Privileged kids of Stanford Law support Stanford alumni Judge Persky's right to support privileged rapists from Stanford U

Exactly one day after law professor Michele Dauber posted a letter supporting #TheRecallofJudge Persky, 53 (allegedly) graduates of the elite Stanford Law School published their own letter, opposing the recall.

The law graduates were just the last ammunition used by defenders of the biggest privilege of the American judiciary (to be able to rule on a whim) to preserve that privilege.  I discussed the efforts of other defenders to preserve this privilege in my previous blog here.

Here is the entire 2016 Stanford Law Class - predominantly white kids.

The math of how many of Stanford Law Graduates of 2016 have signed the letter and who exactly signed the letter remains fuzzy.

"Stanford Daily" says 53 graduates signed the letter.

The "open letter" itself was signed by just EIGHT (8) named graduates who claimed that 48 more graduates also signed, without disclosure of their names, that makes the total 56.

I guess, law school education or journalism does not require to be current on elementary school level math.

So, we do not know who are the alleged 48 additional students who allegedly signed the "open letter" of Stanford Law Students to Law Professor Michele Dauber asking her to halt her POLITICAL activity in appealing to California voters to recall Judge Persky in accordance with the process provided by the California State Constitution.

Since the 48 additional names remain undisclosed, it is safe to assume such signatures never existed.

Otherwise, neither Professor Dauber nor anybody else should be persuaded or impressed by appeals from anonymous sources to halt their political activity to recall a judge.

And, it is a shame for the 8 named graduates to employ "strength in numbers" by adding anonymous votes to their open letter.  Surely after graduating from an elite law school such graduates would know better than to impress the public with conjured votes.

The timing of the graduates' appeal is no less suspect.

The "open letter" was penned and published in June of 2016, when the only thing the "most recent graduates" of any law school are concerned about is the bar-prep course.

To engage in a coordinated campaign of creating a very carefully worded letter and to go around and obtain 56 signatures of people who are scattered after graduation (unless conveniently kept together in a Bar-Bri bar-prep course where they have to come to law school every day) is a job a bar-prep student can ill afford.

Moreover, what is also extremely suspicious in how the "open letter" came about is:

1) the background and racial/ethnic composition of the "drafting group";

2) refusal of the drafters of the letter to address the issue of abuse of discretion as judicial misconduct and to address "discretion" as potential source of corruption; and

3) focus of the drafters only on the borderline legality of Judge Persky's decision (even though it can still be abuse of discretion, which drafters refused to address), and

4) speculation on public feelings regarding racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, and needs for leniency to prevent mass incarceration.

First of all, let me address the background of the drafters.

I would understand if the issues of race discrimination, the need of mercy to criminal defendants would be raised if the person given mercy was an African American defendant, a defendant belonging to the class of defendants disproportionately targeted by the criminal system, disproportionately convicted and disproportionately incarcerated.

I would understand if NAACP or Al Sharpton would be raising the issue, but they don't, because the issue is actually of "white privilege", of a white judge, athlete-alumni of Stanford U giving an inappropriate break to athlete-alumni of Stanford U.

6 months, 3 months for good behavior, for raping an unconscious woman.  Because of the rapist's youth, no prior criminal record and intoxication.

The Stanford Law graduates who have signed the open letter, or who were forced to sign the letter, or whose identities were used to sign the letter (and I will provide their own information revealed by them in their own LinkedIn profiles or revealed by various programs awarding to them different fellowships and other awards), are no novices in the law or in the criminal justice system.

They MUST know from their criminal law course that:

1) intoxication is an affirmative defense for the jury;
2) that the jury already heard the case and convicted the rapist, which means the defense of intoxication was rejected; and
3) they must be aware that at sentencing, the sentencing judge may not defy the jury's findings.

Moreover, a judge is in no way bound by probation report, and probation officers, who are not attorneys, have no power to impose their wishes upon the judge in sentencing decisions.

And, they must be aware that the judge's "discretion" at the sentencing is severely circumscribed by the severity of the crime and by the jury finding of "guilty", rejecting the defense of intoxication.

If the jury rejected the defense of intoxication, the judge could not overrule the jury and award a lenient sentence BECAUSE of intoxication as a guilt-diminishing factor.

Let's also consider the fact that all of the signing graduates are one month away from the bar exam and several months away from being admitted to the bar BY THE JUDICIARY, and thus have a very heavy interest in PLEASING THE JUDICIARY in order to succeed in their profession.

Let's consider also the fact that people who go and are admitted into Stanford Law are looking at careers as judges themselves, and thus have a future self-interest to protect their own future privileges, the biggest one of which is the "discretion" of ruling in favor of one party over another where a judge cannot be openly accused of corruption, even though corruption is screaming from the way "discretion" is applied.

Of course, "judicial corruption" is a taboo word combination in law school courses, for law students, law professors of ethics, and for lawyers.

It doesn't help removing the distinct sour taste from reading the letter to learn that the group includes the daughter of the former (until 2013) Attorney General of Washington State Rob McKenna, Madeleine McKenna, who has experience in handling a "statewide voter outreach program" in her father's recent run for a Governor.

Not only McKenna the father (a licensed attorney with apparent high political ambitions) will benefit in having his daughter brown-nose the judiciary and add support judicial discretion, but a State Attorney General's position is usually a stepping stone for something higher - the Governor, a Senator, or - a state or federal judge.

So, the daughter is arguing for the well-being of her father, and NOT about well-beings of minority criminal defendants who will not be given mercy or leniency by the likes of Judge Persky anyway.

And, Madeleine McKenna's friends are standing in line to support her campaign and, through that support, to put caviar on their own meal ticket, for years to come.

Here are the name of the drafters of the letter and some of their background information that I was able to find online.

1. Akiva Freidlin,
2. Emi Young,
3. Ginny Halden,
4. Jeannie Lieder,
5. Madeleine McKenna,
6. Michael Skocpol,
7. Nick Rosellini, and
8. Vina Seelam

Akiva Freidlin

Here is Mr. Freidlin's experience, as stated by himself on his own LinkedIn profile:

Emi Young

Emi Young's experience, as listed on her own LinkedIn page:

Virginia "Ginny" Halden, recipient of Deborah L. Rhode Public Interest Award

Jeannie Leider, a Public Interest Fellow in Stanford Law School 2015-2016

Here is Jeannie Lieder's description from her Public Fellow award announcement:

Madeleine McKenna, daughter of Washington State Attorney General Robert McKenna who ran for Governor of the State of Washington in 2012;  Madeleine McKenna, according to her LinkedIn page, ran a "voter outreach program" for her father

Madeleine McKenna's education and experience as described on her LinkedIn page:

Michael Skocpol

Here is education and experience of Michael Skocpol, as posted on his own LinkedIn page:

Michael Skocpol is the son of Harvard professor of sociology Theda Skocpol, the former Dean of Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.

Nicholas Rosellini

Vina Seelam

The racial composition of the "drafting" group (even though a more adult drafter's hand is all over the "open letter") appeared to have been very carefully arranged.

Same as appointments for courts, same as partnerships in large law firms, a small number of dark-skinned individuals are thrown in to be able to call "diversity".

That strategy was clearly employed in the "drafting group" where out of 8 "drafters", 7 are white and only 1 is of Indian (not Native American) origin - where Indians are not the discriminated minorities the letter drafters are using to achieve the results desired by the judiciary, to eliminate the precedent of constitutional recall of a judge for abuse of discretion screaming of corruption and "white privilege" racial pre-judgment.

Of course, in this particular situation, careful attention was paid also to the gender composition of the group.  Out of 8 of the alleged "drafters" of the open letter, the majority, 5 of them, are female.

5 females, future lawyers, possibly, future judges, graduates of an elite school, oppose recall of a judge who defied the jury verdict of a white man who raped an unconscious woman and gave him a lenient sentence based on the factor (intoxication) that the jury rejected as a defense at trial.

As I mentioned above, the main focus of the "open letter" is "judicial independence", the judge's right to exercise "discretion" and that the recall of a judge because he made a decision that was within his discretion to make will undermine not only judicial independence, but will jeopardize the much needed mercy to indigent and minority defendants.

In fact, judicial mercy at sentencing MUST be severely circumscribed.

First, because a wide latitude of sentencing choices (the prosecution asked for 6 years, Judge Persky gave 6 months, 3 months for good behavior), when such discretion is exercised in the matter of white privileged kids and not exercised in the matter of minority and/or indigent defendants, the public has a legitimate reason to treat such decisions as having an appearance of being corrupt.

Second, the 8 drafters must know (and especially Madeleine McKenna, the daughter of a former prosecutor from 2004 to 2013) that judicial discretion at sentencing after a jury trial is usually exercised the other way - judges usually PUNISH criminal defendants for going to trial instead of entering plea bargains, often with maximum prison sentences.

Since in this case, the discretion that Judge Persky exercised was contrary to the general trend of how that judicial discretion is usually exercised towards indigent, non-white and non-moneyed/privileged defendants, such smart people as 8 Ivy League law school graduates, one of them a son of an accomplished Harvard University professor, most of them also with Ivy League undergraduate degrees, cannot play dumb by claiming that giving a break to a white privileged kids was a proper exercise of "judicial mercy" that should not be restricted.

A sentencing judge should not be allowed to COMMUTE the sentence - that kind of MERCY is the authority of the GOVERNOR, in rarest of cases.

The sentencing judge should apply strict, equal sentences after the jury has reached the verdict of guilty, and should not have the power to cancel the jury verdict.

One of the most piece in the "open letter" is:

"[m]any of us, like you, believe that justice called for a stiffer sentence in his case.  But we think humility requires us to recognize that we won’t always be able to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate exercises of judicial mercy."

Well, everybody has their own right to think the way they want to think, California voters included.

And, the established democratic procedure, a recall, will show whether the public is able or not able to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate exercises of judicial mercy.

At this time, the public obviously thinks that the prosecutor, the attorney for the People, failed them by not filing an appeal, as well as that the judge is racist and corrupt in favor of wealth and privilege and should not be allowed to decide cases requiring NEUTRALITY.

Why not let the public decide, as is allowed by the California Constitution - whether to recall the judge or not?

And - why try not to influence the public directly, but to direct their letter to the influential law professor asking her to withdraw her support of the recall campaign?

Is it because those powerful adults who apparently pulls the strings of the 8 alleged "drafters" of the "open letter" are actually afraid that they will not like what the public vote is going to be?

Then, why not try to start their own campaign - to change the California State Constitution to remove the recall provision from it?

All in all, the "open letter" leaves an aftertaste that it was a career-enhancing opportunity for the 8 alleged drafters that they could not pass by, and that all 8 of them are looking to receive material, monetary and non-monetary benefits, in their immediate and remote career, from jumping into the fray defending judges' right to act on a whim.

Because, as I said above, these graduates of an elite law school will derive their financial wealth and political influence from such "judicial discretion" in the years to come, and may exercise that discretion themselves when they become judges (which is the career goal of many Ivy League-educated attorneys).

Of course, we have freedom of speech (supposedly) in this country, and the Standford Law School graduates are entitled to their own opinion.

But, when they use the prestige of their education, the numbers of unidentified co-signors in their plea to support the most treasured boon of judicial position - judicial discretion - at the time when judges' associations are lobbying against recall of Judge Persky in order not to lose that coveted privilege (and source of corruption) and at the time when they are just about to be licensed by the very judiciary whose privileges to act on a whim they are supporting, the totality of how they expressed their opinion - stinks and makes their arguments less than good faith, to put it mildly.

I will continue to follow the legal careers of these 8 aspiring brown-nosers of the judiciary with keen interest and will report it on this blog.  I am very much interested to see what was - likely - offered to this group in exchange for the "open letter".

For news about this group of 8 - stay tuned.

No - don't acknowledge that the attorney was never suspended as a matter of law, my money depends on it!

There can be stupid.

And there can be STUPID.

And there can be VERY STUPID.

The EXTRA VERY STUPID is what I saw today in the "legal" argument of attorney Woodruff Carroll, lover of teen chats, the one who "lacks a filter" (not my expression).

By the way, Carroll's enthrallment with sex got the better of him when he used a sexual term "quickie" in a Memorandum of Law - claiming that he has made a "quickie motion".

I will repeat here Carroll's statements that I already posted earlier which prompted observers of his failed election campain for a City Council state that Carroll "lacks a filter" - and that's a huge understatement:



 

Carroll, together with former magistrate Peebles (whose term expired on May 16, 2016, but Peebles still continues as the Magistrate of the Northern District of New York) did employ that tactic - 

"scare 'em a little bit and get 'em motivated" 

with the indigent plaintiffs of the Argro case.

In fact, Carroll used that strategy beautifully where the Plaintiffs went to the hearing to finally kick Carroll out and ended up settling the case for "quick cheap money" (Carroll's words, not mine) 
after a "brilliant speech of Magistrate Peebles) (Carroll's words, not mine, repeated at least 3 times in his pleadings), and after Carroll told them that Peebles will be pissed off with them if they do not settle (Carroll's words, not mine).

To say that Carroll is exceptionally stupid, even for a privileged attorney, is an understatement of the century - he admits A LOT that a corrupt, but "prudent" attorney would prefer to conceal.

But, Carroll surpassed even his own record level of stupidity in his pleading when he claimed that my suspension should not be "reversed" (or deemed as "never happened" because there is no public order of suspension, as I argued) - because Carroll bet money on my suspension.

Carroll does not even try to call me by name, I am "she" and "her" in the majority of his sentences in the pleadings.

Here is Carroll's argument, in all its unadorned glory:

  Carroll argued the above on behalf of the person who provided to the court an affidavit that she wanted to hire me (with or without a license) and provided a written statement that she wanted to fire Carroll - which the court did not allow her to do, and forced her to accept Carroll's services anyway.

Carroll  states in his "affidavit" - without supporting affidavits of his coerced clients - that now the very people who told me that they are prejudiced by my suspension and want me back on the case, license or no license, actually do not want my suspension to be deemed what it is - a nullity - because they will be financially hurt then.

Just imagine that.

Do not apply the law, your Honor, it will hit me in the pocket.

Lacks a filter, indeed.



 

The defenders of Judge Persky - market players in the legal profession

4 days ago, on June 21, 2016, a Stanford Law School law professor Michele Dauber published a letter in The Washington Post supporting recall of judge Aaron Persky, a former Stanford Lacrosse team captain, for giving a super-lenient sentence to Brock Turner, a Stanford swimmer.

Professor Dauber argued that Judge Persky practically contested and corrected through his sentence a jury verdict for felonies, one of them carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of 2 years in prison with no probation allowed.

For the sake of fairness, other reports indicated that under California law, Judge Persky did not violate sentencing guidelines, that he was allowed to consider "unusual circumstances" to reduce the sentence and give probation.  Turner's youth, level of intoxication and lack of prior criminal record were used by Judge Persky as "unusual circumstances" to reduce his sentence.

Yet, Professor Dauber clearly pointed out in her letter that Judge Persky:

• minimized trauma to the victim, and used for purposes of giving leniency to the rapist "character letters" openly blaming the victim;
• "verged on questioning the jury’s verdict, calling the trial an 'imperfect process' and saying that Turner should not be 'penalized' for failing to fully accept the findings of guilt" - thus acting as an advocate for Turner; 
• was not impartial, to which the prosecutor agrees where, while not filing an appeal fearing it will fail because Judge Persky was within his "discretion", the prosecutor did ask the court to remove Persky from another sex assault case claiming he has lost confidence in Persky's impartiality.

The case from which Judge Persky was removed was identical to the Turner case, where a male nurse is accused of sexually assaulting an anesthesized woman:

Persky's lenient sentence caused an unheard of response - potential jurors refuse to sit in his courtroom, apparently believing that so doing is a waste of time and that he is unable to preside impartially.

Professor Dauber pointed out that under the California State Constitution, judges are subject to recall.

That's exactly what people of the State of California, led in their effort by U.S. Representative Jackie Speier and state legislative representatives, want to do - recall judge Persky based on the state Constitution.

By the way, here is Judge Persky's statement at the sentencing hearing explaining his reasons for the lenient sentence.

Professor Michele Dauber, being reportedly, friend of the victim in the Turner case, is surely not impartial.

Yet, neither is Judge Persky.

Both Michele Dauber and Judge Persky appear to be advocates - Judge Persky for Stanford athletes and for young white males raping females, and Michele Dauber - for her raped friend.

Yet, it is not Michele Dauber alone who want the recall of Judge Persky, it is the millions of people who signed the recall petition and the legislators in the State of California.

Nor is it unlawful to do the recall - since it is specifically permitted by the California State Constitution.

Here is what the public defender of Santa Clara County says about Judge Aaron Persky:

"Aaron Persky is widely held by both prosecutors and defense attorneys to be one of the most fair and thoughtful jurists on the bench.

A good and decent man’s reputation is irreparably damaged, his physical safety and that of his family is in serious danger, and the very integrity of the criminal justice system he so faithfully served is in jeopardy."

The sentence of Brock Turner and Judge Persky's conduct at the sentencing hearing does not describe a "good and decent man" though.  It describe a white judge who favored a white athlete from the judge's former alma mater, put down the victim of a sexual assault and argued that the jury verdict that Judge Persky was law-bound to enforce, might not be proper.

Judge Persky has defenders.

The first, as described above, is the Santa Clara County Public Defender Ronald O'Connor who is "appalled" by the recall efforts which, in his opinion, undermine the cornerstone of judicial process - judicial independence.

The second is a prominent constitutional law professor Erwin Chemerinsky.

Professor Chemerinsky is entitled to much less credit as an impartial scholar though after he allowed himself to be bought by the BarBri enterprise.

Professor Chemerinsky's reaction to public efforts to recall Judge Persky is this:

"'I think the public should express its outrage through all of the means that views are expressed: comments to the press, news conferences, petitions, demonstrations, op-eds,' said Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of UC Irvine’s law school. 'People should express their views, but a recall is not the answer and is a real threat to judicial independence.'"

Huh?

The recall effort is allowed and is following the procedure provided for by the California State Constitution.  Surely, a prominent constitutional law professor such as Erwin Chemerinsky must know that the process is lawful.

The next thing to consider is that Erwin Chemerinsky is a practicing attorney and, as the majority of practicing attorneys in this country, will not be caught saying anything against a judge that will have a potential of actually hurting the judge.

So, Chemerinsky, while calling Judge Persky's decision “outrageous,” “misguided” and “grossly inadequate,”  allows the sovereign employer of that judge, "We the People" of the State of California, only one recourse against Judge Persky's behavior: running at the mouth, with no potential of having any impact on the judge.

That's a gross disrespect to democratic process of recall of judges, provided in the California State Constitution.

Reportedly, the president of the California Judges Association, called the looming recall “potentially catastrophic,” claiming that  "[a]ny effort to recall any judge in this country for making a legally valid ruling, no matter how popular or unpopular, presents a potentially catastrophic threat to our system of justice”, and added that “[i]f judicial officers are forced to fear the masses, then American justice and individual constitutional rights will be decided by judges surveying the crowd to preserve his or her own livelihood and personal well-being.”

But - the public is outraged exactly because it smelled the rat and believes that Judge Persky's decision is corrupt and that the judge is "surveying the crowd" - the rich white crowd - "to preserve his or her own livelihood and personal well-being".

The problem that has come to the fore in Judge Persky's case is the so-called "judicial discretion", and how much of it can judges be allowed in deciding cases - at least where issues of fact are already decided by juries.

Sexual assault on an unconscious victim is completely reprehensible.

Yet, reportedly, "current California law calls for a mandatory prison term in cases of rape or sexual assault where force is used, but not when the victim is unconscious or severely intoxicated and thus unable to resist", and that's what California lawmakers seek to correct, after the public outcry over Judge Persky's lenient sentence motivated by Judge Persky's camaraderie with an athlete from the judge's alma mater, as well as by Judge Persky's apparent personal beliefs that the victim's own behavior is to blame - a belief that was demonstrated in a prior 2011 case, too.

Let us ask a question - who wrote the law that is on the books now?

The one making a long prison sentence mandatory when "force is used", but no when the victim is unconscious or severely intoxicated and unable to resist?

How come sexual intercourse with an unconscious victim is not forcible rape?

And, aren't the lawmakers in the State of California predominantly white male lawyers? Who only responded to close the loophole after an international public outcry?

Two public defenders actually launched a petition against recall.

They reportedly said:

"The punishment or removal of Judge Persky in response to his exercise of discretion could lead to policies that limit that discretion, will deter other judges from extending mercy and instead encourage them to issue unfairly harsh sentences for fear of reprisal...  We fear that this shift will disproportionately impact the underprivileged and minorities in our communities and perpetuate mass incarceration.”

So, the concern is that:

• judicial discretion in sentencing will be legislatively restricted, and
• that legislative restriction of judicial sentencing will restrict judges in extending mercy to criminal defendants, and
• that will "disproportionately impact the underprivileged and minorities", and
• will "perpetuate mass incarceration".

It is correct that what is legislatively sought now is to restrict judicial discretion in sentencing.

Yet, that does not take away from the District Attorney an ability to reduce crimes through plea bargaining, it only restricts the judge from giving too lenient sentences for serious crimes after juries have already spoken.

As to judge's ability to exercise "mercy", affecting minorities and perpetuating mass incarceration, which will allegedly be affected by the recall efforts of Judge Persky, such claims are questionable at best.

Here is the statistics of trials in California for 2013:

According to the California Attorney General, violent crimes are actually decreasing at present.

In the same 2013, there were 213,390 total convictions and 38,034 convictions for violent offenses (p. 53 of the report).

Not all felonies are violent crimes - fraud and theft are also felonies.

Only 2.3% of felonies are tried in state courts, the majority of convictions are through plea bargains.

The majority of cases that are tried are tried by private criminal defense attorneys on behalf of those defendants who can afford those expensive private criminal defense attorneys.

Thus, claims that restricting a judge's discretion at sentencing after a jury trial will somehow disproportionately affect minorities or "perpetuate mass incarceration" are simply not credible.

What is more credible is that two public defenders want to get into good graces with the judiciary by launching the petition in support of Judge Persky.

What is also credible is that all judges publicly recognized that the most cherished part of their jobs is ability to act on a whim - the so-called "judicial discretion".

To say that restricting judicial discretion after jury trials is restricting acts of mercy, and especially when that is coming from public defenders, is defying reality.

Judges most often punish criminal defendants for going to trial, making them serve the maximum of the allowed sentences, and that is the opposite of what Judge Persky did with the privileged white rapist Brock Turner.

Judges in criminal courts are mostly former prosecutors, and are mostly pro-prosecution.

In this case, I cannot say that judge Persky is NOT pro-prosecution, he is just MORE pro-Stanford (former) athlete and pro rich white privileged criminal defendant.

After all, who knows what Judge Persky's plans for the future career are, and who knows what Brock Turner's family, or its friends, can offer Judge Persky in return for the lenient sentence.  Future will show.

But, anyway, all criminal defense attorneys, including the public defenders who launched the campaign in support of Judge Persky, know that once you go to trial, in case you lose your client most likely faces a maximum sentence, not a lenient judge like Persky.

That is the rule, Persky's lenient sentence to a rich white kid was the exception.

So, claiming that the Perskys of the California court system will be somehow intimidated into giving tougher sentence, and that it will affect minorities is a lame argument at best - because that is already happening, and what Turner got is exactly the opposite of the current trend.

Arguing that judges in criminal courts will be restricted in their discretion to give mercy which they never give, and opposing the limitation of judicial discretion to impose sentence of a convicted rapist is simply asking for attention and favors from the judicial system.

It is apparent that all defenders of Judge Persky are practicing attorneys who stand to gain from their support of judicial whims and who stand to lose from judicial disfavors exercised through the same judicial discretion they fight hard to preserve.

It is my firm belief thought that, given the backgrounds and patterns of behavior of most judges, allowing judges too much discretion allows them to assert privileges of their friends and members of their own social class and undermines people's trust in the integrity of the judiciary.

I will publish a separate story about yet another set of opponents of recall of Judge Persky - Stanford Law School graduates, the most recent class.

Stay tuned.

While the racist federal #JudgeEdithJones remains on the bench, her critic, civil rights attorney Jim Harrington is accused - of racism

In 2013, an Austin, Texas civil rights attorney and the then-executive director of the Texas Civil Rights Project Jim Harrington openly criticized Edith Jones, the former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit (handling death penalty cases) and a sitting judge of that court for racial bias and participated in filing a complaint against her for violation of judicial ethics.

Here is Edith Jones:

Jim Harrington's not only criticized Judge Jones' statements, but also signed a judicial misconduct complaint filed against Judge Jones by a broad coalition of civil rights organizations.

The statements that Judge Jones made in 2013 - and remained on the federal bench - are close, and some identical, to the statements that Donald Trump is lambasted for today, and correctly so.

Reportedly, Judge Edith Jones stated out of court, at a speech on Feb. 20, 2013, to lawyers at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law (so Judge Jones was clearly subject to judicial discipline and impeachment for her statements):

• That certain “racial groups like African Americans and Hispanics are predisposed to crime,” are “'prone' to commit acts of violence,” and get involved in more violent and “heinous” crimes than people of other ethnicities.

• That Mexican nationals would prefer to be on death row in the United States rather than serving prison terms in Mexico, and it's an insult for the United States to look to the laws of other countries such as Mexico.

• That defendants' claims of racism, innocence, arbitrariness and violations of international law and treaties are really nothing more than “red herrings” used by opponents of capital punishment.

• That claims of “mental retardation” by capital defendants disgust her, and the fact such people were convicted of a capital crime is itself sufficient to prove they are not in fact “mentally retarded.”

• That the imposition of a death sentence provides a positive service to capital-case defendants because defendants are likely to make peace with God only in the moment before their imminent execution.

Moreover, "[i]n her speech, Jones discussed specific cases, including those of three inmates on Texas' death row: Ramiro Ibarra Rubi of Mexico; Elroy Chester, an African American man whose intellectual-disability defense Jones rejected and who is scheduled for execution June 12; and Larry Swearingen, whose claim of innocence has received widespread attention and support."

Additionally, #JudgeEdithJones reportedly stated in her speech  "inmates freed from death sentences have been released not because they were innocent, but because of 'technicalities'—including cases where prosecutors hid evidence favorable to the defense—and offered an odd analogy, noting that 'there were just as many innocent people killed in drone strikes as innocent people executed for crimes,' according to several affidavits."

Which means that Judge Edith Jones, a judge presiding over death penalty cases, has a firmly held belief that ANYTHING THAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES IS RIGHT.  ANYTHING.  If the government ordered a drone strike, that means people killed by that strike are not innocent - according to Judge Jones.  There goes the "checks and balances" doctrine, that the judicial branch will control and restrict the executive branch from illegal actions.

With such beliefs, Edith Jones should not be allowed anywhere near the federal bench to handle civil rights cases against the government, or criminal cases by the government against criminal defendants, and especially death row cases, and especially death row cases of Mexicans and African Americans, and especially death row cases where innocence, arbitrariness, mental retardation or violation of international treaties is asserted, because on those issues Judge Edith Jones has a pre-judgment ready in her mind no matter what the law and the record says.

Judge Edith Jones already made a determination based on the CLASS of cases, no matter what is presented to her in any specific case - that is a complete disqualification from judicial office.

Yet, there she still is, unpunished, and instead, people she talked about, 2 out of 3 death row inmates, were quickly killed off.

Ramiro Rubi Ibarra, a Mexican national, claimed mental retardation, violation of Geneva Conventions and ineffective assistance of counsel - all of those claims were rejected by Judge Jones.

Despite the fact that one of the judges who decided his federal appellate cases, Edith Jones, made racist remarks about him and remarks about her position as a matter of POLICY regarding international treaties, mental retardation and the defendant's race and national origin, which, according to the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Williams v Pennsylvania, tainted the entire panel, Ramiro Rubi Ibarra's was executed in 2014.

Despite Judge Jones' out of court statements discussing Elroy Chester's case which should have led to remand and review of the case since it was decided by a racist judge, Elroy Chester, an African American who claimed intellectual disability (that Judge Jones did not accept as a matter of her own personal ILLEGAL policy, no matter what the facts of the case was), was executed on June 13, 2013, 4 months after #JudgeEdithJones made her statements.

Larry Swearingen is, as far as I could find out, alive at this time and is asserting his innocence - an unacceptable claim for Judge Jones.  In 2015 the Texas Court of Criminal appeals reversed the district court's decision that woud have allowed Larry Swearingen to test DNA evidence from the murder that could have proven his innocence.

The complaint against Judge Edith Jones was DENIED FOR REVIEW.

NO DISCIPLINE was imposed upon Judge Edith Jones for her statements.

The reason for no discipline was that nobody recorded what Judge Jones said - and, apparently, testimony of witnesses as to what she said was not enough for judges judging a judge.

As I stated above, 2 out of 3 death row inmates she discussed - with disdain - in February of 2013 lecture - were quickly executed.

As Joseph Stalin, and countless mafia godfathers said - "no person, no problem". 

Judge Jones got to, quite literally, bury her mistakes - and is allowed to continue to do so.

Judge Edith Jones still continues to remain on the bench of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit today.

Edith Jones is known not only for her racist remarks, but, according to Texas attorney Ty Clevenger, for a cover up of a sexual assault investigation against federal judge Samuel Kent.

I wrote about the criminal prosecution of Samuel Kent who Judge Edith Jones, the Chief Judge of the 5th Circuit, did not want to discipline.

So, a white judge, Judge Edith Jones, who was on the high horse as to Mexicans and African-Americans being allegedly more predisposed to crimes, reportedly helped cover up sex crimes by a white male fellow judge Samuel Kent, showing the world why racial statistics of crimes in the U.S. may be skewed - because crimes committed by high-ranking white males (and females) are simply hushed up.

Edith Jones was not disciplined - at all - for her racist remarks by her fellow judges.

Yet, as to the civil rights attorney who signed the complaint against Judge Edith Jones, in 2015, Jim Harrington, of Austin, Texas, retired from his position as the Executive Director of the Texas Civil Rights Project.  I do not know whether the retirement was forced or not.

Yet, now, in 2016, 3 years after he signed the complaint against Judge Edith Jones because of her racist and pre-judging remarks discussing death penalty cases, Jim Harrington is reportedly himself fighting charges in federal court - FOR RACISM, asserted by Jim Harrington's long-time opponent who must know Jim Harrington's history of opposing racism.

So, if Jim Harrington, a civil rights attorney who fought racism all his life and - coincidentally - who filed a complaint against the racist Judge Edith Jones - is sanctioned for racism by a Texas federal district court, by a judge who is the subordinate of Judge Edith Jones' court, how coincidental that will be?

And, when this whole country was jumping up and down recently about Donald Trump asking a judge of Mexican origin to recuse from his University's federal case - I will run a separate blog, as I promised, indicating that Judge Curiel should have recused, and for more reasons than Trump has asserted - this whole country did not file petitions, and the media talking heads did not rise a campaign to impeach Judge Edith Jones.

And I wonder why.

EVERY ONE OF HER CASES is tainted, going back from the date of her February 2013 speech, and going forward.

EVERY SINGLE ONE.

Because Judge Edith Jones openly professed a firm personal belief that:

1. criminal prosecutions may target people based on race;
2. the government is always right, even when it kills people without prior judicial review;
3. intellectual disability defense to the death penalty is - always - without merit, per se; and
4. it is an insult to follow "international law", even if such international law is a treaty that is within the U.S. Constitution, Supremacy Clause - the Clause that Judge Jones have been sworn to uphold.

And, in view of the reasoning in the decision of her fellow judges that refused to punish her - isn't it then mandatory to allow recording of ALL court proceedings, of EVERYTHING what judges say, to any people present in court or in chambers for conferences - because otherwise the fellow judges will refuse to believe even affidavits of witnesses if they assert misconduct of a judge?

Why then federal courts have written announcements that telephones MUST be switched off?

So that judges cannot be caught in misconduct?

Let's remember - judges are public SERVANTS.  OUR SERVANTS.

They cannot dictate to us that we cannot collect evidence of their misconduct.

So - allowing EVERYBODY to record in court proceedings, state and federal, is a MUST.  It is a public right.

And, Judge Jones MUST BE IMPEACHED, since no discipline was or is likely to be imposed upon her.

When this country is bashing Donald Trump for raising the issue of "appearance of impropriety" that a judge with certain racial roots presides over his case - remember, that people with views like Donald Trump are already there, inside the court, firmly on the bench, and ruling on your cases.

Be afraid of those.

Be vigilant about those.

And be active in asserting to authorities that Judge Edith Jones, and judges like her, cannot be anywhere near the bench.

Is there any basis for federal criminal indictments against #DylannRoof interfering with the state prosecution? - Part III

I continue to analyze jurisdictional basis for the federal indictment of Dylann Roof for the June 2015 shooting deaths of 9 people in an African-American church in South Carolina and injuries to 3 more people.

Counts 1 to 9 and 10 to 12 charge violation of 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(1).

18 U.S.C. 249 (a)(1) is part of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009 (“HCPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 249 and provides:

18 U.S.C. 249(b) requires that no offenses committed under 18 U.S.C. 249 are prosecutable without this certification:

Roof's federal indictment contains a certification by U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 249(b)(1)(A) and (D), see U.S. v Roof, 2:15-cr-00472-RMG, Dkt. 2 of 07/22/2015, page 14:

"CERTIFICATE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

I, Loretta E. Lynch, hereby certify that in my judgment, prosecution by the United States of Dylann Roof for violating Title 18, United States Code, paragraph 249(a)91), is in the public interest and is necessary to secure substantial justice and the state lacks jurisdiction to bring a hate crime prosecution".

Yet, certification under subsection (b)(D) is invalid as unconstitutional: 

"a prosecution by the United States is in the public interest and necessary to secure substantial justice" has nothing to do with Congressional power and does not overcome exclusive jurisdiction of the State of South Carolina under its exclusive police powers granted to the states to prosecute crimes committed within their own territories under the 10th Amendment.

Finally, Subsection (b)(A) is not applicable, because the State of South Carolina does have jurisdiction over the murders and attempted murders, and is vigorously prosecuting Dylann Roof at present.

It is true that, reportedly, South Carolina does not have enhancement of penalties for hate crimes:

"[South Carolina] has no specific hate-crime legislation on the books. ... unlike nearly every other state, South Carolina doesn’t specify tougher sentences or widen the group of people who can be victims of hate crimes."

Yet, in this particular case that it irrelevant and does not justify a costly parallel federal prosecution, and especially one that is, according to the State Solicitor, interfering with the state prosecution.

Dylann Roof has only one life.

He is charged with 9 murders and 3 attempted murders in the State of South Carolina.

Punishment for murder in the State of South Carolina is death.

How much more "enhanced" can that be if what Dylann Roof did would be classified as hate crime.

Dylann Roof racism and the fact that he killed specifically and only African Americans, at their place of worship, can be offered in the state trial as proof of his motive and intent.

Dylann Roof has only one life to pay for his crimes, and the alternative is also the same in both state and federal courts - life in prison.

So, the State of South Carolina absolutely has jurisdiction to prosecute Dylann Roof for a racially motivated crime of murder, and asserting it in a separate court as a hate crime will not bring a higher penalty, it is simply a waste of time, effort, money and an additional torture of the witnesses.

The jury pool alone is going to be, reportedly, 1200 to 1500 people.

All in all, prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 249 appears to be jurisdictionally invalid:

1) because a crime committed with a firearm or a "dangerous weapon" does not, in and of itself, justify invocation of federal jurisdiction in what is already prosecuted as a state crime;

2) because there is no required statutory certification under 18 U.S.C. 249 (b), and such a certification would not be possible or constitutional.

In other words, Counts 1 through 9 and 10 through 12 of the federal indictment are also a waste of taxpayers' money, time of all professionals involved in the prosecution or defense, and constitutes and unnecessary torture of the surviving witnesses of the crime.

As I said previously, the State of South Carolina is vigorously prosecuting the murders and attempted murders, and there is absolutely no basis for the feds to step in and do a parallel (and interfering) investigation and prosecution.

There is no reason why U.S. and South Carolina taxpayers should pay for the murder trial of Dylann Roof twice:

for the state murder trial that was scheduled long ago for January 17, 2017, and for the November 7, 2016 trial that was scheduled recently.

The problem is also that, once Dylann Roof is convicted in federal court, the State of South Carolina might be precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause from trying him, basically, for the same crimes of murders and attempted murders.

So, the feds in this case appear to be filibustering a state prosecution conducted under the state's exclusive police power protected by the 10th Amendment.

As legal scholars have been warning since 2013, federal hate crimes are unconstitutional, and that "the Court should decide the legitimacy of these laws before a more highly publicized and politicized case comes along and makes that task even harder".

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit already rejected a challenge to constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(1) asserting that the U.S. Congress had authority to enact that statute in the 90s of the 20th century under the 13th amendment - to eradicate consequences of slavery that was abolished 130 years prior:

"Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to enact § 249(a)(1).

Although the Thirteenth Amendment by its terms applies to slavery and involuntary servitude, Supreme Court precedent confirms Congress's authority to legislate against slavery's “badges and incidents” as well.

In particular, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)—a case permitting a federal private right of action against private individuals for housing discrimination—that Congress itself has power to determine those badges and incidents.

Section 249(a)(1) rests on the notion that a violent attack on an individual because of his or her race is a badge or incident of slavery.

Congress reached this conclusion by accounting for the meaning of “race” when the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted, the state of mind of the attacker, and the attack itself. By so doing, and under the authority of Jones, we conclude Congress rationally determined that racially motivated violence is a badge or incident of slavery against which it may legislate through its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment."

As it was argued in the amicus brief of the CATO Institute in the case U.S. v Hatch,

Moreover, it was argued in the amicus brief that 18 U.S.C. 249 was enacted in answer to the pressure from lobbying civil rights groups, even though there was no reason to believe that state prosecutions of hate crimes were ineffective.

In Dylann Roof's case, these lobbying efforts are coming back to bite everybody involved:

1) Dylann Roof who is exposed to the threat of double jeopardy;

2) taxpayers who have to pay for two enormously expensive trials, with double the enormously expensive appeal process;

3) the State of South Carolina whose exclusive authority to prosecute crimes committed in its territory is usurped by the feds without reasonable grounds, and, last but absolutely not least,

4) the witnesses who have to be tortured through two trials rather than one.

Such double prosecutions do not help anybody, but they hurt a lot.

The State of South Carolina can handle the prosecution for murders and attempted murders just fine, as do other states.

The feds should prosecute the uniquely federal crimes, pertaining to interstate commerce and international treaties.

This country can go bankrupt allowing double-dipping prosecutions which impeded and interfere with one another.

For the analysis of the remaining counts of the federal indictment against Dylann Roof,

stay tuned.

Is there any basis for federal criminal indictments against Dylann Roof interfering with the state prosecution? - Part II

In my previous two blogs, I described:

1) the standoff between the State Solicitor of the State of South Carolina and federal prosecutors where the State Solicitor asserted that the trial schedule in federal prosecution interferes and impedes the state prosecution in the murder trial of Dylann Roof, who shot to death 9 people and injured 3 in June of 2015 in an African-American church, and

2) general jurisdictional requirements for a legitimate federal criminal charge - and quoted a U.S. Supreme Court that invalidated a criminal conviction because it was based on a federal statute that the U.S. Congress had no power to enact.

I will now analyze each of the statutes that Dylann Roof was charged with violating from the point of view of their validity.

Dylann Roof was charged under the following criminal statutes:

1. 18 U.S.C. 247(a)(2), (d)(1)
2. 18 U.S.C. 249 (a)(1)
3. 18 U.S.C. 924(c )(1)(A);
4. 18 U.S.C. 924(c )(1)(C);
5. 18 U.S.C. 924 (j)(1), charging:
6.  Hate Crime Murder;

• Murder to obstruct free exercise of religion and affecting interstate commerce;
• Murder as defined in 18 U.S.C. 1111, with malice aforethought and using a firearm

18 U.S.C. 247(a)(2) and (d)(1)

Charging Dylann Roof under this section was giving him too much credit.

There is no evidence that Dylann Roof had an intent to interfere with anybody's religious belief.

Dylann Roof shot up the church because it was convenient for his crime-planning, because Dylann Roof knew that the church was a place where, at a certain time, a large number of African Americans will be present.

His crime was a hate crime, but the prosecution will have a really hard time proving that Roof had an intent to interfere with the exercise of religion, and especially proving that beyond the reasonable doubt.

Moreover, subsection (b) which is incorporated into subsection (a) clearly indicates that Dylann Roof was chargeable with this crime is "in interstate or foreign commerce" or "affects interstate or foreign commerce".

And there lays another big problem for the federal prosecution.  Worshiping activities cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be equated with interstate commerce, and, under U.S. v Lopez, claiming that committing a crime in a church somehow interferes with interstate commerce is too attenuated to provide for federal jurisdiction.

This statute, 18 U.S.C. 247, goes back, reportedly, to

QUOTE
-----------

"the Church Arsons Prevention Act, sponsored by Sens. Lauch Faircloth (R-NC) and Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and, in the House, by Reps.

Henry Hyde (R-IL) and John Conyers (D-MI), was originally designed solely to facilitate Federal investigations and prosecutions of these crimes by amending 18 U.S.C. 247, a statute enacted by Congress in 1988 to provide Federal jurisdiction for religious vandalism cases in which the destruction exceeds $10,000.

Hearings were held on both the impact of these crimes and the appropriate response of government.

Federal prosecutors testified that the statute's restrictive interstate commerce requirement and its relatively significant damages threshold had been obstacles to Federal prosecutions. 

Following the hearings, Congress found that "[t]he incidence of arson of places of religious worship has recently increased, especially in the context of places of religious worship that serve predominately African-American congregations."

Legislators appropriately recognized that the nation's response to the rash of arsons should be more ambitious and comprehensive than mere efforts to ensure swift and sure punishment for the perpetrators.

In a welcome example of bipartisanship, both the House and the Senate unanimously approved legislation which broadened existing Federal criminal jurisdiction and facilitated criminal prosecutions for attacks against houses of worship, increased penalties for these crimes, established a loan guarantee recovery fund for rebuilding, and authorized additional personnel for BATF, the FBI, Justice Department prosecutors, and the Justice Department's Community Relations Service to "investigate, prevent, and respond" to these incidents. "

UNQUOTE
=========

So, criminal federal jurisdiction for 18 U.S.C. 247 was invoked because something MORE than efficient prosecution of perpetrators was needed.

What MORE than efficient prosecution of perpetrators in a criminal case is needed?

And how does this "more" justify invocation of federal jurisdiction over a purely state crime, committed on a state territory, in a church?

But, that pronouncement, in and of itself, indicated that the statute is unconstitutional.

States already have, under the 10th Amendment, exclusive police power over crimes committed in their territories, and exercise that power for the efficient prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of such offenses.

That was the power recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v Lopez in 1995 when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of a conviction based on the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.

In fact, as Dylann Roof's case shows, the State of South Carolina's efforts to prosecute Dylann Roof is impeded by federal prosecution, where the defendant is trying to use the federal prosecution (based, likely, on unconstitutional statute enacted, in its criminal part at least, without any congressional authority) to delay and/or impede state prosecution which hurts, not helps the victims and hurts, not helps, the necessary prosecution of a HEINOUS crime - murder of 9 people and injury to three people.

Same as schools were held in U.S. v Lopez have nothing to do with interstate commerce, churches also have nothing to do with interstate commerce, or with commerce of any kind.

In fact, the Christian religion asserts that the church does not have ANYTHING to do with ANY commerce - where Jesus Christ has actually cleansed the Temple of merchants and money-changers.

Worship is a spiritual activity which has nothing to do with commerce, interstate, foreign or otherwise.

So, it is likely that counts 13 to 21 and 22 to 24 in U.S. v Roof (see table describing all counts here) are jurisdictionally invalid, and the federal government is wasting taxpayer money to prosecute Roof where the State of South Carolina is already prosecuting him for common murder, which is much easier to prove.

For the analysis of other statutes used as a basis of the federal indictment against Dylann Roof, stay tuned.