Harassing public defenders and violating constitutional rights of criminal defendants is a suspendable offense for a judge in Missouri. In New York, only harassment of prosecutors can get a judge off the bench

In an amazing move, the State of Missouri suspended a judge, Chris Kunza Mennemeyer, for harassment of public defenders, and for intentionally delaying cases of criminal defendants in order to charge them money for room and board in jail (!) and to deprive them of counsel.

Here is the "heroine":

This judge was reportedly the subject of THREE writs of prohibition in one month - an extraordinary occurrence.

The subject of one writ was that the judge improperly silenced the testimony of an alternative suspect in a murder case.

Compared to New York, Missouri appears to be the shining example of transparency and accountability in judicial disciplinary proceedings.

In New York, a judge will only be taken off the bench if he displeases prosecutors.

As it happened recently to judge Thomas Keefe, the "sit the F**K down" judge of the Albany City Court.

I actually had a report from a witness from August of 2014 that this particular judge, in an eviction proceeding:

1. used expletives against two women, for example, yelling at a grandmother "sit the F**k down" when she was in the middle of a pro se legal argument;
2. mocked and humiliated pro se respondents for researching the law on their own and yelling at them for referencing the law to him
   

I actually heard the "sit the f**k down" yelling by Judge Keefe on the tape.

Individuals in question were then blocked from getting a transcript or an official audio file of the same proceedings from Judge Keefe's court.

So, When Judge Keefe harassed pro se parties, mocked them for trying to make legal arguments and yelled at them "sit the F**K down!!!" during those legal argument - complaints about him were disregarded, and the court refused to release copies of audio recordings of his rantings to the parties whom he harassed in the courtroom.

Yet, Judge Keefe was recently forced to resign amid investigation of his misconduct.

Misconduct continuing over a LONG period of time.

The press wrote about Judge Keefe's courtroom "style", or in other words, about his extreme rudeness, in 2009 and in 2013 - yet the judge remained on the bench.

This is the judge who ate at the bench and puts his feet on the bench - while not allowing everybody else to eat in his courtroom and put their feet on the tables or chairs in front of them.

So, what drove the New York State Judicial Conduct Commission to draw the line in 2016?

Here is what Judge Keefe was finally charged with - and what caused his disciplinary resignation with implied permission to retaliate by the end of September 2016:

SUMMARY of the 13 charges against Judge Keefe:

Charge No	CHARGE
1	made impatient, discourteous and undignified remarks to and about the Albany County District Attorney's Office and the prosecutors who appeared before him and, by his words and conduct, conveyed an impression of bias against the District Attorney's Office
2	made discourteous and impatient remarks to the prosecutor, failed to accord the prosecutor the right to be heard according to law and sua sponte dismissed the charges without a written motion to dismiss before him, in violation of Criminal Procedure Law §§ 170.30, 170.45 and 210.45.
3	sua sponte dismissed the charges in the absence of a motion to dismiss made in writing and/or reasonable notice to the District Attorney's Office, in violation of Criminal Procedure Law §§ 170.30, 170.45 and 210.45.
4	created the appearance of impropriety by meeting ex parte with the defendant, shortly after pronouncing the defendant's sentence and contemporaneously signing a commitment order indicating a sentence that differed from the pronounced sentence, without providing notice to the attorneys of his meeting with the defendant and the change in sentence
5	created the appearance of impropriety by meeting ex parte with the defendant while his criminal case was pending before Respondent
6	created the appearance of impropriety by engaging in an ex parte conversation with the defendant about, inter alia, the defendant's potential sentence and ineligibility for the drug court program
7	engaged in an improper ex parte conversation with the defendant about the circumstances underlying the defendant's alleged violation of his drug court agreement
8	engaged in an improper ex parte conversation with a representative of the victim of the defendant's alleged crime, and asked the representative to reduce the amount of restitution sought from the defendant
9	engaged in improper ex parte communications with the defendant's mother, S C , who was the alleged victim ofthe crimes
10	engaged in improper ex parte communications with a man who claimed to be relative or friend of a defendant in a case pending before Respondent, regarding the defendant's purported violation of her drug court agreement
11	engaged in an improper ex parte conversation with defense counsel concerning the pending proceeding
12	Directed the defendant not to communicate with her attorney, in violation of the defendant's right to counsel pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of New York and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and remanded the defendant to jail for one week for calling her attorney
13	made undignified and discourteous comments to the defendant, who was participating in the Veterans Treatment Court/Track

Out of 13 charges, only 2 charges were directed at some wrongdoing towards a defendant:

Charge 12 - prohibition to a criminal defendant to call her attorney and jailing the defendant for disobeying and calling her attorney;

Charge 13 - rudeness towards a defendant.

All other 11 charges are filed because of ex parte communications with the defense, defense or prosecution's witnesses, displaying bias towards prosecution, being rude to prosecution, dismissing criminal cases without notice to prosecution, changing sentences without notice to prosecution.

Normally, charges of ex parte communications towards a party in a criminal or civil case is disregarded by the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct as not warranting even investigation.

My MULTIPLE complaints about documented cases of ex parte communications were tossed by the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct without investigation.

Here, the Commission bent over backwards to accommodate the complaint of prosecution about ex parte communications.

So, the No. 1 charge was unwillingness to accept plea bargains for charges reduced from felonies, and for disrespect to prosecutors - not to pro se litigants, not to defendants, but to prosecutors.

While Judge Keefe was complained about by the "sit the f**k down" defendants - and the complaint amounted to nothing (a form letter saying "your allegations did not warrant judicial discipline"), here is what warranted a disciplinary resignation:

Judge Keefe actually had no authority to try felonies in Albany City Court (only County Court and Supreme Court have such authority in New York).

Yet, Judge Keefe did not have to accept plea bargains, he had a full authority to reject a plea bargain. 

The next specification is also for the judge's comments and unwillingness to accept plea bargains down from a felony to a misdemeanor.  Please, note that the threat of the DA as to the defendant "facing prison time" was only valid if the charges are valid - and there is a clear possibility that the criminal charges in New York are so sloppily put together that they cannot withstand an indictment, or post-indictment pre-trial motions, or a trial, and that the defendant was simply steered into an easy (for the prosecution) plea.

So - Judge Keefe was not suspended for something BAD (even though they did through in a couple of charges about violations of defendants' rights).

Judge Keefe was predominantly suspended for taking the defendant's side and hurting the prosecution.

And in New York, inlike Missouri, a judge cannot keep on the bench if it crosses the prosecution.

As Judge Keefe's example demonstrates.

Another audit is requested of Delaware County, New York - because Delaware County claims it does not have an inventory of equipment it buys or leases with taxpayers' money

I requested New York State Comptroller's office to conduct another office of Delaware County, New York, because of Delaware County's claim, in answer to my Freedom of Information Request, that it does not have an inventory of equipment it owns or leases.

That means that taxpayers' money, yours and mine, are poured into a sinkhole, with no explanation or traces.

I am publishing my complaint to the NYS Comptroller here, to make sure the public is aware what is going on, in the event NYS Comptroller considers it too insignificant to respond to:

Bribery through donations in a judicial election campaign resulted in a class action in Illinois

In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court made a seminal decision, Caperton v A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.

Here is how the U.S. Supreme Court described the situation that triggered the decision:

Let's note that the judge who received a $3,000,000 campaign contribution from a party refused to recuse from the case - three times, - reversed a jury verdict of $50,000,000 and filed a "concurring opinion" explaining his refusal to recuse.

The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case important enough to review on a writ of certiorari, and held:

So, the U.S. Supreme Court held in 2009 that there is an unconstitutional potential for bias where a judge is given such a large monetary "incentive" that, for any reasonable person, the "incentive" has a potential to sway the judge's opinion and prevent the judge from being impartial.

Since 2009, state and federal courts, including those in New York state, turn the blind eye on this case, claiming that recusal of a judge is a matter of the judge's absolute discretion - and punishing people who say otherwise.

By the way, while the U.S. Supreme Court clearly stated in its holding that a contempt proceeding cannot be handled by a judge who was "reviled" by the alleged contemnor's conduct, New York yanked licenses of two criminal defense/civil rights attorneys - John Aretakis and my own - without a hearing and based on sanctions imposed specifically by judges "reviled" by motions to recuse them.

And, no references to precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court helped.

John Aretakis was suspended a year before Caperton, and I was suspended 6 (!) years after Caperton - and both attorney Aretakis and I remain suspended, even though the suspension is clearly unconstitutional.

Information I am getting through research and feedback on this blog from other states indicates that in other states courts treat Caperton v A.T. Massey with the same disdain as New York.

Moreover, as it was recently revealed, yet another case is making its ways through the federal court system with allegations nearly identical to Caperton.

In Caperton, the case involved refusal to recuse of the West Virginia appellate judge Brent D. Benjamin

who accepted campaign contribution from a soon-to-be appellate litigant in the amount of $3,000,000, and then stuck like glue to the case, refused to recuse and overturned a $50,000,000 verdict.

In a federal class action in Illinois allegations are that State Farm insurance company "recruited" Lloyd A. Karmeier

to run for judicial elections and replace the judge who would be presiding over an appeal, organized and funded the campaign of Lloyd A. Karmeier to the order of $4,000,000, and then, when elected, State Farm reportedly deliberately lied as to the extent of its financial support of Judge Karmeier's election campaign - see all that, and more, reflected in the federal court order. 

The federal court order reflects that the investigation that led to the federal class action was inspired by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Caperton:

Only the amount of money that this man - Brent Benjamin - was paid to be elected to overrule (50 million dollars):





was mere peanuts as compared with what State Farm paid this man, Lloyd Karmeier



to reverse - a $1.05 BILLION judgment.

So, Judge Lloyd Karmeier and his obvious misconduct is the reason for a class certification of the following class against State Farm Insurance:

Note that Professor of Law Erwin Chemerinsky is now a court-appointed class counsel.  That's the same Professor Chemerinsky who lectures for BarBRI, an organization that was sued for shady conduct in how BarBRI courses are put together and how competition is squeezed out, including educators with better and more efficient ways of teaching for bar exams. 

One thing that bothers me to no end.

Both "heroes" of bribery-through-elections, Judge Benjamin in West Virginia, and Judge Karmeier in Illinois, are very much on the bench, have their law licenses intact and were not disciplined for their misconduct.

Yet, at the very same time, two attorneys were suspended in these same states for criticism of judges:

• Lanre Amu in Illinois - who criticized judges for corruption and case-fixing, posted an open letter to the Illinois appellate court accusing certain judges of racism and corruption, and accused specific judges of specific ways of case-fixing;  and

• Stephen Hall in West Virginia - a lawyer who accused judges, in legal pleadings, of racism and corruption.

I recently wrote about an example in New York where an attorney's grand theft of client funds from a trust account is treated as a lesser offense than truthful criticism of a judge.

Obviously, in West Virginia and Illinois accepting a multi-million dollar bribe (disguised as a "campaign contribution") to get elected for a lucrative and highly-paying position of power, and abusing governmental authority in return for that bribe, is not a disciplinary violation at all.

Criticism of such action by an attorney is, nevertheless, a suspending offense in the same states.

What comes to mind is the dissent in Caperton voiced in 2009 by four U.S. Supreme Court Justices:

• Roberts;
• Alito;
• Thomas; and
• Scalia

In that dissent, these four justices claimed that it is not accepting the obvious bribe in return for overturning a multimillion dollar verdict that is the problem.

The problem is, in their opinion, that public trust in the integrity of the judiciary will be undermined if a judicial decision caused by such bribery will be overturned.

In other words, these four justices held the public for idiots - that despite the obvious bribery, the public's trust in the "presumptive" integrity of the judiciary will be unshaken.

In other words, these 4 U.S. Supreme Court justices (one deceased now) believed that there is a presumption of integrity in judges because they took an oath of office - even if a particular judge very obviously broke that same oath, for money.

Yet, if judicial corruption was not a problem, and was not a liability concern for the judiciary, the judiciary would not have bent over backwards, as it is doing now, to create, enforce and expand beyond any breaking point the concept of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and CORRUPT acts on the bench.

So, we undoubtedly have case-fixing in the judicial system.

As the case in California recently revealed, case-fixing may be ongoing and involve a lot of people.

Yet, such corruption is usually swept under the rug unless really big numbers are involved - and even then judges who were involved in the obvious corruption, like Judge Brent Benjamin in West Virginia or judge Lloyd Karmeier in Illinois, these judges remain on the bench, untouched by judicial or attorney discipline, or by state or federal criminal prosecution.

Instead, whistleblowers of judicial misconduct are viciously persecuted and stripped of their livelihood.

Since the subject of judicial corruption is taboo in mass media, we the bloggers, we the People, we through social media, should be exposing every single instant of it, big or small, fixing a case worth 1.05 billion dollars, or a family court custody case.

Corruption is corruption, and people suffer from corruption whether it is money that they have lost as a result of that corruption, or liberty, or custody of children.

So, will Judge Karmeier be disciplined or criminally prosecuted, now that a class action under the Rackateering and Corrupt Organization Act statute was instituted based on his corrupt behavior?

Let's see what happens.

Social media is a powerful news source nowadays, making many things possible - maybe, sharing and expressing outrage in the media will finally prompt authorities to prosecute judges who fix cases in exchange for campaign contributions.

I will continue to follow up on this case and report it here.

Stay tuned.

A Massachussets court rules that African Americans have a lot of reasons to fear the police - and run away from the police

Apparently not only New York City police disproportionately targets African Americans with stops - and that includes even off-duty black police officers.

In Massachusetts, a judge just ruled that African Americans had a lot to worry about if police is seeking to stop them - and that African Americans have reasons to flee when they see a police officer.

The case in Massachusetts involved a conviction for a burglary where the criminal defendant was stopped by the Boston police, and a firearm was found on him.

The trial court and the intermediate appellate court denied suppression of the firearm, but the higher appellate court reversed and vacated the convictions, because "the police lacked reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop".

The description of the suspect by the alleged victims was:

1) a black male wearing a red hoodie;
2) a black male wearing a black hoodie; and
3) a black male wearing "dark clothing".

A police officer spotted men who fit the "general description" and "yelled out":

The officer then radioed the description of black men who ran away when the officer "yelled out" to them, to other officers, who stopped the defendant.  The defendant did not have a firearm on him, but a firearm was found nearby near a fence.

The appellate court ruled that the description that black males ran away when a police officer asked them to wait, was not enough reason for reasonable suspicion, stop, arrest, search and criminal charges.

Whether the defendant did or did not commit a burglary, does not matter - and I know that this issue will upset a lot of people, but that's how the law works. 

The government cannot enforce the law, or teach respect to the law, by breaking the law.

If the only suspicion about a person is his skin color, gender, the color of his clothing and that he ran away from the police - that is simply not enough for arrests and searches.

Federal judge and sexual predator Walter Smith rapidly retired pending investigation into his sexual misconduct - brought about at the demand of Texas attorney Ty Clevenger, who is now targeted for disbarment

I wrote in August of 2016 about yet another attorney targeted for exposing judicial misconduct - sexual misconduct of federal judge Walter Smith.

Texas attorney Ty Clevenger was targeted for disbarment in retaliation for bringing about the re-opening of an investigation into sexual misconduct of a federal judge, and for writing to the Chief Judge of the U.S. Supreme Court requesting to speed up that investigation.

I am happy to report that attorney Clevenger's efforts at least amounted to resignation/retirement of Judge Smith during investigation - and removal of a sexual predator from a federal courthouse.

It is not reported that Judge Smith was criminally prosecuted, or disbarred - absolutely not.

He was allowed to retire and keep his pension and benefits, to be paid by us the taxpayers.

And, of course, courthouse employees, his victims, did not come forward with lawsuits against the court administration for deliberate indifference in exposing female court employees to a sexual predator in a position of power, same as it was done with another federal judge, Samuel Kent, who the judicial system refused to properly investigate and discipline, and who was finally caught, prosecuted, but given a slap on the wrist instead of a real prison sentence for what he deserved.

So - congratulations, attorney Ty Clevenger!

Your courage, at the cost of great personal sacrifice, have helped countless female employees and protected them from a sexual predator in a position of high power.

And shame on attorney disciplinary authorities and criminal authorities in the State of Texas and in the U.S. Attorney's office for not prosecuting Judge Smith for his crimes.

But - we already know that "honor" and "honorable" in the description of the legal profession is just an "honorary title".  A meaningless one.

A black career prosecutor turned judge upholds the "right" of the racist NYPD to prosecute criminal charges NYPD generated against Black Lives Matter protesters. Corruption in New York is poetic.

If you are issued a traffic ticket in New York, in some municipalities, an attorney from the county District Attorney's office is prosecuting the ticket, and in others - the police officer who issued the ticket.  Such a police officer will then violate the police's own "no plea" policy, and will give the defendants legal advice - all illegally, on top of being an interested witness and a prosecutor at the same time.

When police officers give legal advice to those they arrest and prosecute, not only that is the crime of unauthorized practice of law (that the police officers will not prosecute against themselves, naturally), but is also a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial investigator and prosecutor.

Because, of course, the "legal advice" that the police officers are giving to those they arrest is - just go ahead and plea to whatever police officers arrested them for, or for a "lesser offense", even if the original ticket was completely bogus.

And, when the arresting police officer is prosecuting the case, while also being the main material witness in the case, such prosecutions undermine the defendants' constitutional right to an impartial prosecutor.

And, while there may be at least a theoretical possibility of a disciplinary action against a lawyer-prosecutor, with resulting public discipline, disciplinary records of a police officer/ prosecutor remain sealed, as required by New York Civil Rights Law 50-a.  Such records, even in case the officer is discharged and is not subject to protection of NY Civil Rights Law 50-a, are still zealously guarded by police departments, and the New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has recently stated his position that it is within the NYC Mayor's authority to withhold records of discipline against police officers from public access.

But - why is allowing arresting police officers, or police officers at all, to prosecute cases such a bad idea?

The problem is that a defendant in a criminal case (and in a traffic ticket case) has a due process right to an impartial prosecutor who is not interested in the outcome of the case.

That right surely disappears when the prosecutor is actually the arresting officer.

81 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case, Berger v United States, where the court has outlined a "dual role" of a criminal prosecutor:

"The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."

The case is about a federal prosecutor, but is equally applicable to state criminal prosecutor, since federal constitutional right of criminal defendant to an impartial criminal prosecutor remains the same, whether the defendant is prosecuted by the federal or state government.

Yet, when a police officer receives a bonus if the summons he issued "sticks" and results in a traffic ticket fine, or a criminal conviction, fine and surcharge, part of which goes to the municipality that employs the police officer, the "two-fold aim" that "guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer" goes out the door and is replaced by the principle that guilt or innocence does not matter - obtaining fines and escaping liability for the police officer/prosecutor does.

NYPD reportedly settled lawsuits against itself and its police officers for $837 million dollars in the last five years.

Moreover, in protest cases in NYC, NYPD lawyers, reportedly, are at the scene of arrest advising police officers what charges they should bring.

Then, the same lawyers for NYPD prosecute those charges - and put into their plea bargain offers a condition that, in exchange for a reduced charge, defendants must waive their right to sue the police - a direct conflict of interest.

I am very well aware of such conflicts of interest - but thought that it was a freak thing that sprang up in the neck of woods of Delaware County only - where the then-District Attorney Richard Northrup (who now has been elected the Delaware County judge) obtained from a LEGALLY BLIND criminal defendant, without reading to him the agreement he was signing without seeing it, a waiver of the right to sue himself, the judge, and all law enforcement authorities, from local to County to federal, in exchange for a "reduced" charge (A-1 felony was reduced to A-2, which was not a beneficial reduction for the defendant at all).

My husband and I raised the issue of impropriety of that "arrangement".  My husband did it on an assigned criminal appeal, and I did it in a motion to vacate the plea and in a civil action challenging improper exoneration of bail that landed $17,500 of defendant's bail money in the hands of his prior defense counsel, "coincidentally", the then-Vice Chair of the New York Commission for Judicial Conduct Stephen R. Coffey.

The Chief Assistant District Attorney John Hubbard who was, without disclosure, the presiding judge's former law partner and who was opposing the criminal appeal, "privately" threatened my husband not to "burn the bridges" by raising issues of judicial misconduct in that case.

When my husband did not back down, he was disbarred, I was sanctioned for raising those same issues, and suspended without a hearing based on those sanctions.

The participants in the illegal scheme obtaining waiver of the right to bring a civil rights lawsuit:  Northrup, Judge Becker, and Stephen Coffey, who was at that time, "coincidentally", the Vice-Chair of the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct, were not disciplined.

Instead, Northrup was elevated from District Attorney to County Judge, and Becker swore him in, while being at that time retired and having no authority to swear Northrup in - making Northrup's judgeship illegitimate.

John Hubbard is now the "Acting District Attorney" and is running to be elected as District Attorney of Delaware County - unopposed.  Hubbard is now appearing in front of his former boss Northrup, as a judge - and, I bet, no attorneys have filed motions to recuse, for fear that their licenses will be yanked.

And, since Hubbard is running unopposed, he will surely be elected, and rewarded with a 4-year seat of the District Attorney, the salary matching that of a Supreme Court justice, and a path to judgeship in the future, similar to Northrup's career.

After all, Hubbard did his job well - both by intimidating my husband on behalf of Becker and refusing to charge Becker with filing a forged certificate of election when I asked him to do that, and both of those jobs he did without disclosure that he was the former law partner of Judge Becker.  And, after the job well done, which also included criminal prosecution of my friends and clients who sued Becker, on bogus charges, John Hubbard now deserves a boon - the seat of the District Attorney.

So, in Delaware County the waiver of a civil rights lawsuit was obtained in a felony case.

In other, more "visible" counties, and in New York City, corruption is a bit more modest - it allows police prosecutors to seek such lucrative plea bargains only in "minor offense" cases, such as traffic tickets and misdemeanors.


For example, recently in New York City, a judge, Guy Mitchell, denied challenges of two women to constitutionality of New York Police Department and its lawyers prosecuting summonses instead of the District Attorney.

The challenges were made because police officers issuing summonses are interested in the outcome of the case, and that is especially so when New York City settled over $800 million of claims against its police departments over a short period of time.

And the summonses Arminta Jeffryes and Cristina Winsor were challenging were not traffic tickets either - those were arrests during a Black Lives Matter event.

Arminta Jeffryes was arrested and kept in jail for several hours for "jaywalking", and Cristina Winsor was arrested for allegedly "stepping off the sidewalk into the street".  Her summonses - for jaywalking - were issued by a police captain, a very high-ranking figure in NYPD, which begs a question whether the prosecution was politically motivated.

Here are Cristina Winsor (left) and Arminta Jeffryes (right):

The "hero" of a judge who rejected the obviously meritorious challenge to the practice of the police acting as prosecutors of their own summonses, was the former prosecutor Judge Guy Mitchell, recently sworn in by NYC Mayor DiBlasio:

Here is Judge Guy Mitchell:

An interesting political move to assign a black judge to handle arrests in "Black Lives Matter" cases.

Obviously, loyalty to the system in Judge Mitchell overcame his oath of office to uphold the U.S. Constitution - and provide to the two women who are currently prosecuted by witnesses against them their constitutional right to impartial prosecutors.

But, after a black judge in Kentucky, Judge Olu Stevens, was suspended for doing his job and fighting racial discrimination in criminal justice system, black judges obviously will be extra-careful not to be fair, and to bow to the system low, no matter how racist it is to African American litigants and litigants fighting racial discrimination.

Judge Mitchell is a career prosecutor, and has been a prosecutor for 20 years before he came to the bench.

Of course, to him, whatever a prosecutor does is Gospel.

And, if the District Attorney's office has a "Memorandum of Understanding" with NYPD, delegating to NYPD to prosecute criminal cases NYPD generated - that is Gospel to Judge Mitchell, too.

Actually, NOTHING in New York law allows that delegation.

New York County Law 700 gives an absolute discretion only to the County District Attorneys to prosecute crimes and says nothing about allowing District Attorneys (elected public officials) to delegate their powers to anybody else.

But, judges in this country have a history of brazenly changing statutory law through interpretation, so Judge Guy did just that - if a prosecutor does something, like delegation of duties not allowed by statutory law, then the prosecutor can do that, and the U.S. Constitution that Judge Mitchell is sworn to uphold be damned.

Mitchell elevated himself to judgeship on the bones of his African American brothers and sisters, by reportedly saying:

"Seeing friends of mine who went to prison and some have died,” said Mitchell. “[I thought] once I’m in a position to make a difference, this will be an obligation for me to move forward. That has motivated me—the fact that I can make a difference and have someone look and say, ‘If he can do it, I can do it.”

Now that Mitchell is in that craved position of power and can make a difference, and when his brothers and sisters are in the streets protesting against racial discrimination and racial profiling - which is what NYPD does regularly to African Americans, even to African American police officers - Judge Mitchell is "making a difference", and is helping, but he is not helping that justice be served, only that the law enforcement establishment is protected from liability.

Yet, the denial of the challenge is going to be taken further through the court system, since it goes to people's absolute fundamental right that the government does not allow interested witnesses to act as prosecutors in criminal cases.

I will eagerly follow this case and report on it.

Stay tuned.

A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court, addressing the role of retaliative attorney discipline in widening the justice gap

I have filed my long-suffering certiorari petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.

I am planning to write a separate book as to how to prepare such petitions, based on my own experiences and documented steps as to how exactly to format, print and bind the petition the way the U.S. Supreme Court requires - and save money.

The entire text of the petition is available here.

Of course, the petition did not cover all issues I wanted to cover, because of the word limit and because restrictions to font, text field, page size and presentation of documents in courts below in the Appendix makes it extremely costly to properly present all issues you want to present, so you have to cut them.

The petition raises several important issues:

1) how New York lowers the prosecution's burden of proof in attorney disciplinary proceedings in order to skip hearings and strip attorneys of their licenses without a hearing based on retaliative sanctions of judges sought to be recused,  sanctions are imposed by the preponderance of the evidence standard - while the standard of proof in attorney reinstatement proceedings is higher, and the standard of proof in private attorney discipline is higher, too, not to mention that the standard of proof required by ABA Model Rule and by designation of attorney disciplinary proceedings as quasi-criminal is also higher;

2) how New York uses attorney discipline contrary to its declared purpose (protection of consumers), and thus widen the justice gap by removing predominantly qualified criminal defense, family court and civil rights attorneys working for the poor, while replacing them with uneducated, unskilled and often unlicensed providers;

3) how New York uses attorney discipline as the tool of retaliation in violation of 1st Amendment and Due Process; and

4) how New York punishes attorneys for doing their duty for their clients when New York gives attorneys one and only tool to secure for their clients the fundamental federal constitutional right to impartial judicial review - through confrontational motions to recuse in front of judges who are sought to be removed from the case, and how New York then teaches these judges how to sanction attorneys and removes attorneys' licenses, without a hearing, based on such sanctions.


I stress in the petition that, if the so-called justice gap is as important as the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor recently publicly claimed - to the point that attorney slavery is required in order to remedy that gap - it is a good way to start bridging that gap by simply not widening it further and not removing those attorneys who are already working for the poor.

I describe in the petition the situation that, when attorneys' livelihood is automatically taken, without a hearing, for making motions to recuse, no attorneys can realistically be expected to make such motion - and thus litigants' right to impartial judicial review in New York has simply become unavailable, which is a constitutionally intolerable situation.

The petition points out to the U.S. Supreme Court that the court took 2 cases in the past 2 years dealing with the wrong use of occupational licensing contrary of its declared goal:

1) in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v Federal Trade Commission, 574 U.S. ___ (2015),  the Court addressed anti-competitive use of occupational licensing,  and

2) in Whole Woman's Health v Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. __ (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court struck the use of occupational licensing that was declared to protect women's health, while the regulation, in fact, was doing the opposite.

I do not know whether the U.S. Supreme Court will consider these issues important enough for its review.  The petition is in the Court's hands, and I will report on the petition's progress.