The sad consequences of putting a political appointee at the top of the main State Court - decisions that are ragingly unconstitutional and insane

I recently ran a blog about the insane decision of the New York State Court of Appeals putting an "affidavit of errors" in a criminal case a jurisdictional requirement and more reliable than a transcript produced from audio recording of an entire case.   I would like to share some more thoughts about issues that the case raises.

The insane decision, People v Smith, was authored by the new Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Janet DiFiore, a political appointee of Governor Andrew Cuomo and the former career prosecutor of a lifetime.

And, unfortunately it shows the mentality with which prosecutors in the State of New York and this country approach criminal cases - criminal proceedings, with all constitutional "protections" (invariably interpreted against the defendant) are so much slanted against the defendant, and judges are usually so biased towards prosecution that prosecution does not have to think, the only thing it needs to do is to fabricate charges, and judges will go along usually with any crap put in front of them.

But, that mentality, as People v Smith shows, produces truly insane decisions when a prosecutor with such a mentality starts authoring judicial decisions requiring real thought and real legal analysis.

I already did analyze People v Smith earlier, but, while preparing to reply to a comment on that blog, I picked up on some more issues that the decision raises, and would like to share those issues here.


Issues  # 1, 2 and 3 - on reliability of court recording equipment, trustworthiness of judges handling court recording equipment and legitimacy and enforceability of the rules of New York State Court Administration

The New York State Court of Appeals acknowledged in the decision that transcripts produced from audio recordings

1. made with the help of the court's own equipment,
2. when such recording equipment is under the judge's control and
3. in compliance with the rule of the New York State Office of Court Administration

are not reliable.

That turns ANY rules of New York State Court Administration - including the rule of frivolous conduct, 22 NYCRR 130.1-1, the rule of judicial conduct, 22 NYCRR 100, and any other rules not mandatory to comply with.

If that is so, why have those rules?  In other words, the New York State Court of Appeals, while aiming to do one particular thing - prejudge a case, kill a criminal appeal and make it so much more difficult to appeal from misdemeanor cases (handled by justice courts, "not of record" with presiding judges who do not have ANY required level of formal education, even Kindertarten) - in fact, invalidated ALL of its own court rules - as unreliable.

Sweet.

Also, the New York State Court of Appeals indicated that court audio recording equipment should not be trusted - and that judges who control such recording equipment in justice courts should not be trusted.

If judges should not be trusted, how can they be allowed to preside over cases?

That is one interesting consequence of the decision.

Issue # 4 - an equal protection problem: why the same transcripts, produced off court audio recordings, are unreliable for appeals in misdemeanor cases, but are reliable for appeals in felony cases? 

Justice courts in New York state handle not only misdemeanors - to which People v Smith applied.

Justice courts also handle initial stages of felony proceedings, such as the initial arraignments in felony proceedings, setting bail and the so-called preliminary hearings, or, in the legal jargon, "felony hearings" that responsible defense counsel usually require of the prosecution, and especially if the defendant is held in jail.

And, when a criminal defendant appeals from a felony case, he produces all transcripts of all proceedings held "on record" - and that usually includes felony hearings (if they were held), arraignments and bail hearings in the lower, justice courts.

Huh?

So, here is a series of million dollar questions in the aftermath of People v Smith:

1) Why any portion of felony proceedings in New York are handled by a court "not of record" where both the recording equipment for creating the record in the initial stages of such proceedings is unreliable and judges handling that recording equipment are not trustworthy - where an affidavit of the ENTIRE criminal proceedings (which could be months of conferences, motion hearings and trials) is officially deemed, by the highest court in the state MORE reliable than an audio recording produced on court equipment by the presiding judge handling that court equipment?

Didn't the handling of the initial proceedings by justice courts in New York become a constitutional problem as a result of People v Smith?

2) A jurisdictional/interpretational problem for the intermediate appellate court - intermediate appellate courts in New York always require that on appeal appellants provide transcripts of all proceedings "held on record".

I touched upon that issue in my previous blog - but only in regards to appeals from Family Courts. 

I will repeat and expand the question here - how do appellants now appeal as of right to intermediate appellate courts in New York in the aftermath of People v Smith, claiming that any courts where stenographers do not take record of court proceedings are courts "not of record", even those where audio record is taken on court's own equipment?

That includes:

1. appeals from convictions on misdemeanors, DESPITE People v Smith,
2. appeals from all Family Court proceedings, and
3. appeals from convictions in felony cases where a portion of the felony case was handled by a justice court.

After People v Smith, how do appellants deal the transcript requirements in proceedings held "on record" to intermediate appellate courts?

An appeal from a misdemeanor conviction has two "as of right" stages New York - County Court and Appellate Divisions.

Now that "Affidavit of Errors" is established as a jurisdictional requirement, can the court even require a transcript of proceedings if it was not from proceedings "held on record".  Aren't transcripts from such proceedings just reduced to meaningless documents having no legal force and unreliable?

And, as a result:

Issue # 5  Another million dollar question, now to taxpayers - isn't the funding of expensive audio recording equipment for New York justice courts AND Family Courts is now illegal under People v Smith?

Issue # 6 Isn't making defendants pay for transcripts from audio files created by courts "not of record" and to provide such transcripts as part of Record on Appeal now illegal under People v Smith, because such transcripts has no legal force as compared an affidavit from memory?

Issue # 7  If defendants (or respondents in Family Court) are indigent, isn't it now illegal to have their transcripts from audio files created by courts "not of record" paid by the Counties/taxpayers - when such transcripts, in accordance with People v Smith, the decision of the top court of New York State, do not have legal force, are not necessary and "affidavit of errors" are now the only reliable standard for record on appeal from courts "not of record".

Right?

I know from experience that prosecutors, especially career lifetime prosecutors like Janet DiFiore who authored People v Smith, are not used to thinking even a couple of steps ahead, because their "thought muscle", let's put it this way, is atrophied from not being used over the years - and it's not being used over the years because anything is given to prosecutors by courts anyway on a silver platter, no matter how unlawful or insane their actions are, but still. 

What kind of mess DiFiore just created?

And now to Issue # 8.  Affidavit of Errors on WHOSE MEMORY?

The trial attorney definitely cannot inject himself/herself as a witness into the proceeding that can be reversed AND REMANDED BACK to the trial court - because then the attorney will disqualify him/herself for that remand.

Then, we are talking about the memory of the criminal defendant?

Seriously?

Now the LEGAL STANDARD for appeal "as of right" is dependent on the MEMORY OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT?

First of all, is average human memory of ANY human being CAPABLE to retain and accurately recall BETTER THAN THE AUDIORECORDING what occurred in proceedings (traumatic, stressful proceedings for the defendant) over the period of days, months, sometimes years?

If that would be true, ladies and gentlemen, why are we such idiots and why we even invest, as taxpayers into audio AND VIDEO recordings of our government?  Isn't it cheaper not to waste money on all that super-expensive video equipment and streaming from, let's say, U.S. Congress and other public hearings?

Chief New York Judge Janet DiFiore in People v Smith did not even consider the question whether human memory is even CAPABLE of producing an accurate "Affidavit of Errors" that the statute sets as a "jurisdictional requirement", or whether it is fair to require a defendant not only sit their and prepare a defense, but to produce the "Affidavit of Errors".

Second, can a statute or a court interpreting that statute presume that a particular defendant must have that "better than audio recording" memory for purposes of Affidavit of Errors?

What is the evidentiary basis of such presumption?

Will now courts be checking memories of all criminal defendants at arraignments to verify whether they are able to produce a reliable Affidavit of Errors?  Or will that not be required?

Third, how can an "appeal as of right" depend upon VARYING individual human qualities of criminal defendants, such as their memories, which can differ because of genetic predisposition, disability, and depend on quality of education, which, in turn, depends on moneys invested - or not invested - into such education of a particular defendant?

And, fourth, shouldn't the defendant be advised by the court at the outset of criminal proceedings, at arraignment, that the defendant must memorize the entire proceeding and spot errors in it in order to have a right to appeal?

From which flows, as a fifth, doesn't spotting errors in the trial require a legal training - and then, the Affidavit of Errors illegally requires a trial lawyer to memorize the proceedings, on top of everything else the lawyer is doing - and for the lawyer to inject himself as a witness in that proceeding and produce an "Affidavit of Errors" (whether he is retained for the appellate stage of the case or not) in order for his client to preserve his right to appeal?

So MANY bizarre questions arise out of ONE case "authored" by a political appointee/career prosecutor, the newly minted Chief Judge Janet DiFiore.

Isn't the answer to all of that insanity created by DiFiore not only that she does not think - or does not care - what legal consequences her decision will produce or how insane will it look (because nobody ever will get her off her throne due to her political connections, favors owed to her by high-standing politicians, and compromising information she knows about too many high-standing politicians and can hold over their heads).

Isn't the answer to all that is that courts will not even review all these issues and simply reject them as "frivolous" - based on their absolute "discretion"?

But wait - didn't DiFiore in People v Smith just scrap all court rules, including rules of frivolous conduct, as unnecessary for application and overridden by even insane statutory requirements, like the one putting the "Affidavit of Errors" in appeals from courts "not of record"?

And isn't the answer to the whole mess created by People v Smith in that the pre-judged POLICY of the decision is to simply make appeals from justice courts handled by incompetent and uneducated judges impossible or next to impossible?

Or, isn't the answer readily suggested by People v Smith is that the Affidavit of Errors, even though deemed a "jurisdictional defect" if not provided, is A FORMALITY, and a defense counsel can put together a couple of issues, have the defendant sign the affidavit, submit the affidavit to the court - and then proceed STILL with the "unreliable" transcripts from the "unreliable" audio file, like it was before?

But, then, doesn't People v Smith teach to accept crookedness of court decisions, and that certain things need to be done unlawfully and in violation of criminal defendant's rights - in order to preserve defendant's rights?  Because that's exactly what the requirement to produce Affidavit of Errors means - it means violation of the defendant's right to remain silent, or right toe effective assistance of counsel at trial - in order to preserve his right to appeal.

DiFiore definitely needs to be taken off the bench - for a thinking disability.  Mental disability is constitutional grounds for removal of judges in the State of New York, isn't it?

Issue # 9 Doesn't a criminal defendant have a right to remain silent, even throughout criminal appeals?

Courts have held that, pending appeal, a convicted criminal defendant cannot be forced to admit guilt or punished for not admitting guilt - thus meaning that courts recognize that the right to remain silent extends during the pendency of criminal appeals, otherwise criminal appeals will be meaningless and moot if a defendant can be simply forced to confess as soon as he is convicted by the lower court.

If, in accordance with People v Smith - and a statute - now IN ORDER TO APPEAL, the Defendant MUST SPEAK and produce an "Affidavit of Errors", doesn't it violate the defendant's constitutional right to be silent?

*   *   *

As I said above, I understand that prosecutors are not required to think - but prosecutors who are appointed as judges (and especially as judges of the highest state court handling constitutional appeals, and constitutional criminal appeals) are expected to think.

And, if Difiore has a "thinking disability", as she demonstrates by producing decisions such as in People v Smith, she should be taken off the bench.  Shouldn't she?

A sort of "civil double jeopardy" in disciplinary proceedings claimed in North Carolina - by a judge - and the fates of corrupt judicial decisions

Imagine.

An attorney is sued for fraud, and the court partially finds on liability against the attorney, but the case continues to trial on damages.  And the court may award, by statute, PUNITIVE damages against the attorney. 

And a federal court recently ruled that a state court lawsuit for fraud brought by private parties is entitled to be treated as a proceeding brought by the state - because when private parties are suing in tort for a "wrong", that is a "matter of public interest", transforming a private action into a state action - and so the federal court dismissed a civil rights lawsuit based on a Younger abstention usually applied only to proceedings brought by the government against individuals.

That decision was made by former Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York Gary L. Sharpe in Neroni v Becker (my husband's case) - and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed in a summary order for the "thoughtful and well-reasoned decision".

"Great" logic, shown here:

 The "logic" was -

• since private parties sought "punishment" for a "wrong" in a civil action;
• since the civil statute under which private parties brought the lawsuit has a criminal element - even though not used by the state, and
• since a disciplinary proceedings was commenced during the pendency of the private action (by a committee where one of the members was representing the attorney for those private parties) -

a private action is "AS IF" a state proceeding and entitled to the Younger protection.

If you are interested to read about the Mokay saga - you can type "Mokay" or "Mokay saga" in the search window on the right, I wrote a lot about it, and especially about the affidavit provided by one of the "Mokay children" (alleged plaintiffs) after the Mokay Children "won" a $300,000 judgment after an ex parte hearing where public was not allowed (and where exhibits were admitted without reading by boxes and disappeared from the record on directions of the trial judge, who was subpoenaed as a hostile witness to the trial, but quashed subpoena against himself).  In that affidavit, an individual put as a plaintiff in the Mokay action, for 7.5 years, claimed he never was a plaintiff and that he was added to the lawsuit by fraud of an attorney, son of a judge Richard Harlem of Oneonta, New York. - but courts so far are refusing to recognize the affidavit and the doom that it spelled to the entire Mokay case, and court decisions based on Mokay.

Too many careers are riding on legitimacy of the Mokay decisions - and derivative decisions - to vacate any decisions "simply" because the were brought about by fraud - like the 2nd Circuit court did with a 9 billion dollar judgment against Chevron for poisoning people's water in Ecuador.  Nope - we can't punish a corporation for poisoning people's water because that court decision was obtained - of course - by fraud.  If a Joe Doe from the street claims the same about an American court - Joe Doe will simply be sanctioned, and the corrupt court decision will remain "in full force and effect".  After all, what was Joe Doe thinking - that he was Chevron?

But wait - if the person is ALREADY disciplined - or sought to be disciplined in a future damages trial in a civil proceeding that is likened to a "state proceeding" (see Neroni v Becker above), where punitive damages are sought - can the attorney be disciplined additionally, through an attorney disciplinary proceedings?


In other words, can two civil courts impose discipline for the same conduct?

No, this issue did not creep up into my "always frivolous", "crackpot" and "misguided" mind (I am just citing to characterization of my legal arguments that came from attorneys and judges in pleadings and decisions over the years).

This issue has actually crept into the mind of a judge and attorneys representing him in North Carolina where "North Carolina’s highest court is scheduled to hear arguments this week on whether Senior Resident Superior Court Judge Jerry Tillett can be disciplined by two different state regulatory agencies for the same conduct".

Of course, Judge Tillet framed his issue a little differently - can two DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES sanction a judge at the same time for the same conduct?

But wait - is a disciplinary court in attorney disciplinary proceedings now an AGENCY?

That is yet another of my "frivolous issues" that caused the same U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York to impose an anti-filing injunction for frivolous conduct on my husband (again) - and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed in a summary order the "thoughtful and well-reasoned decision of the trial court".

I raised that particular issue, that "court" disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are in fact administrative disciplinary actions by agencies and are not entitled to the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar in federal court.

I raised that issue on behalf of my husband, in Neroni v Zayas, Case No. 3:13-cv-127-LEK-DEP.

LEK means Senior U.S. District Court judge Lawrence Kahn - who confuses me with my husband and vice versa, as I recently discovered.

DEP is U.S. Magistrate David Peebles who recently held an ex parte oral argument of an ex parte motion about me without notice to me or my presence, and sealed the transcript of that argument immediately, but an attorney who "lacks a filter" emerged out of that hearing with knowledge that

I was suspended from the practice of law for my own civil rights lawsuits AND FOR MY HUSBAND's lawsuits against political figures in New York State and Northern District of New York.

Yep - and that's while my husband sued those "figures" pro se (without me representing him) from 2011 to now, (Neroni v Coccoma, see my blog about "assigned counsel for the rich", Neroni v Mayberger).  Apparently, the suspending court - without telling me - has found my evil mind lurking behind my husband in these pro se actions.

But - when people see things that are not there, isn't it some kind of mental disability?

As to how many "political figures" my husband sued in his legal career from 1974 to 2011, including for 24 years before I even met my husband and was living in another country - I cannot tell, but attorney Carroll tells me my law license was suspended for my husband's lawsuits, and since attorney Carroll was not yet sanctioned for telling the court a lie, I must believe him that I was suspended for was the truth - that I was suspended for whatever grudge whichever "political figure" who my husband sued from 1974 to 2011 (and pro se from 2011 to now) developed and retaliated against me.

After all, wife and husband are one.  So when a wife's law license is suspended for a grudge against the husband - it is perfectly lawful.

Right?

Back to Neroni v Zayas.

Remember judge Tillet's claim that a disciplinary action against an attorney is an administrative action?


When I, on Mr. Neroni's behalf, raised the same issue in NDNY court - arguing against application of the Rooker-Feldman "jurisdictional bar" to a decision in attorney disciplinary proceedings, because they are administrative in nature (because a court revoking an attorney's license is an administrative agency no different than an administrative board revoking any other occupational license), the NDNY judge Lawrence Kahn did apply the Rooker-Feldman bar in March of 2014 though, deeming revocation of an attorney's occupational license a "court action" while revocation of a medical occupational license would be an administrative action in the same blessed state of New York - go figure.

In October of 2014, without waiting for the end of proceedings in Neroni v Zayas, Judge Sharpe (a different judge from the presiding judge Kahn) imposed an anti-filing injunction upon Mr. Neroni for his (actually, his attorney's - mine) "frivolous" arguments that an attorney disciplinary action is an administrative proceeding, not a court proceeding, because all other revocations of occupational licenses, of doctors, teachers, taxi-drivers are all administrative.

The 2nd Circuit affirmed the anti-filing injunction against Mr. Neroni, specifically indicating that it is protecting defendants in the "types of cases" my husband was filing - civil rights cases against the government - from "frivolous" arguments - such as that attorney disciplinary proceedings are administrative in nature and that appellate courts who are joined at the hip with attorney disciplinary boards constitute one body, and decisions of such a "blended body" are not lawful.

Enter Judge Jerry Tillet, of North Carolina, with the exact same "frivolous" argument to the North Carolina Supreme Court, advanced by the judge's lawyers - that attorney discipline is imposed by administrative "agencies" (while discipline is imposed by the Court).  Sounds funny, "judge's lawyers", right?

Judge Jerry Tillet is a judge - well, obviously.

And, judges of Jerry Tillet's level in North Carolina are also licensed attorneys.  And Judge Tillet is a licensed attorney - obviously.

So, Judge Tillet first became an attorney, subject to rules of professional conduct of attorneys, and then ADDED to that the position of a judge, and rules of judicial conduct.

When Judge Tillet committed misconduct - to which the judge agreed in a judicial disciplinary proceeding (with a reprimand), the North Carolina State bar pursued the judge also with an attorney disciplinary proceedings, because the judge's conduct violated not only rules of judicial conduct, but rules of attorney conduct, while the judge (see above) is a licensed attorney, agreed to follow those rules, and his judicial position is CONDITIONED on the judge being a licensed attorney - and following those rules.

That's logical, isn't it?

I mean - for the North Carolina bar to pursue a judge who is a licensed attorney and who admitted to violating rules of judicial conduct, where his conduct is also a violation of the rules governing his attorney license is lawful and logical, right?

Yet, the North Carolina Supreme Court so far STAYED the disciplinary proceeding of North Carolina State Bar against Judge Tillet - pending determination whether it can allow a disciplinary action by two "state agencies".

Meaning, the North Carolina Supreme Court is an agency?  And as a court (or an agency?), it is stopping its own action as an agency against a judge because there cannot be two disciplinary actions against a judge for the same conduct, but for violation of different sets of rules?

But wait - even with criminal cases, the same conduct can be subject to the reach of two different statutes - state and federal for example, and courts regularly deny CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS double jeopardy because the same conduct can violate one statute in state law and another in federal law.

Ok, we are not in criminal proceedings, I remember that.  Vaguely.  Because civil and criminal, court and administrative actions have become so confused lately due to decisions of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York in my husband's cases. 

Or wait - did those courts also confuse my husband with me?  They did, didn't they?  Judge Kahn recently denied my husband's motion as mine, and the State of New York stripped me last year of my law license, hard earned when I already had three children, one of them adult, and while I studied for three years away from home and my children, and passed the extremely hard New York State bar on a first sitting in a language that was not my native language - so, why again was I stripped of my law license?

As recently was revealed to me - based on my lawsuits in my professional capacity as a civil rights attorney whose job is - surprise! - sue the government, for suing the government, and for lawsuits of my husband (who practiced law since 1974 when I was 11 years old and happily went to school in Russia),  and for alleged actions of my husband before I was admitted to the bar (my disciplinary Charge I Specification I), and for sanctions imposed upon me by a judge who was my husband's rival and law school classmate for actions of my husband in a court case in 2008 and in an administrative environmental case in 2001 to 2008, also before I was admitted to the bar.

Right, so where were we?

Oh - a North Carolina judge targeted at the same time by judicial disciplinary proceedings and attorney disciplinary proceedings - and claiming it is wrong.

By the way - why was Judge Tillet reprimanded in the judicial disciplinary proceedings in the first place?

Please, don't laugh - for interference in the affairs of a town and a District Attorney's office in the town - I asked you not to laugh, remember? - called Kill Devil Hills.

Yep.

Do not interfere with the devil, the devil will bite' ya.

Seriously, I will look into how did Judge Tillet hurt the feelings of the Kill Devil Hills town officials and especially of the District Attorney and will blog about it separately.

For purposes of this blog - I often write on this blog about how courts' decisions and perspectives suddenly shift when an issue is raised by a powerful party - and then by a more powerful party.

Let's face it - in the eyes of many of my new compatriots, American lawyers, judges and lay individuals I, an immigrant female attorney, after 18 years in this country, 7 years as a citizen, 7 years as a sworn officer of the court - still remain a glorified prostitute, that's exactly how Russian women are stereotyped in American moves.

And, while some people express that idea openly, see comments directed at me here in retaliation for coverage of a story of arson and attempted murder upon three people in retaliation for a born-American woman's stand against judicial misconduct:

others simply act upon deeming me "stupid mail order bride bitch", and a Russian "stupid mail order bride bitch" who teaches them - THEM! the "political figures"! - how to live and who raises those frivolous constitutional arguments.

I already had a view of one judge, Judge Mary Rita Connerton of Binghamton, expressed to me in a court opinion where Judge Connerton had to mention my "furrowed brow, hurried speech and disrespect to authorities" - while dismissing a fabricated child neglect case against me and my husband.

"Furrowed brow and hurried speech" are actually signs of stress and concentration of a person speaking on an important issue, under stressful condition and not in his or her native language.  Judge Connerton did not mention my accent - which was very evident when I spoke - but instead chose to replace the accent (which would be a basis for a complaint against the judge for discrimination) by "furrowed brow and hurried speech", which was essentially the same if it is a characteristic of speech of a non-native speaker.

So, when I, who is (see above) raised a constitutional issue in federal court on behalf of my husband, a career criminal defense, family court and civil rights attorney - disbarred in proceedings rigged by son of a judge and his attorney who was on the disciplinary board (do you follow me still? one can lose oneself in this maze of crookedness) - the system of the powerful "locals" retaliated, and my law license was suspended.

Yet, my clients - with, maybe, two exceptions over 7 years of practice - were all American citizens.  By the way.

And, I was told about the real reasons of my suspension over 8 months after my suspension, only accidentally, and only because an attorney who "lacks a filter" (the media's words, not mine) and who offered $100,000 to my former client to make a false affidavit against me in court (I have incontrovertible evidence on file as to that), was so pissed with me because I wanted to be paid for 3.5 years of my work and not just allow that "filterless" attorney to be paid for my work (do you still follow me?) - and the real reasons for suspension of my law license is that somebody who my husband may have sued when I went to school in another country as a child, may still hold a grudge against my husband, and that grudge travelled to remove my law license.

Again - do you follow me?  Makes perfect sense, doesn't it?

It is all documented, by the way, I am not delirious.

And, as I said above, an anti-filing injunction was imposed upon my husband for my frivolous arguments - which became good meritorious arguments once they are voiced by a judge in North Carolina, obviously.

Now I am reading that those same frivolous arguments, when raised by Judge Tillet's attorneys in North Carolina court - or administrative? - proceeding are deemed as valid, at least to impose a stay on the court - or administrative? - attorney disciplinary proceedings - because a judge asked for it.


So, maybe - just maybe - the 2nd Circuit did something  very good by doing something very bad - denying relief to poisoned people because the judgment in favor of poisoned people was obtained allegedly through a corrupt judicial decision - in Ecuador, and a poor dear corporation that poisoned those people suffered.

But, in our country with precedential law, a precedent is now created that corrupt court decisions are not entitled to full faith and credit?

Right?  Applicable to all corrupt judicial decisions?  Right?

And the decision in the 2nd Circuit is not just tailor-made because some judges needed some sponsorships for some trips from some corporations?

And yes, I do realize that I am not even a Joe Doe, I am simply a Russian "stupid mail order bride bitch" - and, as a Texas American-born attorney Ty Clevenger targeted for disbarment for exact same reasons as the immigrant low life me was suspended, expressed in his blog, "such a peon as" a whistleblower against judicial misconduct is is not entitled to the same treatment in courts as the "golden boys and girls" who are ruining the whistleblower's lives.

But still.

People are not stupid.

People see judicial corruption happening across the United States.

And for how long can the blatant judicial corruption when the same idea expressed by a Tatiana Doe ends the Doe's livelihood, but is considered meritorious if coming from the lips of a judge can survive without people going out into the streets?


When courts play yoyo with the law, judges who "author" decisions that contradict every legal principle in the book, each other, logic, fairness or evidence in the record - not only look like candidates for an insane asylum, they invite the public not to consider their decisions as serious - or lawful.

And why did we have the judiciary (all those expensive court buildings, equipment, personnel salaries funded by taxpayers) in the first place?

So that some rich boys have a place and time (paid by us) to decide cases for their friends and to revenge against whoever step on their toes?

I don't think so.

We have the judiciary as an alternative, not a way to promote, personal vendettas.

If the country cannot believe in reasonableness and legitimacy of decisions of its courts because - obviously, as it is shown above, those decisions sway like a wind driven only by personal grudges and personal feelings of judges - we don't have a judiciary and we don't have enforceable laws.

And that means - the country can sink into chaos any day.  It is already happening.

We need enforceable laws.

And we need honest judges to enforce them.  Otherwise this country sooner or later will sink into bloodshed.

We need to clean up the act of our judiciary for them - because they themselves won't do it - and we need to do it yesterday.

Yet another attorney-blogger who criticized judicial misconduct, specifically, criminal sexual misconduct of two federal judges, ex parte communications of federal judges, and misconduct of personal lawyers of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and of judicial nominee of President Obama is targeted for disbarment. A tribute to the courage of attorney Ty Clevenger

I wrote on this blog about attorney Ty Clevenger who outed through complaints and blogs misconduct, including sexual misconduct, of several federal judges and high-ranking politically connected attorneys.

Specifically, some high-ranking public officials who got into the cross-hairs of Ty Clevenger's criticism are listed below, and the main target of Ty Clevenger's criticism was Judge Walter Scott Smith Jr., of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas

Walter Smith was outed by attorney Clevenger for sexual misconduct revealed in attorney Clevenger's own disciplinary proceedings in the State of Texas - dismissed proceedings - where the victim of Judge Smith testified under oath that Judge Walter Smith:

1. spotted her years before he started sexually harassing her, because the judge actually had in his private chambers monitors where he saw court employees coming and going from the courthouse, and the victim was initially the newly-hired probation officer;
2. after the victim was promoted to become a court clerk four year later judge Smith used his power as the judicial officer to order the victim to appear in his private chambers at the time was drunk on the job, groped her when she appeared, and propositioned to her;
3. when the victim got away from Judge Smith and notified her superior not to leave her alone with Judge Smith because of her advances, Judge Smith started to pursue her by sending her flower bouquets, pressing her to go to rendezvous with the judge outside of the courthouse,  ordering the victim's superior to step away and keep away while judge stayed alone with the victim, and, when the victim was forced to leave her job and filed an employment discrimination complaint,
4. the victim was restored in her job, but then the judge created an impossible hostile atmosphere at work where the victim was actually blamed for making a complaint against the judge by co-workers who had to tolerate the judge's misconduct; and,
5. the judge caused his law clerk to exert pressure upon the victim to withdraw the complaint,
6. and exerted pressure on another employee in the courthouse who tried to reason with the judge and protect the victim, to also resign from the job.

See one of my blog about misconduct of Judge Smith here.

Likely because of Ty Clevenger complaints and blogs, the investigation against Judge Walter Smith that initially ended in just a reprimand and a short suspension without loss of judgeship, without loss of law license and without referral of the judge to criminal investigative and prosecutorial authorities, recently renewed and "deepened".

In April of 2016, attorney Ty Clevenger asked the U.S. Chief Judge John Roberts to speed up investigation of Judge Smith.

In response, Ty Clevenger was targeted with disbarment proceedings, where disbarment charges were filed by personal counsel for presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, and attorney for Bill Clinton during the Monica Lewinsky scandal, attorney David Kendall (and a former clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White) who was among her team of lawyers who destroyed evidence, specifically, THIRTY THOUSAND of e-mails on Hillary Clinton's private server, where such evidence was targeted by both court subpoenas and Freedom of Information Act requests.

By the way, it was recently reported by a Sun Foundation, a watchdog of government compliance with access-to-records requests, that the U.S. Department was not exactly truthful with the U.S. President as to the rate of disclosure on those FOIA requests - and that it was simply an "inaccurate report", given what Hillary Clinton's legal team did, is an understatement of the century, it looks more like deliberate shielding of high-standing public official from requests that could expose them to criminal charges, see also what is done all over the country to people who seek access to public records, see what happened specifically in the State of Georgia last month. 

I was actually personally sanctioned and ordered to pay tens of thousands in sanctions and opponent's legal fees for "harassing" opponents (a former judge) through disclosure of his misconduct in a court proceeding based on information I obtained through an access-to-public-record request.  Moreover, my license was suspended by a judge in response to a motion based on information received through such an access-to-records request revealing that the "judge"'s claim that he is a judge is not based on competent evidence required by law and is, thus, false.

See also how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, a court that habitually puts civil rights appeals on a "fast-and-sloppy" track of summary non-precedential orders (see also my blog here) made by extremely old judges, is trying to stall my FOIA request about potential widespread corruption between federal and state judges and politically connected attorneys that 2nd Circuit covers up for, and likely has been covering up for - for decades.

Individuals seeking public records and exposing such records of misconduct and corruption of public officials are usually citizens hurt by such misconduct, journalists and civil rights attorneys.

All of these people, as explained, with proof, above, are subject to harsh retribution in this country by the politically powerful targets of the criticism and their helpers.

Ty Clevenger's case is no exception.

After all, he not only publicly criticized judicial corruption in his blog, but published the actual transcript of testimony implicating a federal judge Walter Smith in sexual misconduct against at least one and possibly more court employees.

That was, of course, unforgivable, and the former law clerk of a U.S. Supreme Court justice, a former counsel of the U.S. President Bill Clinton, the present counsel of presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and the chair of disciplinary committee (what "coincidences"!) of the D.C. Circuit court
David Kendall, had to file disbarment charges against Ty Clevenger based on trumped up charges, while himself engaging in criminal conduct that is not subject to discipline because David Kendall is a "golden boy" and is above the law, and

who used attorney disciplinary proceedings as a tool of political destruction of critics of judicial misconduct, and who himself, by public admission of his high-ranking client, engaged in a crime, was not investigated or prosecuted, in a disciplinary proceeding or in a criminal proceeding.

That the D.C. District Court for the District of Columbia actually uses attorney disciplinary boards staffed by supermajority of attorneys, competitors to those attorneys the boards investigate and prosecute, in violation of the recent precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court declaring that disciplinary board consisting of super-majorities of market players (licensed attorneys disciplining licensed attorneys) is a violation of federal (civil and criminal) antitrust laws (see also a letter from a former federal antitrust prosecutor on liability of such attorney grievance committees for doing what they are doing to Ty Clevenger), and in violation of the recent ruling of the D.C. District Court's supervising court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit that regulation of an industry by a participant and a competitor in the industry is a violation of due process of law of the competitors.

Obviously, while the D.C. Circuit Court rules that it is a violation of the "regulated" businesses and individual's due process rights when they are regulated, or rather, railroaded (pun intended since the D.C. Circuit case refers to regulation of the railroad industry by Amtrak) by their own competitors, the D.C. District Court continues to appoint competitors to railroad attorneys like Ty Clevenger who dare to expose judicial misconduct - bad judicial misconduct, sexual criminal judicial misconduct, as well as bad criminal misconduct of attorneys with political connections to the highest echelons of power in this country. 

By the way, the dismissed Texas State disciplinary proceeding against attorney Ty Clevenger where the victim of sexual misconduct of federal judge Walter Smith testified was conveniently brought on  complaint of an attorney who represented, without disclosure, Judge Smith's in the judicial investigation of his misconduct. The attorney was rewarded for representing Judge Smith in the investigation by protection from well deserved discipline. 

The convenient disbarment proceedings were brought against attorney Ty Clevenger in the D.C. Circuit court by an attorney who conveniently destroyed e-mails that likely presented evidence of Hillary Clinton's criminal conduct and could have secured, instead of presidency, prison, disbarment and disgrace for Hillary Clinton.  Attorney Kendall was rewarded for his criminal conduct on behalf of Hillary Clinton similarly with protection from discipline or criminal prosecution.

By the way, and, of course, coincidentally, Hillary Clinton is the preferred candidate of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Ginsburg who recently was subject of criticism for her public statement that Hillary Clinton's opponent, presidential candidate Donald Trump, is a "faker" and has "no consistency".

Justice Ginsburg also claimed that if Donald Trump gets elected, Justice Ginsburg will have to flee to New Zealand.

Statements of a judge in anticipation of "Gore v Bush" # 2 with a harsh personal opinion about one of potential parties in front of her in such a case, constituted judicial misconduct, but Justice Ginsburg was not impeached.

Justice Ginsburg did not express regret - initially - for her personal remarks against Donald Trump and, when Donald Trump publicly stated that Justice Ginsburg should resign, stated "gloomily" that she does not know how Donald Trump can become president and that he gets "too much of free publicity."

Yet, when criticism against Justice Ginsburg heated up, Justice Ginsburg did express making remarks about Donald Trump, but did not resign, and very recently, 9 days ago, reportedly held private out-of-court meetings with attorneys "and their guests" at a private resort in New Mexico, discussing who knows what in ex parte meetings with those attorneys "and their guests".

Just in February of this year, another U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Antonin Scalia's misconduct was revealed only after he turned up dead also at a private resort, but in Texas, at the border with Mexico, when his death was clouded with secrecy, local laws were violated in how his death was pronounced without an autopsy, and his body was secretly whisked out of the crime scene and criminal jurisdiction, evidence destroyed by embalming his body, and then his body was removed to Washington and he was hastily and pompously buried. 

I wrote a lot about that occurrence, my blogs can be found by a word-search "Antonin Scalia" in the search window on the right of this blog, but one of the most prominent statements made about Antonin Scalia's passing was that we as a nation should not allow ourselves to lament the passing of a racist judge caught dead, literally, during a trip suggesting corruption, simply because of his high status.

Recently, yet another U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Sonya Sotomayor, expressed at yet another private gathering, in Alaska, that criticism against her "get to her stomach", sending out a clear chilling message to attorneys and parties who appear in front of her, or have a possibility of their cases heading towards her court, to shut up and not criticize her no matter what misconduct she is involved in.

I already broke that rule, by criticizing Justice Sotomayor in September of 2015, "coincidentally" 2 months before suspension of my law license, for potential corruption;  in May of 2016, see also here, and June of 2016, for advocacy of slavery ;  and in August of 2016 for making a thinly veiled threat against those who criticize her.

"Coincidentally", after I criticized ALL the U.S. Supreme Court justices for misconduct in book-writing while tossing meritorious cases without review and for "sponsoring" (in words) the law clerks for all expenses paid trips to England at the expense of secret bodies funded by their secret attorney members and their foreign colleagues, an anonymous criticizer who admitted only to being a male lawyer, but who was likely a judge or a person close to the U.S. Supreme Court justices, published comments on my blog, castigating me for my allegedly "misguided" criticism of judicial misconduct.

When my criticism continued, I was quickly suspended from the practice of law.

Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court was outed for more corruption when a foreign reputable media source, the Reuters agency, published an article about "The Echo Chamber", 66 attorneys with ties to the court, former law clerks of Justices of the court, former colleagues or social contacts (57 men, 9 women, no blacks), who continuously "win" discretionary review in front of the U.S. Supreme Court - at the time when the court cut its intake in half from 1980s by 2009 while the population increased at least 1/3 by the same 2009, and while the Internet, smart phones and social media cause an extraordinary surge of civil rights litigation lately based on documented evidence of governmental misconduct.

With that background, it is not at all surprising that, when attorney Ty Clevenger asked the Chief U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Roberts to speed up investigation of sexual misconduct of federal judge Walter Smith, attorney Ty Clevenger found himself facing a hasty disbarment proceeding.

Attorney Clevenger expects to be railroaded soon - not sorry, disbarred - because the disciplining court made it obvious, by providing Attorney Clevenger with less than 30 days' notice to prepare, less than 30 minutes to present his defense, and denied him the opportunity for discovery - what the court's judgement is going to be.

You do not criticize judges in this country without an expectation of harsh retribution.  Especially if you are an attorney.

Attorney Clevenger understands it well:

As law professor Carl Bogus stated in 2004 in a law review article (that was also the target of harsh criticism by the judiciary), attorneys must "scrape and bow"  to judges - or be destroyed.

Of course, lack of criticism of judges is not "cruelly unhelpful" to judges - it is actually what keeps them on their benches for decades no matter what misconduct, including criminal conduct, they engage in.

Not only lawyers treat judges as "omniscient", they are paying for seminars where judges tell lawyers about their whims - so that lawyers could serve them better.  Please, note that since I ran the blog, the CLE provider conspicously removed the description of the "pet peeves" program - which happens often with links to content exposing judicial misconduct.

I am not proud.

I saved that content, predicting that it will be deleted once the blog exposes it, and just reposted it in the update to the original blog, and here - please, note that the "precious face time with local judges" is sold, for $359 a lawyer, to be exact.

Professor Carl Bogus in his law review article "The Culture of Quiescence" clearly points out at a taboo on criticism of the judiciary - in Rhode Island, but it exists throughout the country, as cases I keep describing on this blog since its beginning in March of 2014 show.

Like the D.C. District is trying to do to attorney Ty Clevenger - who obviously does not scrape or bow.

Good for him!

Yet, professor Bogus calls upon attorneys - and rightfully so - to display leadership and courage, in large numbers, to criticize judicial misconduct:

Yet, it is easy to call people to go to barricades under bullets, but, when it becomes increasingly predictable what happens to those people who actually do go there and display their courage and "leadership" - like it is about to happen to attorney Ty Clevenger - calling for attorneys to fall on the sword is not enough.

What is needed is a grass roots movement to eliminate the source of power and retaliation against attorneys destroying and eliminating from the reach of legal consumers those attorneys who display that "leadership", with courage, honesty, and competence.

And such a grass roots movement is already rising - in the media, on the Internet, step by step, We the People, we citizen journalists do our work, day by day, and the tide is turning.

Just look at the number of judges removed or disciplined after a public outrage in social media, and even criminally prosecuted. 
We are not powerless.

And we need to keep going.

Like Ty Clevenger does with his blog.

The 6th Circuit's strike at the Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act helps towards the road to overturn the stifling occupational licensing schemes that cripple the U.S. economy and hurt employment opportunities and consumer choices

Sex offender laws are a boon for politicians.  No other laws gain more political capital than laws "protecting the children" or "protecting the community" from sexual predators.

Under the guise of such laws, immature teenagers who have sex with one another, or who send nude pictures to one another, have been stripped, for life, of opportunities to go to school, live with their families, have proper jobs, have children or enjoy watching their children perform in different school activities.

As with other criminal cases, most sex offense convictions are obtained in this country on a plea bargain, with no jury reviewing the issues, and often when charges are fabricated through police or prosecutorial misconduct, but when the defendant has a "choice" - to plea to a lesser offense, register as a sex offender, but not go to jail, or to go to jail or prison for a long time.

As with other criminal cases, sex offender laws are racist and disproportionately target the poor, while white privileged male do not get jail time even when convicted by a jury, as the recent Brock Turner/ Judge Aaron Persky case showed.

With more and more municipalities enacting more and more ordinances and restrictions upon "registered sex offenders", with more and more states also piling up those restrictions at the state level, it becomes impossible for "registered sex offenders" to find a place to live or work in this country.

While not many people would be sympathetic to the plight of registered sex offenders, people do not realize how easy it is to be falsely accused of such a crime - and forced into a plea in order to avoid jail time, and that the evidence of a conviction on a plea bargain does not necessarily indicate guilt.

That is especially so with the Romeo and Juliet cases of consensual sex between underage "offenders", in underage children criminally charged for possession or distribution of child porn, or in cases where sex abuse charges are wielded as a means to get advantage in some other proceeding - civil rights, divorce, custody, inheritance.

On August 25, 2016 an amazing court case came from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit.

Contrary to the usual tendency of federal appellate courts to put civil rights cases, especially those of "social pariahs" such as sex offenders, on a fast-and-sloppy track towards non-precedential summary orders (over 85% of federal appellate cases, and close to 100% of civil rights federal appellate cases are decided this way nowadays), the court actually issued a short, but well reasoned full opinion, striking as constitutional the entire sex-offender registration statute in the State of Michigan.

The decision is extremely well-reasoned and contains valuable analysis applicable not only to sex offender cases, but to all cases where the seemingly "civil" regulation is punitive in nature.

The determination whether the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) was an unconstitutional ex post facto law required a determination whether the law had a civil regulatory purpose or impose an additional punishment.

In determining that the law inflicted an additional punishment, the 6th Circuit performed a "history/traditional punishment" analysis, and concluded that SORA, even though it did not have legislative punitive purpose, in its application and effect mimicked the two historical criminal punishments of "banishment" and "shaming", and had close similarities to the current criminal punishments of parole and probation.

What is most amazing about the 6th Circuit's decision is that, instead of stopping at the determination, as the district court's did, that SORA had a "rational relationship to non-punitive purpose", which is how "regulatory" punishments that have little to no connection to their declared purpose are still upheld as constitutional by U.S. courts, the 6th Circuit went further and stated that:

"Intuitive as some may find this, the record before us provides scant support for the proposition that SORA in fact accomplishes its professed goal".

This is a huge step forward from the usual court reasoning that if any "rational" legislative intent and purpose can be found in a "regulatory" law, it is constitutional, without even an attempt to see whether the legislation does, in fact, serve its declared purpose in how it is applied.

In its analysis, the 6th Circuit points out to "the significant doubt cast by recent empirical studies on the pronouncement in [the 2003 Supreme Court decision upholding constitutionality of similar sex offender registration laws in Alaska] that '[t]he ris of recidivism posed by sex offenders is 'frightening and high'". 

The court points out that "[o]ne study suggests that sex offenders (a category that includes a great diversity of criminals, not just pedophiles) are actually less likely to recidivate than other sorts of criminals", and that "[e]ven more troubling is evidence in the record supporting a finding that offense-based public registration has, at best, no impact on recidivism."

The court actually points out that SORA, according to one study, increased recidivism by making it impossible for registered sex offenders to have a proper lawful job and earn an honest living.

The court pointed out that parties in that particular lawsuit were unable to prove that residential restrictions in SORA result in reduced recidivism of sex offenders.

It is also amazing that the court - finally as to all courts - chastised the state government for not even trying to analyze data it had as to whether there are any positive effects from restrictions imposed by its regulatory scheme, in this case, of a sex offender registration statute, specifically, as related to the extraordinary restrictions on "where registrants can live, work, and 'loiter'".

In doing so, the 6th Circuit overruled the traditional non-interference approach of federal courts expressed by the district court judge Robert H. Cleland of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan:

In other words, the state legislature introduced a law imposing severe restrictions on where people can live, walk around or earn a livelihood, some politicians gained some political capital on passing the law, but nobody cared to think - before the enactment - whether the law has a likelihood to help what it is seeking to help with, and after the enactment, whether the law is actually helping what it was supposed to help.

This stone cast by a court at a state government's actions is enormously important in reaching beyond any regulatory schemes with declared purposes to help protect somebody from something without any evidentiary basis that it will or does deliver on the declared purpose.

The 6th Circuit's reasoning in this case can certainly be applied to schemes in occupational licensing that are currently stifling the U.S. economy, fail to protect consumers, and instead restrict consumer choices, make needed services unnecessarily more expensive and less in variety, and restrict the poor from moving up in life while engaging in an honest trade that they are skilled at - let's talk a poor person who can bake magnificent pies, but will never be able to come up with the money to pay up front for all the educational and licensing requirements to get a government's permission to earn a living through selling his or her baked goods, even though the licensing requirements, although "rationally related" to the regulatory purpose, protecting safety of consumers of those pies, is not actually linked to statistics showing any reduction of food poisoning by consuming baked goods.

Let's note that many if not all occupational licensing schemes have been introduced without any evidence-based justification, and carry a punitive element, making it a crime to practice a licensed occupation or profession without a license, and thus monetizing criminal law because only those having funds, not those who are the most skilled and honest workers in that profession, can pay for a license.

For example, the 6th Circuit ruled that "[t]he requirement that registrants make frequent, in-person appearances before law enforcement, moreover, appears to have no relationship to public safety at all.  The punitive effect of these blanket restrictions thus far exceed even a generous assessment of their salutary effects".

Let's apply this statement instantly to the so-called "cottage food industry", the home-baked goods.

In the majority of states, there is a restriction on the gross sales of such goods before costly licensing requirements kick in.

Let's say, the restriction is that you cannot sell goods (in gross) for more than $15,000 a year.

Doesn't this restriction makes home-bake business deliberately unprofitable for, let's say, a stay at home mom, or especially for a single parent of several children?

Consider that to sell even $15,000 gross of home-baked goods, under the "lighter" licensing/registration requirements of the "cottage food industry", one needs to pay for:

1) equipment;
2) the electric;
3) water;
4) supplies - flour, sugar, salt, oil etc.;
5) shipping supplies;
6) labels

Baking at a volume that will amount even to $15,000 a year will take considerable time, too.  And, with the competition from larger bakeries who can drop prices to stifle out a competitor with better products, but less financial capacities, the need to keep prices low to sell anything at all may squeeze the actual profit margin to nearly nothing, making more sense for that parent to rather apply for public assistance than to work hours for literally nothing.

So, whatever is the "intended purpose" of the cottage food industry, its actual effect obliterating any possibility of profit by an arbitrarily imposed "gross sales" ceiling actually discourages people from engaging in this relatively easy trade, and thus leaving consumers with less choices, higher prices dictated by licensed bakeries that put their licensing costs into the price of products, and not necessarily better products than produced in an "Aunt Betty's kitchen" - probably, worse.

Yet, when such occupational licensing scheme is attacked, usually courts stop at the "legislative purpose rationally related to legitimate state interest to protect safety of consumers" and goes no further into the actual effect of the legislation and whether it delivers on its declared purpose.

And, since, if Aunt Betty sells $15,001.00 in a given year, she will likely be subject to criminal charges for practicing pie-baking without a license, this is exactly what the 6th Circuit described in relation to SORA, "[t]he punitive effects of these blanket restrictions thus far exceed even a generous assessment of their salutary effects /sic/" (I believe, the last word was meant as "purpose").

Leaving out SORA-specific statements in the 6th Circuit's decision, such as that SORA "consigns [registrants] to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on the margins ... from their own families with whom, due to school zone restrictions, they may not even live", the 6th Circuit actually made a statement that a regulatory scheme consigned those subject to it "to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on the margins, not only of society...".

By the way, here is the opinion of the district court that the 6th Circuit reversed.

That's exactly what occupational licensing restrictions do to the poor - consigning them to the margins of society and pushing them to depend on welfare where earning an honest living by selling products or services they make using their own skills - simply because their skills fall under an occupational licensing scheme and they do not have enough seed capital to pay for that licensing - or where, like in cottage food industry, the "lighter licensing" restrictions for home baked goods, specifically, the gross-sales cutoff at a low level, make production of those goods economically senseless. 

In addition to reaching behind the usual "comity" non-interference argument of federal courts and actually looking at whether the legislature, punitive in its effect, does what it claims it does, the court made a strong statement on Ex Post Facto laws:

"... the fact that sex offenders are so widely feared and disdained by the general public implicates the core counter-majoritarian principle embodied in the Ex Post Facto clause.  As the founders rightly perceived, as dangerous as it may be not to punish someone, it is far more dangerous to permit the government under guise of civil regulation to punish people without prior notice.  Such lawmaking has 'been, in all ages, [a] favorite and most formidable instrument [] of tyranny".

And that applies to all punitive ex post facto laws, not just sex offender-related ones.

I have no illusions as to motivations of the 6th Circuit in making this decision.

I highly doubt that the decision was motivated by concerns about the rule of law.

Rather, the 6th Circuit clearly recognized the economic - and safety - impact of the overzealous SORA laws.

SORA, on the one hand, produced a lucrative cottage industry, and lobby, of sex offender counselors, but is at the same time imposing huge burdens on probation officers and financial support of enforcement of those laws, not counting that sex offenders cannot get honest jobs and may end up engaging in crimes in order to survive - the unintended, but clear consequence from a politically driven regulation that was not evidence based when introduced, or when enforced.

In any event, the 6th Circuit decision is definitely a breakthrough in overturning statutes and regulatory schemes hurting both the U.S. economy and people's individual human rights, and I hope that this case will have an enormous positive effect in everyday lives of many people - not just sex offenders.  Of course, if the U.S. Supreme Court does not overturn it and does not tell lower federal courts to continue with their "we don't care what state legislature actually does as long as it declares a rational purpose" trend.