Confusion rules in Kansas Supreme Court

To issue three decisions and overrule them in the fourth decision - in one day?

Isn't it a little bit too much?

My suspension would have been impossible in North Carolina, but instead discipline would be imposed upon the sanctioning judge

It would be interesting to know for attorneys or litigants sanctioned in New York or other states for making a motion to recuse a judge after suing that judge that in some states - for example, in North Carolina, the sanctions would be imposed in such a situation against the judge, not against the attorney or litigant who sued the judge before sanctions were imposed.

It is apparently not self-evident in New York since my law license was suspended exclusively based on sanctions that were imposed upon me by the judge against whom a lawsuit was pending.

In North Carolina such a situation would have required: 

• an automatic recusal of a judge, and
• discipline AGAINST THE JUDGE for non-recusal - the judge was CENSURED for not recusing,

see the full text of the North Carolina case here.

In my case, Judge Becker was not only not discipline, but my license was suspended based on his sanctions against me imposed after the lawsuit was filed against Judge Becker by a party in the action where sanctions were imposed.

I guess, what is considered inappropriate FOR A JUDGE to do in North Carolina, is inappropriate for an attorney to point out to such a judge in New York.

Go figure.

My suspension would be impossible in Texas. Why is it possible in New York, then?

While reading a recent article about judicial misconduct in the United States and specifically in New York - reported, naturally, outside of this country, since the local "mainstream" media sources are deadly afraid of the subject - I came across a situation where a female attorney from Texas was slapped with contempt proceedings by a judge after she made a motion to recuse him.

My further research of that situation revealed a recitation of the following law in Texas applicable to procedures in motions to recuse:

" If a motion to recuse is filed, the judge only has two options: recuse himself or refuse to recuse himself.  

If the challenged judge refuses to recuse himself, then he cannot hear any further matter in the case until an assigned judge hears the motion to recuse.  See e.g.Jamilah v. Bass, 862 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App – Houston [14th Dist.] 1993)(orig. proc.). Any order signed by the challenged judge after a motion to recuse is filed is void.  In re Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 987 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding)."

So, the attorney who was unlawfully slapped by the challenged judge with contempt proceedings for making a motion to recuse him continues to practice law.

Unlike me.

I was slapped with sanctions (which would have been void in Texas) by the exact same judge whom I was challenging on a motion to recuse.

In Texas, if a judge refuses to recuse, another judge should step in to determine the motion to recuse - and while that motion is pending, the challenged judge may not make any decision in the case.  In other words, any proceedings on the case STOP if a motion to recuse is made and the challenged judge refuses to recuse.

Not so in New York.

In New York, the challenged judge is given an absolute discretion to decide the motion challenging himself.

Which resulted in sanctions - and suspension of law license - for me, while suspension of law license happened without providing me with any pre-deprivation hearing, because, in the eyes of the disciplinary court, I had enough "due process" in being slapped with sanctions by an enraged challenged judge.

After all, he "examined his own conscience" before denying my motion to recuse and slapping me with those sanctions.

Once again - why the State of Texas, which is not exactly known for its democratic ways in the courtroom - recognizes that a challenged judge is presumed biased in relation to a motion challenging his own impartiality and/or integrity and may not preside over or decide such a motion.

Why in New York an attorney may be suspended for making a motion to recuse while in Texas such a thing simply cannot happen - as a matter of law?

Shouldn't the right to earn a living be the same due process right and not depending on the whims of the legislatures in various states?

Especially that the rule of "discretion" for judges to preside over motions to recuse them is not even a statute, is not even a court rule - it is a judicial policy determination, illegal as legislating from the bench on an important issue of constitutional law.

Once again.

Why New York "justice" looks like cavemen's justice as compared to Texas?

Online law education is now good because there's not enough brick-and-mortar students?

In 2000 I started studying at an online law school, Concord Law School out of California.

The school disclosed that it is not accredited by the ABA, but indicated that it is in its plans.

I enrolled because I was curious about the law - being an immigrant wishing to know the law of my new country, and being a wife of a trial lawyer, to better help my husband in his law office as a legal assistant.

In 2001 9/11 happened, and I cancelled my plans to go to Los Angeles to take the "baby bar" - the 1st year law student examination for online schools that California required.  I had a newborn baby, there were threats of more attacks, and I did not want to risk separation from my family at such a time.

Yet, I went through 1.5 years of the school, and went successfully.

In 2005 I applied to Albany Law School and was admitted, with a merit scholarship.

I inquired whether my studies in Concord Law will be credit - and they weren't.

I had to repeat those courses I already took in Concord, which were no worse, and actually better than in Albany Law.

I would, of course, much prefer to go to an online school instead of a brick-and-mortar school, for many reasons.

I was an older student, not a fresh college graduate, and I had family obligations.

When I started attending law school in Albany Law, my older daughter started college, and I had two minor children at home needing me around.

I needed to be able to help my husband to handle the law practice (I was his legal assistant), and to help around the house and with the kids.  

His practice was large, busy and stressful, and he needed any help that could come his way.

I also very much wanted my young son to continue learning Russian - which I could not do at a distance from Albany (my son remained with my husband who did not speak Russian in Delhi, NY).

Therefore, online education would have suited me just fine, and having to live 89 miles away from my family, especially when separated with mountain roads covered with snow and ice, was a great sacrifice for everybody involved.

And, as I am learning now, an unnecessary sacrifice - because the reasoning that was advanced for not accrediting online education is going away now, merely because of a decline in enrollments in brick-and-mortar schools.

The reasoning advanced at the time I was denied credit for my previous studies at Concord Law was that American Bar Association does not believe the quality of online education will protect consumers as much as the quality of education in brick-and-mortar law schools.

There was no evidence to support that conclusion at that time, and one of the graduates of Concord Law, Ross Mitchell, my former classmate, has been admitted to the practice before the U.S. Supreme Court, not to mention federal district and appellate courts, so the education Concord Law gives is not bad at all.

Yet, ABA stubbornly refused accreditation to online law schools, which brings to the fore the question:

why a non-profit corporation is allowed to control how the entire huge country's government - in 50 states, 13 federal circuits with all included district courts - is licensing court representative for the American people?

And the question is even prominent because recently, 

• after enrollments in brick-and-mortar schools started to decline and brick-and-mortar law schools are facing tough choices whether to cut their faculty since they cannot maintain their budgets with declined enrollments;
• as a reaction to this purely economic, market event - lack of enrollment of students into brick-and-mortar law schools, the ABA suddenly changed its position as to online law school education and started to accredit online law schools.

As an example of that sudden change, recently, Syracuse School of Law in New York state announced that it is considering opening a partially-online J.D. program fully accredited by the American Bar Association.

So, what of quality of education?

What of protection of consumers?

Does that protection cede when law schools start losing money and look for wider "customer base" with cheaper products, a mere marketing survival tool?

Or was the prohibition on online law schools a measure based not on quality of education, but on stifling cheaper, more affordable and more accessible education, especially for people who live in rural areas (like I did) and had families and jobs to maintain (like I did)?

From the very beginning?

While, of course, I resent having my family to go through these sacrifices (not to mention a higher tuition than at an online school, since my merit scholarship did not cover the entire education - and the additional living costs that I wouldn't have had if I remained at home and went to an online school), the tendency to allow online law schools is actually good.

It will further increase competition among law schools.

It will further drop prices of law education.

It will make law education more affordable and accessible to people with less funds, and from remote areas for whom having to attend a brick-and-mortar school, especially with a prohibition to work for the 1st year - that is yet another ABA's anti-competitive invention - was a bar to receiving law education at all.

I hope that the next step should be to make education about law available to people at the high school level, and to make the law degree not an "advanced" degree, as it is now, but a regular college bachelor's degree, as it is in other countries - with no damage to quality of education.

That would eliminate the illogical structure of law education that exists in this country nowadays where a person needs to complete sometimes an unnecessary bachelor's degree, thus incurring additional student debt, as a condition precedent of being able to go to law school.

I hope that this pre-requisite is cut for the online law schools, and they start giving BA/JD diplomas, where legal education starts from the very first day of the BA program.

I hope also that legal education will be allowed to incorporate to a larger degree apprenticeships, because classroom learning without practical skills do not mean much.

In fact, apprenticeships should be allowed to take the majority or at least equal number of credit hours required toward getting a law degree, as learning theory.

But, returning to the topic of online law schools and ABA's change of heart regarding accreditation - control of the legal profession should be taken away BOTH from this non-profit corporation AND from the government.

Who people want to hire to represent them in court should be governed only by people's trust in that person - and by a power of attorney reflecting that trust.

That, and the word of mouth that, in the age of the Internet, will spread like wildfire, about good court representatives and bad court representatives alike - is all that is needed for consumer protection.

A deadly blow dealt to judicial immunity - from an unlikely source, former judge of New York State Court of Appeals Carmen Ciparick

Oh, the joy of depositions.

Usually, if a judge is sued, the lawsuit is tossed on judicial immunity grounds.

In a rare deposition of a former judge of New York top state court, which lifted the veil, at least a little bit, as to what judges in New York State are all about.

Now remember, the concept of absolute judicial immunity - a doctrine that judges invented to give as a gift to themselves, so that they could not be sued for constitutional violations on the bench, such as fixing cases, for example - is jammed down the public's throat with an explanation that it is "necessary" to make CORRUPT judges immune from suit, and thus strip victims of their corruption of any possibility of a remedy in order to maintain and preserve judicial INDEPENDENCE.

An interesting concept of independence from the constitutional oath of office, but still - that's what the declared justification of the concept of judicial immunity is, judicial INDEPENDENCE.

I saw it time and again in civil rights lawsuits.

So, as a matter of common sense and logic, if judicial independence is so important that even corrupt judges are protected by the concept of judicial immunity - it means that what kind of judicial candidates must be picked to be on the bench?

Wouldn't it be independent-minded?

Apparently not so - says former New York State Court of Appeals judge Carmen Ciparick.

Carmen Ciparick was called to testify at a deposition in a civil rights case, this case:

Here is the full text of the deposition, it is not long, just 9 pages.

The deposition was held on February 18, 2016.

After the deposition, the plaintiff in the action filed a motion on April 20, 2016, seeking to include former judge Ciparick in an anti-discrimination lawsuit, as a defendant.

I obtained the motion from Pacer.gov and am reviewing it.

Here are some portions from the proposed 3rd Amended Complaint of Tracy Catapano-Fox:

So what did Judge Ciparick say in the deposition that invited the lawsuit against her?

Here's one of her statements:

Ciparick, after 34 years on the bench, believes that "insubordinate" people should be allowed to be on the bench?

So, Ciparick was "subordinate"?

The question is - to whom?

Should all litigants she ruled against in her 34 years on the various benches, be now thinking who told her to rule the way she ruled, and she obeyed as a good girl?

I recently raised an issue in court that assignment of cases by a recused judge is a violation of the litigant's due process of law.

In my arguments that when a recused judge controls assignment of other judges to the case he controls the outcome of the case - and that is a violation of due process of law, I relied upon the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit:

McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983) (“To permit a disqualified chief judge to select the judge who will handle the case in which the chief judge is disabled would violate the congressional command that the disqualified judge be removed from all participation in the case.”)

The situation involved a motion for sanctions for frivolous conduct against private attorney Ellen Coccoma (representing private clients on County time - and she conveniently lost or destroyed her time sheets for the County for the time when she was toiling on this case, in answer to my FOIL request), wife of Chief Administrative Judge for upstate New York Michael V. Coccoma who controlled assignment of judges to her cases, and assigned Kevin Dowd, a judge who had definite mental health problems (he was raving on record about a urinal built in his honor at a custody proceeding) and was close to retirement, and Michael Coccoma the husband also controls lucrative assignments of retired judges as "judicial hearing officers".

=====

New York State Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department disagreed court responded to my well-grounded argument this way:

"Homestead repeatedly asserts that Justice Dowd erred in refusing to recuse himself in this matter, pointing to the fact that Ellen Coccoma, who has served as counsel for plaintiffs, is the wife of the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for Courts Outside New York City. 

Homestead specifically argues that the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge controls the assignments given to retired Supreme Court Justices serving as Judicial Hearing Officers and could thus conceivably cause difficulties for Justice Dowd following his retirement if he sanctioned or otherwise ruled against Ellen Coccoma in this action (see Judiciary Law §§ 850 [1]; 851, 852; 22 NYCRR 81.1). We do not agree that this remote, speculative, "possible or contingent" financial interest warrants the disqualification of Justice Dowd (People v Whitridge, 144 App Div 493, 498 [1911]; see Langdon v Town of Webster, 270 AD2d 896, 896 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 766 [2000])."

===

Of course, the appellate court conveniently overlooked my other argument, based on the McCuin case above:

McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983) (“To permit a disqualified chief judge to select the judge who will handle the case in which the chief judge is disabled would violate the congressional command that the disqualified judge be removed from all participation in the case.”)

 - that Michael Coccoma himself recused from all of my cases, and that assignment by Michael Coccoma of any judges amounted to re-entry after recusal of Michael Coccoma himself, with a purpose of retaliation (I wrote about this technique of 3R's - Recusal-Reentry-Retaliation of New York judges, happened to me several times).

Of course, judge Kevin Dowd claimed that no matter who assigns him, his "judgment" is independent.

That's not what Carmen Ciparick thinks though.

Now, who would be more eligible for the position of an independent judge than the Executive Director of the Citizen Complaint Board about actions of police officers.

You need to be REALLY independent-minded to withstand pressures about the subject as sensitive as police misconduct, in our day and time.

Yet, Carmen Ciparick rejected that Executive Director as a judicial candidate for the reasons described above.  Here is her reasoning, once again:

Ms. Fox was the Executive Director of the Board - who was she supposedly "insubordinate" with?  Who is her boss?

What was she "insubordinate" about?

And why is insubordination TO AUTHORITY is a disqualification for a judge whose only "subordination" must be to the law? And nobody else?

So, the cost that innocent victims are paying for "judicial independence" by being stripped of their right to an effective remedy for constitutional violations - judicial immunity for MALICIOUS and CORRUPT conduct of a judge - is all for a fake?

Because independence of a judicial candidate is a DISQUALIFICATION?

Good job, Carmen Ciparick.

The Northern District of New York sets a new precedent chilling civil rights lawsuits against social services - bring such a case to trial, and your attorney will be suspended and screwed out of her fees, so nobody from now on will take such cases

In 2012, I was approached by three prospective clients:

Dara Argro;
Myrna Horshinski;
Cody Fletcher Bess - of Oxford, New York.

They contacted me because I was the only civil rights attorney in the entire State of New York who they contacted (after contacting about 60 other attorneys) who was not afraid to sue Social Services.

They complained to me that Social Services of the Chenango County regularly ransacked their house, see the 2nd Amended complaint here.

I sued on their behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York in 2012.  The agreement between us was that my award of attorney fees will come at the end of the action if we prevail (the likelihood of prevailing was strong, with a strong promise of punitive damages).

That was my first mistake.  I couldn't predict in 2012 that disciplinary proceedings will be used against me in order to strip me of my ENTIRE fee in that case, of my 3.5 years of work.

The docket report of the case is included herein in its entirety, as of today.

The case survived (with my help) 3 motions to dismiss and 1 motion for a summary judgment and was scheduled for trial in the summer of 2015.

At that time it became known that one of the Defendants died, and her death was not disclosed to the Plaintiffs.

I requested an adjournment of the trial to get the Estate of the deceased Defendant done, so that my client would receive a better award at trial.

Apparently, feeling for your clients and trying to do what's best for them may be ruinous for a civil rights attorney.

It was for me in this case. 

After I obtained an adjournment, on their authorization, my clients first claimed that they had other, more important things, than to pursue forming the Estate of the deceased individual.

Then, a new trial date was scheduled, on November 13, 2015, see the docket report, Docket entry No. 83.

On the same date, the State of New York suspended my law license.

Previously, the disciplinary prosecutor in the state case Mary Gasparini admitted under oath that she acted as a collecting agency for the initial complainant in the case, the Lawyers Fund for Client Protection (the charge brought in favor of the Lawyers Fund was dismissed by the disciplinary court, by the way, saying that it has nothing to do with attorney discipline).

So, if Mary Gasparini could act as a collecting agency for Lawyers Fund in a disciplinary proceeding, why wouldn't she act for Chenango County Department of Social Services (whose attorney is on the judge-picking committee in the 3rd Department, and thus part of the "brotherhood/sisterhood").

There were two major civil rights cases (Neroni v Zayas and Argro v Osborne) that the State of New York and the Chenango County Department of Social Services filibustered by my suspension.

Get your pick who asked to suspend me on that particular date.

On November 18, 2015 the Northern District of New York allegedly suspended my federal law license, too.

Why I say "allegedly"?

Because normally orders of suspension or disbarment are at least pretended to be a court orders, and court orders imposing public discipline must also be public.

You do not have a criminal conviction that is secret, right?

Same with orders of suspension.

Yet, in my case, you can see from the "attorney lookup" on the NDNY website that I am suspended, but you cannot see on Pacer.gov any indication of any records of any disciplinary proceedings or any order of suspension for my name.

So, I am "kind of" suspended - by a secret order of the court.

Which is, of course, illegal.

But - what happened next is even more so.

We had a written agreement with my clients.

After my alleged suspension (which was reported to me first in a letter of Judge Norman Mordue who obviously knew about a secret order that never appeared anywhere), my clients hired an attorney "on recommendation of the bar association".

That attorney had them sign a quick retainer agreement asking for $500/hr (!) - from indigent clients!

Of course that attorney, Woodruff Carroll, had to use my 3.5 years of work that brought a difficult and acrimonious case to trial, through, once again, 3 motions to dismiss, a motion for a summary judgment, discovery and a deposition.

I had to travel, I invested time and money, my clients could call me at any time of day or night, I sifted through myriad documents that they have been sending me, they told me I am their Godsend.  Ok.

I described Mr. Carroll's "first efforts" on the case in this blog.

He later explained to the court that he took the case because he only saw a potential for a quick settlement.

He settled a multi-million dollar case for $30,000, pushing that my attorney fees should be either part of the settlement, or "not at all".

I refused to participate in Carroll's illegal "motion to fix" my fees.

First, such a motion should be made by me - and there was no fee dispute with my clients.  They told me they will honor our written agreement with an hourly rate.

Second, there is no procedure to fix such fees in federal court, and state court rules and laws do not necessarily apply.

Third, I was trying to not have my indigent clients pay me ANYTHING, instead waiting until the resolution of the case to apply for fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as allowed in civil rights cases for prevailing plaintiffs.

Since my (now former) clients insisted they wanted an order of protection from social services as part of the agreement, that qualified as a material change for position, prevailing in the action, and I could apply for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988.  All that I needed is time to wait and see how the case resolves.

Yet, that was not good enough for Woodruff Carroll, who, as I understand, had a behind-the-scenes agreement with the defendant, possibly for a kickback, to kill my attorney fees, even though his clients had a distinct interest to have my fees paid not by them, but by the defendants.

With the mind to kill my fees, Woodruff Carroll, according to Dara Argro, his own client, asked her for a written retainer agreement that we had between us.

She has sent to him THE ORIGINAL of the agreement (I have another).

Woodruff Carroll then turned around and claimed to the court, on the motion that the three plaintiffs did not initially authorize, that there was NO written agreement between us - while having the original of the written agreement sent to him by Dara Argro.

After I talked to my former three clients and ascertained that Woodruff Carroll coerced them to sign a retainer agreement with $500/hr hourly rate, but assured them that they would not have to pay, because he will be paid "by the state", Woodruff Carroll turned around and will be collecting from the settlement (or from the clients, of course).

After I indicated to the court, in a written JURISDICTIONAL objection sent by mail that:

1) Woodruff Carroll did not have authority to make the motion to "fix" my fees;
2) I have no dispute with the plaintiffs as to my fees, and do not want to make the motion to fix them at this time, and only I can make such a motion;
3) my fees have nothing to do with the settlement, we have a written retainer agreement, I provided services for 3.5 years of litigation when I was perfectly licensed, and my fee award does not depend on the amount of settlement my now former clients are negotiating;
4) 42 U.S.C. 1988 provides for award of attorney fees if the plaintiffs prevail - and there is no conclusion of the case yet, so it is premature to even talk about fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 - and I will wait until the conclusion of the case to apply for fees directly from defendants, so that my indigent former clients would not have to pay a penny.

Fair to the plaintiffs?

I think it was.

Turned out to be not fair to me.

But, this particular court would know a jurisdictional objection when it is screaming in its face.

So, the court proceeded on the merits without deciding the issue of jurisdiction to review such a motion - not from me.

First, Judge David Peebles (who hates me with a passion for criticism in pleadings and on this blog, I pointed out his misconduct), hate and all, makes a recommendation to the judge to pay me $15,000, the decision can be found here.

In that award he reduces the amount that he could discern from the docket report of the case listing what I filed and what I did, because I was "admonished" - by him - for not appearing at a telephone conference because I was sick and on a 3-MONTH documented medical leave.

Of course, such admonishment for being sick was illegal under the Americans with Disabilities Act, but when did that stop judges from disciplining an attorney who criticizes them.

Then, Peebles talks a lot about my standing to apply under 42 U.S.C. 1988 which, in his view, is "unlikely" - even though the case was at this time not finally resolved and scheduled for trial.

Then, Peebles applies New York State law about charging liens, admitting that under the same New York State Law the standing to bring a motion to fix MY fees belong - who would guess? - to me only, and certainly not to my clients.

Once again - we have a retainer agreement.

I did work for 3.5 years of litigation.

I brought a difficult civil rights case to the point of trial.

My former clients told me that they were trying to replace Carroll, but couldn't because, even with the case scheduled for trial, attorneys in New York (they called around 50 firms this time) are deathly afraid to be even associated with suing social services.

So, they told me, Carroll is better than nothing, and they needed the money.  I can't blame them - as to that point (they later signed an affidavit, while telling me they didn't, allowing Carroll to do whatever he wants with my fees, while continuing to tell me that they will be fair to me).

Carroll visited their house (to have them sign a $500/hr retainer agreement, to be paid "by the state"), and saw their financial situation.

Carroll, in his electronic submissions to the court that were not properly served to me and that I was able to recently read through downloading them, at my own expense, from Pacer.gov, tried to diminish what I did claiming that I did not do "much of discovery".

That is - while his ENTIRE fee was based on what I did, and he wouldn't have gotten a penny without me first bringing the case to the point of trial, threats from social services and all.

Now, here is the kicker.

Peebles still recommended the judge to "fix" my attorney fees - based on motion brought not by me that I objected to as made without standing - at $15,000.

Judge Norman Mordue rejected that recommendation and awarded me, for 3.5 years of litigation, exactly ZERO.

Because, in his view, on a motion that only I could bring and that I did not authorize Carroll to bring on my behalf, Carroll was still allowed to bring the motion - on whose behalf, I do not even know, because it was for Defendant's benefits and against me who wanted to be paid not by my clients but by Defendants, so Carroll was acting as an attorney for the Defendants and not for his clients, which the court, of course, swallowed - anything against Tatiana Neroni is good.

Judge Mordue claimed that, given all opportunity, I failed to answer the motion.

In the same breath as saying that I was supposed to make that motion, not oppose it - and I didn't yet.

And, did I mention that Woodruff Carroll, on behalf of plaintiffs, who told me that he told them that he will "let the judge decide", opposed ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS my opportunity to collect legal fees FROM DEFENDANTS, so that his indigent clients would not have to pay me anything.

Think about the kickback he must have gotten for that one.

The court swallowed that, too.

So, as of now, a precedent has been created in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, that runs like this.

Civil rights attorneys, beware.

If you take a case of an indigent plaintiff to sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983, here is what may happen.

The case may either be dismissed, under the myriad court-created (illegal under Article III) abstentions, deferences, enhanced pleading standards, comities, and other "doctrines" - and then you will be sanctioned for bringing a frivolous civil rights lawsuit and made to pay multi-thousand dollar attorney fees.  Happens all the time to civil rights attorneys, and at an increasing rate, so taking such a case is a considerable risk from the very beginning.

Yet, if you are successful in jumping through all hurdles - which means that the case is EXCESSIVELY BAD, as one attorney told me "it's a puke standard - the case will survive if it's so bad you want to puke by hearing it".

If you read the 2nd Amended Complaint, you will see that the puke standard was pre-eminently satisfied in the Argro case.

And it was not much reduced after the partial summary judgment either, see it here, a decision so bad that it apparently cost the initial defendants' attorney Maria Lisi-Murray her position Levine, Gouldin and Thompson.

She was immediately picked up though and now toils at the New York State Attorney General's office where, as I learnt over the years as a civil rights attorney, the hiring requirements are (1) complete lack of integrity; (2) incompetence, (3) ability to brown-nose the judge.

On the 3rd one Maria Lisi-Murray failed in Argro, but she immediately got assigned to another civil rights case of mine, where I am a party, and started to ask for sanctions against me from the time she was first assigned.  I guess, being booted from a law partnership was hard to take.  And because of some civil rights attorney, too.

Carroll pounded into his clients who are (1) unsophisticated in law and (2) had hopes for at least some monetary award (naturally) that the only thing they can get is what defendants' insurance would or would not pay.  

Of course, when the case started, Dara Argro told me that they do not care about the money - they cared that they would bring about some change regarding social services.

Dara Argro told me also that Carroll never even touched upon the issue of punitive damages, available in such circumstances and requested in the action - that is why defendants were so frantic to settle in the first place, instead of going to trial, to prevent exposure of issues at trial.

Dara Argro also told me that Carroll adamantly refused to proceed to trial, even though the plaintiffs wanted it, thus coercing the settlement - that may be illegal because of that coercion.

It was insanity anyway and attorney malpractice (in my opinion) to settle a multi-million dollar case with a promise of punitive damages for $30K, that's why it was necessary to remove me first, so that my clients would be stranded and have to hire some clutz who would not want to try the case, would sell his clients out to the defendants and would quickly settle for a quick buck (for himself) and a pittance for them.

So, once again, the rule for the civil rights attorneys here is as follows:

If your case miraculously survived a motion to dismiss and a motion for a summary judgment and is scheduled for trial (and that happens only to a minuscule minority of civil rights cases nowadays) - if you are an attorney for the plaintiffs who secured that victory by endless work, be prepared to lose your license for a contrived reason 

(the reason for my suspension is not clearly stated in my state order of suspension beyond the fact that I was sanctioned by a judge for frivolous conduct, which, in view of a recent declaration of unconstitutionality of a criminal statute with the same language as the rule of frivolous conduct, without more, does not constitute a basis for discipline at all).

Then, be prepared that the clutz who replaces you at the helm of the case, will cut you out of your entire fee, by fraud if necessary (Carroll stated to the court under oath that I do not have a written retainer agreement while having it in his hands).

OF COURSE I will make a motion to vacate this abomination.

But, of course, I realize that making a motion to a court whose attitude is that I have no rights no matter how you look at it, may be futile.

I wonder who, after the decision in the Argro case, would want to represent civil rights plaintiffs against social services at all.

And THAT is the main message meant by what was done to my legal fees.

Social Services are protected by the Northern District of New York, no matter what they do.

That court will bend over backwards, to the point of illegally suspending the plaintiffs' counsel in order to prevent the case from going to trial, with the concurrent exposure of issues involved, and to prevent the award of legal fees against the defendant.

Social Services can do anything to you.

And, with what happened to me as a civil rights attorney suing them, the message of the court is clear - DO NOT TOUCH.  The social services, I mean, not constitutional rights of people violated by social services.

NDNY is the advocate of social services instead of an enforcer of federal laws, as it is sworn to do under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

What else is new.

But - as to my suspension, I did not have my last laugh yet, and, if it is vacated, many things can happen...

At this time I simply warned Carroll that a case for fraud and fraud upon the court has accrued against him because of his sworn statement to the court that I did not have a retainer agreement while he had the original of that agreement in his hands, sent to him by Dara Argro.

And there is 6 years' statute of limitations to sue Carroll for that.

And there are actual and punitive damages for that.

And Carroll "accomplished" cutting me out of much more than $15,000 in legal fees as reasonable value of my services at the time they were provided.

So, since Carroll did not want me to be paid by defendants, I understand he will be happy to pay me himself, with punitive damages and treble damages allowed under Judiciary Law 487 (fraud upon the court).

And, attorneys and parties dealing with attorney Woodruff Carroll, know that he is dishonest - at least based on his tactic to first take from an uneducated client an original retainer agreement and then turn around and tell the court, under oath, that there is none.

If he can lie under oath about that (as he lied before that he was authorized to bring the motion to "fix" my fees), he can lie about anything else.

Richard Harlem's "Senator Seward connection" moved to the Appellate Division in March of 2016 - to fix the Mokay appeal?

As I was advised today in a letter from a court, Judge Robert C. Mulvey, formerly the Chief Administrative Judge of the 6th Judicial District who fought tooth and claw to keep Judge Becker on my cases, and especially the Mokay case, even when Becker's conflicts of interest were apparent, has got a promotion.

Since March of 2016 he is the justice of Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department.

Here is his official biography on the site of New York State Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department:

Judge Mulvey as author of opinions on judicial ethics - one of the most unethical judges that I know - that's great.

It is not unusual that Cuomo promoted Mulvey higher - Cuomo needs to surround himself with unethical judges who owe him, just in case he needs to call in a favor.

As Becker called in a favor on Chief Judge Cardona of the same court - in several cases, and proudly told us so on the record.

I wonder how many more cases he talked to Cardona about.

But - most prominently for the coming Mokay appeal of my husband, involving issues of gross fraud on behalf of attorney Richard Harlem - comes the "Senator Seward" connection of Robert Mulvey.

I did not know that Robert Mulvey was "legislative counsel" to Senator Seward.

Richard Harlem actually is Senator Seward's landlord of many years.

Here is the connection.

Since Mulvey worked as a "legislative counsel" for Senator Seward in 1994-2000, and Senator Seward's district office is in Oneonta, NY, where Richard Harlem has been his landlord for decades (I checked through a FOIL request to NY State Senate), Mulvey inevitably knew Richard Harlem and his father Robert Harlem personally.

After all, the connection between Seward and Robert Harlem is unmistakable - given at least the number of Bills that Senator Seward put through the Senate "honoring" or "commemorating" Robert Harlem, without mentioning that he is the father of his longtime landlord Richard Harlem.


So, did Mulvey rush to the Appellate Division to fix the Mokay case, at the request of the cancer-stricken Senator Seward?

To help his recovery by rescuing his longtime friend - or his friend's (late judge Robert Harlem's) child?

Let's wait and see.