What was the court so afraid of in my disciplinary pleadings, opposition to prosecution's motion for a summary judgment and my cross-motion, that it unlawfully sealed those pleadings?

Judiciary Law 4 provides that all court proceedings are open to the public.  Judiciary Law 90(10) says nothing that attorney disciplinary proceedings, or its records, must be sealed, and multiple precedents provide for an attorney's right to waive her own privacy in such disciplinary proceedings, which I already did multiple times and in writing.

I decided to make public at least the points, if not the arguments and supporting authorities for the arguments in my cross motion that the NYS Appellate Division 4th Judicial Department denied twice, one time on September 30, 2014 without an explanation, and another time, when I brought a motion to vacate, renew and reargue as of right, and asked, as a point of my constitutional due process right to a reasoned court decision, without an explanation, reasoning, and with an anti-filing injunction and with an unlawful sealing order, without a notice to me or opportunity to be heard on those issues.

These are the "secret" issues that the court does not want you to see;

These were the points of my opposition to Petitioner's pending motion for a summary judgment that the court ordered a hearing on (but unlawfully sealed), and which the referee refused to give me that hearing:

1. Point I.  That the Petitioner (disciplinary prosecutors) failed to provide to the court all the pleadings when bringing a motion for a summary judgment, which is a requirement under the law for bringing such a motion.
2. Point II..  That the Petitioner, while not putting in the actual record of the proceedings, attempted to change the petition by adding to it a new charge through a motion for a summary judgment, which was not a lawful move.
3. Point III.  That the Petition fails to state a claim in attorney misconduct, and that Petitioner conceded that Charge IV (failure to pay fines) is moot.
4. Point IV.  That Charge I Specification I (charging me for not practicing law on behalf of "clients" in 2008 when I was not an attorney and was not allowed to practice law) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and with imposition of sanctions upon the Petitioner and its attorneys. 
5. Point V.  Unavailability of collateral estoppel in regards to Judge Becker's sanctions for frivolous conduct because Judge Becker positioned himself as a victim of my alleged harassment and thus disqualified himself from imposing sanctions as a matter of law, and because of the difference between the rules of frivolous conduct in court proceedings, 22 NYCRR Article 130, and in attorney disciplinary proceedings, 22 NYCRR 1200.
6. Point VI.  That the standard of proof in attorney disciplinary proceedings by preponderance of the evidence violates my right to due process and equal protection of laws, as compared to the rules of private discipline and rules of reinstatement requiring the standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence.
7. Point VII.  That there is new evidence indicating that sanctions imposed upon me by Judge Becker which are the basis of the proceeding are part of unconstitutional abuse of power and retaliation by Judge Becker in violation of my due process and 1st Amendment rights which preclude application of collateral estoppel, and such evidence was not and could not be reviewed by any court before the disciplinary court.
8. Point VIII.  That my right to criticize the judiciary in court proceedings on behalf of myself and my clients is fully protected by the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and its freedom of speech, freedom of association and petitions clauses, and specifically, that viewpoint and subject matter discrimination, especially discrimination based on viewpoint and subject matter of grave public concern, is unconstitutional.
9. That new developments in the law precluded application of collateral estoppel, such as:
1. De facto overruling by Judge Becker of his own decision that a motion to challenge his legality as a judge was frivolous;
2. De facto overruling by the Appellate Division 3rd Department as to whether my arguments in Shields v. Carbone were frivolous, in a later decided appeal in People v. Carbone, with similar arguments but no sanctions;
3. De facto overruling by Judge Becker of Shields v. Carbone in the later decided by him Martens v. Neroni where he recognized that I was not an attorney at the time of DEC proceedings that he used in Shields v. Carbone as a basis for sanctions against me, in Martens v. Neroni Judge Becker recognized that I was never fined by the DEC Commissioner, contrary to what he said in Shields v. Carbone as a basis for imposition of sanctions against me;
4. A reversal in an administrative proceedings in Orange County in 2012 that affected the basis of Judge Becker's decision on sanctions in Family Court in 2011 and in the proceedings that exposed undisclosed disqualification of Judge Becker in Family Court proceedings;
5. A reversal in another related administrative proceeding that affected the basis of Judge Becker's decision in Family Court;
6. The decision of Judge Becker in Family Court of 2010 that was partially overruled by factual findings in Pennsylvania in September of 2012;
7. The partial partial reversal and remand on appeal in Neroni v. Becker in federal court that undermined the basis of Judge Becker's sanctions;
8. A new precedent on misconduct of judges in New  York providing for taking judges off the bench for exactly the same conduct as Judge Becker engaged in in the proceedings where he sanctioned me;

These are the points of my cross-motion that the court denied without an explanation or reasoning, and the second time, after I asked for a reasoned decision as a matter of due process of law, in my motion to vacate, renew and reargue as of right, with an anti-filing injunction and sealing order:

1. That the Petitioner and its attorneys (at the time I made the cross-motion the Petitioner was the Professional Conduct Committee of the NYS Appellate Division 3rd Department) should be disqualified from proceeding and that the petition should be dismissed for grievous prosecutorial misconduct.
1. Fraudulent Charge I Specification I attempting to discipline me for NOT committing a crime of practicing law without a license in 2008;
2. Fraudulent Charge IV charging me for not paying the sanctions as of January 29, 2013 (the filing date of the Petition) while the sanctions were paid into the court escrow in the summer of 2011;
2. That attorney discipline is selectively enforced in New York and is not enforced at all against politically connected attorneys and attorneys related to judges, with examples:
1. Non-prosecution of the wife of Richard Sise, Chief Judge of the NYS Court of Claims, and acceptance of Ms. Cornelia Cahill into Hiscock & Barclay, her disciplinary prosecutor's firm, as a partner;
2. Non-prosecution of attorneys - New York State Senators - involved in self-interested voting which protects the market of legal services and puts the legal profession into disrepute;
3. Non-prosecution of attorneys employed full-time in public service for using taxpayer-paid time for private practice, examples were:
1. Ellen Coccoma, wife of Chief Administrative Judge of Upstate New York Michael V.Coccoma who, while being a full-time Otsego County Attorney, is involved in private practice during her taxpayer-paid time;
2. Porter Kirkwood (now running for the seat of Delaware County Judge) who, while being a full time Assistant County Attorney in Delaware County, maintained a private law practice and represented clients during taxpayer-paid time and in conflict with his public employment
4. Non-prosecution of attorney Stephen Coffey, former Vice Chair of the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct, for his threats of criminal prosecution against anybody who would touch "his" bail money, when his law firm was fired before final disposition of a criminal case.  Attorney Coffey or his law firm lost on two appeals, refused to return the money for years despite two court orders, and was never disciplined for that misconduct.  Karen Peters is the Chief Judge of my initial disciplinary court, was on the same Commission for Judicial Conduct with Mr. Coffee, did not disqualify herself while reviewing complaints against her own courts, same as Mr. Coffee did not disqualify himself while reviewing complaints about Judge Becker involving Mr. Coffee's own misconduct.
5. Non-prosecution of Delaware County District Attorney Richard Northrup for trading plea bargains for agreements from criminal defendants not to prosecute Richard Northrup in civil court proceedings.
6. Non-prosecution of attorney and former judge of a justice court Diane Schilling, former counsel for Michael V. Coccoma, who was taken off the bench for attempting to fix another judge's wife's traffic ticket, but was not disciplined as an attorney, was embraced as a partner by a law firm of Anthony Cardona (son of late Judge Cardona, Chief Judge of the NYS Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department, my initial disciplinary court) and of Amanda Kuryluk, niece of the judge of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of New York.  The law firm, after embracing Diane Schilling as a partner, engaged in deceptive advertising of Diane Schilling's virtues, including the fact that she was a judge, while not mentioning that Diane Schilling was taken off the bench for misconduct.
7. Non-prosecution of Chief Assistant District Attorney and son of a judge Michael Getman, as well as his father, a judge, for engaging in a fraudulent scheme in a non-profit;
8. Non-prosecution of attorney (now judge) Carl F. Becker for engaging in conflicted representation (representing Delaware County Social Services and a private client who wanted to adopt a child, and creating a false indicated report, now vacated, against another person in a way absolving the private client);
9. The unwritten policies in all 4 attorney grievance committees in New York not to prosecute prosecutors, as demonstrated by recent publications and investigations in ProPublica.org.
3. That licensing of attorneys by the very same branch of the government whose misconduct attorneys are duty-bound to challenge is a violation of the principle of independence of court representatives and human rights defenders, and is undermining democracy in the United States;
4. I also raised appearance of prosecution against me based on my national origin, as a Russian native and an immigrant attorney.
5. That Judiciary Law 90 is aimed at unconstitutional stifling of criticism by attorneys against judicial misconduct.
6. That conflation in the disciplinary court of legislative, executive and judiciary powers disqualifies the court from presiding over the disciplinary proceedings.
7. That positioning the practice of law as a "privilege" rather than a due process right, is a violation of attorneys' due process of law.
8. That the court's rulemaking demonstrated bias in favor of disciplinary prosecution where the court put in an elevated standard of proof for private discipline, dropped it down to preponderance of the evidence for public discipline (censure, suspension, disbarment), and then raised it once again for purposes of reinstatement of law licenses.
9. That certain specific instances of bias and misconduct of the 3rd Department Court and its judges against me and my husband disqualified the court from presiding over my disciplinary case.
10. That here is a clear potential of retaliation against me by the 3rd Department court because of my continuing inquiry as to appointment of judges and judicial hearing officers into that court.
11. That there is an appearance of impropriety where 22 NYCRR 122 provides a possibility of financial influence over judges of the Appellate Divisions by Michael V. Coccoma whose wife Mr. Neroni was suing at the moment and I was asking the court to sanction for frivolous conduct.  The 3rd Department recused from reviewing this issue in my disciplinary action, but still resolved the issue, in favor of Ellen Coccoma, in another action, Kilmer v. Moseman, in January of 2015.
12. That I ask the court to recuse because I already made the case of my political persecution under the guise of disciplinary prosecution public, through this blog.
13. That Judge Becker is unfit for the bench, based on multiple lawsuits against him (only some of them were mine or my husband's) raising serious issues of misconduct.

Apparently, all of the above issues, issues of serious public concern, were too explosive to be given public access, so the court decided to seal the proceedings, without any basis in law for doing that, and the new Petitioner, the 4th Department's Attorney Grievance Committee, is now trying to put me in jail for publicly addressing these issues of grievous public concern.

But - these issues must be addressed.  And I insist they should be addressed.  And I insist the public should know how these issues are addressed by courts.

When the NYS Attorney General's hats get confused, or why do taxpayers pay money to the Assistant Attorney General Michael Danaher?

I received recently a transcript from a civil proceeding where I raised an issue of constitutionality of a certain court rule.

When a litigant raises the issue of constitutionality of a statute or court rule, the New York State Attorney General must be given notice of that challenge.

I did serve the New York State Attorney General with that challenge.

NYS Attorney General appeared in the action through his Assistant Attorney General Michael Danaher who, according to data collected by seethroughny.net, has a base salary of $123,930.00 per year (not counting benefits) and who has actually received in 2014 (the year when the challenge was heard) $122,401, according to the same source.

Michael Danaher filed an opposition to my motion where he did not even mention the issue of constitutionality, the only reason why the Attorney General was called into that action.

At the oral argument on the motion, Michael Danaher appeared in person (paid for his travel and for his "work" by taxpayers), and presented to the court the following arguments:

Once again, Michael Danaher said that he came to court that day "representing the OCA" (the Office of Court Administration) and "the judiciary" and "to support the integrity of court orders", while he was called into the case for the ONLY reason of supporting or opposing a challenge to constitutionality of a court rule or statute.

Mr. Danaher's office is and has been at the time of the motion hearing, in Binghamton, NY.

The hearing was held on June 19, 2014 at 3 Court Street, Delhi, New York, where the Delaware County Supreme Court is located.

Mapquest.com shows that Michael Danaher had to spend approximately 3 hours roundtrip to come to Delhi, NY to tell the court that he "represents the OCA and the judiciary", has come to "support integrity of court orders" (when the only reason he was brought into the action by notice was a challenge of constitutionality of a court rule), and he came to court without any intention of making any arguments.

So, you, ladies and gentlemen, taxpayers of the State of New York, paid your taxes to fund Mr. Danaher's joy ride over the scenic Catskill mountains in June of 2014, and that included wear and tear on his car, gas, and the high salary that Mr. Danaher paid that day and the previous days when Mr. Danaher put in oppositions to my motion without having a clue as to why he was even called into the case.

Moreover, Michael Danaher made that trip to claim he is there in support of "integrity of judicial orders".

He meant the order by which Judge Becker, after I sued him for misconduct, showered several sanctions upon me, in Neroni v. Harlem included, and in Neroni v. Harlem the sanctions were imposed by a judge who was a witness and a co-conspirator in a case (the case asserted a conspiracy with a judge behind Mr. Neroni's back, during proceedings where Mr. Neroni was not a party, to influence the Mokay v. Mokay proceedings due to which Mr. Neroni was prematurely disbarred in 2011 while the case is ongoing to this day).

It was an order by the judge who already granted to Richard Harlem's client the Estate legal fees from the Mokay litigation claimed as damages in the Mokay action, behind Mr. Neroni's back, so Judge Becker was not supposed to be anywhere near the case involving his own misconduct as a participant in that conspiracy to commit fraud.

Moreover, in that case Judge Becker punished me for - guess - quoting contents of public pleadings of Michael Danaher's colleague from the same office, Mary Walsh, another Assistant Attorney General from the Binghamton office.

The pleadigns referred to the fact that Richard Harlem's and his father Robert Harlem's attempts to commit fraud upon the court are nowhere to be an accident or mistake, but that there is a pattern of similar conduct, as evidenced by Michael Danaher's colleague's investigation of this father-son pair of attorneys in the Blanding case, see the actual open-court pleadings of Michael Danaher's colleague Mary Walsh for quoting which I was sanctioned by Judge Becker as "invading privacy" and "harassing" Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem.

So - the "integrity of the court orders" that Michael Danaher appeared to support (even though he was called into the case for a completely different reason) was to make sure that nobody overturns a retaliatory and unconstitutional order of Judge Becker, a witness in the proceeding over which he was presiding and who sanctioned me for absolutely legal conduct, quoting public records as proof that actions of defendants charged in Neroni v. Harlem (fraud and fraud upon the court) were not an accident or mistake, but happened prior.

If that is how Mr. Danaher and other public servants in the State of New York do their jobs, there is no wonder why New York is in a permanent budgetary crisis.

People of the State of New York need to cut the waste of public funds. 

Start that cut with cutting useless workers like Michael Danaher.

Jailhouse lawyers and the hypocrisy of attorney licensing as a consumer protection technique

The State of New York punishes practice of law by individuals who are not licensed attorneys as a felony since 2013 and has been punishing it as a misdemeanor for years prior.

Licensing of attorneys is declared to be done by the government for protection of the public.

Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court, as far back as in 1969, and that is 46 years ago, has struck down state regulation punishing a person for providing legal assistance to other prisoners.

The Supreme Court has stated in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) the following:

The above U.S. Supreme Court case should be read broadly to ensure the intended effect of the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to ensure constitutionally guaranteed true access to court for poor and poorly educated litigants vindicating their constitutional rights.

When read broadly, we have a U.S. Supreme Court case, a mandatory precedent for the states, that provides that in the absence of "some provision" by the states for a "reasonable alternative" to assist "illiterate or poorly educated" individuals to prepare legal documents pertaining to their fundamental constitutional rights, the state may not validly enforce a regulation which absolutely bars provision of legal services to such indigent litigants by non-attorneys.

Yet, we have not only inmates who continue to struggle, without legal representation, and without funds to pay to prepare legal documents for post-conviction relief, but we also have criminal defendants who, according to the State of the Judiciary 2015 address in New York, are habitually denied counsel at arraignment, or provided substandard representation by public defenders carrying unmanageable case loads.

We also have people being evicted, losing custody of their children, being foreclosed on their homes, being sued for consumer debt, and having no access to a lawyer because these litigants are poor.

The only thing that bars such litigants from representation in court by a knowledgeable, but unlicensed representative, for free or for a reduced cost, is criminal statutes for unauthorized practice of law, statutes that should be held unconstitutional where the state does not provide a "reasonable alternative" to a private attorney to assist the illiterate, poorly educated and poor litigants in their needs.

The State of New York does not have such a reasonable alternative.

Therefore, attorney licensing in New York, declared to be in place to protect the consumers, does not protect the consumers, is in fact hurting the consumers, is unconstitutional as blocking poor litigants' access to courts and preventing them to have trusted and knowledgeable, if not licensed, court representatives of their own choice.  

Such attorney licensing system clearly exist only as an anti-competitive measure to protect the market and high prices that the majority of the public cannot afford, for politically connected attorneys.  

And, therefore, attorney licensing should be abolished as not providing the declared benefit to the consumers and  hurting the consumers.  

Another recording of a conference showing another cooked transcript - and exposing Mary Gasparini's lies and Referee Sirkin's incompetence

My disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini submitted to the Referee a "Proposed Referee's Report" where she falsely made claims that the January 12, 2015 "proceeding" was a "hearing" that was properly noticed to me and where I testified - and attached a transcript with false statements of the stenographer to that effect.

At the same time Gasparini filed criminal charges against me because an audio recording of the January 12, 2015 conference was placed on the Internet showing that the appearance on January 12, 2015 was not a hearing, and I was not called to testify, was not sworn in and did not actually testify, nor does the recording show that I made any stipulations or waivers before the conference of January 12, 2015 began, as the transcript claims I did.

Mary Gasparini also made claims in her "Proposed Referee Report" that on October 23, 2014 there was allegedly a pretrial "hearing".

You be the judge as to whether the October 23, 2014 was a "hearing" or a conference - as Referee Sirkin said himself, and whether any adjourned date from October 23, 2014 was, similarly, a scheduling conference.

The stenographer did not record a major portion of the October 23, 2014 conference, but I do have an audio recording of that conference, and I do have a transcription of that audio file, see below.

Compare how "complete" is the transcript of the October 23, 2014 hearing.

Note that the Referee clearly states in answer to my direct question that what will be happening on the adjourned date is NOT a hearing.

Note that the Referee claims that motions are pending in front of him, which never happens in attorney disciplinary proceedings, referees do not have authority to review and decide motions, that would be an unlawful usurpation of non-delegable authority of an appellate judge - elected to the New York State Supreme court and Appointed by the Governor to the Appellate Division.

Referee Sirkin, a retired Wayne County judge, has no right of serving as a justice of the Appellate Division, even though he undertook to decide motions in the Appellate Division, as the recording clearly demonstrates.

So, attorney Mary Gasparini has urged the Referee to file false report, based on falsified transcript of the January 12, 2015 scheduling conference which, as the recording of the previous pretrial conference of October 23, 2015 shows, was never meant to be a hearing, and, as the recording of the January 12, 2015 conference shows, was actually not a hearing (ordered by the court that the referee should schedule and conduct, but never scheduled or conducted, in defiance of the court order).

Moreover, Mary Gasparini filed criminal charges against me because information about her own and referee's misconduct, as well as an audio recording of the January 12, 2015 conference proving that the transcript of that conference was falsified appeared on the Internet.

Of course, now, when the audio recording of the October 23, 2015 conference has been placed on the Internet, there is even more proof of Gasparini's misconduct, as she attended that conference and clearly heard both my question to the Referee whether the next appearance (that happened on January 12, 2015) is going to be a hearing and the Referee's answer "no".

Conduct of attorney Mary Gasparini in the use of false transcripts and urging the referee to use such false transcripts, and filing criminal charges against me, Gasparini's opponent in litigation who exposed her misconduct, is clearly attorney misconduct warranting disbarment.

Yet, I doubt she will ever be investigated or disciplined for that conduct.

And for that reason, I believe, it is time to call in the feds and make a criminal complaint against Gasparini and the crew.  Maybe, Gasparini will enjoy the company of Sheldon Silver, one never knows.

Gasparini's actions, in my legal opinion, clearly falls within the definition of theft of honest services of a public officials, mail and wire fraud.

The extraordinary story of how an attorney in New York is persecuted for taking a stand against judicial misconduct continues.

Stay tuned.

COMPARISON OF THE AUDIO RECORDING AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF WHAT OCCURRED DURING THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 23, 2014

Audio Recording	Transcript
General conversation between Stephen R. Sirkin and attorneys Mary Gasparini & Gregory Huether who arrived there earlier than I did (I came on time)	Here and further below until the transcript starts - not reflected in the transcript.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Good morning, folks, good morning.
TATIANA NERONI: Good morning
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Good morning, counsel and counsel. It’s been a slight change of plans.  Uh… The original was in the nature of a kind of a pre-trial conference to see where we were going, that kind of stuff, and to set dates. I was notified by the Appellate Division … I don’t remember exactly when  … I think it was a few days ago, that the Respondent has filed a motion in the Appellate Division which can only be heard by the Appellate Division, and I’ve got a call from the Appellate Division telling me that… kind of not to do much until the Appellate Division has reached the decision on Respondent’s motion. And I think he gave me kind of a safe date, but I’m not sure I wrote it down properly.  I have November 20th.  Does this ring a bell to anybody when the Appellate Division hands down decisions? It could be a few day before November 20th.
GREGORY HUETHER:  There was an Appellate Division day last week where the court hears matters.  The next one will be in December, meaning the time when all court members will be in Rochester all sitting…
REFEREE SIRKIN:   Yes.
GREGORY HUETHER:  …they may review some motions referred to them and make some decisions…
MARY GASPARINI:  November 20th is the decision release date (repeats distinctly and loudly) November 20th is the decision release date
REFEREE SIRKIN:   Ahh…
TATIANA NERONI:  The return date, your Honor, is October 28th.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  October 28?
TATIANA NERONI:  Yes.
MARY GASPARINI:  It’s the return date on the motion.
TATIANA NERONI:  Yes.
REFEREE SIRKIN: It’s the return date on the motion, but then they will have to decide the motion.
TATIANA NERONI: Yes.
REFEREE SIRKIN: I think you’re entitled to more time.
MARY GASPARINI:  In this matter? You mean…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Yeah… Yes, for example, pending before me is the motion by the Grievance Committee and the cross-motion by Respondent, and there is no point in deciding and delivering a written decision to that motion unless the Appellate Division reaches a decision on the most recent motion.
MARY GASPARINI:  Okay.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  That’s sort of what I was told.
MARY GASPARINI: Okay.  So, the November 20th date, that’s a Friday, your Honor?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  I’m not sure it’s the right day…
MARY GASPARINI:  That was the decision release date.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Decision release date, November 20th?
MARY GASPARINI:  And it is likely what that date is for, the date the Appellate Division…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Okay, that’s the decision release date, it should be a few days after that.
MARY GASPARINI:  Our next…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Will be later.  Yes, there is no point having it on the 20th…
MARY GASPARINI: And they don’t release decisions until 3 o’clock.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Okay.
TATIANA NERONI:  Your Honor, I must then notify your Honor that I have a prior family commitment, because I have a Thanksgiving family vacation planned since July, and since July we bought tickets, I’ll be outside of the State of New York from November 17th to December 4th.  And that involves my minor son, and I promised him since July, and I cannot change that.  I request…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  You will be back here when, counsel?
TATIANA NERONI: I will be here on December 4th.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  December 4th?
TATIANA NERONI: Yes.
REFEREE SIRKIN: Of course, it doesn’t make much difference.  I’m not going to interrupt counsel’s vacation time.
MARY GASPARINI: I wouldn’t expect you to, your Honor.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Is December 4th okay, or are you coming back?
TATIANA NERONI:  It’s… I am coming back very late on December 3rd, and December 4th will be a hardship for me to come here, because there could be flight delays, I don’t know how it is…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Is December 5th okay?
TATIANA NERONI:  5th is fine.
MARY GASPARINI:  Your Honor, I respectfully request actually the following… the following week.  During that week that Ms. Neroni is coming back from her vacation, I am scheduled to speak at two CLE’s we are having a Committee meeting that week.  So that first week of December is also difficult  for …
REFEREE SIRKIN: I would accommodate both people, both counsel.  How about Monday, December 8?
TATIANA NERONI:  That’s for the actual hearing, your Honor, or …?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  No
TATIANA NERONI:  …conference?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  No.  The way this will work is, depending on what my decision says, sort of that handing my decision on the motion and cross-motion… ahh… and from that decision, if necessary, we’ll set a hearing date and/or, if necessary, a mitigation date, depending.
MARY GASPARINI:  Okay.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  …on how I rule on the motion.
MARY GASPARINI:  Okay
REFEREE SIRKIN:  … and cross-motion.  Let’s do it on December 8.  Okay?
STENOGRAPHER:  Should I be here?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Yes, Sir, you should.  Yes.  Please. That’s Monday, December 8th, Syracuse.
TATIANA NERONI: 9 o’clock, your Honor?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  I’m sorry?
TATIANA NERONI: 9 o’clock?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Yes, let’s do it at 9, this way we won’t be so tired…  It won’t be long anyway on December 8th.
TATIANA NERONI: The only thing is, can I ask it to be a little bit later I live in Delhi, NY, I had to leave at about 5:30 to…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  I had to leave at… I don’t know where Delhi is from here… I just don’t know, but I live probably … not two hours from here, but close.
TATIANA NERONI:  Ok.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  So it takes me a while to…
TATIANA NERONI: So it’s 9 o’clock?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Yes, let’s do it at 9 o’clock.  That way you’ll be home sooner.  But basically then on the 8th I’ll be handing down my decision and setting what, if any, hearings are necessary.
MARY GASPARINI:  Ok.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Okay? Assuming the Appellate Division… Assuming that the case is still pending as a result of Respondent’s motion.
MARY GASPARINI:  And… if…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  I can’t predict.
MARY GASPARINI:  If the Appellate Division has not rendered a decision in response to Ms. Neroni’s motion, but, say, by the Friday before that …
STENOGRAPHER (whispering) :  do you have a card?
TATIANA NERONI (whispering): no I don’t
MARY GASPARINI: … by Friday the 5th?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  They will.  If they are not going to, there is no sense in proceeding, because of the motions directly in the Appellate Division… And if Respondent prevails…
MARY GASPARINI:  I am done…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  I am done anyway.
STENOGRAPHER:  Thanks, do you want a copy of the transcript?
TATIANA NERONI:  Uh… Probably, not.
STENOGRAPHER:  Ok.
TATIANA NERONI: Not right now, thank you.
MARY GASPARINI: Would you like to put any of that on the record, your Honor?
REFEREE SIRKIN:  I am sorry?
MARY GASPARINI:  Would you like to put any of that on the record as far as our…
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Wasn’t it on the record?
STENOGRAPHER: What you just said?  No.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Oh, I want it on the record.  Absolutely, absolutely, I wasn’t paying attention. What we are doing here today is… that was… set dates for pre-trials, trials, hearings.  However, recently the Appellate Division the Respondent has filed a motion in the Appellate Division and that I really can’t proceed until they rule on Respondent’s motion. And they assumed that … apparently the decision date is November 20th, and I understand both counsel have various and sundry commitments and I am certainly willing to respect, and I’ll set a date for the next appearance and I think it’s December 9th, was it?  8th?	The record starts.
MARY GASPARINI:  Monday, December 8th.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Monday, December 8th.  And depending on how the Appellate Division rules on Respondent’s motion I’ll have my decision then on the Grievance Committee’s motion and Respondent’s cross-motion, and depending on how I rule will depend on future proceedings whether there be no future proceedings, or a hearing, or a mitigation hearing.  If requested.  Okay?
MARY GASPARINI:  Thank you, your Honor.
REFEREE SIRKIN:  Thank you, folks. Be well.  Be safe out there.
TATIANA NERONI: Thank you.