"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.

Wednesday, March 4, 2015

Access to court in a civil rights case for Tatiana Neroni? No issues coming from her can be deemed meritorious

In May of 2014 I have filed a civil rights case Neroni v. Peebles in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.

The case raised multiple issues of public concern and listed multiple public officials (including judges) and multiple politically connected attorneys as defendants.

The case was dismissed before it was even SERVED, by a judge whose recent law clerk (as I learnt later on) was accepted for employment by the law firm of one of the defendants.

I appealed that "sua sponte" dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit.

The 2nd Circuit first tried to force me to get admitted to the 2nd Circuit bar while doing a pro se appeal.

I refused.

The 2nd Circuit forcibly "admitted" me to its bar anyway.

Then, the 2nd Circuit engaged in a game of treating defendants in the court below (where the case was dismissed before the action was served and before those defendants appeared in the action and became parties) as proper parties to the appeal.

The 2nd Circuit bent over backwards to call those non-parties "Appellees, invite them to appear in the action, and make me serve papers on them.

The NYS Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney General refused to appear in the appeal, practically supporting my argument to the court, with legal authorities, and stating that since their clients were never served before the court below dismissed the case, they are not parties to the appeal.

The court ordered me to make a separate motion to strike the Appellees.

I did.

Today I received a notification that my motion to strike Appellees as parties was denied.

I got curious as to why that happened, even though the 2nd Circuit's own case law provides that defendants who did not appear in the court below before the case was dismissed (as it happened in my case), are not proper parties in an appeal from such a dismissal.

I logged into and retrieved the following order that the court did not consider necessary to notify me of:

First of all, I must note that, unlike all other civil rights cases where my husband or I were involved with the 2nd Circuit, this is the first time when the "troika court" that made a decision on the appeal did not consist of senior-status judges, and I wonder whether the dismissal was actually a knee-jerk reaction of the judges to my blog here describing there court as the court consisting of people too old to handle the rigorous regiment of constitutional appeals.  

Yet, the senior status judges who are usually assigned to the fast-and-sloppy track deciding constitutional appeals (or, rather, rubber-stamping dismissals of such appeals), at least pretended that they had reviewed the case.

These "active-status" three judges did not even pretend that they reviewed the appeal, because the Appellant's Brief was never filed, nor was I allowed to even set a deadline to file it.

The court dismissed the constitutional civil rights appeal from a case raising issues of denial of access to court, court bias and issues of misconduct of judicial officers and court personnel OUTSIDE of court proceedings and thus not subject to any judicial immunity, without even wanting to see what I MIGHT say in the Appellant's brief - before such Appellant's brief was even filed.

So, when you, ladies and gentlemen, file a constitutional appeal with the 2nd Circuit, you have two options - either a "troika-court" of three senior status judges who pretended to read the case, but rubber stamp a denial of the appeal in a summary "non-precedential decision", or you get an active-duty "troika court" dismissing the appeal without even having an opportunity to review it.

And that is happening while a civil rights litigant has a right to FULL appellate review DE NOVO of all legal issues raised in the lower court.

I guess, the 2nd Circuit is afraid of my ability in raising those legal issues that they dismissed the appeal without allowing me to file an Appellant's brief?

By the way, in that same blog where I provided a table of ages of the judges of the 2nd Circuit, I suggested that instead of appointing 2nd Circuit judges for life, people should change this status quo by introducing to elect federal judges.  That would have been a shock to the system of the 2nd Circuit judges who have become too comfortable in their jobs and allow themselves to do whatever their whims tell them, and not what the law requires them to do. 

I am not at all surprised that the retaliation came, and that the retaliation came, "accidentally", the very next day after I did not appear in the fabricated criminal proceeding in my disciplinary action where my disciplinary prosecutor asked the court to put me in jail for 30 days for violating my own privacy.  

I wonder what the 4th Department's ruling on the criminal proceeding will be, as I obviously was not curious enough to appear there and verify it in person.

As to this decision by the 2nd Circuit "troika court" in Neroni v. Peebles (that I published in this blog above), I will certainly publish the entire "non-meritorious" Neroni v Peebles lawsuit, with exhibits and all, on Facebook, by the end of this week.  

When I publish it, the public will be the judge as to whether there are "no arguably meritorious issues" for discussion, or whether the 2nd Circuit and every one of its judges had an institutional interest to hide these issues as far as possible and prevent any review of issues raised in my lawsuit.

It's funny that what I raise in lawsuits is, first, declared as having no merit, and about 2 years down the road, I hear the same ideas from the speech of some high-and-mighty government official as his own novel and progressive ideas.

While such "noble" tricks makes one puke, the point is that I want the public to know what KIND of ideas our glorious federal courts and judges, sworn to protect the U.S. Constitution and citizens of the U.S. of America from violations of that Constitution, consider so lacking in merit that they dismiss an appeal BEFORE THE APPELLANT'S BRIEF WAS FILED, and without even setting the deadline for filing such a brief.

And that is, after the court below also dismissed the case before it was even served.

And that was after the 3rd Department and its Professional Conduct Committee engaged in an ex parte communication and left my disciplinary case when Neroni v. Peebles was filed and when the requests to waive service were sent out to defendants.

Something is fishy in the state of New York.   Read Neroni v. Peebles and find out what exactly is so fishy and so sensitive that two courts refused me access to the courts with those issues.

As to what I am going to do next with Neroni v. Peebles, I will notify the public through this blog when any next steps will be made.

Please, give me until the end of this week to publish Neroni v. Peebles on Facebook.

I will provide a link to the lawsuit here or will make a short new blog notifying of the update.

Stay tuned.

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