On
the need of urgent legislative intermediate and sunset review of
unconstitutional
practices in attorney regulation by New York appellate courts
New
York attorney regulation courts are in open contempt of a direct US Supreme
Court order as a matter of policy
Tatiana Neroni,
J.D.
October 26, 2021
List of cited authorities
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 4,
Prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures by the government...... 2,
3
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5, Right
against self-incrimination................ 2, 3
Court cases
Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)................................................... 2
Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)............................................ 2
Matter of Albert
O. Grant, 184 AD3d 315 (1st Dept 2020).................................... 4
Matter of
Alexander L. Shapiro, 177 AD3d 28 (1st Dept 2019).................... 4
Matter of Craig F.
Meltzer, 189 AD3d 80 (1st Dept 2020).................................... 4
Matter of Donald
R. Dunn, 174 AD3d 175 (1st Dept 2019)............................. 4
Matter of Durove, 2015 NY Slip Op
08517, 135 AD3d 176 (1st Dept., November 19, 2015)............................ 5
Matter of Kavin L.
Edwards, 171 AD3d 221 (1st Dept 2019)............................. 4
Matter of Lawrence
A. Doris, 186 AD3d 23 (1st Dept 2020)............................... 4
Matter of Lori
Vinciguerra, 188 AD3d 56 (1st Dept 2020).................................... 4
Matter of Marina
Trubitsky, 183 AD3d 146 (1st Dept 2020)............................. 4
Matter of Paul
Frieary, 190 AD3d 7 (1st Dept 2020)........................................... 4
Matter of Wayne A.
Autry, 177 AD3d 44 (1st Dept 2019).................................... 4
Matter of William
S. Winters, 190 AD3d 27 (1st Dept 2020)............................... 4
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) 2
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967) 2,3
Other Authorities
22 NYCRR § 1240.7(b)(3)...................... 3
22 NYCRR 1240.9(2).............................. 3
22 NYCRR 1240.9(a)(1)......................... 3
In 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in any
proceedings, civil or criminal, in rem or in personam, a person may not be made
to produce documents to be used to incriminate him, or be made to testify against
himself, based on protections of the 4th and 5th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution[1].
And, in 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that
the government may not obtain indirectly the result that it is not allowed to
obtain directly, it may not strip people of their federal constitutional rights
under the guise of some state policies[2].
New York attorney-regulating courts did not obey that
US Supreme Court precedent and continued to strip attorneys of their licenses
and livelihoods for refusal to engage in self-incrimination during
investigations by licensing prosecutors.
Let’s not also forget that in regulating attorneys New
York courts have been regulating a subject, “practice of law” that is not
clearly defined by the State Legislature, and, thus, the entire regulatory
scheme of lawyers is, and remains, unconstitutional and void for vagueness and
overbreadth[3].
In
view of continued defiance by New York lawyer-regulating courts of Boyd v US). and Speiser v Randall), in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court
had to issue a direct order declaring unconstitutional specifically the
practices of New York lawyer-regulating courts in stripping attorneys of their
licenses and livelihoods for failure to produce records and for failure to
testify during investigations meant to affect their licenses[4].
In answer to that direct court order by the U.S.
Supreme Court New York attorney-regulating courts engaged in further defiance
of constitutional precedent and criminal contempt of court as a matter of
policy.
New York attorney-regulating courts have at least 3
policies in direct contempt of the U.S. Supreme Court order in Spevack v
Klein.
Policy # 1. The presiding judge of the attorney-regulating
court may, by a court rule, help in investigation/prosecution of an attorney by
compelling him to produce records and to testify by a judicial subpoena, or subpoena
duces tecum, under the penalty of contempt-of-court for disobedience [5]. In fact that policy is, in and of itself, a
contempt of a higher – U.S. Supreme – court order, directed at New York
attorney regulated courts[6] and declaring
unconstitutional this particular type of compulsion, violating 4th and 5th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Yet, New York attorney regulating courts honor their
rule higher than the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court precedent and a
direct U.S. Supreme Court order.
Policy # 2. In New York, a lawyer may be stripped of his
law license “on the interim basis”, according to a state court rule –
· during
a licensing investigation,
· before
any formal charges are filed and
· before
the final adjudication of these charges,
· simply
for invoking his 4th and 5th Amendment privilege by:
o
Failing to respond to a complaint,
o
Failing to come to a deposition and
testify against himself, and
o
Failing to produce records to be used
against himself[7]
Policy # 3. In New York, a lawyer may be automatically permanently
stripped of his license if he/she persists in invoking his/her 4th/5th
Amendment privilege for 6 months after he/she is initially stripped of his/her
license because of invoking her 4th/5th Amendment privilege[8].
These 3 policies are written by New York lawyer-licensing
courts as legislators expressing the will of these courts to defy a direct
order of the U.S. Supreme Court in Spevack v Klein that declared unconstitutional
the very actions that New York state courts authorized in their 3 rules by
which attorneys in New York are automatically and summarily stripped of their
licenses and livelihoods for invoking their constitutional rights in license-revocation
proceedings, without any formal charges brought against them.
And, these openly and defiantly unconstitutional
policies are not allowed to collect dust – they are actively used by the court
to punish lawyers with banishment and starvation for disobedience, even though
if that particular type of disobedience is what the U.S. Constitution (that each
judge of the court is sworn to uphold) allows lawyers to do[9].
New York courts consider enforcement of these openly
unconstitutional policies of such importance that they consider it necessary to
make sure that, for example, a very elderly lawyer’s license is rather revoked
for failure to cooperate with the investigation than surrendered voluntarily,
as the lawyer asked the court to allow him to do[10] - an unreasonable
viciousness, especially as compared to practices of New York State Commission
of Judicial Conduct towards judges routinely allowing judges to resign from the
bench for non-disciplinary reasons to save face.
These policies are undermining not only federal
constitutional rights of particular lawyers who are stripped of their licenses
for invoking their federal constitutional rights, but of the whole declared
purpose of attorney regulation – protection of the public.
People cannot expect vigorous protection/defense of
their constitutional rights from attorneys who are forbidden by state licensing
authorities to protect their own constitutional rights and who must live out their
entire professional life in fear that their license and livelihood can be yanked
at any time for nothing more than invoking their federal constitutional rights that
they are undoubtedly entitled to[11] - by a U.S. Supreme Court
order directed specifically at New York attorney-regulated courts, no less.
People cannot be expected to trust legitimacy of all
appellate court’s decisions when such appellate courts are openly defying –
for over half a century, too - a U.S. Supreme Court order regarding their power
over lawyers.
New York appellate courts must start doing their job
in upholding the U.S. Constitution in their decisions rather than openly and
defiantly violating the U.S. Constitution and a direct order of the U.S. Supreme
Court in lawyer-regulating cases. Courts
cannot expect the public to rely on legitimacy of such courts’ decisions
otherwise.
The openly unconstitutional policies in regulating
lawyers in New York must be abolished, and regulation of lawyers in New York
should be subjected to urgent legislative intermediate and sunset review in
view of its general unconstitutionality and its pervasive unconstitutional
policies and practices.
[1] Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
[2] Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
[3] See Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972) (“It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.
Vague laws offend several important values.
1. First, because we assume that man
is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws
give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent
by not providing fair warning.
2. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
3. Third, but related, where a
vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those]
freedoms." Uncertain
meanings inevitably lead citizens to "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked,"
footnotes omitted, emphasis added, the quotation structured.
[4] Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
[5] 22 NYCRR § 1240.7(b)(3) (“Investigation, Disclosure. The Chief Attorney [of the attorney licensing
prosecutors – T.N.] is authorized to apply to the Clerk of the Court for a
subpoena to compel the attendance of a person as a respondent or witness, or
the production of relevant books and papers, when it appears that the
examination of such person or the production of such books and papers is
necessary for a proper determination of the validity of a complaint. Subpoenas
shall be issued by the Clerk in the name of the Presiding Justice and may be
made returnable at a time and place specified therein”).
[6] Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
[7] See 22 NYCRR § 1240.9(a)(1): “§ 1240.9 Interim Suspension
While Investigation or Proceeding is Pending (a) A respondent may be suspended
from practice on an interim basis during the pendency of an investigation or
proceeding on application or motion of a Committee, following personal service
upon the respondent, or by substitute service in a manner approved by the
Presiding Justice, and upon a finding by the Court that the respondent has
engaged in conduct immediately threatening the public interest. Such a finding
may be based upon: (1) the respondent’s default in responding to a petition,
notice to appear for formal interview,
examination,
or pursuant to subpoena under these Rules”.
[8] See 22 NYCRR 1240.9(2): “An application for suspension
pursuant to this rule may provide notice that a respondent who is suspended
under this rule and who has failed to respond to or appear for further
investigatory or disciplinary proceedings within six months from the date of
the order of suspension may be disbarred by the Court without further notice”.
[9] See e.g. Matter of Wayne A. Autry,
177 AD3d 44 (1st Dept 2019) (lawyer’s license suspended for 3 months in
New Jersey, but also indefinitely, “until further order of the court”, “based
on his failure to cooperate
with
two separate disciplinary investigations”, New York court added identical “reciprocal
discipline”);
Matter of Donald R. Dunn,
174 AD3d 175 (1st Dept 2019) (“failure to appear for a deposition as
directed by a judicial subpoena … that evidenced a willful failure to cooperate
with the AGC’s investigation, which warranted his interim suspension”);
Matter of Kavin L. Edwards,
171 AD3d 221 (1st Dept 2019) (interim suspension for “failure to cooperate
with the AGC’s investigation of professional misconduct”. The lawyer “failed to submit a written answer
to the disciplinary complaint and defaulted on the second day of his court
ordered deposition”);
Matter of Alexander L. Shapiro,
177 AD3d 28 (1st Dept 2019) (interim suspension for failure to cooperate
with the investigation and appear at a deposition/interrogation following a
judicial subpoena);
Matter of Marina Trubitsky,
183 AD3d 146 (1st Dept 2020) (interim suspension
for failure to appear at a deposition/interrogation following a judicial
subpoena);
Matter of Craig F. Meltzer, 189 AD3d 80 (1st Dept 2020) (interim
suspension for “failure to cooperate with the AGC’s investigation of
professional misconduct);
Matter of Lori Vinciguerra, 188 AD3d 56 (1st Dept 2020) (suspension for
3.5 years, one of the reasons – failure to provide to prosecutors information
about lawyers’ employers since the year 2002);
Matter of William S. Winters, 190 AD3d 27 (1st Dept 2020) (reciprocal with
New Jersey suspension for 5 years for failure to cooperate with investigation);
Matter of Lawrence A. Doris, 186 AD3d 23 (1st Dept 2020) (interim suspension
for failure to cooperate with investigation and be deposed/interrogated following
a judicial subpoena);
Matter of Paul Frieary, 190 AD3d 7 (1st Dept 2020) (interim
suspension for failure to cooperate with licensing investigators/prosecutors);
Matter of Albert O. Grant, 184 AD3d 315 (1st Dept 2020) (interim
suspension for failure to cooperate with licensing prosecutors re accusations
of criminal nature – theft).
[10] See
e.g. Matter of
I. Frederick Shotkin, 174 AD3d 146 (1st Dept 2019) (a 91-year-old lawyer
asked the court to allow him to voluntarily surrender his license for
non-disciplinary reasons, the court denied that request and took the license
through a public “interim suspension” for failure to cooperate with
investigation);
[11] See e.g. Matter of Durove, 2015 NY Slip Op
08517, 135 AD3d 176 (1st Dept., November 19, 2015) where the court states that allegations of a
client against the attorney (of criminal nature) cannot be proven on the documentary
evidence licensing prosecutors obtained, but that does not matter because the
attorney may be stripped of his license, before the investigation is complete
and before any formal charges are filed, on an “interim basis” simply because he
refused to be interrogated by licensing prosecutors.