On playful definitions of sexual predators

Judge Walter Smith who resigned during a re-opened investigation regarding his sexual misconduct, see here, here, and here, will not be investigated for judicial misconduct, because he is no longer a judge.

The press presents it as judge "beating" investigation of misconduct.

Yet, there can be also a criminal investigation, and an attorney disciplinary investigation - yet, there are no reports of either.

Instead of an attorney disciplinary prosecution against former Judge Walter Smith, a retaliatory prosecution is under way of attorney-whistleblower Ty Clevenger who

• obtained and published sworn testimony of Judge Walter Smith's victim,
• brought about the first investigation of Walter Smith, and
• insisted on re-opening and speeding up the investigation when Walter Smith received just a slapped on the wrist.

And, the press playfully calls this sexual predator a "wayward" former judge.

"Wayward", "beats", a coy picture of the sexual predator with a schoolgirl posture...

What is going on?  Are we now glorifying sexual crimes against women?

"Wayward" is socially inacceptable - but not necessarily illegal.

So, the press is afraid to call a sexual predator a sexual predator even when a sworn testimony of his victim is available?

So, a new law emerges in this country - sex crimes are prohibited, unless you are a judge and you resign quickly before you can be disciplined.

And no, Judge Walter Smith is not a "wayward" former judge who "beat" his own prosecution by resigning in time.

Here is the sworn testimony of Judge Walter Smith's victim describing, in detail, how not only Judge Smith was trying to pressure her into sex, ordered her supervisor to disappear so that the judge could have time alone with her, even though she previously asked the supervisor for protection against the judge's unwanted attentions, but also how Judge Smith's law clerk was pressuring her into retracting on her claims that Judge Smith engaged in sexual misconduct towards her.

Former Judge Smith is not a "wayward" individual with a coy-girl look who "beat" some kind of puny investigation.

He is a sexual predator who needs to be brought to justice, if the judiciary wants to expect any respect to its integrity at all.

Judge Damon Keith on racism of federal court judges in Ohio: " Democracies die behind closed doors. ... I am deeply saddened and distraught by the court's deliberate decision to reverse the progress of history"

Donald Trump called out a Latino judge Gonzalo Curiel for not recusing from the case of Trump University because of the judge's background.

The judge refused to recuse, even though there was plenty in his background warranting recusal, see here and here.

We have federal judges openly claiming that their personal heritage should be used in their judicial decisions.

One judge who so claimed is a federal appellate judge Ilana Rovner, the other is one of the present-time U.S. Supreme Court Justices Sonya Sotomayor.

Here are both of judges holding beliefs that their personal heritage must be part of their judicial decision-making (the two judges on the right):

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court exceeded its authority to the point of allowing federal judges to act as unsworn witnesses and adjudicators and use their own personal "experiences" (which are not made part of the record and are not known to litigants), in order to decide sufficiency of pleadings in civil rights cases - cases which, under the 7th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, demand that all issues of fact are decided by jury.

At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Batson v Kentucky, has made clear, at least in one context, that (whatever those judicial experiences are), discrimination based on race at least in criminal proceedings is constitutionally intolerable - and criminal verdicts made by juries picked with the exclusion of a certain race are unconstitutional.

Yet, in the same blessed state of Kentucky, an African American judge Olu Stevens

was suspended for trying to do his job and eradicate racism in criminal proceedings, just as the U.S. Supreme Court directed to be done in Batson v Kentucky.

Now, in the State of Ohio, another judge, a federal 94-year-old African American judge Damon Keith

not only issued a fiery dissent against his colleagues, judges whom Judge Damon Keith pretty much accused of racism in their court decision.  Judge Damon Keith also gave an interview to the press about his beliefs that led to his dissent, a very unusual situation.

Judges usually do not - and are not supposed to - make public comments about their judicial decisions.  Judge Olu Stevens of Kentucky was suspended for not only fighting racism in the courtroom, but also for making public comments about racism (even though the racism was apparent) of a white prosecutor.

Here is Judge Keith's 38-page dissenting opinion (you can use the keyword "dissenting" to find it within the pdf document starting with the majority opinion).

The majority judges whose opinion Judge Keith criticized as racist was authored by white male judges:

Danny J. Boggs

and John M. Rogers:

Here is how Judge Keith's dissenting opinion starts:

And here is how it progressed (I encourage my readers to read the dissenting opinion of Judge Damon Keith in its entirety, here I will only provide some excerpts):

Judge Damon Keith then provides life stories of 35 people, both black and white, with pictures, who were killed by white supremacists, many of them for their stance on the right of the persons of color to vote.

This is the voting law in the State of Ohio that Judge Keith describes as challenged in the lawsuit:

While describing the history of how the new law came about - and I encourage my readers to read the entirety of that account - Judge Keith, importantly, points out that, while the new law presupposes some literacy in providing the necessary information, help to illiterate voters by poll workers is prohibited by that same law:

Judge Keith points out that the standard of review on appeal in federal court is a "de novo" review of issues of law and mixed issues of law and fact:

but also deference to the factual findings of the trial court:

Judge Keith then points out that not only the district court made reasoned determinations warranting deference, but that those determinations were made after a 12-day bench trial, as a culmination of several years of litigation, and based on a lot of evidence presented to the court:

Despite the applicable standard of review of "clear error" as to factual findings of the trial court, the majority, according to Judge Keith, overruled the factual findings simply because the court could decide differently

Obviously, the only reason for the majority to depart from the clear standards of review was their desire to do so.   

Judge Keith then points out that the majority disregards the requirement of using the "totality of circumstances" approach in analyzing the disparate impact of the law on the right of the persons of color to vote, instead using what Judge Keith called a "piecemeal freeze frame approach", analyzing whether each one of the factors, taken separately, demonstrate a disparate impact - which is too much of a burden to meet, and is not required by law.

Judge Keith points out that the majority misinterpreted or misrepresented certain evidence in the case, applied a wrong legal standard to analyze the equal protection claim, fundamentally misrepresented and misapplied the disparate impact legal standard, disregarded the lower court's findings of the history of racial discrimination in voting in Ohio.

Here is Judge Keith's full conclusion about the majority's opinion:

Did Judge Keith use "the richness of his experiences" as a black person living in Ohio?

Judge Keith is, reportedly, a grandson of former slaves, and surely his family's "rich experiences" with slavery and then with racial discrimination, formed his world outlook.

Yet, the dissenting opinion of Judge Keith shows that the judge DID NOT use "the richness of his experiences" - or his family's - in that opinion.

Instead, he analyzed the majority's opinion under the law, and under the required standard of deference to the trial court's decision.

Here, the parties voluntarily chose an African American district court judge, Algernon L. Marbley,

to hold a bench trial, not a jury trial, in their case.

Then, a super-majority of white judges was appointed to decide the appeal from that case, and suddenly, all legal standards required to apply deference to the decisions of  black judge were scrapped, and two white judges, acting, without authority, as trial judges instead of appellate judges, overruled the factual findings of a black judge.

All that Judge Keith's dissenting opinion was pointing out - as "impassioned" as the press called that opinion - was that the majority did not apply the required legal standard and did not afford due deference to the lower court's factual determinations, as they were required by law.

And that was a continuation of "white supremacy", now on the bench.

The "white supremacy" in the courtroom continues not only through Judge Olu Stevens' removal in Kentucky, and overruling of Judge Algernon Marbley's case by the super-majority of white judges in Ohio federal court who disregarded applicable legal standards and acted as trial judges instead of appellate judges.

In California, white female #judgeAnne-ChristineMasullo

is currently the target of a public defender's motion to recuse based on allegations of racial bias.

Judge Masullo is listed on the website of her court as a "Family Law" supervising judge:

Here is a review I found about Judge Massullo's practices in Family Court:

Yet, Judge Massullo, a career prosecutor before coming to the bench, was assigned to the criminal case against an indigent African American man for resisting arrest.

Judge Massullo, in a pre-trial ruling, prohibited the public defender to ask prospective jurors their opinions about the Black Lives Matter movements and the police brutality - which, obviously, would allow the prosecution to keep on the jury jurors with prejudice against African Americans and their resistance to police brutality.

While the case claims to be one of robbery or attempted robbery, there exists - thank God for cell phones - evidence showing a police officer punching the defendant while he was already in handcuffs and on the floor face-down.

Nevertheless, it was the defendant who was charged with battery on police officers and not the other way around.

The alleged robbery - conspicuously - was not charged, even though it was the trigger for the whole situation, and there are claims that the allegations of robbery were made by a passenger who insulted the defendant's pregnant girlfriend - and that defendant was unarmed and did not commit robbery.

By the way, in the state of Texas last year, the jurors were given questionnaires to answer in writing as to their opinions on the Black Lives Matter movement and police brutality - while Judge Massullo prohibited a public defender in California to question prospective jurors about their opinions on the same subject even orally, during the jury selection (voir dire) stage of the criminal trial.

Knowing Judge Massullo's background as a career criminal prosecutor, as well as her reported stance on pushing people to settlements, is it her way to push the criminal defendant to reach an agreement with the prosecution, in view of the prospect of not being able to pick an impartial jury?

So, the "richness of experiences" of the nation's judges informing their decisions continues to boggle observers' minds.

What plausible reason could Judge Massullo possibly have, other than her personal bias and apparent desire, as a former career prosecutor, to help the prosecution, to block questions of a public defender to prospective jurors, in a criminal case against an African American involving police brutality, about their opinions on the movement of African Americans resisting police brutality?

I will continue to cover the subject how the "richness of experiences" based on judges' personal backgrounds "guide" their decision-making.

And how this nation's courtrooms are ruled by personal whim of judges, causing our democracy, as Judge Keith cogently stated, to "die behind closed doors".

Stay tuned.

Alabama's strange stance on same sex marriage

It is interesting to be a witness to history.

In 1999, when I came to the United States, homosexuality was a crime.

In 2003, after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v Texas, it was not a crime any more, see the decision here.

Fast-forward 11 years more - and the U.S. Supreme Court found that same sex marriage is a constitutional right.

After the decision, some state officials, as well as private individuals refused to accept legality of the U.S. Supreme Court decision.

A Kentucky clerk Kim Davis

went to jail - with a lot of vocal support from various groups from around the country - defending her individual right not to issue same sex marriage licenses.

Now Kim Davis is reportedly on the receiving end of a motion for $233,058 in legal fees against her for refusing to issue same sex marriage licenses.

In three states,  Alabama, Oregon and Wyoming, judges who refused to officiate at same sex marriages, or gave instructions to others not to issue same sex marriage licenses, became the targets of judicial disciplinary proceedings.

In Alabama, the target of such a disciplinary proceeding was the state's Chief Judge Roy Moore,

who defended himself on the basis that the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions are not the Supreme Law of the Land - and they are actually not, despite the fact that they are presented that way in courts, law schools and in the press.

In Oregon, the target of the disciplinary proceedings was judge Vance Day.

In Wyoming, the target of the disciplinary proceedings is judge Ruth Neely.

While Alabama, Oregon and Wyoming prosecuted its judges for disobeying the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding constitutionality of same sex marriages, Texas State Bar refused to prosecute its Attorney General Ken Paxton

for the same behavior, instructing county clerks not to issue same sex marriage licenses.

And, in North Carolina, a federal civil rights lawsuit against the state's magistrates refusing to issue same sex marriage licenses, was recently dismissed. 

Federal judge Max Cogburn

who dismissed the case, claimed that plaintiffs failed to show that they have standing and that they were directly harmed by law.

I have put pictures of people at the center of controversies here to show the uniting factor - race.  All of them are white.  Whether it is a mere coincidence or not, and whether the coincidence means anything, is for my readers to judge. 

Among these six states:

1. Alabama,
2. Kentucky,
3. North Carolina,
4. Oregon,
5. Texas, and
6. Wyoming

that have come on the map with controversies where state officials defied the U.S. Supreme Court decision on same sex marriage, the strangest stance is in Alabama.

While Alabama suspended its Chief Judge Roy Moore, first, during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him, and then, after the trial, for the rest of his term, the same blessed State of Alabama, through its Attorney General, refused to prosecute a florist for refusing to make a flower arrangement for a same sex marriage couple.

Moreover, Alabama State Attorney General reportedly joined "a dozen other states" in refusal to prosecute businesses for discrimination against same sex couples.

Here is the timeline of Alabama State AG's reaction to the same-sex marriage decisions by federal courts and their enforceability.

In February of 2015, before the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case Obergefell v Hodges, finding a constitutional right to marry for same sex couples, Alabama State AG issued the following press-release:

On September 30, 2016, on the same day as permanent suspension of Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore was announced for defying the U.S. Supreme Court's same sex marriage decision, the Alabama State Attorney General issued this press-release:

So, apparently, we have 13 states asserting, in an amicus brief filed in a court case in a Washington state court, that business owners have a right to discriminate against customers based on their religious beliefs.

The states that filed the amicus briefs supporting such discrimination are:

1. Alabama,
2. Arkansas,
3. Kansas,
4. Kentucky,
5. Louisiana,
6. Nebraska,
7. Nevada,
8. Oklahoma,
9. South Carolina,
10. Texas,
11. Utah, and
12. West Virginia.

The lawsuit in State of Washington court is posed as an issue of state constitutional law - whether people must shelve their religious beliefs when they open a business.

Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that business owners may not discriminate on the basis of race.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court upheld constitutionality of same sex marriage, it is not a big stretch of imagination to predict that discrimination on the basis of sex orientation by private business owners will be prohibited, too.

Yet, the Alabama Attorney General sends to the public interesting vibes by making the press release about his support of business owners in the State of Washington, and based on state Constitution, on the same day as the State Chief Judge Roy Moore was suspended for defying the U.S. Supreme Court decision on same sex marriage.

When one public official is de facto removed from office for nearly the same conduct as the other public official in the same state is continuing to display, that is a strange state of events, indeed.

And especially when, notably, Alabama State Attorney General joined Texas State Attorney General in the amicus brief regarding state constitutional right of private businesses to discriminate against same sex couples - that is the same Texas State Attorney General who also instructed county clerks in his state not to issue same-sex marriage licenses, and the Texas Bar would not prosecute him for misconduct.

What an interesting time we live in...

The U.S. Supreme Court accepts a case on propriety of sanctions against a party and attorneys

In a historic move, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted, first time in decades, a case raising the issue of propriety of sanctions against an attorney and a party, using the so-called "inherent powers of the court".

Here is the certiorari petition that was accepted.

The issue presented for review of the U.S. Supreme Court is, reportedly, whether sanction of attorney fees imposed upon a party (and attorneys) under inherent powers of the court, without criminal procedural protections, must be tailored to the harm directly caused by misconduct, and whether attorney fees can be awarded for actions of attorneys not directly attributable to subjective bad faith of clients.

Of course, the petition was filed by a party, not by its attorneys, and thus the focus of the petition is on the rights of the parties in view of alleged misconduct of their counsel.

Yet, since attorneys were also sanctioned in this case, and since rules distinguishing whether certain awards are compensatory or punitive/criminal, will equally apply to attorneys and parties, the case is important for both litigants and the legal community.

The mere fact that the U.S. Supreme Court took such a case, coming from the 9th Circuit (of course, sanctions were very high - $2.7 million) indicates that the Court, finally took an interest in the issue of the court sanctions.

It should be noted, too, that, before imposing sanctions, the court did hold an evidentiary hearing - which is rare.  Usually courts impose sanctions under their "inherent power" without any hearings.

And, even though in this case not criticism of a judge (which is a constitutionally protected conduct of an attorney and party), but a non-disclosure in discovery (which is attorney misconduct, if attorney knew of the discovery item subject to disclosure and did not disclose it), the issues are:

1. the propriety of use of "inherent power of the court" to sanction,
2. whether there must be a connection between harm caused and the amount in sanctions, and
3. whether procedural protections similar to those in criminal proceedings must be provided -

and these issues apply to all sanctions imposed by courts against parties or attorneys.

I will need some time to read through the 9th Circuit's opinion and dissent and through the certiorari petition, and will provide more comment on them in the future.

Stay tuned.

Federal appellate #judgeIlanaRovner is "subconsciously" "guided" by her "Jewishness" in her decision-making

Meet the 79-year-old judge Ilana Rovner, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit:

In reaction to president Obama's nomination of a Muslim to a federal bench (possibly, a first in the United States), this Jewish judge stated that "she believes judges are guided in their decision-making by every facet of their lives, 'maybe even subconsciously.'”

I wonder what is that supposed to mean.

A Jewish judge is "guided" by her Jewishness, a Muslim judge will be guided by his Muslim culture, as the U.S. Supreme Court justice Sonya Sotomayor will be a "wise Latina woman", guided by the "richness of her experiences"? And, a white judge will be guided by his or her white culture, and a black judge will rule based on his black culture, etc. etc. etc.

What about principles of neutrality, equality under the law and objectivity?

This is what Judge Rovner thinks when she decides a case:

Now, did Judge Rovner's "Wait a minute, I'm Jewish" thinking caused her to claim at the end of July, 2016, that gay people are not protected against discrimination in the work place under the civil rights law?

Did Judge Rovner tell the U.S. Congress at her second confirmation hearing in 1992, for the position of a federal appellate court judge, that she was GOING to be "guided" by her ethnicity or religion in her judicial decision-making?

Or in 1984, at the confirmation hearing for the position of a federal district court judge?

Apparently, not.  Otherwise, she wouldn't have been confirmed - because "Jewishness", or any other cultural, ethnic, or religious "background" may not influence judicial decision-making.

Actually, Judge Rovner's confirmation was, according to her own admission, "a breeze", with no "litmus tests" -

so nobody actually asked (or dared to ask?) Judge Rovner a question whether she will be guided by her being Jewish, and if she was so asked, there would have been a storm in the media about anti-Semitism against a Jewish judicial candidate.

While all along the question was very reasonable and real - because, according to her own admission now, Judge Rovner IS "guided" in her judicial decision-making by her Jewishness.

Or, did Judge Rovner tell the U.S. Congress that she is going to practice medicine on the bench without a license?  That she and her colleagues will "diagnose" a lawyer as "lying" because he did not come to a hearing because he was vomiting from a stomach bug - the only confirmation of that "lying" being that the lawyer, who was sick and vomiting, did not go to a doctor to confirm that he was vomiting?  And was suspended because he was vomiting and sick, because the court deemed it as lying and failure to properly represent his client.

What bothers me is also the timing of Judge Rovner's revelation that she uses her Jewishness in her decision-making - at the time when President Obama nominated a Muslim to the federal bench.

The following questions spring up because of this revelation, and the timing of the revelation by Judge Rovner:

1) Does Judge Rovner consider being guided by her Jewishness as proper for purposes of judicial decision-making?

2) Does she assert, by the timing of her revelation, that:

    a) all judges are guided by their ethnic and/or religious backgrounds in the judicial decision-making?

    b) the Muslim judge, if nominated, will be so guided by his Muslim background and cultural and religious heritage in his decision-making?

Because if she does, that looks as a not-so-subtle inciting against such a nomination, at the time when the country is swept by divisive comments of irresponsible politicians, and when Muslims Americans already do not feel welcome in their own country.

I see a lot of anti-Muslim sentiments on Facebook, for example.

Some people, and intelligent people, too, are openly making anti-Muslim statements.  One person demanded to unfriend that person if that person's anti-Muslim sentiment's are not shared.  (I did.  I do not accept bigotry of any kind.)

So, now Judge Rovner, after having been confirmed "as a breeze", without any questions asked whether she was going to use her Jewishness in her judicial decision-making (as she admittedly does now), is actively hinting to the public and authorities in charge of nomination and confirmation of the first Muslim judge that judges do use their background in their judicial decision-making.

To me, it is an active hint at a "legitimate" double-standard that exists in American courts - certain type of biases, but not others, are legitimate.

A judge is ok to consider her "Jewishness" in her judicial decision-making - or else the press will scream Anti-Semitism.

A judge is ok to consider his Latino roots and experiences of himself and his family members as possibly illegal immigrants, in his judicial decision-making against a person who criticized illegal immigration from Mexico, the judge's parents' native country (whether the criticism was fair or unfair, and especially when it was unfair) - or else the press will scream impropriety, racism and bigotry.

But, it is dangerous to appoint a Muslim judge who may - theoretically, hypothetically - consider his Muslim heritage in his judicial decision-making?

That's what Judge Rovner is hinting at in her ripe old age?

Apparently, Judge Rovner needs to retire.  Yesterday.

It is my firm belief that NONE of ethnical, cultural, or religious background MAY be considered in judicial decision-making.

It is the law, and the facts - and that's it.

It is not about the judge's OWN background, the judge is not a party, or a witness in the case, and the judge's background should have NOTHING to do with the case or the judge's decision in that case.

Whether the judge is Latino, Muslim, African-American, Caucasian, Native American, Chinese or of any other ethnicity.
That said, nominating a law partner from the giant firm Latham & Watkins,

a law firm that is practicing all over the country in federal courts, whether he is Muslim or not, is a very questionable move for the President.

Because, naturally, Latham & Watkins will not stop practicing in their own law partner's court - and there will be a big problem with appearance of impropriety.

Well, at least judges - when they become old and senile, at least - start coming out of the closet and give people a retrospective views of what they are guided by in their decision-making.

How many parties and attorneys will come forward now to make motions to vacate Judge Rovern's decisions and to recuse Judge Rovner because they were guided by her "Jewishness"?

I won't hold my breath.

"When a federal judge gets angry, he must be placated"?

I wrote this week about misconduct of federal judge Garaufis who had the audacity of claiming that when a law firm sent a 3rd year associate to a conference with him instead of a law partner, that was disrespectful and even insulting to the judge.

It was, once again, judicial misconduct pure and simple - as a judge does not get to say which one of the attorneys from a law firm hired to represent a client gets to appear in court, it is for the client and for the law firm to decide.

Moreover, the judge who was unhappy that an associate appeared in front of him, is not unhappy when the government sends recent law school graduates in criminal or civil rights cases, and, where the same court has licensed the associate in question as qualified to practice law in that court, no judge could find it "insulting", as a matter of law, when the attorney licensed by that court actually came to practice in that court.

After a storm of unfavorable comments in the media about Judge Garaufis, the following, reportedly, transpired:

1) Facebook (the client) and the law firm APOLOGIZED to the judge who committed misconduct;

2) the, judge, reportedly, partially apologized - sort of, only that he did not mean to criticize the associate:

and yes,

3) "everybody are friends again".

Yet, what Judge Garaufis said as part of his "apology" is a prime example of the judge's (intellectual) dishonesty, a big issue of public concern:

An "inference" "achieved through the media" that the judge was ever "upset at" the associate was "totally unfounded"?

Please...

One needs a lobotomy to take this kind of bogus at face value.

What kind of "inference" anyone, including "the media", needs to interpret these words:



And, it is definitely not only the matter of being "upset at" the associate, it is the matter that the judge behaves as a cantankerous and spoiled brat in need of appeasing by treating the "court" as another type of "court" - as in "King's court", and requiring lawyers to be "courtiers" required to appease the judge.

That is all that is wrong with the U.S. judicial system - the "culture of quiescence", the "scraping and bowing" of attorneys in front of judges, "or else".

The "friendship" cost Facebook to the tune of $3,000 per hour per each of 3 (by other accounts, 5) partners who appeared at the "apologetic" conference.

So, Judge Garaufis' self-respect apparently has a price-tag on it - $15,000.00 per hour for conferences (for 5 lawyers), plus travel expenses for lawyers to come to a conference in front of Judge Caraufis from as far as California.

Or, does Judge Garaufis have behind-the-scene agreements with law firms to throw tantrums when associates, with cheaper hourly rates, and not the more expensive partners, appear in front of him?

Maybe, Facebook can afford such a costly - and unnecessary - apology, but a usual American litigant who cannot afford an attorney in the first place, surely cannot.

But, what I find the most alarming of it all is the conclusion that a supposedly reputable legal blog "Above the Law" draws from all of it - maybe, with a "tongue in cheek", maybe not so much: "when a federal judge gets angry, he must be placated".

Really?

A federal judge should be treated as a capricious prima donna when he throws a tantrum?

Not impeached and taken off the bench for misconduct - if that anger is as displaced as Judge Garaufis' was?

One interesting thing is - that the judge who is supposed to be independent from the outside influence, even mentioned the "inferences by the media", and apologized nearly immediately after a storm of criticism in the media and social media.

But, the criticism continues.

Here are some more comments about the situation:

and, in a more "courtly" language:

When a client sends a lawyer to court, it is the client's not the judge's choice who the client sends.

No apologies for the choice of lawyer needed.

What is needed is discipline - or, better, removal of Judge Garaufis.

He forgot one portion of his oath of office - that there are no titles of nobility in the United States.

Not even for cantankerous federal judges.

Oregon follows Alabama in trying to remove a judge from the bench for not following a U.S. Supreme Court precedent

I wrote yesterday about a trial in Alabama against Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore who refused to obey the U.S. SUpreme Court precedent regarding same-sex marriage.

The State of Oregon prepares the same fate for state judge Vance Day who refused to perform same sex marriages based on his religious beliefs.

Regardless of whether Judges Roy Moore and Vance Day are right or wrong in their positions, disciplinary proceedings against them for disobeying a U.S. Supreme Court precedent set a precedent that for a judge to disobey a U.S. Supreme Court precedent - any precedent - is a violation of his or her oath of office warranting removal.

And such a precedent is extremely important for civil rights litigation across the country where judges, both state and federal, pick and choose which of the U.S. Supreme Court precedents to obey and which to ignore and punish for even mentioning.

I will continue to cover the Vance Day and the Roy Moore stories.

Stay tuned.