On the death of yet another "trouble-maker". It is dangerous to address judicial corruption in the United States: a disbarred and detained California attorney Patrick Massud is dead, and the government attorney Massud accused of corruption is claiming a suicide

I wrote previously about the tendency in the U.S. for persecution and prosecution of whistleblowers of official misconduct and corruption.

I reported at least two suspected murders that nobody wants to investigate - of Sunny Sheu in New York who reported judicial corruption (somebody sold a home from under him, and, even when that person was caught and convicted, a judge refused to cancel his eviction, and Sunny Sheu found some information on the judge shortly before his suspicious death that raised questions about the judge's role in the eviction situation and in Sunny Sheu's death), and of Adam Rupeka, a vocal critic of New York police.

Sunny Sheu actually made a video shortly before his death expressing his concern that he will be killed shortly for his investigation of corruption.  Still, nobody is investigating his apparent murder, and it was reported that medical witnesses quickly changed their statements and the body was quickly disposed of.  And, questions whether Sunny Sheu was murdered for investigating judge Joseph Golia remain.

A disbarred and detained California attorney #PatrickMissud,

• detained and awaiting trial for allegedly making "criminal threats" against a judge (he reportedly has sent emails threatening to detonate a bomb near a judge),
• an attorney who reportedly made "frequent insults" against the Chief U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Roberts (of course, in the U.S., any criticism of a judge is perceived by judges as an "insult" requiring retaliation) on his website, and who
• repeatedly sued judges for corruption and repeatedly had his lawsuits denied on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity - which means, courts never reached issues raised by Patrick Missud on the merits and let judges escape responsibility no matter whether they actually acted maliciously and corruptly -

was reported dead in jail by the jail system (Santa Clara County jail) where he was held without bail awaiting trial.

And, of course, it was reported by the jail authorities that he committed suicide.

Yet, it is apparent that there may be more to that story than just a simple solution of a suicide.

As a former intern for New York Prisoners Legal Services, I do know how inmates are battered by prison guards or prison gangs outside of the reach of cameras in retaliation for reporting misconduct against public officials, and then are accused of beating their own torturers and locked up in solitary confinement for years.

In this case, it was reported that "was found early Saturday on the floor of a common area in the men’s wing, according to the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office, who added that his injuries were consistent with a fall from the upper level".

And, by the way, it was reported in correctly that Patrick Missud was an "inmate" in a correctional facility.

In fact, he was a detainee, detained before trial and presumed innocent.

In view of his standoff with the judicial system, he should have been placed in protective custody, but apparently, he wasn't, and then he was conveniently found dead to prevent his trial where he could make further statements against judicial corruption.

And this is happening in the blessed state of California, where attorney Dr. Richard Fine was incarcerated for over 14 months for CORRECTLY claiming judicial corruption - that Los Angeles Judges received an addition to their salaries from Los Angeles County of over $50,000 a year while the County appeared in front of those judges.

The State of California finally came up with a "solution" of this "problem":

• it disbarred and incarcerated the 70+ whistleblower Dr. Richard Fine;
• gave retroactive CRIMINAL immunity for corruption to its judges - which should really boost public confidence in the integrity of the California judicial system and judges;

and then

• refused to allow the California State Bar (that disbarred Dr Richard Fine) to collect member dues because of corruption within the California State Bar;
• but, of course, the California State Supreme Court quickly overruled that and gave that lucrative money-making opportunity right back to the corrupt California State Bar.

Makes a lot of sense.

By the way, as another piece of interesting information on the subject of judicial corruption in California that supposedly does not exist (because attorneys are viciously persecuted when they heretically raise the issue of the presumed-honorable with a self-given gift of immunity for corruption judges) - recently, a court clerk was convicted in federal court, on a plea bargain, just 6 months after the start of criminal proceedings, for fixing over a 1000 DWI cases.

The public needs a collective lobotomy to believe that he did that without judges presiding over such cases being on the hook, but even the feds did not dare to touch judges.

Just read the book "Operation Greylord"

written by a then-prosecutor and mole for the FBI who brought about that sting against over 100 judges and lawyers in the Cook County, Chicago, Illinois, for corruption and fixing cases - to see how big that business is and how it works.

There was simply no possibility that such a vast operation was handled just by a court clerk, and did not involve judges.

The plea bargain struck with the court clerk means that there will be no trial, and the local judiciary will be spared the testimony about possible involvement of judges in that same scheme.

There was no hope to strike any plea deals with Patrick Missud who, I am sure, was looking forward to a trial forum to address the issue of judicial corruption.

And, under a U.S. Supreme Court case Dennis v Sparks, even if a judge is covered by absolute immunity for corruption in a civil lawsuit against himself, he can still be called to testify about that corruption.

Patrick Missud could make that happen.

Now he can't.  Because he is conveniently dead.

A person who, for years, asserted issues of corruption in the government, dies in the hands of the government.  And the government claims he committed suicide.  As I said, how convenient.

Looks like silencing of a critic to me.

A couple of Mississippi Supreme Court judges acknowledge that judicial immunity may "embolden" judges to do bad things - but leave the issue "for another day" to address. What self-serving cowards

Here is a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi in a case of a former court administrator (a female) against a Mississippi judge (a male), the infamous #JudgeJeffreyWeillSr who illegally ordered to jail a public defender for contempt and made unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct against another public defender, Alison Kelly.

And, it was public defender Alison Kelly's motion to recuse that Judge Weill reportedly used to retaliate against one of his own (former) members of staff, his former female court administrator.

 Judge Weill first, reportedly, harassed Karla Watkins Bailey so that she finally left the job, and then cleverly devised a way to defame her and ruin her reputation - by putting what she says were defamatory claims against her into a footnote of his decision in response to a motion to recuse from 65 criminal cases filed by the local public defender (a female).

The former court administrator sued, but, unfortunately, not for harassment on the job - as it was done in New York, Morin v Tormey, where the case was litigated in federal court for 4.5 years and finally resulted in a $600,000 settlement for the clerk (from taxpayer's pockets, unfortunately, not from the pockets of Chief Administrative Judge of the 5th Judicial District James C. Tormey who viciously retaliated against the woman after she refused to do his bidding and spy upon the judicial candidate for the "opposing" party - remember, judges are claimed not to be political animals, right).

Instead, the clerk sued for defamatory statements contained in the footnote.

While the trial court - let's give that courageous court a credit - rejected the judge's claim of absolute judicial immunity, the top court of the State of Mississippi, the court that "regulates" attorney licenses, by the way and that should be the most honorable of courts, reversed and tossed the complaint on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity.

The court has held that the claims of irrelevancy of the defamatory claims, that the former employee had nothing to do with the motion to recuse, do not take away the protection of absolute judicial immunity.

One judge wisely did not participate in this shameful decision, and two judges filed a short and cowardly concurrence where they agreed to toss the lawsuit against their brother, but "expressed concern" about what their own decision will do in the future, whether it will embolden judges to commit malicious acts in the future knowing they are immune (they know that since Stump v Sparkman, a plurality opinion, by the way, was decided back in 1978).

Here is the concurring opinion:

I have just two questions - if these two judges felt so strongly about the decision (and absolute immunity for malicious acts - they avoided to say "and corrupt", which is what the judicial immunity was self-given by the U.S. Supreme Court justices to themselves and to all of their brothers and sisters in courts of "general jurisdiction" back in 1978), why did they CONCUR, not DISSENT?

Surely, a strong two-judge dissent would have made a potential path to the U.S. Supreme Court smoother for the defamed woman.

Second, isn't that lack of courage attributable to the fact that judges were reluctant to take away the judicial immunity protection (illegally obtained in the first place, since all judges take a constitutional oath of office, and nothing in the U.S. Constitution allows anybody, including the U.S. Supreme Court, to allow other people to violate the U.S. Constitution or engage in malicious or corrupt acts on the bench with immunity) FROM THEMSELVES?

But that, of course, is a rhetorical question.

Once again on what is exactly attorney regulation (and any other occupational regulation) - protection of the public or protection of attorneys from competition? And are courts regulating attorneys acting as administrative agencies, after all?

Often, truth about games government plays and lies it tells the public comes out when competing interests of various economic groups clash and when, in the zeal to promote one "cause", the government overlooks that it exposes its own lie regarding another important issue.

For example, the U.S. Congress has enacted a statute, 8 U.S. Code § 1621 called "Aliens who are not qualified aliens or nonimmigrants ineligible for State and local public benefits".

That statute includes into public benefits professional licenses:

"(c) “State or local public benefit” defined

(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this subchapter the term “State or local public benefit” means—

(A)

any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local government".

Now, what would be wrong about that?

What is wrong is that regulations of professions is claimed to the public to be necessary for protection of the CONSUMERS, of the PUBLIC, not of the licensed professionals.

If that is true, a license is a restriction, not a "public benefit" for the licensed professionals.

What is also interesting, specifically in connection with regulation of attorneys is that 8 U.S. 1621(c)(1)(A) talks, as about public benefits, about professional licenses "provided by an agency of a State or local government".

Attorneys are regulated by the judiciary branch that, when I challenged it in federal court pointing out that attorney regulation is an administrative function and attorney disciplinary proceedings are administrative in nature, claimed to the federal court (and the federal court agreed) that such proceedings are judicial in nature.

Yet, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division 2nd Department agreed, on June 3, 2015, with the New York State Attorney General asserting, on behalf of an illegal alien seeking to be admitted to the bar, that a law license is a "public benefit" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1621(c)(1)(A).

New York State Attorney General is representing in New York everybody in town - all three branches of the government, including the prosecutorial, investigative and decision-making side in attorney disciplinary proceedings.

So, the New York State Attorney General was arguing to the 2nd Department reviewing a case of application for admission to the bar to the 2nd Department's attorney disciplinary committee while arguing to both that they are an "agency" within the meaning of a federal statute, and that what they give (law licenses) is a state agency giving out a public benefit to the holder of the law license.

The same New York State Attorney General is arguing to federal courts, repeatedly, that Appellate Divisions and attorney disciplinary committees are not administrative agencies, but are members of the judiciary branch.

Those two arguments are mutually exclusive, and, thus, frivolous and fraudulent.

But, who is going to discipline the New York State Attorney General when he represents all judges in the State of New York, and when he represents all attorney disciplinary investigators and prosecutors in New York who can easily yank law licenses from all judges in federal courts sitting in New York, thus subjecting them to impeachment - while judges are reviewing civil rights actions where New York State Attorney General is opposing such civil rights lawsuits, and is advancing these mutually exclusive, and thus, fraudulent arguments?

Once again, who is going to discipline the New York State Attorney General for making fraudulent arguments to the court while representing regulators of the judges' own law licenses?

Yet, while the New York State Attorney General can continue to lie all he (and his staff) wants to courts in view of their apparently impunity, it is quite apparent that, conceptually, the same law license cannot possibly serve BOTH as a measure of protection of the public, AND as a "public benefit" given by the state to lawyers, from whom the state government is protecting the public by means of that same law license.

Moreover, when the New York State Attorney General acknowledges that a law license is a "public benefit provided by a State agency" in one setting, it is then fraudulent to assert that courts and their attorney disciplinary boards do not operate in attorney regulation as agencies (executive branch), but operate as courts (judiciary branch), in order to obtain benefits for the government that is available to the judicial branch and is not available to the executive branch.  That's another "chameleon" argument by the New York State Attorney General that is inherently incompatible.

Had New York State Attorney General been consistent in its argument that attorney regulation is for protection of the public and that the regulating court is not acting as an agency, but as a court, it would have advanced two arguments in the Matter of Vargas that it did not advance:

1. 8 U.S.C. 1621 is not applicable to attorney regulation because a law license is not a public benefit to the attorney, but is a measure of protection of the public, not attorneys;
2. 8 U.S.C. 1621 is not applicable because the regulator in the proceedings is not a "State agency", but a court.

None of these arguments were advanced, instead, the N.Y.S. Attorney General wholly endorsed both points:

1. that a law license is a public benefit to the attorney and not a measure of protection for the public (because it cannot be both); and
2. that the regulating court that issues and revokes licenses it a "State agency".

I understand that, given the absolute impunity from any discipline or accountability, and the ability to have "independent" federal judges (licensed attorneys regulated by private attorney disciplinary boards sitting in secret) rule in their favor, no matter what the law says - one and the same thing, the law license and regulation, cannot be used to provide benefits to both sides - to protect the consumers from attorneys, and to provide a benefit to the attorney.

As I said, truth sometimes seeps out inadvertently.

The Pennsylvania saga on removing elected public officials through the backdoor dealings of attorney discipline continues

Now, I do not condone public corruption, especially by prosecutors.  At all.

But, what is happening in Pennsylvania is completely bizarre.

While Pennsylvania is suspending, disbarring and denying reinstatement of attorneys left and right for the biggest sin of all - criticizing the judiciary - it is really lenient (usually) on attorneys working for the state and committing misconduct.

For example, Pennsylvania, having no statute of limitations on attorney discipline, still did not disbar attorney Ronald Castille, former Philadelphia DA whose misconduct, and misconduct of his staff (of which he had to be aware) was described in detail in the 2016 U.S. Supreme Court case Williams v Pennsylvania:

• obtaining death penalty by fraud, withholding Brady material and suborning perjury from a prosecution witness;
• getting elected to the bench on the basis of that fraudulent death penalty sentence, and then
• blocking habeas corpus relief for the condemned prisoner as a judge in the same case where Ronald Castille was a prosecutor, and blasting the condemned prisoner's attorneys for trying to defend him.

And, Pennsylvania was not in any hurry to disbar Judge Marc Ciavarella for selling kids, for million-dollar bribes into kiddie prisons.

And, Pennsylvania was in no hurry to suspend the law license of Philadelphia DA Seth Williams, even after he admitted "not reporting" gifts given to him while he was already a public prosecutor.

It only suspended his law license "on agreement" when he was federally indicted for corruption - but remained in office, like Pennsylvania former AG Kathleen Kane did, making a second precedent of a lawyer with a suspended license running a law office.

A lawsuit has now been filed by people with no standing to do that (a defense attorney and Seth Williams' predecessor as a DA) to oust Seth Williams from office.

Yet, Seth Williams is a public official, and the only way he can be ousted is through impeachment.

So, the Pennsylvania saga of playing with law licenses of public officials continues.

Let's see what the court ruling will be on the lawsuit.

I will continue to monitor this bizarre case.

Stay tuned.

Judge's divorces and a brand new format of statutes of limitations on discipline against judges, but not attorneys. A Michigan story.

All states (as I have heard from readers of this blog and based on my own research) claim that there is no statute of limitations on attorney discipline.

The same, of course, should apply to the regulators of attorneys - judges - whose misconduct can and do result in much more dire injuries to the public and to individual parties.

Yet, in the blessed state of Michigan, proposals for new rules have been reportedly introduced imposing a short statute of limitations upon discipline of judges, prohibiting even INVESTIGATIONS of judges past the "statute of limitations".

And that is extraordinary.

Because in all states, statutes of limitations are also "affirmative defenses", to be raised after the investigations are completed and after the charges are already filed - and such a defense may be waived if not timely raised by the charged party.

For judges, the invented new format of statute of limitations is different, not only because it was introduced (while statute of limitations for attorney discipline, imposed by Michigan judges, does not exist), but because it will prohibit even to investigate them past the statute of limitations.

That said, the proposed rule might not (if applied honestly) help #MichiganJudgeTheresaBrennan

to escape investigation of misconduct - because it was not discoverable within the statute of limitations.

The only people privy to that misconduct was the judge, the prosecution witness who kept mum, and the judge's now-estranged husband who was under spousal privilege when he was married, but voluntarily disclosed that the judge (1) had an affair with a prosecution witness during a murder trial;  (2) talked to that prosecution witness during that murder trial.

So, it is important for judges not to divorce their spouses.

They know too much and, if pissed, can reveal it.

And, once again, the Michigan Supreme Court, the one that is regulating lawyers and appears to be regulating its own conduct, too, is considering whether to allow to even investigate complaints filed against judges 3 years after the alleged offense "unless upon a good cause shown".

More incentive for judges in Michigan to be even more secretive in their misconduct than they are now, so that they are protected from discipline completely.

By the way, federal judges invented an even better solution - .they lobbied the U.S. Congress for the Judicial Disability Act, which prohibits discipline of judges completely if misconduct occurred in relation to a court case.

Judge Brennan reportedly had an affair with a prosecution witness and had ex parte communications with her lover during a murder trial.

So, had Judge Brennan been a federal judge, a complaint against her would have been tossed, statute of limitations or no statute of limitations.

Michigan should learn from the best (subverters of law) - the federal judiciary.

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York is now making profit on sanctions imposed on lawyers?

On March 30, 2017, 76-year-old U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York Victor Marrero

sanctioned lawyers for the use of wrong spacing (24-point instead of double-spacing) to cram more words than was allowed by "court rules" (25 page per brief), and required them to pay a $1,048.09 fine.

Was it proper for lawyers to achieve by stealth what they could do by openly asking the court for permission to exceed the page limit?

No, it was not.

Was it warranting a monetary fine and sanction?

I don't know.

Yet, what I do know that it is wrong to set limits for arguments. 

Some lawsuits have more complex issues than others.

Lawsuits having just one claim require less pages for arguments than lawsuits having more than one claim, and the same court rules require grouping of claims together, for fear of forfeiting the claim on "claim preclusion" doctrine.

If you included all claims, you are at a disadvantage as compared to people who assert just one claim.

You are also at a disadvantage if you have more parties in your lawsuit (either plaintiffs or defendants), because that complicates the matter, and increases the number of claims.

Yet, the page limit for arguments remains the same.

I did not see analysis of those issues in 76-year-old Judge Victor Marrero's order of sanctions:

And, slapping lawyers with monetary sanctions without considering whether they were trying to obtain a fair review of all arguments for their clients, and whether the omission was inadvertent (after all, the pleading could have been done by an associate or a paralegal who did not know the spacing rules), was more characteristic of a cranky elderly and impatient judge who needs to retire and enjoy sunsets on the beach, than of a competent jurist.

Competent jurists do not mete out monetary sanctions that would require measuring the brief with a ruler.  They concentrate on issues of merit of the case in front of them.

It was silly.  And petty.

But it was not only silly, and petty - Judge Victor Marrero forgot himself to such a degree that he ordered the sanctioned lawyers to pay the fine to the clerk of his own court.

Which means - Judge Victor Marrero allowed his own court to profit from his own sanctioning decision, an unconstitutional conflict of interest recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court 90 years ago, before Judge Marrero was even born.

In recognition of this conflict, some New York courts (over the village court level) order sanctions to be paid not to the court clerk, but to a fund outside the court system, to avoid appearance of impropriety.

Apparently, appearance of impropriety was not much of a concern for Judge Victor Marrero.

So, by pointing out that lawyers for a party committed a faux pas by violating a non-sensical court rule about "one-size-fits-all" page limit for arguments on an important issue of a preliminary injunction, at the time when no discovery was made in the case and no issues aired out, the judge, in his persnickety and cranky zeal to have lawyers appearing in front of him observe formalities to the letter, chose to disregard the basic rule of due process - that judges presiding over cases must remain neutral and not create conflicts of interest.

Well, Judge Victor Marrero did, by having his court already, at the beginning of litigation, profit from the fine he imposed upon the lawyer for one of the parties - payable to the court itself.

Judge Victor Marrero should really retire.

And the case should really be transferred to another court - which, let me guess, will not happen.

A corporate executive fired for trying to buy a County into voting on a public-bidding contract in Texas? Delaware County, NY, has a better solution for this "problem" - no public contracts at all

In 2015, the New York State Comptroller published an audit of Delaware County, New York, indicating that for 30 years going back, public contracts were not submitted in that county to public bidding, as required by law.

As far as I checked by now, the practice continues, audit or no audit, FBI investigating the County's murky financial dealings or not.

Delaware County has a point - why deal with a paper trail that can expose corruption when no paper trail makes it easier to conceal corruption?

For example, recently in Texas it was reported that a high-ranking corporate executive may have been fired after an attorney complained about a sweet deal offered by his corporation to the decision-making county officials (a private stock offer) while the corporation was participating in a contract-bidding with the county.

And you know who the corporation fired?  Of course, the whistleblower who reportedly admitted to the practice.

So, the best solution is for Texas counties (and counties around the U.S.) to follow the example of the Delaware County, New York.

No public bidding, and no paper trail = no problem.