Walker v.
Hartman, 09-16-00299-CV (TexApp Dist 03/30/2017)
April 13,
2017
On Appeal
from the 58th District Court Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause
No. A-198,246
Submitted on
January 27, 2017
Opinion
Delivered March 30, 2017
Before
McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
OPINION
STEVE
McKEITHEN CHIEF JUSTICE
Appellant
Layne Walker appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss appellee
Stephen Hartman's lawsuit[1] against him pursuant to the Texas Citizens'
Participation Act ("TCPA"). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 27.001–.011 (West 2015), § 51.014(a)(12) (West Supp. 2016) (providing for an
interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss filed under section
27.003 of the TCPA). In five appellate issues, Walker argues that: (1)
Hartman's legal action was based on, related to, or in response to Walker's
exercise of his right of free speech or to petition; (2) Walker's motion to
dismiss under the TCPA was timely; (3) Hartman's nonsuit of his defamation
claims after Walker moved to dismiss did not prevent the trial court from
granting relief under the TCPA; (4) Walker showed each element of one or more
defenses to Hartman's claims by a preponderance of the evidence; and (5)
Hartman did not marshal clear and specific evidence of a prima facie case for
each essential element of his claims. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
On May 28,
2013, Hartman, a licensed investigator and licensed process server employed by
Klein Investigations and Consulting, entered the courtroom of the 252nd District Court while Walker, the
former judge of said court, was presiding. Hartman pleaded that he approached the bar in the
courtroom, but did not cross it, and after motioning for the bailiff,
Deputy Lewis, to come toward him, he whispered to Lewis that he needed to serve Walker with a summons.[2]
According to Hartman, Lewis walked to Deputy Broussard, and Broussard "rushed toward Hartman and
immediately began pushing Hartman to the exit door, stating Hartman needed to
'leave or go under arrest.'" According to Hartman's petition, he
did not attempt to serve Walker in court.
Hartman
pleaded that although he identified
himself as a licensed process server and did nothing disruptive,
Deputies Lewis and Broussard, as well as Deputy Barker, placed Hartman under arrest and confiscated his
personal property, which included, among other things, his iPhone and a
video recording pen that had captured the events. Hartman also pleaded that the
officers used excessive
force during his arrest and detained him for an excessively long period of
time. Hartman alleged that Walker knew in advance that Hartman intended to attempt to serve him
and that Walker had instructed Deputies Lewis, Broussard, and Barker to arrest
Hartman when Hartman stated his intention to serve the summons.
According to
Hartman's petition, the three
deputies subsequently allowed Hartman to serve the summons on Walker in the
jury room. Hartman pleaded that he was told he would be charged with interfering with
public duties and disrupting a public meeting, and he alleged that
Deputies Broussard, Barker, and Lewis falsified probable cause affidavits to support those
charges. In addition, Hartman alleged that Walker and other defendants, working together, replaced
Hartman's recording pen with a pocket screwdriver "as part of their scheme
to hide Hartman's recording pen and its evidence[.]" Hartman also
alleged that Walker's court coordinator "maliciously sought to revoke Hartman's professional
licenses[]" by filing
formal complaints with the Texas Department of Public Safety Private Security
Bureau, the Texas
Process Server Review Board, and the Texas Association of Licensed
Investigators (a trade association).[3] As a result of the complaints
being filed, Hartman's licenses
as a private investigator, personal protection officer, and commissioned
security guard were suspended for approximately three months until his
criminal case was dismissed.
Hartman also
pleaded that "Walker, with the participation by overt acts by all other
Defendants[,] … prosecuted a malicious, illegal criminal case against
Hartman[.]" Hartman alleged that Walker and other defendants
"illegally purported
to, or pretended to, hire Joe Alford to serve as a District Attorney Pro Tem
(DAPT), and arranged
for illegal payment of Joe Alford out of the Texas Indigent Defense Fund (IDF)."
According to
Hartman, Walker instructed
Broussard to take Hartman's recording pen home, where Broussard downloaded it onto a
CD and attempted to delete the pen's contents.[4] According to Hartman, Walker and other
defendants instructed the persons who were present
in the courtroom during the incident "to provide perjured affidavits and
one false witness statement[] to support Hartman's arrest and prosecution[]" and instructed sheriff's deputies to prepare falsified
arrest reports and probable cause affidavits. Hartman's petition alleged
that the recording pen contained evidence proving that the probable cause
arrest affidavits and reports, as well as the affidavits of witnesses, were
"perjured and materially false[.]" Hartman further alleged that the
defendants who participated in a "pattern of denials and obfuscations about the existence
of the recording pen and its evidence" acted on the personal orders of
Walker and other defendants.
Hartman
pleaded that the individual defendants all "acted in a civil conspiracy to
perpetrate Texas torts against Hartman, through collective misconduct, with a
unity of purpose and goals, in order to damage Hartman." According to
Hartman's petition, the
goals of the conspiracy were to maliciously and illegally prosecute Hartman, to
destroy Hartman's career, and to maliciously inflict "as much emotional and psychological harm
and damage on Hartman as possible." Hartman pleaded that Walker and
other defendants caused Hartman to be maliciously prosecuted, and he pleaded
that he was suing all of the defendants, "jointly and severally, for the
tort of malicious prosecution."[5]
Hartman
further pleaded that he was suing Walker in his individual capacity
"because Walker was
not only a coconspirator, but also Walker is ultimately the instigator of the
civil conspiracy at issue in this case." Hartman pleaded that
Walker's tortious misconduct stemmed from "non-judicial actions outside the scope of his
jurisdiction as a judge[]" and that "Walker's misconduct was not
based on his adjudication of any case lawfully assigned to his court."
Additionally, Hartman pleaded that he was not a party or a witness to any case pending in Walker's
court, and Hartman asserted that Walker's non-judicial acts were not protected by judicial
immunity. According to Hartman, Walker's misconduct did not involve normal judicial
functions; all of Walker's alleged misconduct, except for Walker's order
to Broussard to arrest Hartman, occurred outside the courtroom; Walker's alleged misconduct did not occur in a case Walker
was adjudicating; and Hartman
did not attempt to visit Walker in Walker's official capacity.
Hartman
pleaded that he sought "joint and several liability against all of the
Defendants … because each action of each Defendant, as well as each tort
perpetrated by each Defendant, was an overt act in furtherance of the civil
conspiracy to maliciously prosecute Hartman and to destroy his career."[6]
In addition, Hartman sought
imposition of punitive damages "against all the Defendants jointly
and severally under Texas law[.]" Hartman filed numerous exhibits with the
trial court, including, among other things, two affidavits signed by Hartman
(one from the complaint he filed against Walker with the Judicial Conduct
Commission and a second affidavit signed on May 28, 2013), the court reporter's transcript
of the proceedings taking place in the courtroom when the incident that led to
Hartman's arrest occurred,[7] and testimony taken before one of the boards with
which Walker filed a complaint against Hartman. Our review of the
appellate record does not reveal any affidavits from Walker.
WALKER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER THE TCPA
Walker filed
a motion to dismiss Hartman's entire case under the TCPA. Referring to the
allegations in Hartman's original petition, Walker asserted that Hartman had
sued him for "defamation and related torts." Walker argued that the
trial court should dismiss Hartman's claims regarding Walker's filing of
complaints with the Texas Department of Public Safety Private Security Bureau,
the Texas Process Server Review Board, and the Texas Association of Licensed
Investigators "because they are based on, related to, or in response to
Walker's exercise of the right to petition[,]" and the services provided
by process servers are related to community well-being. Walker also complained in his motion to dismiss
that Hartman had filed a motion to strike allegedly objectionable, defamatory,
and ad hominem portions of Walker's pleadings. According to Walker,
Hartman's motion to strike constituted a "legal action" as defined by
the TCPA. Walker further asserted that all of his actions were protected by the judicial
communications privilege, and he characterizes the other torts asserted
by Hartman, which include malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy, as tag-along torts that must also
be dismissed.
In response,
Hartman argued that: (1) Walker's motion to dismiss was untimely because Hartman had previously asserted
the same causes of action against Walker in a lawsuit filed in federal court;
(2) Walker lacked standing
to
assert the motion because he had testified before
the Process Server Review Board that his court coordinator unilaterally
completed the grievances and used his signature stamp; (3) Walker presented no case law or evidence that any of the
boards with which he filed complaints have quasi-judicial powers; (4) the claims in the grievances
were false and therefore did not constitute the exercise of free speech;
and (5) Walker's TCPA motion only affects Hartman's past claims for defamation
and tortious interference, and because those claims have been dismissed the
issue is moot.
After
conducting a hearing, the
trial court signed an order denying Walker's motion to dismiss. The trial judge
did not explain the basis for her ruling in the order, nor did she sign
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
ISSUE TWO
In his
second issue, which we address first, Walker argues that his motion to dismiss
under the TCPA was timely filed. Section 27.003(b) of the TCPA provides that
"[a] motion to dismiss a legal action under this section must be filed not
later than the 60th day after the date of service of the legal action."
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(b). As discussed above, Hartman
argued before the trial court that Walker's motion to dismiss was untimely
because Hartman had previously asserted the same causes of action, based upon
the same facts, against Walker in a lawsuit filed in federal court in June
2013, and Hartman makes the same argument in his brief before this Court.
According to Hartman, because the federal court refused to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his tort claims, Hartman was required to refile
his lawsuit in state court, and he points out that "such filing tolls
limitations" back to the date he originally filed his federal complaint.
Hartman asserts the state court proceeding is therefore part of the same
litigation he filed in federal court in June of 2013. Hartman argues that the
state case is based on the same nucleus of operative facts, has the same
individual defendants, and asserts the same torts as the federal lawsuit. He
also points out that "the TCPA may be asserted to seek dismissal of a
state court defamation claim in a federal case."
Each of the
cases Hartman cites in support of his argument that Walker's TCPA motion was
untimely involved subsequent petitions, claims, or counterclaims filed within
the same lawsuit, not the situation presented here; that is, successive
lawsuits filed in different courts. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express,
Inc., 393 S.W.3d 242, 242–43 (Tex. 2013); Hicks v. Group & Pension Adm'rs,
Inc., 473 S.W.3d 518, 527 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.); In re
Estate of Check, 438 S.W.3d 829, 836–37 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.);
Miller Weisbrod, L.L.P. v. Llamas-Soforo, No. 08-12-00278-CV, 2014 WL 6679122,
at *9–11 (Tex. App.—El Paso Nov. 25, 2014, no pet.) (not yet released for
publication). The purpose of the TCPA "is to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely,
and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law
and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious
lawsuits for demonstrable injury." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
27.002. The TCPA "shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose
and intent fully[,]" but the TCPA "does not abrogate or lessen any
other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege available under other constitutional,
statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions." Id. § 27.011.
Taking into
account the broad purpose of the TCPA, as well as the lack of authority for the
proposition that a common nucleus of operative facts makes a subsequent lawsuit
filed in a different court tantamount to the lawsuit previously filed, we
conclude that Walker's TCPA motion to dismiss was timely filed. See generally
id. §§ 27.002, 27.011. We sustain issue two.
ISSUES ONE,
THREE, FOUR, AND FIVE
In issue
one, Walker argues that Hartman's legal action was based on, related to, or in
response to Walker's exercise of his right of free speech or to petition.
Walker's third issue asserts that Hartman's nonsuit of his defamation claims
after Walker moved to dismiss did not prevent the trial court from granting
relief under the TCPA. In issue four, Walker argues that he showed each element
of one or more defenses to Hartman's claims by a preponderance of the evidence,
and in issue five, Walker contends that Hartman did not marshal clear and
specific evidence of a prima facie case for each essential element of his
claims.
The TCPA
permits a litigant to seek dismissal of a "legal action" that is
"based on, relates to, or is in response to a party's exercise of the
right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association[.]" Id. §
27.003(a). The statute broadly defines a "legal action" as "a
lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or
any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable
relief." Id. § 27.001(6). The party moving to dismiss under the TCPA bears
the initial burden of demonstrating that he has been sued for exercising his
First Amendment rights. Id. § 27.005(b).
Once the
moving party establishes that the suit implicates First Amendment rights, the
burden shifts to the party bringing the action, who must then adduce
"clear and specific evidence" of a prima facie case as to each
element of the claim. Id. § 27.005(c); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 586–87
(Tex. 2015). In determining whether the claim should be dismissed, "the
court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based." Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.006(a). "Under [s] ection 27.006 of the
Act, the trial court may consider pleadings as evidence." Serafine v.
Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.). The Supreme Court
has noted that "[c]lear and specific evidence is not a recognized
evidentiary standard[,]" and "[a]lthough it sounds similar to clear
and convincing evidence, the phrases are not legally synonymous." In re
Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that the term
"prima facie case" "refers to evidence sufficient as a matter of
law to establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted." Id.
at 590.
The Supreme
Court explained that under the TCPA, general allegations that merely recite the
elements of a cause of action will not suffice; rather, "a plaintiff must
provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its claim." Id. at
590–91. Although the TCPA "initially demands more information about the
underlying claim, the Act does not impose an elevated evidentiary standard or
categorically reject circumstantial evidence." Id. at 591. If the
non-movant meets his burden, the movant may still obtain a dismissal by
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a
valid defense to the claims. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(d).
The issue of
whether Walker met his burden of establishing that Hartman's case related to
Walker's exercise of his First Amendment rights is a legal question that we
review de novo on appeal. Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716,
725 (Tex. 2013). When the trial court denied Walker's motion to dismiss, it did
not expressly determine whether Walker had met his burden. As previously
discussed, Hartman's original petition asserted claims for defamation and
tortious interference with business relationships stemming from Walker's filing
of formal complaints against Hartman with the Texas Department of Public Safety
Private Security Bureau, the Texas Process Server Review Board, and the Texas
Association of Licensed Investigators. Hartman later nonsuited those claims by
filing an amended petition which omitted them.
Based upon
the allegations asserted in Hartman's original petition and affidavits, as well
as in response to Walker's motion, we conclude that Walker established that a portion of Hartman's
lawsuit related to Walker's exercise of his First Amendment rights, which
brings Hartman's lawsuit within the purview of the TCPA. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001 (3) (stating that the exercise of free speech means a communication made
in connection with a matter of public concern); see id. § 27.001(7)
(stating that a communication
includes submitting a document in any form regarding a matter of public
concern, such as community wellbeing). We sustain issue one.
Having
determined that a portion of Hartman's lawsuit related to Walker's exercise of
his First Amendment rights and that Walker timely filed his motion to dismiss
under the TCPA, we now turn to issue three, in which Walker argues that
Hartman's decision to nonsuit his claims for defamation and tortious
interference with business relationships does not prevent the trial court from
granting relief under the TCPA. As discussed above, it appears that Hartman's
only remaining claims against Walker are malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. In
Rauhauser v. McGibney, No. 02-14-00215-CV, 2014 WL 6996819 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Dec. 11, 2014, no pet.) (not yet released for publication), the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals was presented with a case involving the operator of
websites who sued various defendants for "defamation, defamation per se,
business disparagement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious
interference with business relationships, and other non[-] defamation torts[
]" related to the defendants' postings of allegedly threatening and
defamatory statements on the
websites.
Id. at *1. The appellees decided to nonsuit certain claims, and Rauhauser
argued that his TCPA motion to dismiss survived the nonsuit. Id. at *2.
The
Rauhauser court noted that "[a]lthough a plaintiff decides which of its
own claims to pursue or to abandon, that decision does not control the fate of
a nonmoving party's independent claims for affirmative relief." Id.
According to the Court, "a defendant's motion to dismiss that may afford
more relief than a nonsuit affords constitutes a claim for affirmative relief
that survives a nonsuit[.]" Id. The Court concluded that Rauhauser's TCPA
motion to dismiss survived the nonsuit because, unlike a nonsuit, the TCPA
motion to dismiss might also allow Rauhauser to obtain a dismissal with
prejudice, attorney's fees, and sanctions. Id. at *2–3. For the same reasons
explained in Rauhauser, we conclude that Walker's motion to dismiss under the
TCPA survived Hartman's nonsuiting of certain causes of action. See id. We
sustain issue three to that extent; however, we must address issues four and
five to determine whether the trial court erred by denying Walker's motion to
dismiss.
In issue
five, Walker argues that Hartman did not marshal clear and specific evidence of
a prima facie case for each essential element of his claims. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c). Walker asserts that Hartman failed to
do so as to his claims for defamation and tortious interference, which Hartman
has nonsuited, but Walker does not address whether Hartman met the elements of
his additional tort claims. By filing an amended pleading that omitted his
claims for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships, we
agree that Hartman failed to prove those causes of action by clear and specific
evidence. See id. § 27.006(a) (providing that a trial court shall consider
pleadings, as well as supporting and opposing affidavits, in determining
whether to dismiss); Rauhauser, 2014 WL 6996819 at *2–3.
Both before
the trial court and in this appeal, Walker seeks dismissal of Hartman's entire case, not merely parts
thereof. Walker characterizes Hartman's claims for malicious prosecution
and civil conspiracy as merely tagalong or related torts that must necessarily be dismissed because Hartman's
claims for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships,
which no longer exist, fall within the purview of the TCPA. When a legal
action is in response to both expression protected by the TCPA and other
unprotected activity, the legal action is subject to dismissal only to the extent that it is in
response to the protected conduct, as opposed to being subject to
dismissal in its entirety. Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 393.
We disagree
with Walker's contentions that Hartman failed to make a prima facie case and
that the causes of action Hartman alleges for malicious prosecution and civil
conspiracy are tag-along torts, thereby making the entire lawsuit subject to
dismissal under the TCPA. As discussed above, Hartman's live petition asserts
causes of action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. To prove a
malicious criminal prosecution claim, the plaintiff must establish: (1) the
commencement of a criminal prosecution against him; (2) initiation or
procurement of the action by the defendant; (3) termination of the prosecution
in the plaintiff's favor; (4) the plaintiff's innocence; (5) the absence of
probable cause for the proceedings; (6) malice in filing the charge; and (7)
damage to the plaintiff. Kroger Tex. Ltd. P'ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 792
n.3 (Tex. 2006); Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.
1997). The elements of a civil conspiracy are: (1) a combination of two or more
persons; (2) to accomplish an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful
means; (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or
more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate
result of the wrongful act. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 675
(Tex. 1998). Liability for conspiracy comes from the act done to further the
conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Carroll v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 592
S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. 1979). The elements of a conspiracy claim require
participation in some underlying intentional tort. Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v.
Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
"Malicious prosecution is an intentional tort." Closs v. Goose Creek
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 S.W.2d 859, 869 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no writ).
We conclude
that Hartman's live pleadings and affidavits, which we are required to consider
as evidence under the TCPA, allege facts if neither rebutted nor contradicted, demonstrate the elements of
causes of action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy as to
Walker, and those causes of action are not dependent upon nor related to
Walker's reporting of Hartman to boards and a trade association governing
private investigators and process servers. See Serafine, 466 S.W.3d at 360; In
re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590; Suberu, 216 S.W.3d at 792 n.3; Morris, 981 S.W.2d
at 675; Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. §
27.006.
Because Hartman made a prima facie case by marshaling clear and specific
evidence of each essential element of his claims for malicious prosecution and
civil conspiracy, we overrule issue five. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. §§ 27.005(c), 27.006.
In issue
four, Walker contends that he established by a preponderance of the evidence
each essential element of a valid defense to Hartman's claims. Specifically,
Walker argues that he showed that he is protected by the judicial
communications privilege and the quasi-judicial communications privilege as to
Hartman's former claims for tortious interference with business relationships
and defamation, as well as to Hartman's motion to strike portions of Walker's
pleadings. As explained above, because Hartman nonsuited his claims for
defamation and tortious interference with business relationships, we agree that
Hartman has failed to make a prima facie case as to those causes of action. See
id. § 27.005(c). Therefore, we need not address whether Walker proved a valid
defense as to Hartman's claims for defamation and tortious interference with
business relationships.
With the
exception of arguing that Hartman's claims for malicious prosecution and civil
conspiracy are tag-along torts that are related to Hartman's previous claims
for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships, Walker
does not address them. We must now determine whether Walker demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence his defenses of judicial immunity and
quasi-judicial immunity as to Hartman's claims for malicious criminal
prosecution and civil conspiracy. See id. § 27.005(d) (providing that "the
court shall dismiss a legal action against the moving party if the moving party
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element of a
valid defense to the nonmovant's claim").
A judge
"shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge."
Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(B) (3), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit.
2, subtit. G app. B (West 2013). A judge has immunity when acting in the course
of a judicial proceeding over which he has jurisdiction. Turner v. Pruitt, 342
S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1961). The
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity encompasses all judicial acts unless the
judge's actions clearly fall outside the judge's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,356–57 (1978); Dallas Cty. v.
Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2002); Spencer v. City of Seagoville, 700
S.W.2d 953, 957–58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, no writ). "A judge will
not be deprived of immunity because he was in error, took action maliciously[,]
or was in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only
when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Brandley v.
Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1995) (abrogated on other grounds by Mapes
v. Bishop, 541 F.35 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008)) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 359).
"Judicial acts include those performed by judges in adjudicating, or
otherwise exercising their judicial authority over, proceedings pending in
their courts." Twilligear v. Carrell, 148 S.W.3d 502, 505 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). Whether an act is judicial or
nonjudicial is determined by the nature of the act; that is, whether it is a
function normally performed by a judge, as opposed to other acts that simply
happen to have been performed by a judge. Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 227 (1988)).
On the other
hand, quasi-judicial immunity and other similar terms, such as official
immunity or qualified immunity, are all "used interchangeably to refer to
the same affirmative defense available to governmental employees sued in their
individual capacities." Baylor College of Med. v. Hernandez, 208 S.W.3d 4,
11 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). "Government employees are
entitled to official immunity from suit arising from the performance of their
(1) discretionary duties in (2) good faith as long as they are (3) acting
within the scope of their authority." Id. at 11.
Although we
agree that Walker is entitled to judicial immunity for ordering Hartman's
arrest when a disturbance (regardless of the cause of the disturbance)
involving Hartman occurred in Walker's courtroom while Walker was presiding, we do not agree that Walker's
alleged actions subsequent to Hartman's arrest are protected by judicial
immunity. See generally Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(B)(3). Hartman's
alleged causes of action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy, as
pleaded, occurred after
Hartman had been removed from Walker's courtroom. See generally Warren
v. McLennan Cty. Judiciary, No. 10-09-00274- CV, 2010 WL 2869817, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Waco July 14, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op) (citing Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d
510, 517 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that when a court has some subject matter
jurisdiction, judicial
immunity applies unless the judge's action was nonjudicial)).
In Ballard,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered four factors in determining
whether a judge's conduct was protected by judicial immunity: (1) whether the
judge's actions were a normal judicial function; (2) whether the judge's
actions occurred inside the courtroom; (3) whether the controversy centered
around a case pending before the judge; and (4) whether the judge was acting in
her official capacity. 413 F.3d at 515–16. In this case, Walker's alleged actions after
Hartman's arrest include, among other things, replacing Hartman's recording pen
with a screwdriver, illegally hiring and paying a District Attorney Pro Tem to
prosecute Hartman, instructing officers to take Hartman's recording pen home,
obtaining allegedly perjured witness affidavits and probable cause affidavits
to support Hartman's arrest and prosecution, and causing Hartman to be
maliciously prosecuted. These are not normal judicial functions. These alleged actions
occurred outside the courtroom, did not center around a case pending before
Walker, and did not involve Walker acting in his official capacity. See id.
Accordingly, Walker did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
existence of the defense of judicial immunity. See id.; see also Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(d).
We turn now
to Walker's assertion that he
proved his defense of quasi-judicial immunity by a preponderance of the
evidence. As noted above, Walker discusses his quasi-judicial immunity
argument only in the
context of the complaints he filed against Hartman and how those complaints
pertain to Hartman's former causes of action for defamation and tortious
interference with business relationships. We analyze Walker's claim of
quasi-judicial immunity solely with respect to Hartman's remaining claims for
malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. As we concluded above, with the
exception of ordering Hartman arrested in the courtroom, Walker was not acting in his official
capacity when he allegedly committed the acts complained of by Hartman in his
pleadings and affidavits. As such, Walker is not entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity for the acts which Hartman asserts constitute malicious
prosecution and civil conspiracy. See Hernandez, 208 S.W.3d at 11.
As part of
his argument in issue four, Walker asserts that the absolute judicial
communications privilege requires the trial court to dismiss Hartman's motion
to strike, in which Hartman argued that certain portions of Walker's pleadings
were objectionable for various reasons. According to Walker, the trial court
was required to dismiss Hartman's motion to strike because it constituted a
"legal action" that implicates Walker's right to petition. Section
27.001(6) of the TCPA defines a legal action as "a lawsuit, cause of
action, petition, complaint, crossclaim, or counterclaim or any other judicial
pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief." Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(6). As was the case with his other
arguments before the trial court and on appeal, Walker did not argue that only
certain pleadings or causes of action be dismissed or stricken, but that Hartman's lawsuit be
dismissed in its entirety. Given the posture of the case, we cannot conclude that the trial court
erred by signing an order denying Walker's TCPA motion to dismiss. For
all of the above reasons, we overrule issue four.
Having
determined that Hartman has met
his burden for each element of his claims for malicious prosecution and civil
conspiracy and that Walker did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence each essential
element of a valid defense to these claims, we affirm the trial court's
order denying Walker's motion to dismiss under the TCPA. See id. § 27.005(c),
(d).
AFFIRMED.
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Notes:
[1] Hartman
sued Walker and numerous other defendants.
[2] Hartman
pleaded that, for safety reasons, he decided to attempt to serve Walker at the
courthouse with a bailiff's cooperation because when Hartman had previously
attempted to serve Walker at his residence, Walker had a gun, and Walker's son
chest-bumped Hartman.
[3] These
allegations were also made against Walker individually in Hartman's original
petition, but Hartman deleted these allegations as to Walker in a subsequent
petition. However, Hartman did plead that Walker's court coordinator acted
"on behalf of Walker" and used Walker's signature stamp.
[4] The
record indicates that after an internal investigation, the Sheriff recommended
Broussard's termination.
[5] The
criminal case against Hartman was ultimately dismissed.
[6] In his
original petition, Hartman also asserted that Walker, acting through his court
coordinator, had tried to "destroy Hartman's ability to earn a living in
his professions by defaming Hartman per se to all of the Boards that issued
licenses to Hartman, with the goal of these Boards confiscating Hartman's
professional licenses." Hartman's original petition also asserted that
Walker tortiously interfered with Hartman's business relationships. However,
the defamation and tortious interference with business relationships
allegations do not appear in Hartman's second amended petition, which was the
live petition when the trial court ruled on Walker's motion to dismiss. In
addition, Hartman originally asserted a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against all of the defendants; however, Hartman's counsel
stated at the hearing on Walker's motion to dismiss that he had dismissed the
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that claim does not
appear in Hartman's live petition.
[7] Walker
moved to strike the exhibits, but the trial court signed an order denying
Walker's motion to strike.
