I will not allow you to make a motion to recuse without my permission - judicial innovation going backwards

Due process of law requires that a motion addressing the lack of jurisdiction in the court may be made at any time.


In New York, the same applies to motions under Judiciary Law 14.


But not in Judge Kevin Dowd's court.


Judge Kevin Dowd sanctioned me for making a motion (on my own behalf) to vacate my own sanctions because he prohibited to my client (and husband) Mr. Neroni to make motions without judge Dowd's permission.


Yet, if the court lacks jurisdiction, all decisions of the court, including Judge Dowd's decision restricting my access to court - should be void.


But Judge Dowd blocks my own and my husband's access to court to be able to prove it...  It's a chicken-and-egg or a cart-and-a-horse situation...


In law, it is called a "hypothetical jurisdiction", where the court rules on the merits before deciding whether it has jurisdiction, usually for purposes of convenience/expediency.


That's what Judge Dowd did when he ruled that because I made unsuccessful motions in the farcical Mokay case in the past before vindictive Judge Becker and before no less vindictive Judge Dowd who was at that time sued by my husband in a pro se action for, among other things, mental incapacity to preside over my husband's cases, as well as misconduct (and who can be successful when the game is rigged), I may not, without permission of Judge Dowd, make further motions - even if I see clear evidence of disqualification or impropriety in the actions of that same Judge Dowd.


To block a litigant's right to make a motion to recuse and disqualify is something new in jurisprudence - Judge Dowd should congratulate himself on such an "innovation". 


By the way, not that Judge Dowd would care about the U.S. Constitution he took an oath to uphold, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that exercising hypothetical jurisdiction is a violation of litigants' due process of law.


And it is exercising hypothetical jurisdiction where the judge claims that no motions, even no motions challenging jurisdiction of the court, may be filed without his express permission.


Does Judge Dowd understand what a jurisdictional motion is?


Also, it is a really great trick for a judge to allow parties to make a motion to recuse THAT SAME JUDGE only on THAT SAME JUDGE's permission.


Of course, you will have to wait until the hell freezes over for such permission.


But - that is what judicial arrogance allows itself because the judge knows that he can never be sued and, most likely, will never be disciplined, no matter what he does.


And that situation simply has to change.


It is interesting to mention that Judge Dowd, same as Judges Becker and Tormey before Judge Dowd, punished me for "flouting" his order prohibiting something not to me, but to Mr. Neroni. 


I was moving to vacate actually my own sanctions - and Judge Dowd did not prohibit me personally to do that...


Once again my husband's and my own identity were blurred before Judge Dowd's eyes.  When the name "Neroni" is like a red rag, I guess, it does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish.  The story repeats itself...

A case of first impression is a frivolous case

In many courts where I appeared judges are strangely unaware of the text of the U.S. Constitution or what it might mean.


The same I can say about many experienced attorneys.


In fact, some attorneys, when I raised arguments based on my clients' due process rights, openly claimed to the court that the claim is frivolous because I do not quote any case law.


What constitutes due process of law is, admittedly, not spelled out in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.


But, that clause exists, and a similar clause exists in New York State Constitution.


There also exists the Ninth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reserving all rights that are not spelled out in other Amendments, to the people.


Thus, if something is not spelled out, and there are no specific cases on a particular issue, it does not automatically mean that the argument is frivolous.


Yet, to many judges - it is.


Such an approach completely destroys development of constitutional jurisprudence, channels it into the existing grooves, stifles any creativity or development of jurisprudence and legal thought and indicates that what is allowed to legal scholars in law schools, is somehow prohibited to raise in the courtroom, for what reason - nobody knows.


Somebody, at some point, must raise a new idea for the society to develop.


And, most likely, raise it again, and again, and again, until it takes root.


Without new ideas tried out in constitutional jurisprudence in the courtroom, no progress in the field of civil rights is possible.   Maybe, that is what the government, including the courts, wants all along? That is my impression - judging by the fact, how fiercely and blindly courts lash out at any new constitutional ideas.


And I raise, again, and again, and again, the simple idea that constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence and constitutional issues may not be decided by application of the rules of "frivolous conduct" - which are - how the hypothetical "reasonable" person will view a certain issue.


Had attorneys stuck to the "reasonable person for the time and place" standard, women would still be property of men, African Americans would still have been slaves, contraceptives and homosexual relations would still be criminal, etc. etc. etc....


Constitutional jurisprudence is not majoritarian jurisprudence.


Raising constitutional issues may never be frivolous, no matter what courts say who simply want to lighten up their caseloads and intimidate civil rights attorneys against bringing more cases.


The "floodgate of litigation" approach is never a good reason for denying people access to court.


In this case, though, the floodgate approach simply does not work.  All that courts need to do is - instead of creating multiple frivolous doctrines preventing access to court by civil rights litigants - to actually drop the silly immunity doctrines, abstentions and other bars to federal civil rights litigation and decide cases on the merits.


When government officials know that their collective asses may be whipped up in court, and pretty heavily, and that they may afterwards lose their jobs because they become a liability to their employer, they will think twice before committing the same misconduct - and there will be actually less litigation.


The U.S. Supreme Court decided that same sex intercourse may not be criminalized - and there is no litigation on that subject.


The U.S. Supreme Court decided in principle that contraception is legal - and litigation on that subject is on peripheral issues only (right of notification of parents if a minor asks for contraception, the issue of abortion and at what term it can be done), but not on the issue of legitimacy of contraception as a concept.


The same applies to any other constitutional issue to be raised.


But - if issues of first impression are sanctioned as frivolous, as federal courts started a tendency to do now - civil rights litigation with still be happening, still be deflecting the court's resources, but will be going in circles without any major breakthroughs.


Protective measures in civil rights jurisprudence backfire on all of us.

Attention attorneys against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending in the State of New York - a call for a federal class action

When a disciplinary proceeding is filed against you, it is scary.  Many attorneys with whom I confidentially discussed my husband's proceedings, based on the farce of the Mokay case I described in this blog, and about my own disciplinary proceedings, based on retaliative actions of a judge whom I sued, gave me "big eyes" and stated that disciplinary proceedings are so scary they do not want to know anything about them.


Yet, to learn "on the go", when such proceedings already became a reality, is scarier.  And every bit of information as to how to fight these modern day Torquemadas might help.


In the recent decision in my husband's federal pro se civil rights proceeding Neroni v. Coccoma I found a gem of a case that may help attorneys currently involved in a New York State disciplinary proceeding shape their arguments that such proceedings are unconstitutional.


It is amazing what kind of treasure lays around for years (the case is from 1975) and is not given proper regard by attorneys.   Probably, it is exactly because attorneys are so scared of disciplinary proceedings, they are afraid to fight for their rights, and instead try to concede points and plead to something, no matter whether they are guilty or not, in order to preserve the "prize" - the attorney license.


Ok, in 1975, that is 39 years ago (!) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in a case Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of City of New York
515 F.2d 427
C.A.N.Y. 1975 -


gave immunity to attorneys for the prosecuting disciplinary body - Committee for Professional Conduct (COPS) - because - wait - the Committee is an arm of the court.  The pinpoint page for this "pearl of wisdom"  within the case is 433.  The federal court equated COPS being an "arm of the court" with a special master in federal proceedings. 


In fact, a federal master is something entirely different - it is an adjudicator appointed on consent of parties, not a prosecutor pursuing an attorney clearly against his or her consent.  But, when a court wants, in a quick decision, without much bother, attain a needed end, especially when it knows that to get a certiorari review from the U.S. Supreme Court is nearly impossible - the court allows itself to be sloppy.


Now, please tell me, ladies and gentlemen, how can a court where investigators and prosecutors are "part of the court", be considered a true court, instead of a court-advocate?


And how would adjudications of a court blended with prosecutors and investigators and necessarily ruling for them, be deemed constitutionally valid?


Just a thought...


As I said before, it is time for attorneys who are either improperly disciplined or improperly targeted for discipline, to unite in action.


And, based on Anonymous that I cited above, I would suggest not only activities toward a legislative action, but a federal class action.

Emotions as legal terms

In my practice of law I have come across terms that are, in usual life, designations of emotions or moral principles.

It is anybody's guess how emotions or moral concepts wormed their way into the legal terminology, but they are there, and they may affect your rights (as well as mine).

Conscience of the court

Here is the Merriam-Webster definition of what "conscience" is.

It is apparent that "conscience" should not be chosen as a legal term defining people's rights, because it is (1) subjective, (2) vague, (3) non-transparent,  (4) unreviewable by an outsider/appellate authority.

Yet, there exists in the American jurisprudence not one, but two terms involving "conscience of the court".



(a) The "shock the conscience of the court" test

This is the test about which I heard one appellate attorney tell another in the hallway of an appellate court - "but that threshold is impossible to meet!".  And then the attorney cautiously turned around to check out who may have heard the statement and apologetically said "well, of course, I do not mean that the court has no conscience"...

The attorney was right.

That test is (nearly) or, realistically, actually impossible to meet, and for a reason. 

A body of government cannot have a conscience.

A panel of several judges cannot have one uniform conscience.

Rights of people cannot rest on whether a single judge does or does not have a conscience that may be shocked.

There is no uniform test as to what a conscience is, whether a certain individual does or does not have it, and what kind of threshold deeds must or must not shock that elusive conscience.

The "test" was frequently criticized by the scholars, but it is still there...

(b) Searching the conscience of the court

This test is used in by New York state judges deciding a motion to recuse filed against them.

They "search their conscience" and announce to the litigants the results - usually the results are, predictably, that the judge, no matter how biased and bent on revenge he is, will never admit that he is biased and bent on revenge and instead says that he "searched his conscience" and found there "no hard feelings" against you or your attorney.

The beauty of it (for the judge, not for you) - is how would you check whether the judge is telling you the truth?  What is conscience? What are uniform standards for the judicial conscience, if any? That he has a conscience?  That he consulted it?  What the conscience told him?  That what his conscience told him was proper and lawful?  That he has actually followed that conscience?

So - searching the conscience of the court is also an exercise that proves that the courts are not really separated from the church.  It is a rather mystical experience, and one must have blind faith to believe the judge in what he says without having any proof of validity of his/her claims, and no guidelines for application of this test.

Since the test is defining a fundamental constitutional right of litigants, the right to a fair and impartial tribunal, my belief is that litigants are entitled to more than having the object of their motion for recusal alleging misconduct or conflicts of interest, or an appearance of impropriety searching their own conscience.   Announcing that your federal fundamental constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal, as New York judges do, is, in my view, the height of arrogance and disdain to the rule of law and to the oath of office that they took when they donned their black robes.

And, as I stated earlier in my blog, peremptory challenges to judges instead of motions to recuse that more often than not bring sanctions from those "unbiased" judges who "searched their conscience" and found "no hard feelings" against the moving party, are long overdue in New York.

Also long overdue is a legislation expressly prohibiting judges to punish attorneys and parties for making a motion to recuse and/or disqualify and announcing such decisions, if made, void as a matter of law without necessity to move to vacate them, because such efforts, as I am finding out, will be blocked by the courts on any possible and impossible pretexts.

Contempt of court

Contempt is defined by Merriam-Webster dictionary as follows:

It is a feeling of lack of respect or approval.

At law, it is a lack of "proper" respect to the court or a judge which is demonstrated in speech or actions.

Now, what is "proper" and "improper" is a subjective call.

Whether a certain person is or is not entitled to respect, is a subjective call.

Whether the government is entitled to respect - is, on the other hand, a constitutional issue.

In a classic 1st Amendment case an individual was convicted for burning the American flag.

The conviction was overturned because the American flag is also burned to dispose of old flags.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court reasons, what is being punished is the expression, that the flag was burnt in protest against governmental actions - and that is within the core protection of the 1st Amendment.

Well, protest against actions of any branch of the government is within the core protections of the 1st Amendment, and that includes the court.

Thus, the requirement that the court

(1) must be "duly" respected (even though judges self-servingly absolve themselves from suits for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench and retaliate against those who point out their misconduct, which is contemptible conduct not warranting any respect);

(2) that the judge who thinks you are not "properly" respecting him can summarily, as an accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury, punish you criminally if the alleged contempt happened in his presence

should long ago be eliminated out of American jurisprudence.

The government is entitled only to so much respect as it has earned.

In fact, the only thing the government can require from its citizens is for them to abide to the rule of law.

When a judge is violating the law before your very eyes or in a court order, what constitutes the rule of law, becomes fuzzy.

My firm belief that the words "contempt" and "conscience" should be eliminated out of the legal terms of the American jurisprudence and strict constitutional standards must be enacted by the Legislature and enforced as to rights and duties of judges, parties and attorneys in the courtroom - with equal obligations of decorum and deportment.

At this time, a judge can demean and humiliate a party or attorney all he wants, with no recourse, and a party or attorney complaining about it may lose their property, liberty or livelihood.

Isn't that contempt of the rule of law?

Trust/faith/belief in the integrity of the judiciary

Trust is defined by Meriam-Webster dictionary as follows:

The public is expected to trust in the integrity of the judiciary, allegedly so that the rule of law be maintained in the country.

Attorneys are supposed to maintain that trust and not undermine it, at the fear of losing their livelihood.

As far as I could see, the judiciary as a whole makes no efforts to earn that trust and every effort to breach it.  What of self-imposed immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, what of retaliation against whistleblowers of judicial misconduct that not only I, but other attorneys and scholars are concerned about.

A reasonable person cannot trust in the integrity of an individual who uses his power to proclaim himself immune from liability for malicious and corrupt behavior.   Such a person would cause in reasonable people suspicious and contempt, not trust.

To require trust from the public and maintaining that trust from attorneys is an equivalent, in my opinion, of installing the judiciary as a type of deity which can do no wrong and should be worshipped no matter what.

It appears that the American judiciary has significant narcissistic/mania of grandeur issues, and evaluation and treatment is long overdue.





Judge, can you, please, attach an X-ray of your conscience and a transcript of what it told you? After you search it to decide my motion to recuse?

Yet another judge "searched his conscience", found no bias against me or my husband, and sanctioned us for pointing out his misconduct.


The hero this time is Judge Kevin Dowd of Chenango County Supreme Court, assigned, coincidentally, to the Mokay case that I just blogged about before receiving the "gift" of sanctions from the "unbiased" Judge Dowd.


We made a motion to vacate sanctions against us imposed by Judge Becker after we sued Judge Becker two times.


The "unbiased" Judge Dowd denied the motion and sanctioned me and my husband $1,000.00 each for making it.


The setting of the motion is as follows.


1.  On June 27, 2011 my husband and I sued Judge Becker for misconduct.
2.  Judge Becker sanctioned me or my husband us in 4 different cases after we sued him in state court.
3. We sued Judge Becker in federal court for retaliation.
4. Judge Becker imposed sanctions against both of us in two more actions.


All sanctions were imposed close in time to the lawsuits.


The lawsuits against Judge Becker were dismissed on immunity grounds without reaching the merits.
The Appellate Division affirmed sanctions in Mokay without reaching the issue whether the sanctions were the product of retaliation, because what happened in other cases was not part of the record on appeal from the direct case on sanctions.


We made a motion to vacate sanctions to make the pattern of Judge Becker's misconduct part of the record and to make at least one court review them on the merits.


Judge Dowd presides over the case.  Judge Dowd was assigned to the case under the guidance  and monitoring by the previously recused Judge Coccoma.  My husband sued Judge Coccoma's wife.  Judge Coccoma holds in his hands Judge Dowd's post-retirement financial perks.  Judge Dowd is close in age to mandatory retirement.  Judge Dowd recently gave a monetary favor to Judge Coccoma by refusing to sanction Judge Coccoma's wife in a situation where she concealed the death of her client, made a motion without revealing the fact that she has lost her authority as an attorney, obtained an order on that motion and aggressively continued her attempts to bring my husband to a deposition.


Ellen Coccoma revealed the death of her client (and the resulting abatement of the court's jurisdiction, as well as her own authority) only when I threatened to compel her to produce her client at a cross-deposition.  Only then she revealed the fact, but not the date of the death.  Yet, she has claimed to me in March of 2012 that her other clients' standing in the action is based on their father's  "valid power of attorney". At the time of making the claim, Ellen Coccoma knew that the person who has given the "valid power of attorney" was dead since November 6, 2011, and as of the same date his power of attorney was void.


My husband was disbarred for less.


Ellen Coccoma will never be disbarred.


In fact, Ellen Coccoma will never be even sanctioned - because she is married to a judge, and a high-standing one.


Judge Dowd gave Judge Coccoma a financial favor by not sanctioning Judge Coccoma's wife.


Judge Dowd gave Judge Coccoma a further favor by sanctioning the complainants against Judge Coccoma's wife, using court proceedings to cloak himself with immunity for effecting this conspiracy.


Judge Dowd might be surprised to learn that if the conspiracy arose outside of the courtroom, there is a precedent in federal court in Pennsylvania that provided that where a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights in which a judge engaged was outside of court proceedings, the injury inflicted by the judge who is part of the conspiracy in the court proceedings is not immune, H.T. et al., v. Mark A. Ciavarella, Jr., et al, 3:09-cv-00286-ARC, Document 1510, page 22.


Judge Dowd does not find any conflict of interest or grounds for his disqualification from the case, after "searching his conscience", even though Judge Dowd previously recused from a related case, Neroni v. Harlem and his presiding over a related case is equivalent to re-entry a case after recusal, which is prohibited by New York law.


At the time of presiding over the case, Judge Dowd was sued by my husband for misconduct in Neroni v. Coccoma's, recently dismissed by Judge Sharpe, where judge Sharpe cloaked Judge Dowd with immunity even though Judge Dowd failed to properly restore jurisdiction of the court after it abated due to the death of Ellen Coccoma's client.


My client will certainly appeal the decision, especially that now there is a precedent out of Pennsylvania which breached the armor of judicial immunity for out-of-court actions that resulted in in-court injury.


On May 16, 2014 I sued Judge Dowd in his individual capacity in federal court seeking a disclosure from him whether he is or ever was a part of the secret-membership organization The American Inns of Court. 


On June 5, 2014 Judge Dowd  made his decision in the Mokay case sanctioning me and my husband $1,000.00 each for making "frivolous" motions.


My husband alleged in his dismissed lawsuit, based on a transcript in a proceeding, that Judge Dowd might lack mental faculties because Judge Dowd discussed in a custody proceedings, without any relevance to anything, that a law school in a certain town was building a statue in Judge Dowd's honor which was in fact a urinal. 


Of course, Judge Dowd had no hard feelings against my husband and was completely unbiased.  Only - to believe that we need to do a collective lobotomy.


This judge is now presiding over the Mokay case, which was botched up big time already by a parade of judges to the point of becoming a major farce. 


Of course, Judge Dowd "searched his conscience" and did not find any "adverse feelings" against my husband or myself.


The X-ray of Judge Dowd's conscience was not attached to the decision and will not be part of the record on appeal that will, for sure, follow.


Whether Judge Dowd has a conscience, whether he, indeed, searched it, what that conscience advised Judge Dowd, was it a proper and lawful advice, and did Judge Dowd follow it will remain forever unreviewable by the Appellate Division.


Judge Dowd claimed that there is nothing new in what we are asserting on our motion to vacate.


Judge Dowd apparently has a difficulty reading or is simply and arrogantly hoping that the Appellate Division where judges are similarly sued to disclose their involvement with the American Inns of Court, will do anything to punish me and block my access to court anyway.  And maybe he is right.


In fact, my friend told me that an attorney she knows keeps telling her exactly that - that I should stop filing lawsuits against judges, that I should stop blogging about judges, then I might have a chance to survive as an attorney...  Otherwise I will never win in any court.


So much for the faith in the integrity of the judicial system.


Judge Dowd stated that all the issues pertaining to Judge Becker's sanctions were already decided by other courts.


I wonder which other courts Judge Dowd means because I am not aware of any courts who decided on the merits the issue whether Judge Becker's sanctions imposed upon us after we sued him, were a product of unconstitutional retaliation. 


Judge Dowd must be dreaming, same as he dreamt about a law school building urinals in his favor in that other proceeding that my husband mentioned in his federal lawsuit.


One must give Judge Dowd credit for one thing, though.  He knows the system well.  He knows that he, most likely, will remain unpunished for his egregious retaliation, because to punish one judge for retaliation will open a can of worms and set a dangerous precedent.


You know why?  Judicial retaliation is pervasive in New York.


To eradicate it you might behead many out of the judicial corps of New York state.  And the system cannot afford such a loss of reputation.


The system would rather bend the law past the breaking point and sacrifice the messengers of such misconduct.


So - if you want to get from under the pile of judicial retaliation, the "unbiased" judges will oblige and will mount some more of the same, claiming all the way that they "searched their conscience" and remain unbiased.


As the last stroke of his "unbiased" opinion Judge Dowd struck Plaintiff's note of issue because they were not ready for trial (for the second time), and allowed them to re-file the trial note of issue without a filing fee - and without a time limit.  


They will be ready when they will be ready - that is the new rule of Judge Dowd's court.  Of course, when you are trying to get post-retirement perks from a certain judge you want to please and when you are trying to prevent Mr. Neroni from vacating his order of disbarment (which would have happened had Judge Dowd dismissed, as he was supposed to, the proceedings for failure to prosecute, based on newly created law, because proceedings are asserting a non-existing cause of action, and are prosecuted by irreconcilably disqualified attorneys) - anything is handy and possible.


After all, who would do anything to a judge...  Judge Ciavarella had to take millions of dollars in kickbacks for the feds to "notice" his wrongdoing and for the courts to finally catch up with him and disbar him, and he still escaped liability for his shenanigans which were "judicial acts" - unlawful sentencing of juveniles in furthering of conspiracy (see the quote from the decision giving Judge Ciavarella immunity placed as a general runner on top of this blog).


Judge Dowd's misconduct in comparison with what Judge Ciavarella did is child's play - he "only" gives favors to a judge who holds the keys to financial perks after Judge Dowd (soon) retires by retaliating against us.


So, the Mokay farce goes on.  With an "unbiased" judge at the wheel.

Chief Judge Sharpe of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York protects a judge's wife from a lawsuit - at the expense of the applicable law, fairness and justice

I already wrote in this blog how Judge Sharpe created an assigned counsel class for the rich and powerful (while 80% of New Yorkers cannot afford legal representation) when he legitimized representation of attorney Ellen Coccoma, the wife of the Chief Administrative Judge for upstate New York Michael V. Coccoma, by the New York State Attorney General, at taxpayers' expense as to the claims where she was sued for her actions as a private attorney.


Judge Sharpe also helped Ellen Coccoma out by dismissing the lawsuit against her in her official capacity pertaining to her investigation and prosecution of my husband's disciplinary case which was related to the Mokay case from which Ellen Coccoma's husband recused.


Judge Sharpe has ruled that Ellen Coccoma is entitled to a "quasi-judicial immunity" for both her investigative and prosecutorial activities because she acted in her official capacity for the Committee on Professional Conduct (COPS).

In his decision Judge Sharpe cited in a negative fashion a case Neroni v. Zayas, recently brought by my husband and which has survived a motion to dismiss at this time.


Judge Sharpe apparently read Neroni v. Zayas very selectively, because in that case, his own court ruled, on March 31, 2014, that a COPS attorney may be sued for money damages for actions in his investigative capacity, because quasi-judicial immunity does not cover investigative functions of the prosecutor.

Notwithstanding the ruling in Neroni v. Zayas, Judge Sharpe made a contrary finding, that Ellen Coccoma, in her capacity as a member of COPS, a body enforcing attorney discipline, was "the arm of the Appellate Court" and was immune under the  "quasi-judicial" and prosecutorial immunity, even for her actions in investigative capacity.

Yet, in November of 2013 Judge Sharpe's own court remanded my disciplinary case back into the arms of that same court despite the fact that I claimed that same issue, that since the members of COPS are deemed as "the arm of the Appellate Division" and its part, and since the Appellate Division also makes substantive and procedural rules pertaining to attorney discipline, the Appellate Division conflates in itself executive, legislative and adjudicatory function, functions as an administrative body and not a court, and thus attorneys in New York are denied any judicial review before their licenses are suspended or revoked.


Does Judge Sharpe read what his court produces?


Does Judge Sharpe try to coordinate and harmonize what his court produces?


It is also interesting to mention that prosecutorial immunity was awarded by the U.S. Supreme Court to prosecutors on the premise that they are amenable to discipline and to criminal prosecutions and thus public is not without a remedy.

When the New York State Attorney General represents COPS, and COPS refuse to prosecute disciplinary violations of NYS AG and his assistant attorneys, as they did when I complained about certain misconduct of certain Assistant AGs, the chances of NYS AG prosecuting COPS are non-existent.


When COPS reject all disciplinary complaints against its own attorneys and complain to the Appellate Division about complaints filed with them against their own attorneys, as they did when I turned all attorneys and attorney members of COPS in for fraud upon the court for claiming that I did not appear at a deposition in 2008 to represent my alleged clients when I was not even an attorney, the chances of prosecution of COPS attorneys for disciplinary violations are non-existent.

Then, why does immunity still cover COPS?  If the rationale and justification for granting absolute prosecutorial immunity disappeared, the immunity must disappear, too.  That is logical and fair, otherwise the society and the victims of such attorneys' wrongdoing society will get no remedy at all, which is definitely contrary to public interests.



The rule of the state of New York - and now federal courts - is enforced again, and again, and again.



If you are a member of the family of a judge, or you are yourself a retired judge, or you are employed with the government, courts will bend over backwards to rescue you and punish the person who is trying to get a remedy for your wrongdoing.


All that Mr. Neroni wanted is to show that Ellen Coccoma deprived him of his due process right to an impartial prosecutor and investigator by deriving a monetary gain from the fruits of her disciplinary investigation and prosecution and to obtain a remedy for that.


What Ellen Coccoma did is well documented. 
Judge Sharpe would not even look at the merits of the case.


Judge Sharpe did not even look at the applicable law which does not allow to cloak a prosecutor with absolute immunity for investigative acts.


Judge Sharpe instead ruled for Ellen Coccoma and allowed Ellen Coccoma to apply for attorney's fees against her own victim.

What can I say...


Wives of judges rock!  Especially in Judge Sharpe's courtroom.

Chief Judge Sharpe of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York dismisses a civil rights case without reaching the merits - but with a lot of disrespect to the plaintiff

I continue to analyze the amazing decision of Judge Gary L. Sharpe dismissing my husband's civil rights lawsuits, made 3 weeks after I sued Gary L. Sharpe in his individual capacity.

Here are a couple more of amazing snippets from the decision.

This is how the lawsuit - and the decision - are introduced by Judge Sharpe.  In the "background" section Judge Sharpe does several diametrically opposite and mutually exclusive things.

(1) In footnote 3 Judge Sharpe states that "the facts are drawn from Neroni's complaint and presented in the light most favorable to him".

(2) Then, Judge Sharpe characterizes those facts, allegedly in the "most favorable light", yet, using the following derogatory language:

• "yet another chapter in a barrage of lawsuits filed by Neroni, a disbarred and disgruntled former attorney";
• "his lengthy and disjointed complaint";
• "names as defendants a host of judges, court officials, private attorneys, and private law firms";
• "weaves a tangled web of judicial corruption, political favoritism, and professional improprieties, resulting in a range of - barely decipherable - constitutional transgressions"

This spectacular paragraph deserves special attention and analysis, for the benefit of the public who does not know what is happening behind the doors of civil rights litigation, as well as for the benefit of attorneys and future litigants who are going to face (1) Judge Sharpe,  (2) civil rights litigation in federal court in general.

First of all, if the above language is presenting Mr. Neroni's complaints in "the most favorable light", I won't dare to ask what would be presenting Mr. Neroni's facts in an unfavorable light. 

It appears that Judge Sharpe pays lip service to the law requiring review of plaintiff's facts on a motion to dismiss in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but his attitude and the language of presentation of those facts speak louder than his declaration of intention.

Yet another chapter in a barrage of lawsuits by a disbarred and disgruntled attorney

To me, as a professional linguist with a Masters degree in teaching the English language, this phrase tells a story of bias and derogatory attitude to Mr. Neroni.

The inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the language in the phrase are that (1) Mr. Neroni was rightfully disbarred;  (2) is upset about losing his disciplinary proceedings and (3) is lashing out at anybody in sight because of his disbarment. 

How correct and proper Mr. Neroni's disbarment was, and whether Mr. Neroni is legitimately upset about how it was brought about, you can judge after reading this material.

Moreover, since Mr. Neroni's disbarment is mentioned, it appears that the language (1) must bear some relevance to all lawsuits referenced by Judge Sharpe in his footnote to the "Background" section and (2) that all those lawsuits were dismissed on the merits, so the court has a right to make credibility disrespectful credibility determinations about the "barrage" of lawsuits and "indecipherable" tales of "a tangled web of juridical corruption" etc.'

In his footnote 3 to the "Background" section  Judge Sharpe references four lawsuits brought by Mr. Neroni as a "disbarred and disgruntled former attorney":

1. Neroni v Zayas - the implication is that the case was improperly filed and dismissed - yet, the case proceeds on the merits, and the partial dismissal was without reaching the merits and is on appeal;
2. Neroni v. Grannis - is about Mr. Neroni digging a pond in 2001, 10 years before his disbarment, on his property in the town of Hamden, about New York State Department of Environmental Conservation not having a readable map that could give Mr. Neroni notice he could not dig a pond where he did dig a pond (see map below which is a map of Walton area that DEC presented to me only after the decision on liability against Mr. Neroni, and without my participation as a co-owner, was made, and where no reasonable person can find or tie any address, which DEC actually admitted on record);
3. Bracci v. Becker is a case about sanctions imposed upon Mr. Neroni by a disgruntled judge, Judge Carl F. Becker of Delaware County Supreme Court, in retaliation for Mr. Neroni's lawsuit against Judge Becker for misconduct.  Bracci v. Becker covered Judge Becker's sanctions in Neroni v. Grannis.  Bracci v. Becker was dismissed without reaching the merits, and the 2nd Circuit affirmed the dismissal after I sued the judges of the Northern District of New York Court and while providing a sloppy and meaningless second rate review of four pro se appeals in that case;
4. Neroni v. Becker - Mr. Neroni sought a declaratory judgment that when the New York State Court of Appeals allowed damages for "attempted fraud upon the court", after the partial summary judgment on liability was granted against Mr. Neroni and before the appeal from that summary judgment was heard, the New York State Court of Appeals "changed horses" on Mr. Neroni mid-stream, abolished the civil part of the Judiciary Law 487 under which liability of Mr. Neroni was found and upon which disbarment without a hearing was based before the underlying case was finally resolved (it is not resolved until now)

The Mokay case, which is still pending and due to which Mr. Neroni lost his license without a hearing after 37 years of practice is a separate saga.   

I am preparing a separate book, based on documentary evidence, as to how every applicable law in the Mokay case was bent or broken in order to decide for the plaintiffs' conflicted attorneys and to deliver to them money damages out of my husband's pockets. 

The plaintiffs' attorneys in the Mokay case were from the beginning the retired judge Robert Harlem (deceased since 2012) and his son Richard Harlem (alive and still on the case).

Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem were caught for misconduct in, "coincidentally", an Estate matter in 2000.

Robert Harlem practiced law and drafted a will while being a sitting Supreme Court justice, in violation of the New York State Constitution, and involved in the signing of the will and additions to the will his law clerk, his confidential secretary (later his wife) and his son Richard Harlem.

Then, Richard Harlem submitted the will to the Surrogate's Court with a backer showing his name and not his father's name, which the New York State Attorney General saw as a sign to conceal from the court the fact that the will was illegally drafted by a sitting Supreme Court justice.

Robert Harlem then quickly retired from the bench before his term was up in anticipation of the bounty from the will where he bequeathed to himself several thousand shares of stock of the IMB Corporation, designated himself as the 3rd Executor charging fees to the Estate and bequeathed the residue of the 9 mln dollar estate to the trust where he was a salaried trustee.

Such self-dealing was a no-no for an attorney even if Robert Harlem had a right to practice law, but, at the time he drafted the will and codicils/additions to the will, he was a sitting Supreme Court justice and was absolutely prohibited by the New York State Constitution to practice law.

Robert Harlem, according to the New York State Attorney General's office, resisted disclosure that he was the author of the will and codicils for a year.

Then, Robert Harlem claimed that even though he drafted the will and codicils, there was nothing wrong in doing so, even though he did that while being a sitting judge, because the decedent was his friend.

The NYS AG turned Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem into the Professional Conduct Committee for their shenanigans.  The case that obviously warranted disbarment of both attorneys, died there.

Then, Mr. Neroni turned attorneys Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem into the Professional Conduct Committee in 2006 due to their outrageously conflicted representation in the Mokay case where they represented party plaintiffs and a de facto party defendant which the NYS Appellate Division 3rd Department acknowledged.

 I turned Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem in 2011 when I discovered not only the full record of the Blanding case from the Otsego County Supreme Court, but also that Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem concealed from the Supreme Court what was going on in the Delaware County Surrogate's Court which was contrary to their claims in the Supreme Court.

Since the member of the Committee John Casey appeared to use the Committee for picking influential clients or members of his firm, the Harlems were saved, John Casey's law firm, instead of disbarring them for their shenanigans in the Estate of Blanding (Otsego County), embraced them as paying clients, and instead the complainants against them, Mr. Neroni and I, were prosecuted, and Mr. Neroni was disbarred.
 

It is apparent that courts refuse to apply the applicable laws which favor Mr. Neroni and instead invent laws that disfavors Mr. Neroni and favors his politically connected opponents.

Therefore, Mr. Neroni, an attorney who has faithfully provided zealous representation to public in an under-served poor area, and practically had for years an ongoing free legal clinic in his home where anybody could come or call for legal advice at any time of day and night, has every right to be upset, and "the web of judicial corruption" is a reality in New York courtrooms.

While obviously mocking Mr. Neroni's attempt to untangle the truly existing web of judicial corruption in New York courtrooms, while at the same time  hypocritically claiming that he reviewed Mr. Neroni's facts in the "light most favorable" to Mr. Neroni, Judge Sharpe did not reach the merits of Mr. Neroni's case, and thus has no right to make credibility determinations, because that is the function of a factfinder, and Mr. Neroni asked at the outset of the litigation for a jury trial.   

Judge Sharpe has two options - dismiss without reaching the merits, but then not reach the merits of the case he so dismissed for any reasons or purposes, or allow the case to proceed to discovery and trial and let the jury to decide issues of merits, as Mr. Neroni demanded and has a right to.

Judge Sharpe chose the third, unlawful way, he both dismissed the case without reaching the merits and made disparaging remarks about credibility of Mr. Neroni or substantive validity of his claims.

So much for the rule of law in Judge Sharpe's understanding.