disciplined) - the better career is offered to him/her.

I already wrote about judges of the two appellate divisions, Leslie Stein of the Appellate Division 3rd Department, and Eugene Fahey of the Appellate Division 4th Department who were elevated to the Court of Appeals after brazen misconduct on the bench.

Prudenti successor is NOT Michael V. Coccoma.

So, at least Coccoma was bypassed on his way up the ladder.

I bet, nobody wanted to promote a judge who has been repeatedly sued for corruption, self-dealing, protectionism of his wife through supervising assignments to her cases as an attorney of judges who are close to retirement, are looking into Coccoma's hand to receive post-retirement perks and who oblige Coccoma in retaliating against his and his wife's critics.

Is there a legal difference between an electronic recording transcribed by a stenographer and a stenographic record directly made at trial by the stenographer? There is when an appellate court wants to make an inconvenient criminal appeal disappear.

Is there a difference between a criminal trial and sentencing recorded directly by a court reporter/ stenographer or made as an audio recording by the court and then turned over to a stenographer to provide a stenographic record of the court proceedings?

You would think that it is a silly question.  Of course, there shouldn't be any such difference - a stenographic transcript is a stenographic transcript.

Yet, Judge Keene's court attorney, of Tioga County, asserts that there is a difference between the two.

Here is a letter sent to me by Judge Keene's attorney on July 31, 2015.

The letter is clearly accusing me of neglecting a client by failing to file an "affidavit of errors" in a case where the court claims no stenographic record was made  (while admitting that a stenographic transcript was filed with the court and omitting the fact that a motion to settle that transcript timely made by me is pending in the lower court since March of 2012, for 3 years).

Yet, it appears that the court is trying to shift to me neglect and misconduct of their duties not by one, but by several judges participating in this case on the trial, motion and appellate level.

The case involving a jury trial for a sexual offense resulted in a conviction.

An appeal was timely filed.

Since the defendant was indigent, an assigned counsel (myself) was promptly assigned.

As soon as I was assigned, I requested transcripts of all proceedings, such as pre-trial arraignments, hearings, the trial and sentencing.

When transcripts were provided and I had an opportunity to review them, I put in front of the trial court a motion to settle the transcripts supported by an affirmation (which in New York is an equivalent of an affidavit) pointing out gaps in the transcripts making proper appellate review impossible for the lack of proper record.

Since the case is a high-profile sex offense case upon which several other derivative adjudications are based, the court system which supposed to be a neutral reviewer, resisted the appeal from progressing.

The first judge presiding over the appeal, Judge Carl F. Becker, assigned me to the appeal - the only case Judge Becker has ever assigned me to, and assigned me, conspicuously, after I sued him in state and federal court (both lawsuits were dismissed without reaching the merits or having discovery on the basis of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench).

At the time Judge Becker assigned me to the case, Judge Stephen Rose of Sidney Village Court, a non-attorney and a former police officer, called me directly to my home office, verified when I will NOT be at home, came to my home at that time, demanded that my husband (at that time a disbarred attorney) should accept delivery by Judge Rose of transcripts in this case, had my husband signed for acceptance of the delivery, and then turned around and complained to the Professional Conduct Committee that my husband is engaged in unauthorized practice of law and I am condoning such practice.

Knowing unethical and corrupt practices of Judge Becker, I have a reason to believe that the only reason Becker assigned this single case to me was because he had an agreement with Judge Rose to use the case to entrap me and my husband into charges of unauthorized practice of law and aiding and abetting the same.

The entrapment did not work the way it was supposed to.

Neither Judge Becker nor Judge Rose are outstanding legal scholars, and neither one of them took into account the law of the State of New York providing that, when an attorney is served with anything at her home, she can be served, by substituted service, upon a person of "suitable age and discretion", and the choice of the person of a suitable age and discretion is with the person serving the papers.

The person serving the papers was Judge Rose (which was a clear "irregularity", but that's what Judge Rose chose to do).

So, Judge Rose came to my home knowing, through prior verification, that I will not be there at the time he comes, chose my husband as a person of "suitable age and discretion" to accept service of papers for me, had my husband sign for acceptance of such service, and then turned around and complained that the perfectly lawful act by a person who does not have to be an attorney and which does not constitute the practice of law, is practice of law on behalf of Mr. Neroni and condoning of the same by me.

I made a motion to recuse Judge Rose and filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of my husband.

Judge Rose recused.

The federal lawsuit on behalf of my husband, Neroni v Zayas, was initially decided (partially) in his favor when Judge Lawrence E. Kahn of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York ruled that the case should not be dismissed and should proceed to trial on the issue whether a disbarred attorney may be investigated and prosecuted by an attorney for Professional Conduct Committee any further, or whether a disbarred attorney so investigated may sue for money damages.  

After Lawrence E. Kahn, upon information and belief, got some benefits from high-standing attorneys who had material interests against my husband, through the means of the so-called American Inns of Court, Lawrence E. Kahn backtracked on his decision and dismissed the case, on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity of members of the Professional Conduct Committee for malicious and corrupt acts.

Back to People v. Simmons, subject of the letter of the Tioga County judge's attorney who did not mention in her letter that the case is pending on appeal in Delaware County Court.

The motion to settle the transcript was made on March 5, 2012 to the proper lower court.

Judge Becker, as the appellate judge, held a conference in the case, with the special prosecutor James Hartmann and myself as the appellate attorney for the defendant, present.

Judge Becker accepted that the motion to settle the transcript was proper and transferred its review to another court.

Usually, motions must be reviewed, and decision on them made, within 60 days of the returnable date.

More than 3 years passed since I made the motion.  The initial returnable date was March 20, 2012.

When the courts woke up and figured that the lower court forgot to make a decision on the motion, they started to blame me.

In the letter by court attorney of currently assigned to the appeal Judge Gerald Keene of Tioga County, the court attorney for the judge claims that because the proceedings at trial and sentencing were not recorded by a court stenographer, I had to file an "affidavit of errors", and if I did not file the same, the appeal should be dismissed.

The court attorney, at the same time, admits in her letter that a transcript (while omitting the word "stenographic" transcript) of the trial and sentencing was provided to the appellate court, making the section of the law she is quoting inapplicable, since it is a distinction without a difference whether the stenographer was actually present in court to create a record that she later transcribed, or whether she transcribed a record from an audio recording of proceedings made by the court.  If anything, transcript from an audio recording may be more precise than transcript from the coding and decoding by the stenographer.  In any event, the resulting transcript is a stenographic transcript filed with the court, and CPL 460.10(3) does not apply.  It would apply if no record would be taken at all.

It is telling that the court attorney does not mention in her letter the conference before Judge Becker,  approval by Judge Becker of my motion to settle, directions by Judge Becker and by two subsequently assigned appellate judges to the lower court to review and resolve the motion to settle.

Here is my motion to settle made on March 5, 2012, provided here without exhibits that were filed with the court.

 It is clear that I made a supporting Affirmation for the motion which, if the court wants to nit-pick and insist that electronic audio-recording made by the court and turned over for a stenographer to create a stenographic transcript is not the same as the stenographer actually sitting in court and providing the transcript from her recordings, and not from the audio, can be clearly regarded as an "affidavit of errors".

Why are several judges, including Judge Keene, so keen on preventing the appeal from happening?

Because, given the gaps in the record, the reversal in this case is a must.

And, with the reversal, the following things may happen:

1) a sex offender registration of the defendant will be expunged;
2) a new trial will have to be held where previously intimidated witnesses may come forward and testify properly;
3) if the defendant wins, the Delaware County Department of Social Services, the "child" of Judge Becker and of the current judicial candidate Porter Kirkwood, will look very pale, to put it mildly;
4) a federal lawsuit by the defendant may follow against participants in malicious prosecution against defendant which cost him dearly in terms of a served jail sentence, reputation, job and liberty restrictions and irremedeemable financial and emotional losses.

For that reason, it is easier to pound on an assigned counsel who was assigned for the reason of being entrapped into a criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting in unauthorized practice of law, and instead she did her job and staunchly fought for her client (which is unusual for assigned appeals).

Here is the notice of motion to settle the transcript, vacate the conviction and recuse Judge Rose with a supporting affirmation, made on March 5, 2012 and still unresolved.

Which brings me to a question - how can a court that aggressively and vigorously acts as an advocate for the prosecution, for years, through a number of different judges, be a neutral adjudicator on appeal?

*   *   *

I do not usually blog about a pending criminal appeal.

In this case though, I considered it imperative to do that to protect my client's interests since I have a feeling that the assigned judge of the Delaware County Court, the appellate court, seeks ways of how to make the appeal disappear instead of doing his job - because of the embarrassment to so many people, including many judges and one retired judge, that is involved in a reversal that is a must in this case, based on how bad it was handled and how selective the record was, to the prejudice of the criminal defendant.

Judge Thomas J. McAvoy of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York puts public in courtrooms in jeopardy in order to protect a bad judge

On July 24, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York made brave new law by dismissing a federal lawsuit against Judge Kevin M. Dowd of Chenango County Supreme Court on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity.  See Case No. 3:15-cv-000370-TJM-DEP, Dkt. 15.

The lawsuit asserted in no uncertain terms that Dowd's conduct targeted in the lawsuit occurred after Dowd recused from a court case and in retaliation for having to recuse.

Moreover, the means of retaliation - knowingly using an armed Nazi sympathizer on a Jewish pro se indigent litigant to throw him out of "Dowd's" courthouse, once again, AFTER Dowd recused from the case and lost all judicial authority to be there, was not only disgusting, but a clear violation of the civil rights plaintiffs' due process rights.

The concept of judicial immunity, which was "implied" from prior history of immunity in the "old country" where there was no Constitution and where the absolute power (and its abuse) by the King and his servants were the reasons for American independence to begin with, is obviously unconstitutional judge-created self-serving protection to begin with.

Yet, even that concept, as declared by the judiciary, had boundaries - a judge is not protected by absolute judicial immunity for acts in clear absence of all jurisdiction.

What kind of jurisdiction does a judge have AFTER HE RECUSED from a case?

Logically and reasonably - none.

In the opinion of federal senior-status judge Thomas A. McAvoy of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, Dowd was still covered by absolute judicial immunity after he recused from the case for the following reasons:

1) "Defendant's action in ordering a belligerent litigant from a proceeding is certainly conduct arising directly from the litigation".  

       A.  Nowhere in the complaint is there any mention that the litigant was "belligerent".  Making a motion to recuse is not evidence of belligerence as a matter of law - as is any other rights exercised under the guarantee of access to court covered by the 1st Amendment (petitions clause) of the U.S. Constitution which Judge McAvoy was sworn to uphold.

     B.  On a motion to dismiss factual inferences must be made in favor of a non-moving party (the plaintiff), and the judge made an inference of "belligerence", the opposite inference, in favor of the defendant, a brother-judge.

     C.  Judge McAvoy mixes apples and oranges in admitting at the same time to conduct of Defendant "arising directly from litigation", from which Defendant already recused, and that Defendant still made an order pertaining to that litigation - from which, once again, he already recused and lost all authority to make any orders "arising from litigation" due to his recusal.

          In making his astonishing "arising from litigation" stretch of judicial immunity to cover misconduct, specifically, violent Antisemitic conduct, of a judge in retaliation for a motion to recuse AFTER he recused from the case, Judge McAvoy did pay the lip service to the existing case law that provided that the analysis of whether the act of a judge is an act of judicial nature covered by absolute judicial immunity, the court must analyze 

                 "the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, 
                  and to the expectations of the parties, i.e. whether they dealt with the judge 
                  in his judicial capacity", citing to Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir., 2009).

      Throwing tantrums against parties who moved to recuse the judge, after recusal, is not a function "normally performed by a judge".

      A reasonable party does not and should not expect such a tantrum.

      And, after the judge recused from the case, he is no longer, cannot and is not authorized by law to act in any judicial capacity.

       In his analysis, Judge McAvoy skipped all of those points and misapplied the above rule in a way that I can only deem intentional, or due to Judge McAvoy age and necessity for retirement since he no longer can withstand the intellectual rigors his job requires.

       First, Judge McAvoy claimed that Dowd, in ordering removal of a plaintiff, after Dowd recused from the case and while plaintiff did absolutely nothing wrong and was not "belligerent" (there is nothing in the pleadings even suggesting that, so that part is Judge McAvoy's invention of part of the record, which is judicial misconduct in itself), engaged in judicial function.

       Here is what the alleged "judicial function" in ordering a known and armed Nazi sympathizer to throw a pro se indigent Jewish litigant from the courthouse AFTER the judge recused from the case and lost all power of control of the case, as presented by Judge McAvoy:

       "Controlling the behavior of parties at a proceeding at which a judge is presiding
        is certainly a function normally expected of a judge".

     Yes, Judge McAvoy, and the key words are "at which a judge is presiding".  That means, after recusal the judge is no longer "presiding" over court proceedings and cannot do anything in the proceedings or towards participants in the proceedings.

      Further, Judge McAvoy states this:

      "Since conflict with and among litigants occurs with some frequency in courtrooms
       and conferences, a judge also must sometimes order court staff to exercise control 
       over parties and avoid conflicts from escalating.  Such actions are certainly 
       an important and regular judicial function".

      Once again, Judge McAvoy twisted the facts in the complaint, and not in favor of the non-moving party, as he was bound by the law to interpret the pleadings.

      A judge ordering staff to exercise control over parties and "avoid conflicts from escalating" was, first, not a judge any longer in that particular case, but a lay person, was not presiding over any proceedings as a matter of law, and there was no conflict that needed to be prevented from escalating.

      Judge's own temper tantrum due to a motion to recuse that the judge granted cannot be, constitutionally, a legal basis for absolute immunity to be stretched beyond the recusal of the judge.

       Otherwise, whatever the judge does after recusal, no matter how bad, will be covered by judicial immunity.

       Think about it - Judge McAvoy just created a precedent by which Judge Dowd could order the armed Nazi sympathizer/court attendant to shoot down the pro se litigant, as Judge Dowd's way of preventing "a conflict from escalating".

      So, Mr. Shtrauch must be happy that he escaped with his life.

      As to other litigants appearing in courts covered by jurisdiction of the Northern District of New York, they must now be very afraid for their safety when considering to make motions to recuse, because now a judge, even if he recused, will be cloaked by absolute immunity even if he orders the insolent party who dared to request the judge's recusal to be shot dead - as a method of prevention of a conflict with a party from escalating.

       So - one, be very afraid.

       Two - shouldn't Judge McAvoy consider full retirement already?  

        Because, Judge McAvoy's sleep of reasons produced a monster that severely jeopardizes public safety in courtrooms:

    And all of that sleep of reason and mockery of the rule of law that insults any reasonable person's intelligence - for what, Judge McAvoy?  To protect one bad judge, whose behavior is getting more and more bizarre by the day, from inevitable accountability?

   
       

Court attorney Nancy Stroud, her hard work to get into employment by the judiciary, and her pool cleaning problems

In my previous post pertaining to the "In God We Trust" sign in the Schenectady County Family Court I wrote about attorney Nancy Stroud who became a court attorney for Judge Jill Polk of Schenectady County Family Court.

I also posted a picture obtained from Nancy Stroud's Facebook page showing appellate judge Elizabeth Garry attending the celebrations in the Schenectady County Family Court.

I must note, in this separate blog post, as I promised, the hard work that got Nancy Stroud into the good grace with the judiciary to gain employment in the court system.

First of all, Nancy Stroud posted herself as a Facebook friend of a wife of a judge Lisa Gordon, and of the Albany County Family Court judge Susan Kushner.

After I blogged about it, Susan Kushner, according to reports of reliable witnesses, fraudulently denied in court having ever been a Facebook friend of Nancy Stroud and Lisa Gordon, and Nancy Stroud made her friend list private, which brings the question I already asked pertaining to the list of Facebook friends of yet another attorney - Claudette Newman, a judge and a law clerk to a judge, if there is nothing secret or inappropriate in that friend list, why hide it AFTER somebody blogged about it?

What Nancy Stroud did not make private is her expression of joy at her employment with the judicial system that happened after Nancy Stroud put on Facebook her friendship with judge Sue Kushner and wife of a judge/magistrate Lisa Gordon.

Here is that expression:

I am sure that readers can only sympathize attorney Nancy E. Stroud for making such a great sacrifice in order to provide public service to New York litigants - forego hiring a pool service and clean her pool on her own.  The horror!  

In comments to this glamorous picture, Nancy E. Stroud admitted what is not posted on the website of the Schenectady County Family Court, that she is now court attorney for Schenectady County Family Court Judge Jill Polk.

Wife of a judge Lisa Gordon put a "like" on Nancy E. Stroud's appointment.

A friend commented as to how hard Nancy E. Stroud worked to get there:

 Who is "both", is not clear.

But Nancy E. Stroud definitely "worked hard" to get a drastic reduction of her income and get hired as a judge's court attorney - judging by her Facebook friendship with judges and their relatives at the very least, and by the fact that the celebrations in the Schenectady County Family Court were attended by Elizabeth Garry, the first openly gay appellate judge (who prevented the press from commenting on her being gay when she ran for the judicial office), but, once elected and appointed as an appellate judge, is flaunting it.

My question is - does the "hard work" includes motivation of Elizabeth Garry to support Nancy Stroud for this employment involving the alleged drastic cut in income, simply as a political move, of one gay woman to another, which nevertheless gives an appearance to the public as an attempt of insulating Nancy Stroud's judge of possibility of reversals by Garry's appellate court for reasons unrelated to merits of cases?

And, as we know, judges hate and fear reversals, to the point of misrepresenting to the voters the history of their reversals - as the recently "retired" Judge Carl F. Becker of Delaware County Court did during his 2012 election campaign.

Also, glamorously clean pool and all, Nancy Stroud's drastic pay cut is heavily outweighed by the following benefits:

1) locked in salary which will only go up, and for which Nancy Stroud should not really break a sweat, as she had to do in her private practice;

2) full absolute judicial immunity for whatever shenanigans she commits as the law clerk for a judge;

3) a path to her own judgeship, since many judges come from law clerks and flaunt that employment during their judicial campaigns;

4) a good medical and retirement package.

5) and - the salary is not so bad in the court system.  For example, the salary of the law clerk of the same retired Carl Becker (by the way - it is an interesting question where will Lauren Clark be employed on his retirement, will any of the judicial candidates coming to the bench agree to inherit her, with her incompetent writings?) is well over $100,000 - as reported by Seethroughny.net.

Not bad at all - and is definitely enough to hire pool service and not pretend to friends and public on Facebook that Nancy E. Stroud heroically took a pay cut and went to "work for the State" for any reasons other than her own selfish self-advancement.  

The "relaxed" rule of law in upstate New York courts...

A reader asked two questions on Avvo.

Avvo is an attorney rating website where anybody can rate any attorney's performance and/or ask legal questions that willing lawyers registered with Avvo answer, if they can and wish.

So, once again, a reader asked two questions on Avvo pertaining to legality of a judge's actions.

Question # 1

I already raised this question in my blogs pertaining to the case O'Sullivan v Bowie, Delaware County Index No. 2014-911, where the judge accepts motions from a police officer sued in his individual capacity for misconduct (vehicular assault) and where the police officer is not an indigent.

There, not only the fee was waived by the Delaware County Supreme Court (County Clerk Sharon O'Dell, presiding judge John F. Lambert, court attorney Mark Oursler, see my blogs about him and what he is doing /or not doing/ during court conferences here - and it was Mark Oursler who refused to put on record, despite my request, a court conference in a case where attorney Andrew Van Buren, political supporter of Judge Becker, was verbally harassing me, thus preventing me from having evidence of that harassment), but Mark Oursler, reportedly, made it his business to call people in charge of the Delaware County building at 111 Main Street and brokered for a rent-free room so that Derek Bowie's attorney could have a deposition at the building, at the County taxpayer's expense - and that is after the audit by the NYS Comptroller that already pointed out tremendous waste by Delaware County officials. 

 Remember, two of Delaware County officials, County Attorney Porter Kirkwood who ok'd the rent-free depositions, and the District Attorney Richard Northrup who employs Derek Bowie's uncle Jeff Bowie and refuses to prosecute Derek Bowie for vehicular assault and attempted murder of Barbara O'Sullivan ( a critic of judicial misconduct) while instead unlawfully prosecuting Barbara O'Sullivan for a made-up crime where Derek Bowie is an alleged witness, are currently running for two judicial seats in the upcoming Delaware County elections.

This is what attorneys answered on Avvo to the question above - whether a filing fee must be paid before the Order to Show Cause is signed:

So, the law is:  no, the motion filing fee must be paid and the Order to Show Cause must be filed with the County Clerk (instead of being sent directly to the judge's chambers without paying any filing fees), and a judge in a New York court simply cannot sign an Order to Show Cause without such a filing and without a fee, unless (as to the fee only) the litigant asking for such signing is an indigent (which should be separately established).

Of course, Derek Bowie is not an indigent, of course, no application for the Order to Show Cause was filed (because the County Clerk immediately scans all filings, and nothing appeared in the record when the application for the Order to Show Cause to undo the default of Derek Bowie was made), and the filing fee was still waived, the Order to Show Cause was still signed by Judge John F. Lambert, heard without proof that it was properly served, and granted, and a motion to vacate that decision because it was unlawfully made was denied by Judge Lambert, raising questions of applicability of the rule of law in Delaware County (especially to critics of judicial misconduct suing police officers for crimes pertaining to citizen safety), as well as to competence and impartiality of Judge Lambert.

Question # 2

Several answers were posted to this question by NY-licensed attorneys.

The answer by the attorney Terry Horner of Poughkeepsie, NY, floored the reader who reported the answer to me.

Note that all three answering attorneys indicated that what the judge did was wrong.

One of the attorneys stated that such conduct by a judge is grounds for mistrial.

Another stated that an attorney may have no choice but to proceed if the judge wants to disregard the failure to file a note of issue.

Yet another stated that such a failure may happen because cases get "procedurally confused" when "a computer puts" the cases on the trial calendar with the trial Note of Issue filed and served.  So, now computers, not people, put cases on trial calendars - and computers are to blame for procedural violations.

Attorney Terry Horner, though, took the bull by the horns (no pun intended) by stating that "procedure upstate is, shall we say, more relaxed than in Southeastern NY".

That is another way of saying that such violations by upstate New York judges are to be expected, which prompted the reader to make the following comment:

I do not think any attorney in New York can, in good faith, say the "Wild West" comment was not true...

Do we trust in God in a New York State Court?

Here is a picture obtained from the Facebook page of Nancy Stroud, the Facebook friend of Albany County Family Court judge Susan Kushner (see my blog about Nancy Stroud's and Sue Kushner's unethical behavior in appearing in the same case without disclosure of their Facebook friendship, and when Sue Kushner actually denied that FB friendship, even though it was documented).

Apart from other interesting details which I will discuss in a separate blog post, what jumps into view immediately is the huge inscription on the wall of the State Court of the State of New York:  "In God We Trust".

That statement indicates that the judiciary in the State of New York operates by religious laws and not by the secular laws of the United States and the State of New York, nor by the state and federal Constitutions which all judges are sworn to protect and uphold, as a pre-requisite of taking that bench and donning those black robes.

I guess, it does not matter to the New York State Judiciary that promoting a religion in state court is a violation of the 1st Amendment of the litigants and their attorneys.

What if "we" do not trust in a God, in the particular God, or if we trust in Gods, or if "we" are pagans, or witches (wiccans - there is such a religion) - or, God forbid (no pun intended) if "we" are agnostics or atheists?

Then, we do not have a right to be heard in court?

I bet!

I know, for example, that a prosecutor from Delaware County District Attorney's office, John Hubbard, was spreading rumors about me that I am nuts and should not be hired as an attorney because I advocated for two clients who objected to being summoned, under the power of the People of the State of New York (and the threat of criminal contempt of court) to have a court deposition in a church building.

So, remember - when you are going to a State Court in the State of New York, you'd better trust in God - or else.

And, since the picture includes the radiant Judge Elizabeth Garry of the NYS Appellate Division 3rd Department, the rule "In God We Trust" in state courts of the State of New York also applies to appeals.

So, for those of us who do not trust in God - God help us?

I have a better suggestion - just advocate for removal of the "In God We Trust" signs in State Courts of any state.  Presenting those statements at all, and especially above the bench, above the U.S. flag and above the State seal is unconstitutional, unlawful and sends the message to the litigants and attorneys (albeit likely a correct message) that the judiciary in the United States is not governed by the law and is not enforcing the rule of law in the courtrooms, but whatever interpretation of God's (and the judge's own) will that the particular judge wants to impose on the people.

Assigned rotational citizen judges, universal public legal education, revocation of any and all immunities - any takers?

I already wrote on this blog about the necessity to provide public legal education - in view of the obvious "justice gap" that the New York State Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman so likes to refer to in his various speeches year in and year out, and he is not alone in paying lip service to the "justice gap", but does not effectively address reducing it.

When 80% of litigants cannot afford an attorney, the state should at the very least teach them, through public education, how to fend for themselves in court.

I also wrote extensively on this blog about the necessity to repeal and abolish legislatively and/or through state and federal constitutional amendments any and all immunities for public officials to violate the law and state and federal constitutions and deprive people of basic human rights - without any remedies to the victims and any accountability to the perpetrators so cloaked in "immunities".

Many scholars have written so far that immunities are undemocratic and unconstitutional, and that creating them was usurpation of power by federal courts which was not given to those courts by Article III of the U.S. Constitution - and that is the power to legislate or amend legislation.

In fact, the U.S. Constitution must have within its text, clear and simple, a text describing the list of persons and the list of circumstances under which that same U.S. Constitution may be violated.  There is no such clause in the U.S. Constitution, and, therefore, there is no such right to violate it - no matter what the judge-created doctrines of various immunities say.

There is no question that the judicial system throughout the U.S. has become too expensive, too wasteful, as well as corrupt and disfunctional, delivering anything but justice, which is what it is supposed to deliver.

Judicial misconduct is rampant and unaccountable, attorneys whose livelihood depends on judges, are mostly silent,  it comes to the point that there is no assurance that judges on the bench are not high - see my blog about a judge who has lost custody of his child, through a court decision, because of use of cocaine, which did not prevent him getting on the judicial bench, and did not cause him to lose his law license.

Yet, with all of the above said, disputes that need final resolution exist and will continue to exist, and a system, some system that works is needed to resolve them, finally, efficiently, fairly and in compliance with the U.S. Constitution and concepts of equity and fairness.

What should be done?

What kind of system would you create if, hypothetically, none existed, for dispute resolution?

I propose the following structure:

1/ all members of the public receive legal education at the high school level that would allow them to understand court rules and be effective either in representing themselves in court, or as judges presiding over court cases on a rotational basis.

2/ judgeships, whether by appointment or by election, should be abolished, and with such judgeships the structure of corruption and "career paths" through law clerkships to being hired by law firms that rely upon the former law clerk's ties to the judge, will be eliminated, too. 

With eliminated judgeships, attorneys in New York (as an example) will not be able to brown-nose judges no matter what judicial misconduct they commit, be as incompetent as they want, and then, after they did nothing to earn a pension, "run for the bench" and have taxpayers fund their pensions and medical needs while they continue to be as incompetent and corrupt, and even more than before they came to the bench.

3) as the alternative to term or "for life" judgeships I propose to computer-assign citizens, on a rotational basis, to cases in counties where they do not live and without prior warning as to what the case is about.

4) I suggest that an assigned citizen judge handles only cases on one certain day and is not forewarned as to which cases those are going to be, so that he does not make phone calls ahead of time and is not able to do research as to the background of parties.  This arrangement will certainly not eliminate corruption in court proceedings completely, but will dramatically reduce it, especially when every citizen acts as a judge at some point, and thus, it is not just the absolute unchecked and often corrupt power of one person, for years, over the entire county.

5) of course, there should not be any immunities for intentional violation of people's rights established by law, and no right of legal representation in lawsuits based on intentional violation of constitutional rights.

The state will assign taxpayer backed legal counsel in all cases, but judges will be aware that they will have to reimburse the state for legal fees should the jury find they were, indeed, violating people's constitutional rights.  At this time, cases against judges are dismissed before discovery, without even looking whether they, indeed, violated people's constitutional rights - because of the alleged (judge-created) judicial immunity - which, as I stated above, is unconstitutional.

6) Commissions for judicial conduct must operate openly, transparently to the public and should consist of members of the public.  Since there will be no position of elected or appointed judges, there will not be a conflict of interest, as it exists now, where commissions are mostly populated by attorneys whose licenses are in the hands of judges attorneys are supposed to discipline, and by judges who have a vested personal interest not to prosecute other judges and not to create bad precedents that may hurt themselves.
 
This way, judgeships will stop being such an attractive position for people who should not be close to the bench, will stop to breed corruption on the scale it is happening now, will stop being the source of absolute power of the government to oppress its citizens (and do that in a corrupt way, without any accountability) and will be reduced to the function it is supposed to accomplish - conflict resolution.

My proposal, of course, is not ideal, nothing in this life is.  But it is an attempt to reform the completely corrupt judicial system so that it discharges its function instead of being the sought-after sinecure to provide for financial security of otherwise incompetent and corrupt attorneys, to establish absolute tyranny of men (rather than laws) for years and decades in a certain locality, and to drum up business for family and friends of such judges, to the detriment of the public and litigants.

My readers are encouraged to post and send me comments, or to address their legislative representatives with their proposals as to how to reform the broken "justice" system in their state and on the federal level.