"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

Judicial accountability in Nevada - beating the dead horse

Same as in Pennsylvania in Kids for Cash scandal, same as in New York, in the state of Nevada judicial disciplinary authorities take their heads out of the secret place where those heads are, and do their jobs only when a judge is convicted of a federal crime.

Judge Stephen Jones resigned and was convicted of federal investment fraud - for a scheme defrauding 50 investors and using his name as a judge in an assurance that their investment is safe.

That is the same judge who had "a romantic relationship" with a female prosecutor while she handled cases in front of the judge.

For the prosecutor, the act of handling cases in front of the judge while having an affair with him was not bad enough, but the exposure was, so that she committed a suicide.

Once again, the judge had to be:

1) convicted of a federal federal;
2) resign from the bench, but not before he reportedly collected his $200,000 salary for months despite being suspended for misconduct; and
3)  disbarred

before the judicial disciplinary authorities also decided to NOW "take him off the bench" - a purely symbolic gesture, because to get back to that bench he now has to get a presidential pardon and restore a law license, both events extremely unlikely.

Shouldn't the order of events be different?

Shouldn't Judge Jones be:

1) first taken off the bench;
2) then disbarred; and
3) then convicted of a federal crime?

After all, the burden of proof to take off the bench and disbar is lower than to convict of a crime - and there was plenty of evidence to do that.

So much for judicial accountability.

Holding out and not disciplining the judge until the discipline is ridiculously redundant.


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