Self-dealing in New York State Legislature goes unaddressed by authorities

A gay legislator is paraded by the press for pushing through a pro-gay legislation.  There is no mentioning of a disqualifying conflict of interest, abstention from vote - no, NYS Assemblywoman Deborah Glick is paraded for "helping that law pass".

14 New York State Senators, licensed attorney with private practices, vote on legislation making it a crime to practice law without a license - thus protecting their own market and income.  There is no mentioning of a disqualifying conflict of interest, no abstention from vote.  On the opposite, licensed attorneys are "co-sponsors" of such legislation.

Another senator attorney, Senator DeFrancisco, drums up legislation that helps his own and his son's private practice.  There is no mentioning of a disqualifying conflict of interest, no abstention from vote.

Is the NYS Attorney General reluctant to investigate and prosecute these legislators for self-dealing in office because, by law, the NYS AG is also those same legislators' legal representative when they are sued for misconduct in office?

And the conflicted statutory scheme protecting the legislators (and other members of the New York government) and preventing New York State Attorney General, an elected public official, from prosecuting misconduct in office, is created, in yet another act of self-dealing, by the same New York State Legislature.

No investigations, no prosecutions for the self-dealing means encouragement of the same conduct at present and in the future, at public expense.

I understand that Preet Bharara only has 24 hours in a day and 365 days in a month to address corruption in New York State government, but Preet Bharara should not be the only messiah able to rescue New Yorkers from this corrupted mess.

What is official misconduct in Missouri, is business as usual in Delaware County, New York - and for two judicial candidates, Porter Kirkwood and Richard Northrup

As was reported today, a judge in Ferguson, Missouri, invalidated all arrest warrants made by the Ferguson municipal court before December of 2014 because of the alleged conspiracy between the local police, city officials and the courts to convict people in order to raise revenues.

In Missouri, apparently, such conduct of public officials is illegal.

In Delaware County, New York, similar conduct is being announced blatantly and unapologetically as a savings to taxpayer during a judicial election campaign of two county officials, and is officially approved by two current candidates for the judicial seat, Delaware County Attorney Porter Kirkwood and Delaware County District Attorney Richard Northrup (see references to press releases  and press coverage in that blog).

These two public officials approved a position of a new prosecutor with benefits paid out of conviction fines.  

That is a financial incentive to that prosecutor that him/her and his/her family will not receive medical coverage unless convictions are brought in, rightfully or wrongfully.  Boy is that an incentive to convict.

A recent New York Comptroller's report indicates that a portion of conviction fines is earmarked to finance local law enforcement.

A description on the website of the Delaware County Sheriff's Department that the STOP-DWI program as "self-sustaining" programs financed by conviction fines, together with the article in the Walton reporter (see link in the blogpost here) where Delaware County probation chief unapologetically states that not only STOP-DWI, but probation and law enforcement in Delaware County, NY, receive money from conviction fines, and that now that the new prosecutor will be similarly "stimulated", the law enforcement hopes for convictions - and revenue - to go up.

So, what is glaring official misconduct in Missouri, is business as usual - and laudable "savings" strategy pandered to voters in order to lure them to vote for two public officials responsible for the scandalous financial incentives for a prosecutor, and to put them even higher than where they are now - on the bench, for 10 years.

The more corrupt you are and the more willing you are to collude with the local law enforcement to bring up revenues and violate people's constitutional rights (to bring "savings" to taxpayers and voters, of course) - the more eligible you are for judicial office?

So, being able to use your public office in order to bring revenues at the expense of people's constitutional rights is yet another new qualification for judicial office in New York - in addition to being gay, as New York State Assemblywoman Deborah Glick insists.

Digest of Grazzini-Rucki petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, challenging absolute judicial immunity

As promised, here is the digest of what I consider the most important points in the Grazzini-Rucki petition that challenges before the U.S. Supreme Court the concept of absolute judicial immunity (the full text of the petition is available here).

I would divide the analysis in the petition in two parts (the petition does not make a division in parts I and II like I do, division in parts in the petition is different, division in Parts I and II is my division based on my own analysis of the petition).

Part I - challenge to legality of the concept of absolute judicial immunity;

Part II (if argument in Part I fails) - challenge to misapplication or failure to apply by lower courts of "tests" invented by he U.S. Supreme Court to analyze whether absolute judicial immunity applies.

Under Part I, analysis covered the following:

1/ The U.S. Supreme Court, by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, is a court of limited jurisdiction (as all other federal courts) and does not have the power to legislate or amend existing legislation.  Power to enact and amend legislation exclusively belongs, pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, to the U.S. Congress.

2/ The U.S. Supreme Court gave itself, in the famous case Marbury v. Madison, authority to interpret - not change - the U.S. Constitution or federal statutes.

3/ Statutory interpretation does not include amendment of interpreted statute.

4/ Only ambiguous terms of a statute are subject to interpretation by courts.  If the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts have no authority to interpret the statute, but must apply it "as is".

Having stated these fundamental principles of the law, the petition then applied it to the concept of absolute judicial immunity, with the following results.

1/ 42 U.S.C. 1983, by statutory text, applies to "every person", not to "every person, but judges and people officially connected with judges".  

For that reason, 42 U.S.C. 1983, the scope of Civil Rights Act and its reach to "every person" is not subject to statutory interpretation and infusion of "absolute judicial immunity" (I would add - or other doctrines of immunity or deference invented by federal courts to absolve governmental officials from the reach of the statute).  Nor, by the way, the Civil Rights Act, is restricted by the so-called "state actors" - once again, it applies to "every person" who, under the color of state law, violate people's federally protected statutory and constitutional rights.

2/ Even if the U.S. Supreme Court WOULD have the right to reach behind the clear and unambiguous text (which it does not because it is, once again, clear and unambiguous, which does not give the court authority to interpret it), reasonable interpretation would have resulted in a decision that absolute judicial immunity does not apply to actions brought under the Civil Rights Act because the Civil Rights Act was enacted as a civil twin of a criminal statute that did not have in it absolute judicial immunity, and that it was a civil twin of the criminal statute, and that it does not make exception for judges based on the concept of absolute judicial immunity, is clearly reflected in the Congressional debates prior to enactment of the Civil Rights Act.

3/  The conclusion - "interpreting" absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench as "implied" by Congress in enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is an unconstitutional act of the U.S. Supreme Court, in excess of its Article III power and in violation of the U.S. Congress's exclusive Article I power.

Part II -  misapplication and failure to apply tests invented by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to determine whether absolute judicial immunity applies (attorneys always provide alternative arguments in case one of them fails).

So, if the argument that the concept of absolute judicial immunity is unconstitutional, the petition then offers a "misapplication" argument.

There is a case by the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts requiring federal courts to conduct analysis of whether a certain function claimed by the defendant-judge to be protected by the concept of absolute judicial immunity, existed at the time of enactment of the Civil Rights Act, in 1871, was considered a judicial function at that time and was afforded absolute judicial immunity at that time.

The petition points out to cases putting the burden of proof in that issue on the defendant-judge claiming the immunity.

The petition analyzes some cases showing that in the majority of cases where absolute judicial immunity is given, neither defendant-judges even try to analyze the common law in 1871, nor federal courts require such analysis, instead giving absolute judicial immunity for any act that is loosely interpreted as "judicial" NOW.   In other words, the petition points out that lower federal courts do not follow, in the analysis of application of absolute judicial immunity, even the "precedents" of the U.S. Supreme Court requiring federal courts to apply absolute judicial courts only when its applicability is PROVEN to them BY THE DEFENDANT-JUDGE, by analysis of the 1871 common law.

The petition points out that certain courts and certain functions, such as:

• the so-called "courts of limited jurisdiction" created by statute - family courts, probate courts;
• function of a court stenographer;
• function of a social worker - 

did not exist in 1871 and cannot be possibly granted absolute judicial immunity.

In sum, the petition is logical, based on existing case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, on solid references to statutes and Congressional records, and clearly points out that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is (1) unconstitutional legislating from the bench of the U.S. Supreme Court, contrary to clear and unambiguous language of a federal civil rights statute;  (2) that the doctrine is applied contrary to the "tests" created for that purpose by the same U.S. Supreme Court, giving blanket immunity to defendant-judges for any conduct, without any inquiry as to whether such conduct was considered judicial and was covered by absolute judicial immunity in 1871, as the U.S. Supreme Court requires defendant-judges to prove and the courts to find before they apply absolute judicial immunity.

In other words, the petition makes it clear (even though it does not say it - it is my personal opinion) that the concept of absolute judicial immunity is not only unconstitutional concept, but a self-serving concept by the judiciary, and it is applied in a self-serving way, to make the absolute judicial immunity absolute in all respects and not subject to any restrictions or tests - which is not and should not be possible in a democratic society, as NOBODY may be given a license to violate the law, and especially the main law of the country, the U.S. Constitution, without providing victims of such violations a remedy.

Sexual orientation, race, gender, or any other factors other than knowledge of the law and ability to be impartial and even-tempered is not a proper factor for choosing a judge to the New York State Court of Appeals, or to any other court

In June of this year (2015), Judge Read of the New York State Court of Appeals announced that she will retire early,  before her term expired.

Immediately, speculations began in the press as to who is going to be appointed in Judge Read's place and suggestions started to pour.

Appointments of judges are an interesting matter in New York.

Such appointments must be at least based on judicial qualifications, right?

Qualifications for a judge should be (exclusively):

• knowledge of the law;
• proven integrity, fairness and impartiality
• ability to be even-tempered with parties and counsel, under any circumstances

That's all.

Not party affiliation.

Not race or ethnicity.

Not gender identity.

Not sexual orientation.

Not origination from the poor or from the rich.

None of that.

It is presented to the public time and again that the judiciary is not the "political", or "representative" branch of the government.

In other words, judges do not represent certain segments of population, their work has nothing to do with "representing" the public and reflecting wishes of the public, but is to painstakingly review the record of the case in front of them, apply the existing law and make a fair ruling.  That's all.  A judge takes an oath of office to be fair and impartial to all parties and attorneys appearing in front of him or her.

Of course, then we have such judge as the Chief Administrative Judge of the 5th Judicial District Judge James C. Tormey who first orders attorney and court clerk Bobette Maureen to spy on a judge and judicial candidate for future election running on a Democratic ticket, to dig dirt about him, and when Ms. Maureen refuses, engages in a binge of retaliation, is sued for it, litigates for 4.5 years at the expense of taxpayers and then settles for $600,000, also out of taxpayers' pocket.  Only to be sued again, now by a female Spanish court interpreter, a Latino woman, also for discrimination and retaliation.  So - let me see, party affiliation and race/ethnicity matters for Judge Tormey, as well as gender identity - he discriminates only against women.

Recently, I wrote about judge Lisa M. Fisher of the Greene County Supreme Court, and her elated audio post-election interview where she described her tricks to lure "Democratic women voters" by statements that women are "under-represented" on the bench.  

Once again, there are only two qualifications to be a judge - knowledge of the law and integrity/impartialiry/fairness.  

For Judge Fisher and for those thousands of voters whom she swayed, gender identity was the key.   Moreover, Judge Fisher also pointed out that it was somehow a problem for her that for 18 years there has not been a "Republican" judge on the bench in her area. 

In other words, gender and party identity in a judge mattered to Judge Fisher - which raises issues whether Judge Fisher now sits on the bench ruling for women and Republicans.

We also keep reading about the "first" black, female, transgender, LGBT, whatever judge.  Which undermines two fundamental concepts pertaining to the judiciary:

1) that the judiciary branch is not a representative branch of the government;

2) that the judiciary must be impartial to all parties and counsel that appear in front of the judge, and should not favor members of their own class.

If that is so, why push for "the first" _____ (insert characteristic) judge on the bench.

Yesterday, the "first openly gay" legislator in New York State, Assemblywoman Deborah Glick, made a public statement stating that "it is time" to appoint a first LGBT judge.

Now, when New York State introduced legislation several years ago allowing same sex marriage, I supported the move, because, in my opinion, it is an equal protection issue.

When the U.S. Supreme Court found it in the U.S. Constitution that same sex marriage is constitutionally protected, I supported the move because I also believe that it is an equal protection issue, although issues of "retroactivity" to all those who were persecuted, denied rights and even criminally convicted for same sex emerge because the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the same U.S. Constitution that was passed in the 18th century, and the 14th amendment that was passed at the end of the 19th century, but keeps "finding" in it what it did not see there before.  

This "finding" process to me as a civil rights attorney who was punished for "frivolous conduct" for interpreting the U.S. Constitution in the way a federal court did not like, and I am far from the only one so punished, looks a little bit arbitrary and giving too much power to the U.S. Supreme Court. 

Yet, once again, I firmly believe that people should have same rights without regard to sexual orientation.

That said, such equality rights are irrelevant to judicial qualifications where the only things that matter are knowledge of the law and impartiality.

Who and how the judge has sex with or has sexual attraction to, which is the essence of sexual orientation, should have nothing at all to do with preferences for judicial appointments, and "pushes" for an LGBT judge (same as "pushes" for a female, black, Latino, Italian, Anglo-Saxon, whatever else judge) are completely inappropriate.

As much as the LGBT community, and Assemblywoman Deborah Glick as part of that community, wants to see "their own" on the bench, appointment of judges who are "representative" of a sector of the community destroy the remainder of the dwindling public trust in impartiality of the judiciary by a clear undertone that the judge which is part of a certain community will serve that certain community better than other litigants - which is a DISqualification for a judicial office.

It is enough conflict of interest that, as it is openly stated in the article, Deborah Glick, a lesbian herself, "helped pass" the same sex marriage law - even though interested parties should not participate in legislating, because it taints the legislation with self-interest and tells a lot about Deborah Glick's integrity.

Now Deborah Glick is "pushing" for an LGBT judge - while

1) she has no say in the matter;

2) she is in no position to influence the Governor;

3) influencing the governor as to judicial appointments based on factors that has nothing to do with judicial qualifications is plain wrong and tells adversely on the image of the legislator 

What I am also concerned about is the identity of the judge Deborah Glick is "pushing" for.

There are three openly gay appellate justices in New York, two women, former Lambda Legal Executive Director Rosalyn Richter and Elizabeth Garry, and Paul Feinman.

Elizabeth Garry and Rosalyn Richter were appointed by Governor Pataki in 2008, on the same day - clearly indicating that their homosexuality was a large part of the appointment decision, even though sexual orientation should have NOTHING to do with judicial appointments - even though the LGBT community pushes the issue as if appointment of "openly gay judges" is a step up in history, and a step toward a "more just judiciary".  What sexual orientation does or should have to do with judicial qualifications is, once again, a mystery for me.  

The press celebrated the appointments as a sign of social progress, instead of expressing outrage that factors that had nothing with judicial qualifications drove the appointments.

Judge Feinman, of the Appellate Division 1st Department, was appointed by Governor Cuomo in 2012 and was a former president of the International LGBT association who openly expressed elation, at the time of his appointment, that "the first gay man" was appointed to be an appellate judge in the State of New York.

Now, the question is, since Judge Feinman was so elated and stressed this "firstness" as some kind of an achievement, does it mean that for 3 years he "serves" his community better than others and has preferences to "his own"? Because otherwise, his being gay should not have been a factor in his appointment - as it clearly was.

I did not litigate in the 1st Department and do not know the record of competence and integrity of Judges Feinman and Richter.

Yet, I did litigate, and a lot, in the Appellate Division 3rd Department, both as an appellate attorney on behalf of clients and as a party, and I personally know the abysmal record of Judge Elizabeth Garry - on both points of judicial qualifications, competence and integrity.

Judge Garry, judging by her decisions both in the courts below and in the courts above, and based on personal experience of people who knew her as a lawyer, is a judge who unashamedly assigns herself to cases involving interests of her former law partners, or in cases where a party litigant took a benefit from her when she was an attorney (like a client left from attorney Garry to that other attorney) and, respectively, rules in favor of her law partner and against the attorney who hurt her by taking her client away.

I already posted on this blog Judge Garry's ex parte decision pertaining to my own disciplinary proceeding where Judge Garry 

1) unlawfully reviewed the application of the Attorney Disciplinary Committee where her own former law partner Samantha Holbrook was a member - and then elevated Samantha Holbrook to be the Committee's "Chairperson", while documents pertaining to appointment of Samantha Holbrook as a member or of the Committee or the Committee's "Chairperson" were denied to me when I made a FOIL request for them;  

Samantha Holbrook, when reviewing the disciplinary case against me and against my husband, was at the same time litigating a slip-and-fall case pertaining to our property, with my husband as a party defendant.  

That did not put off either Samantha Holbrook from the case, or Judge Garry from presiding over my disciplinary proceedings (before the ex parte transfer to the 4th Department) or unlawfully adding my husband into those proceedings to help stall discovery in a federal civil rights lawsuit - because by adding my husband to the motion for an order of transfer (without notice to him or me) Garry's former law partner Samantha Holbrook made it more difficult for my husband to obtain records that the Committee refused to release to him since his unlawful disbarment in 2011, even though by law they became a public record for ANYONE's access as of the date of disbarment, July 7, 2011.

Then, Samantha Holbrook AND Elizabeth Garry continue to block access to the ex parte "application" by Samantha Holbrook's Committee to Elizabeth Garry's court for an ex parte order of transfer to this day, to both me and to my husband, even though our names are on that order as parties to litigation.

That misconduct only garnered for Samantha Holbrook an appointment from Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman to the "Commission for Statewide Attorney Discipline" and a place on several committees within the "Commission" to ensure "uniformity, efficiency and fairness" of attorney discipline in New York.  Right!

2) The disbarment of my husband was because of the Mokay case (see blog posts about the Mokay saga in this blog).

Judge Garry was the second judge assigned to the case and the first judge to rule on that case at the trial level, while very close in time before her assignment to the case, Judge Garry was still an attorney, and lost a beneficial client to my husband - which did not prevent Judge Garry to get assigned to my husband's case and to consistently rule against him, without paying any attention to the applicable law or record of the case.

All of the above actions of Judge Garry qualify her more for a disciplinary action than for the highest bench on the New York State Court of Appeals, but I am holding my breath as to the appointment, because, so far, two judges who committed misconduct in our cases, made it to the Court of Appeals, Leslie Stein and Eugene Fahey, so why not add a third one to that happy family...  

After all, Governor Cuomo was sued by both of us and, in an apparent retaliation, as well as a likely bribe, appointed Leslie Stein to the Court of Appeals at the time she was in the process of making a decision for Governor's Cuomo's subordinate, the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation - and, of course, ruled in favor of the hand that fed her.

So, out of the 3 gay judges whom Governor Cuomo may choose to elevate to the Court of Appeals, at least one has an abysmal record, which, I understand, does not matter - because she is one of the two "first openly gay judges" appointed to the appellate bench?

Let's stop looking at how and with whom a judicial candidate has sex, because it does not matter to how that same judicial candidate, after he or she becomes a judge, makes decisions.

Appointing based on "social progress" and "first XYZ-ness" diverts public attention from the actual qualifications of the judicial candidates which should be ONLY:

1/ knowledge of the law;

2/ integrity, impartiality and fairness.

Let's see who is appointed to the two seats that are being freed this year on the NYS Court of Appeals, by Judge Susan Read because of her early retirement and by Chief Judge Lippman who turned 70 this year, because of his mandatory retirement (that he was unable to change through an attempt to change New York State Constitution).

Such appointments will make for an interesting factor analysis as to what, in reality, not in declaration, matters on the bench - knowledge of the law and impartiality or party affiliation and factors "marketing" such an appointment to certain politically powerful segments of population.

Proposals for the change of the New York State Constitution

As I mentioned before on this blog, I am going to publish my proposals for the upcoming 2017 Constitutional Convention and subsequent referendum as to how to change the New York State Constitution.

Here are my first proposals:

1.  To mandate public legal education in high school.  That will at least alleviate the need for attorneys in court representation and will bridge the gap between the "presumption of knowledge of the law" by the public and arcane and complicated legal rules that require an expensive interpreter (a licensed attorney) to explain to that same public.

2. To require that rules of law must be written in clear and simple language and rely on concepts taught in public schools, so that the presumption of notice and knowledge of those laws to be valid.  What we have now are laws that even lawyers and judges cannot agree upon, split hairs in interpreting them, and punish each other for interpreting them incorrectly.

3.  To allow any person to represent any other person in court.  Access to courts is already guaranteed by the 1st Amendment (petitions clause) of the Federal Constitution, it must be secured by people's right to retain anybody they trust, not only expensive licensed attorneys practically imposed upon the public by the government, to represent their interests in court.  

Independence of such court representatives from government regulation is key.  

Quality of services of such representatives will be quickly regulated by the market - lawsuits for breach of contracts, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty or fraud.  Such causes of action are already on the books.  

At this time, the majority of New Yorkers cannot afford services of licensed attorneys, and those who can, do not receive independent (and thus efficient) representation by such attorneys, because livelihood of such attorneys depends on the very government whose conduct attorneys may have the duty to their clients in challenging.

4.  To allow and make it a duty (like a jury duty) of EVERY person to serve as a judge on a rotational basis.  

This will eliminate dynasties of "blue blood attorneys", eliminate the virtual necessity of attorneys to "build relationships" with judges,  prevent judges from building relations with the local legal elite and assign themselves to cases of their enemies with purposes of retaliation and thus will dramatically reduce corruption in court proceedings.  

5. To make judicial duty compensable at the lowest level, like jury duty, and make the citizen-judge "serve", like jurors do now, on a case-by-case basis only.  This will reduce the burden on the economy by judicial salaries, benefits and retirement packages.

6.  To eliminate all types of immunities for governmental officials acting in excess of their authority and in violation of written statutory law and state and federal Constitutions.

7.  To allow legal representation at public expense of public officials sued for excess of power in office, but to require compensation of value of such services if the public official in question is found by a court to have acted in excess of his duties in office.

8.  To prohibit payments of settlements in lawsuits for misconduct of public officials out of public funds.

9.  To introduce "citizen grand juries" callable by a petition of citizens and self-controlled, with authority to engage independent experts of the law for consultation purposes only.


I will continue to publish my proposals to change the New York State Constitution - both new and updated proposals from the above list if I decide to amend them.

Feedback from readers is welcome, as always.

A FOIL request was filed for records of the New York State Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline

Today I filed (by e-mail) a FOIL request with the New York State Commission for Attorney Discipline asking it the following information:

1/ copies of all applications to testify at the three public hearings held on July 28, 2015, August 4, 2015 and August 11, 2015 by the New York State Statewide Commission for Attorney Discipline;

2/ copies of all audio and video files of hearings;

3/ copies of all rules issued by the Commission as to how hearings are to be conducted and/or recorded, with records indicating who issued those rules, with signatures of issuers, and with records showing where, when and how such rules were displayed during the hearings;

4/ official telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of all members of the Commission;

5/  copies of telephone records and e-mails of the Commission from their assigned telephones from the time the phones were issued up to the date the response to this FOIL request;

6/ minutes of all three public hearings before the Commission;

7/ all rules and policies created/issued by the Commission.

I know that many people submitted their proposed testimony to the Commission, but not many people were heard.

Since people who submitted proposed testimony for a public hearing, obviously waived their privacy, their submissions became public records subject to FOIL requests, whether they were invited to testify or not, because the Commission claims it will review all of the submissions and will make its recommendations to the New York State Court system based on all of the submissions, whether the witnesses were invited to testify orally or not.

Stay tuned as to the Commission's response.  

Who are the federal judges who used their public computers to access their Ashley Madison accounts?

As was recently reported by the blog "Above the Law", hackers into the Ashley Madison website published information about names and e-mail addresses of account holders in Ashley Madison and - guess what - some of them were federal judges who accessed the accounts from their court computers.

Now, this particular information cannot possibly be private as information contained on public computers and not in regards to the specific job of judges, is not private.

I do not care with whom federal judges cheat on their wives - men, women or animals.

But I do care if they do that on the job, instead of addressing their caseloads, and especially because, as a civil rights attorney, I know that civil rights cases are tossed as a matter of policy, to clear the allegedly busy dockets.

I wonder if the "busy dockets" are cleared by judges of the pesky cases involving constitutional violations just to free judges' time to play in Ashley Madison or pursue other personal entertainment in public time, on public dime and on public computers.

And for that reason - names of judges who used federal computers to access their Ashley Madison account, if it is already hidden after hackers made it public, should be made permanently public - because it IS a public record on a matter of serious public concern.

And - impeachment of those judges is in order, because judges in federal court may serve only "during behavior" and trying to use a public computer in order to cheat on their wives during their public time and on public dime is definitely not good behavior.

So - who are the "winners"?