It does not matter which one of the Neronis to punish - part next

I wrote in several previous blogs that New York state courts, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, being busy courts, do not distinguish between my husband and myself when punishing either one of us for actions of the other.

Gary L. Sharpe of the NDNY punished my husband for my conduct in lawful actions unrelated to my husband, and for actions of my friend in her pro se proceedings unrelated to both of us.

Gary L. Sharpe of NDNY punished me for actions of my husband unrelated to me.

Carl F. Becker of Delaware County Supreme Court punished me for actions of my husband that led to his disbarment (before I was admitted to the bar) and for my husband's motion to recuse in an environmental administrative proceedings where I was not allowed to participate as a party, before I became an attorney.

The 2nd Department heaped it all together and claimed I am a party in my husband's pro se actions where he was the only party.

The 3rd Department joined my already disbarred husband as a party to my disciplinary proceedings in 2014 in its order of transfer to the 4th Department.

The 4th Department suspended me from the practice of law for actions of my husband at the time I was not admitted to the bar in 2008, even after its Committee withdrew the charge.

On March 3, 2016, in Neroni v Follender, the Appellate Division 3rd Department, against whom my husband just filed a motion for sanctions for frivolous conduct in the U.S. District of New York, retaliated against me by stating, on page 2 of the decision, "[t]he action culminated in a default judgment against plaintiff's [that is me] clients and an award of sanctions for frivolous conduct against plaintiff; both determinations were affirmed by this court".

That statement was an intricate combination of truth and lies.

The action that culminated in a default judgment was against my husband's clients, I was not an attorney at the time the motion for that default judgment as made and did not represent those people at that time. The 3rd Department knew about it, but still piled it all up into one heap, whether it was about my husband or myself, does not matter.

I was an attorney for those people only on motions to vacate the default judgment and on appeals from denials of such motions.

The 3rd Department did not - and could not - affirm the judgment of default, such judgments are not appealable.  The 3rd Department dismissed that appeal specifically on those reasons, which means that the judgment of default was not affirmed on appeal.

The sanctions imposed upon me for making motions to vacate were imposed for allegedly delaying satisfaction of money judgment, which the 3rd Department affirmed in 2012.

The "delaying" was the motion to compel attorney Jonathan Follender to do what statutory law required him to do in the first place - make the record of a case where he obtained a default judgment complete by, if not filing the transcript of deposition of an expert that he did not properly notice to Mr. Neroni as the attorney on the case, then at least to disclose the identity of the testifying expert and the court stenographer, so that I would be able to obtain that transcript myself.

The motion was denied, so the default judgment based on incomplete record in the underlying case is not valid until now, but I stand punished multiple times, and my law license suspended, for trying to make the record of a court case complete, as required by statutory law, where attorney Jonathan Follender continues to conceal the identity of the expert and of the stenographer who took the deposition that Mr. Follender never filed with the court, but instead obtained a default judgment without a full record.

The sanctions in Neroni v Follender were imposed upon me for suing people who first said I caused the delay in satisfaction of money judgment and then said that I caused premature satisfaction of that same judgment, asking for more sanctions.

The defendants asked for sanctions for suing them.  Sanctions were granted and affirmed by the 3rd Department on appeal.  So, I was sanctioned, and lost my law license, for delaying satisfaction of a money judgment and for causing that satisfaction too soon.

It appears that in New York, sanctions for frivolous conduct depend entirely upon the identity of those against whom the sanctions are requested.

If that is a judge or a relative of a judge, or a connected attorney, courts will bend over backwards to invent ways not to sanction.

If it is an attorney they want punished, financially bled and gone, they will bend over backwards to ignore evidence that attorney's claims are legitimate and will sanction the attorney anyway.

And especially if people to be sanctioned are Frederick Neroni or Tatiana Neroni.  We have laws personally carved out against us in the State of New York.

Judiciary Law 487 gutted and evidence put on its head for the benefit of a private attorney who is also a judge

I wrote about a case that I brought against a local attorney Jonathan Follender (who is also a judge of a justice court in the County of Ulster, and thus is fiercely protected by the court system no matter what he does wrong), and about his shenanigans that were never sanctioned as frivolous conduct (the theories of "frivolous default", "death of a corporation" /in a motion for substitution nunc pro tunc/, "loss of companionship of a dog" /a non-existent cause of action in New York/).

I received a decision affirming dismissal of my lawsuit against Follender for defamation and fraud upon the court, affirming also sanctions and attorney fees - $10,000 - imposed by Judge Tormey who Follender asked to punish me because I sued Tormey in federal court (on behalf of myself and 3 clients) and because I generally sue judges, and Tormey obliged Follender.

Of course, I was not the only one woman who sued Tormey for misconduct, and Tormey was sued before me by a female attorney, court employee, a lawsuit that lasted 4.5 years and resulted in a $600,000 settlement out of taxpayers' pockets and not Tormey's, even though his misconduct had nothing to do with his duties as a judge, and after I sued him, by a court interpreter.  

I note that the Appellate Division 3rd Department affirmed the appeal right after my husband filed a motion to sanction the Chief Judge of that court for frivolous conduct in a federal court that I published in full here.  

In his Respondent's brief Follender repeated the maneuver meant to inflame the court that worked with Tormey by asking the 3rd Department to affirm the appeal because I sued the 3rd Department - as an attorney, on behalf of a client, Mr. Neroni.  And it worked again.

I also wrote on this blog that courts do not distinguish which of the hated Neronis it is in front of them - and sanction my husband for my actions as an attorney and vice versa.

I was punished for my husband's motion to recuse in environmental administrative proceedings, and that sanction was used to suspend my law license.

The first (and most important charge) in my disciplinary proceedings that resulted in suspension of my license (withdrawn by the disciplinary committee in January of 2015, but it is not reflected in the order of suspension) was for my non-appearance in a deposition and non-reaction to a motion for a default judgment in 2008 when I was not admitted to the bar and could not be the individuals' attorney.  In fact, my husband was those people's attorney, he appeared at the deposition, and he did not have to oppose the motion that was never properly served upon him, but all of that did not matter to any court.

Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit indicated that both my husband and I were parties in all lawsuits that Mr. Neroni brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.  That was not true, my husband brought two lawsuits pro se, but that did not really matter for the 2nd Circuit - if my husband's name was on those lawsuits, the court had to attach my name to it anyway.

By the way, the 2nd Circuit attached me to my husband's two pro se lawsuits without my last name - "Mr. Neroni and his wife Tatiana".  Apparently, I am just an appendage to my husband without any last name.

I wonder if the court could say the same talking about people like, let's say, "Dennis Blazer and his wife Janet" (DiFiore, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals).

I thought that women have a separate identity from their husbands, and are entitled to a last name when identified in court papers.  The 2nd Circuit differs and treats me as a minor not entitled to a last name.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York punished my husband for my litigation in a criminal case (that is not subject to sanctions), after my husband was not a licensed attorney, and thus had nothing to do with that criminal case.

All of the above said, when punishing us, judges lose the sense of reality and forget that certain things they do have a precedential effect, and that when punishing one of the Neronis, they can help another.

Affirming the dismissal of Neroni v Follender was exactly such a thing, while it hurt me, it helped my husband's case in his upcoming appeal in Mokay v Mokay, because the 3rd Department, in its rage against me gutted Judiciary Law 487, the fraud upon the court statute used against my husband.

This is how the Appellate Division 3rd Department did it.

I sued Jonathan Follender under two parallel legal theories:

1) defamation;

2) Judiciary Law 487 (fraud upon the court).

My theory was that Follender made his false statements to the court, but after the court lost its subject matter jurisdiction (in a homestead sale proceeding after the underlying money judgment was satisfied) - therefore, no matter which path the court takes, one of the theories applies.

If the court lost jurisdiction by the time of the false statements, defamation applies, but Judiciary Law 487 does not.

If the court had jurisdiction by the time of the false statements, defamation is protected by litigation privilege, but Judiciary Law 487, with its longer statute of limitations, 6 years, still applies.

Follender claimed in those proceedings that I represented Respondents (I did not) and that I allegedly frivolously caused - gasp! - premature satisfaction of a money judgment before Follender could sell the people's home - as well as that I frivolously defaulted by not appearing in the court proceedings, where, again I was never retained as an attorney.

The false statements were reflected in court papers very clearly, in several transcripts that I presented to the court.

I must also state here that Judge Tormey applied absolute judicial immunity to private attorney Jonathan Follender, which created a jurisdictional bar for all claims, including a claim of Judiciary Law 487, thus gutting Judiciary Law 487 and destroying that statute completely.

I was eagerly awaiting how the 3rd Department will deal with this situation on Judiciary Law 487.

Apparently, the 3rd Department was so busy in its rage to punish me that it did not notice that its decision was a conceptual disaster.

Here is the great decision of the 3rd Department.  

First, the caption reflects that it took the panel of 5 judges less a mere month-and-a-half to render a decision on an extremely complex case with a very large record.

Nowhere in the text of the case will you find a clear and distinct statement that there were two separate and distinct court cases that my lawsuit dealt with, one where I was an attorney of record (on motions to vacate a judgment of default) and another where I wasn't an attorney of record (homestead sale petition).

Nowhere in the text of the case will you find a legal analysis whether I was an attorney of record in the homestead case of not, which was a central issue in determination of the issues on the appeal.

Nowhere in the text of the case will you find a jurisdictional analysis of the homestead case verifying whether the court had jurisdiction over the case when Follender was making his statements, and that made a difference whether the "litigation privilege" to the defamation claims applied or not.

Without such jurisdictional analysis (which was a must, because argument was asserted in the court below and on appeal, based on irrefutable court records, that the underlying money judgment was satisfied before the homestead petition came to be heard, and thus the court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear that petition from the first appearance date), the court made the following statement:

So, the court made a determination that a defamation claim that was not barred by the 1-year statute of limitations, was made in the course of a "prior court proceeding", and that was in 2013.

The money judgement was satisfied in 2011, so the "court proceeding" that was not covered in 2014 by a one-year statute of limitations for defamation could only be the homestead proceeding where appearances (without my participation, since I was not an attorney of record and asserted it every time there was an attempted to yank me into those proceedings) continued until 2013, even though jurisdiction was lost in 2011.

Of course, the 3rd Department did not take it upon itself to specify which of the two "prior court proceedings" that were subject of Neroni v Follender were meant, but the dates make it clear.

Also, the 3rd Department affirmed dismissal of defamatory statements other than one dismissed on "absolute privilege", on the 1-year statute of limitations.

Great job.

Yet, conceptual problems then loom.

How much more specific can one get when one, with transcripts, not simply alleges (as required for the pre-answer pleading stage), but proves beyond ANY doubt that the following false and defamatory statements were made to a court by an attorney:

1) that I was attorney of record in a case where I wasn't;

2) that I abandoned my clients by non-appearance;

3) that I caused a frivolous premature satisfaction of a money judgment that prevented Follender from selling the people's home - which, apparently, was wrong for me to do, even though I didn't have a hand in satisfaction of that money judgment, and even if I did, there is nothing wrong about it;

By the way, my law license was suspended (and the 3rd Department that recused from that case, relied on the suspension by the 4th Department affirming Neroni v Follender) based on sanctions of Judge Becker for allegedly delaying satisfaction of the money judgment.

Go figure - 

Becker sanctioned me $1,250, on request of Follender, 

for delaying satisfaction of the money judgment, 

then, immediately after the judgment was satisfied, Follender asked Becker to sanction me, in a homestead petition proceeding that already lost jurisdiction because the money judgment was satisfied by one of my two prior clients that had nothing to do with me, for "causing a premature satisfaction" of that same money judgment;

then, Follender continued to run his mouth to Judge Becker and then to Judge Dowd, in proceedings that lost jurisdiction before it started, that I must be sanctioned for "abandoning my clients", "causing a frivolous default" (whatever it is), even though I never appeared in that action and never had to, since I was never retained for that separate proceeding with a separate index number, where - once again - jurisdiction died because of satisfaction of the money judgment before the very first hearing.

Then, when I lost patience and sued Follender for defamation and fraud upon the court, I was punished by Tormey for suing Follender (also a judge) and for suing Tormey himself in federal court (on request of Follender), and then the 3rd Department affirmed the sanctions because Follender asked the 3rd Department to punish me because I sued the 3rd Department.

Makes a lot of sense.

But, can it be more specific than proving, at the pleading stage, with court records, that an attorney made false statements to the court that I was an attorney of record in a case where I wasn't, that I am responsible for "frivolous behavior" of (1) delaying satisfaction of a money judgment and (2) causing the satisfaction of the money judgment too soon, right after I was sanctioned for delaying satisfaction of that same money judgment, and that (3) I abandoned individuals who never retained my services in the homestead petition by not appearing in that proceeding, and not frivolously causing a default and loss of jurisdiction (!) by the court - Follender stated that, too, to Judge Becker!

To say that what Follender claimed in various cases was, if all combined, crazy, is an understatement of the century - yet, each court buys it because whatever crazy stuff comes out of Follender's mouth is necessary to punish me, and New York courts can punish me for my last name and nothing else.

So, whenever I am concerned, the 3rd Department rejects irrefutable proof through transcripts and affirms sanctions for pleading with lack of specificity - thus creating a separate pleading standard, and a bill of attainder, for me alone.

I am honored.

Yet, when the 3rd Department made an interesting misstep that can constitute gutting of the entire Judiciary Law 487, and created a precedent for all attorneys sued in the 3rd Department under Judiciary Law 487.

Tormey gave Follender, a private attorney, an absolute judicial immunity for false claims made to the court.  That immunity is a jurisdictional bar that destroyed the statute, Judiciary Law 487, and made it unenforceable.

The 3rd Department affirmed that determination, while versing it an "absolute privilege".  The 3rd Department did not say what kind of privilege it is, and, since the 3rd Department did not indicate that Tormey's grant of absolute judicial immunity was wrong and affirmed Tormey's decision in its entirety, it affirmed absolute judicial immunity for private attorneys sued under Judiciary Law 487.

Thank you, the 3rd Department.

Now you will have to apply that same determination you've just made in Neroni v Follender to my husband's case in Mokay v Mokay, give my husband that same absolute judicial immunity you just gave Follender and dismiss that case for lack of jurisdiction.

I would also like to point out that the 3rd Department says nothing about the 6-year statute of limitations for fraud upon the court, when the 3rd Department is talking about a 1-year statute of limitations for defamation claims and applying an "absolute privilege" to false statements of an attorney made to the court.

I just wanted to stress once again what occurred.

The 3rd Department claimed that defamatory false statement made by an attorney to a court (which was without jurisdiction at the time of the claims) are "absolutely privileged" and cannot be reached either by defamation claims or by Judiciary Law 487 claims.

Thus, Judiciary Law 487 claims was reduced to nothing by the 3rd Department.

I bet, attorneys currently sued under Judiciary Law 487 and whose appeals are currently pending in the 3rd Department, will be thrilled.  

My husband included.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to compare the panel that affirmed Neroni v Follender and the panel that recused from my disciplinary case:

First, please, note that where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit adds me, without last name, as a party to Mr. Neroni's pro se lawsuits and affirms punishment of Mr. Neroni for constitutional arguments and for still-pending civil rights lawsuits (case No. 14-4765):

the 3rd Department added Mr. Neroni as a party to my disciplinary proceedings where Mr. Neroni was not a party, without notice or opportunity to be heard, without authority to do that, long after Mr. Neroni was disbarred by the same court.

By the way, since the 3rd Department adamantly refused to release to the 4th Department court the application for the ex parte order mentioned in that order, or to give access to Mr. Neroni or myself to that order, jurisdiction over my disciplinary proceeding could not fully pass to the 4th Department from the 3rd Department (because the 3rd Department refused to fully relinquish the complete record of  my disciplinary proceedings to the 4th Department), which makes my order of suspension illegal and made without jurisdiction.

While the 3rd Department is keeping hidden part of the record of my disciplinary proceedings from which it recused, the 3rd Department's refusal to recuse from Neroni v Follender case is even more interesting.

Since the illegal ex parte June 11, 2014 order decided by judge Lathninen, McCarthy, Stein, Garry and Rose,

judges  that failed to fully transfer jurisdiction over my case to the 4th Department, but declared a recusal of the 3rd Department from my cases, the 3rd Department made several appellate decisions adverse to me:

1) On October 23, 2014, Neroni v Grannis which I blogged about before here as a case of brazen judicial corruption - by judges Clark, Stein, J.P., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Lynch, JJ;

2) Kilmer v Moseman, Case No. 518903 on January 29, 2015 by judges 

Lahtinen, J.P., Garry, Rose and Devine, JJ. - where the court refused to sanction a judge's wife for obvious fraud upon the court, and refused to sanction another judge's law firm for participating in the case where the judge, Eugene Peckham, presided before his retirement, joined the firm as a law partner, and the law firm did not notify the court of that fact, and Eugene Peckham continued to also be a "judicial hearing officer" for the same court which disqualified his law firm from appearing in that court.  Sanctions were not imposed upon Peckham and his law firm despite the fact that his law firm was disqualified by court order from representing anybody in that action - I had to make a motion for that, Peckham and his law firm resisted disqualification, even under these circumstances!!!

and 

3) Neroni v Follender decided on March 3, 2016 by judges 

McCarthy, Garry, Lynch, Devine and Clark.

In all of the above three panels previously recused judges participated, which undermined the New York constitutional rule that a decision by an appellate court must be done by a quorum of at least 4 judges (meaning judges who are not disqualified), and participation of a previously recused judge in the case is the equivalent of a re-entry of the recused judge into a recused case.

Here, the entire court recused from my case in June of 2014, thus requiring recusal of the court from all other cases where I was a party.  I made several motions to recuse in Neroni v Follender, which were all denied without an explanation by the 3rd Department.

A recused judge has no "discretion" to continue to preside over cses of the same litigant if the judge recused from the litigant's other cases.

In Neroni v Follender, Judge McCarthy had the audacity to rely upon my suspension, based on the sanction imposed for allegedly delaying satisfaction of money judgment while dismissing my claim of fraud upon the court when Follender was inviting upon me sanctions for frivolously causing to satisfy that judgment too soon.

I understand that Judge McCarthy who was presiding in Neroni v Follender, was in too much of a hurry to punish me whatever the record was, after my husband asked the U.S. District of New York to punish the 3rd Department's Chief Judge Karen Peters for frivolous conduct in litigation.

But, when two judges out of the Neroni v Follender panel recused, on behalf of the entire 3rd Department, on June 11, 2014, from my disciplinary case while keeping from the new court the application upon which the June 11, 2014 order was made, it was highly inappropriate for the recused judges to rely upon a decision made by another court upon an incomplete record - incomplete record being caused by misconduct of those same 3rd Department judges.

And that's exactly what Judge McCarthy brazenly did in a footnote in Neroni v Follender:

So, McCarthy says by relying on that footnote - because I was sanctioned, on request of Follender, for "delaying satisfaction of money judgment" in the "breach of contract case", it was ok for Follender to ask to sanction me for "premature satisfaction" of that same money judgment, right after the previous sanction was imposed ( the sanction which the same 3rd Department affirmed and for which I was suspended by the 4th Department).

And, McCarthy says by relying on that footnote - it is ok for a court to withhold part of the record when transferring a case to another court, and then to rely upon the decision of that other court which the relying court knows is unlawful because it is based on the incomplete record.  I wonder what the Judicial Conduct Commission will say about it.

And it is ok for McCarthy to say that there was no enough "specificity" in the claims of fraud upon the court when the same attorney makes diametrically opposite statements to court seeking sanctions against me for both delaying satisfaction of the money judgment and allegedly causing to satisfy that same money judgment "too soon".

Yet, such two diametrically opposite views, of the same court, are simply unsustainable, and, of course, I will address that through appropriate legal process.

We have a saying in Russian - you can weave a rope for a long time, but there will be an end to it.

I do not know whether the crap the 3rd Department stepped into by affirming absolute judicial immunity for Jonathan Follender, a private attorney, will be the beginning of the end of our saga where laws favorable to us do not apply, and evidence favorable to us is simply ignored (as the 3rd Department did with multiple records in multiple proceedings in order to punish us, including Neroni v Follender).

Of course, the 3rd Department will continue to try to wiggle out of inconsistencies in its legal theories.

The good part is that the 3rd Department is not the only Appellate Division in the State of New York, and that litigation under Judiciary Law 487 vigorously continues in other Departments, too, creating precedents that, due to department splits, will have to be eventually heard by the New York State Court of Appeals, and will apply to us, too.

So, we will see how this exciting thing called the "law" in New York will develop.

Stay tuned.

A no-public-bidding 33-million-dollar contract of New York Unified Court system with a non-profit. Budget constraints and personnel cuts, right...

In November of 2015, the soon-to-be-retired New York Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman announced and endorsed a program funded allegedly by an "anonymous private donor", called "Legal Hand".  I wrote about the program on this blog on December 22, 2015.

The program was about non-attorney volunteers providing legal services and advice to indigent individuals and, as announced, sometimes "screening" their cases.  The program, reportedly, "helped" the cases of consulted individuals to not reach courts.

The program caught my immediate attention because I actively researched the concept of unauthorized practice of law, in this country and in the State of New York, moreover, since 2013 to November 2015 when I was suspended from the practice of law (right before I was about to file a motion for sanctions for frivolous conduct against Judge Jonathan Lippman, the 3rd Department Court, the 3rd Department Professional Conduct Committee, and the New York State Attorney General) I was litigating a federal civil rights lawsuit on behalf of my husband raising, among other things, the issue that unauthorized practice of law (UPL), is tailored in New York to the identity of criminal defendant, which is unconstitutional.

Specifically, I asserted there, and Mr. Neroni is continuing to assert it on his own in his motion to vacate the dismissal of his civil rights lawsuit based on new evidence, including the "Legal Hand program" (see his newest pleadings on the subject published in full here), that UPL laws in New York are vague, undefined, allow arbitrary enforcement, and are actually arbitrarily and selectively enforced, unconstitutionally targeting people's right to earn a living.

UPL is practicing law without a license, and is a criminal statute that must be applied blindly, without looking at the identity of the person.  That is not what is happening in New York which applies UPL to suspended and disbarred attorneys differently than to never-licensed individuals.

Practicing without a license means practicing where you never had a license, or practicing when you had a license, but it was suspended or revoked.

Yet, New York applies one set of rules to those who never had a license and another, stricter set of rules, to those who lost their law licenses.  In other words, in New York, what is a crime of UPL to those who lost their licenses, is not the crime of UPL for those who never had it - and the "Legal Hand", endorsed by New York's Chief Judge is one of the examples.

Yet, exploration of the "Legal Hand" program brought me into something, I think, bigger that unconstitutional application of UPL laws.

When I researched the program, I found that it was handled by the so-called "Center for Court Innovation", a "public charity", a non-profit organization.

Back in law school, I took a course in non-profit organizations from a professor who was extremely distrusting to these entities.  To give you an idea, the professor told us that he never donates to a single charity before they answer two of his questions (and most never do):

1) financial reports of the charity;
2) percentage of income of the charity dedicated to its declared mission (example: how much money does a children's cancer research institute dedicate to children's cancer research?)  Could be as little as 1% of collected funds, or less - there is no set limit for that.

Following my professor's tip, I started to ask these questions to charities who call for donations.  They usually refused to provide financial disclosures, refused to answer the question as to the percentage and quite often became belligerrent as to why I ask all those questions instead of just doing "the right thing" - just give them the money.

Well, while researching the webpage of the Center for Court Innovation, a public charity (a tax-exempt non-profit corporation otherwise known as the Fund for the City of New York, Inc.), I found this spectacular statement:

Yes, it was declared that this non-profit was "founded as a public/private partnership" with the New York State Unified Court System.

That put the "partnership" within the reach of Freedom of Information Law, at least, on the Court Administration's side.

I filed a FOIL request with the New York State Office of Court Administration in December of 2015 and asked for information about the "partnership".

Here is my FOIL request:

The Court Administration answered with its usual tactic - "we will answer within 20 days", even though the law is clear that they should provide information within 5 business days, unless information is substantial and not easy to find.

Instead of complying with the law, governmental entities in New York (it is a universal trick) first give you a "20 day run-around", then take a lot more than 20 days to respond in the hope that you will forget.

In my case, I made the FOIL request by e-mail on December 23, 2015, and, until yesterday, did not have any responses.  So, I wrote again and threatened with a lawsuit and legal fees against those individuals who are stalling release of records, in case I am represented in the lawsuit by a licensed attorney (New York conveniently suspended my own law license so that I could not sue for stalling my own FOIL requests, after I made in October of 2015 a FOIL request that the Court Administration is still stalling - about members, founding documents and other records pertaining to the so-called "New York State-Federal Judicial Council", a shadow organization influencing New York and federal courts).

After my e-mail  yesterday, New York office of Court Administration reacted nearly instantly (showing that 20 days were not really necessary to respond), but gave me not documents pertaining to the formation of a "partnership" that, according to available information, existed since at least 1990s, and, according to the papers filed by the Fund with IRS, since 1982 (the "ruling" year).

The only documents pertaining to that so-called "private-public" partnership that New York Court Administration released to me so far is - guess - a CONTRACT for the period of 2014 to 2018 between New York Court Administration and the Center for Court Innovation, approved by:

1. The court administration
2. New York Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli
3. New York Attorney General

Of course, I contested the incomplete disclosure with the following e-mail:

But, guess what was the amount of the contract between the New York Unified Court System and the Center for Court Innovation for the years 2014 to 2018 approved by the New York State Comptroller and New York State Attorney General?

33 million 763 thousand and 419 dollars, ladies and gentlemen, of taxpayers' money, are pledged to be diverted by the New York Unified Court System to "independent research" and some "projects" where, I am sure, relatives and friends are employed by the droves - and that is at the time of budget cuts, when the court claims too high caseloads, cuts personnel, and asks from the New York State Legislature an ADDITIONAL budget for increase of salaries of judges.

And here are the names of people who approved the contract:

Of course I will apply to the NYS Senate immediately asking to disaffirm the findings of the commission for judicial pay raises as a need for additional budget for such raises (not that our corrupt Senate will listen to me, of course, but I will at least make the record) - because the budget is right there, only it is used for "contractors", which should be investigated as to employment of relatives and friends of judges.

If New York Unified Court system has extra money to splurge on "contractors" to do "independent research" for them, it definitely must have money to fund such pesky things as (first as priority) indigent defense and then (last priority) judicial salaries.

That the contract is open-ended, its terms which are not contained in the contract itself, but are attached in an "appendix" allows a non-profit corporation to practically to run the New York State court system, and many of its programs, and to influence the courts' decision-making process.

Since it has been approved by the State Comptroller and State Attorney General, apparently, state authorities cannot investigate the project for public corruption, because they are themselves involved in it and will look like idiots for approving it in the first place.

To learn for what exactly did the New York Court system is going to pay nearly 34 million dollars of your money over the years 2014 to 2018 - stay tuned.

The Oklahoma State Supreme Court contributes to accelerating demise of attorney regulation

Attorney licensing, as any other form of occupational regulation, is declared to be done in the interests of consumers.

The government verifies, we are explained, for the benefits of consumers, that licensed attorneys should have the right qualifications and skills to practice.

For that purpose, rigorous standards are set for certification of law schools, and for licensing examinations for attorneys called "bar examinations".

And, certifications of educational institutions and licensing exams exist - remember? - to protect the consumer from unqualified providers.

So, what if law schools cannot get certified by those rigorous standards?  They must then close - the logical answer.

So, what if law students cannot pass that bar exam (a pass or fail test)?  They must then be denied the law license.  Anything else undermines the declaration that attorney licensing is done for protection of consumers.

Well, the Oklahoma Supreme Court just helped show the America public what a sham attorney regulation is, by lowering the bar for the statewide attorney licensing - because law graduates increasingly fail to pass it, despite the fact that previous generations of law students (of better educational caliber, obviously) could and did pass it in higher numbers.

Is it a protection for consumers at all if attorney candidates who cannot prove their skills in order to gain the right to represent their clients are simply forgiving the fact that they cannot prove their skills to the required standards, and the standard is simply dropped so that they can meet it?

Why take the bar exam at all then if it is a chameleon test, to be suited to the body of students taking it.  

They say - do not blame the mirror for your face.

Do not blame the result of the bar exam for your own lack of knowledge.

Not any more.

Now that the Oklahoma bar exam is changed from a real-life mirror to a magic mirror.

Instead of reflecting to the consumers that those who passed the test possess the required skills to represent them, now the simplified Oklahoma bar tests insults all future bar takers and puts into all consumers doubts as to whether all future Oklahoma bar takers idiots who are unable to satisfy rigorous standards that previous attorneys could satisfy.

Therefore, in Oklahoma, the price of attorneys admitted to the bar in the "pre-dumb bar exam era" will go up and it will be even more difficult for the "post-dumb bar exam era" attorneys to find a job.

If regulation of the legal profession is dying, the courts should not insult those still trying to join it by lowering the test standards to all applicants, as if all of them are unable to meet the previous standards.

In any event, consumers of legal services, beware.

If the previous bar exam was not a guarantee of quality of legal representation, the dumber bar exam leaves a gaping question as to why attorney regulation continues to exist at all.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon does not engage in pajama discrimnation against pro se litigants - and it is a very lonely court in that

I wrote about e-filing discrimination against pro se (civil rights) litigants in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, about a motion made by a pro se party in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York for a right of such e-filing, and about a decision made in another federal court actually explaining why pajama discrimination is good discrimination.

The "good pajama discrimination" happened in one of the U.S. District courts in Ohio where the court told an out-of-the-country litigant that (1) they have a rule by which pro se litigants must file on paper and by mail, while only those represented by counsel file electronically and that (2) the pro se litigant in question filed by mail before in the same lawsuit and such filing did not appear to deter him from filing, so he can just as well continue to file it the same way in the future.

After posting the blog about the "good pajama discrimination" in a federal court in Ohio, I found a case in the U.S. District Court in the District of Oregon where an e-filing application by a pro se litigant was granted - without a word of opposition or reproach.

Kudoz, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon - at least on the issue of e-filing, this court leads the country in non-discrimination against pro se litigants.

But, so far that I could find, only one federal court only that I have found so far sees absolutely no need to burden their own clerks with scanning and e-filing on behalf of pro se litigants when such pro se litigants are perfectly capable to do that themselves, while other courts prefer to create unnecessary work, give pro se litigants less time and make it more costly for them to litigate in federal court, while the others insist on discriminating against pro se litigants as their "discretionary right"?

So, do judges have discretionary rights to discriminate and make access to court more difficult to one class of litigants over others?

Right to indigent criminal defense - for a price in South Dakota

If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to you.

That's what they say in the movies.

But, if you are a criminal defendant in the State of South Dakota, and if you cannot pay for your legal defense, one will be provided to you, still at a price of $92/hour - even if you are acquitted.

Does it make any sense?

No.

Does it violate established constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases? Most certainly.

So why do folks in the South Dakota government who are responsible for charging indigent criminal defendant $92/hour for a public defender are doing it?

Because, if the person is poor, the person will not be able to sue for violation of his or her rights, that's why.

Disgusting.

I am starting to publish materials of my disciplinary proceedings - here is my cross-motion to dismiss, raising constitutional issues and describing Judge Carl F. Becker's misconduct in detail

Now that I am safely (for the court system) suspended and materials of my disciplinary proceedings became public in all senses and for all purposes, I am starting to publish them.

Before, when I published evidence of misconduct and fabrication of transcripts in my proceedings, I was charged with criminal contempt of court - for violating my own privacy (charges were dismissed sua sponte by the court, but not after putting stress on me for 4.5 months and driving me out of the State of New York to prevent further harassment).

Now that there is not a single reason not to consider the materials of my disciplinary proceedings public, but knowing that the court will not make it public even if the law says they are public (as the court already did before, on multiple occasions), I am staring to publish those materials (there are a lot of them) myself.

It is a lot of work, I have to scan a lot of documentary exhibits, misconduct of the judge upon whose sanctions my law license was ultimately suspended was legendary and spanned many years, many cases and was targeting many attorneys, not just myself.

Since Becker ultimately ran from the bench and was allowed to use "early retirement" to hide his misconduct and was not disciplined in any way, I think these materials must be published as a matter of public service, so that people know at least the small extent of his misconduct - in my case and in cases that I knew and complained about.

The public should also be able to see how New York courts squash criticism of judicial misconduct and misconduct of politically connected attorneys.

The motion I am publishing today was made in March of 2014 to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department.

The 3rd Department did not know what to do with it and transferred it, in an ex parte manner, as a hot potato, to the 4th Department.

The 4th Department did not know what to do with it either, and, probably, it was just too much to read for the lazy court, so the 4th Department did the following with this motion:

1) denied it without an explanation or reasoning in September of 2014 - I made a motion to vacate, renew and rehear, as allowed by law, and for a REASONED decision.

Enraged by that, the 4th Department then

2) denied the motion once again, once again without an explanation and reasoning (the motion was raising constitutional issues of public importance, but treaded too much, I guess, on protected turf that the court had a self-interest not to reach), but with an imposition of an anti-filing injunction (without notice or opportunity to be heard on that) and with a sealing order aimed against me, even though the sealing order was based on the statute that protects my privacy that I did not need, 

then

3) the, one of the charges that I sought to dismiss and that the 4th Department denied to dismiss - twice, without an explanation or reasoning, but with an anti-filing injunction against me for asking for it - was withdrawn by the Committee and one other charge that I sought to dismiss, and the motion was denied twice without an explanation or reasoning, was ultimately granted.

No sense in all of that at all.

The charges that were sustained were clearly unsustainable, as my Affidavit/Memorandum of Law in support of this motion says.

There are over 100 documentary exhibits supporting the motion.  They are referenced in the affidavit.  It takes a lot of time to scan them, but I will do that.

At this time, I am publishing the Affidavit/Memorandum of Law only, so that it gives people an idea what exactly I was punished for by suspension of my law license for 2 years, and why the 4th Department and its attorney disciplinary Committee fought tooth and claw to deny me my right to an open public disciplinary proceeding.

Especially because my order of suspension mentions only that I was suspended because "a judge" sanctioned me "for frivolous conduct", but does not mention that the "frivolous conduct" was making motions to recuse that same judge for egregious misconduct - or that that judge, Carl F. Becker recused from one of my cases BEFORE he sanctioned me and AFTER he sanctioned me, and then quickly "retired" before his term was out under circumstances suggested that he ran from the bench before he was booted from there (the NYS Judicial Conduct Commission's annual report for 2015 mentioned that several judges went off the bench during investigation without making public that the reasons were disciplinary, and I there are reasons to believe that Becker was one of them).

The motion was scanned in 4 batches because of my scanner's limitations.

Here is the motion:

Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4

Supporting documentary exhibits to this motion will be scanned and published at a later time, when I have time to do that (again, it is a lot of work), but I will do that.  

My disciplinary case has startling similarities with the recent disciplinary case in Louisiana, also against a female attorney, Christine Mire, also because of motions to recuse a judge, see my blogs on the matter here and here.

I did not finish covering Christine Mire's case either, I will post some more analysis of some additional materials I was able to obtain in that case shortly.

Stay tuned.