Is persistent illiteracy a basis for impeachment of a federal judge?

I wrote in this blog previously that federal courts consistently misread the XI Amendment.

Federal courts claim that the XIth Amendment prohibits citizens of a state to sue their own state.

The text of the Amendment does not contain such language.

I was already punished by the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York Gary L. Sharpe for correctly quoting the XIth Amendment.

On November 6, 2014, Judge Kahn whom my husband just accused in a pleading of failure to disclose disqualifying conflicts of interest pertaining to Mr. Neroni and to me, rendered a decision where Judge Kahn dismisses certain claims of my husband based on Judge Kahn's understanding that the XIth Amendment bars my husband, a New York resident and citizen, from suing the State of New York.

Apparently, the U.S. Congress must include a reading and comprehension test as a pre-condition for confirmation of federal judges.

And - is failure to be able to read and comprehend the contents of the written law and the U.S. Constitution a basis for impeachment of federal judges?

Then, I suggest that Judge Lawrence E. Kahn, along with Judge Gary L. Sharpe, both of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, should be impeached for inability to read and comprehend the U.S. Constitution that they are both sworn to uphold.

And when judges rely on INCORRECT reading of the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court (Judge Kahn relied on an incorrect and later overruled case of the U.S. Supreme Court misreading the 11th Amendment), I cannot help recalling an old joke from my youth in the Soviet Russia:

--

A sergeant addresses newly drafted privates:

-  Private Ivanov!

- Yess, Comrade Sergeant!

- Do crocodiles fly?

- No, Comrade Sergeant!

- But, Comrade Captain says they do!

- Oh, they do, but very-very low to the ground, Comrade Sergeant!

--

It's time to start audits of efficiency and competency of American courts and to revamp the federal and state court systems according to a business model of recruitment and management

A party or an attorney can be severely sanctioned in American courts for missing an appearance, both with a fine, with a disciplinary action (for an attorney) and for an entry of a judgment of default against the party.


Try missing a deadline to submit a pleading - the result will be the same.


Yet, I have yet to see a judge who would abide by mandatory court rules on:


(1) disqualification and disclosure of conflicts of interest;
(2) timely issuance of court orders.


In New York, written court orders must be issued within 60 days of the returnable day of the motion or the last date of the trial.


Dream on.


I had judges who denied me, off-handedly and arrogantly, any written decision to my written motions.


I had judges who told me to obtain, at my own expense or expense of my client, a transcript of the proceedings to discern from it what the judge's decision is (even when the judge did not make a decision in such proceedings).


I had judges who took, literally, years, to issue a decision.


I had judges who took years and still not issued a decision.


One of such judges is Judge Jacqueline Lamport of the Stamford Town Court.  Judge Lamport has failed to issue an order of dismissal of a criminal action, despite my repeated written and oral requests, for over 2 years now.


Delaware County Court has failed to either appoint or control a judge to settle a transcript, and as a result I cannot proceed with an assigned criminal appeal for two years.


My written requests to the courts to move the case are simply ignored.


Judge Mary Work of the Ulster County Supreme Court has taken half a year to issue a decision on a motion that was filed in September of 2013, more than a year ago.


Federal courts are no different.


Federal court can routinely deny a party or attorney extra time to oppose a motion, but then will take a year to decide that same motion.


In federal appeals courts (I have the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit) clerks delay filings that arrive by mail by 2 weeks or more, causing the court to treat necessary filings as not being made, with dire consequences to parties.


Those same clerks sometimes lose filings sent to them by certified mail and claim the filings were never made.


Those same clerks require unnecessary work from pro se parties, such as service of forms and pleadings upon non-existing opponents.  That is all from personal experience, I can only imagine how pro se parties who have no legal education are treated.


Attorneys and parties are routinely sanctioned by courts for imperfect pleadings.  Yet, judges may routinely misrepresents facts of the record, existing law, they can deviate from the law, they can make up the law for the parties or attorneys they favor, they can make up the law against the parties or attorneys they disfavor, and there will be no consequences whatsoever.


If a business model is to be applied to courts in terms of efficiency and competency, many judges, clerks and other court personnel will be fired and blackballed for what they now do on a daily basis.


No business can effectively exist and survive being so wasteful, so inefficient and so arrogantly incompetent as American courts are.


So maybe it's time for the People of the United States and of each sovereign state to start direct audits their courts, their efficiency and competency and start approaching recruitment and performance of the judiciary as any business owner approaches such issues in his business?


The question that will arise then will be - with so many sacked arrogant incompetents whose only value was familial or other "friendly" or political connection to judges or other public officials - who will hire them?  In earnest?  Imagine these people with signs "will work for food" - and what will you do for food, screw up somebody's business for food? misrepresent business records for food? misrepresent company policies or food? be arrogant to customers for food? No, thank you.  




If screwing up somebody's business is unacceptable, how is it acceptable to screw up people's lives through incompetence, arrogance, cronyism and corruption of personnel of the American courts?

Does this country need female attorneys at all?

I am not going to argue that a female attorney is better in any situations than a male attorney.  To me, gender does not define competence, even though for some clients it is easier to discuss certain issues with a male, or a female attorney, respectively.


Yet, based on how female attorneys are treated by the industry of legal services, how they are promoted, or rather, not promoted, and how they are discriminated against, openly and in more subtle ways, it appears that female attorneys still have become the mainstream of the legal profession.


Many female attorneys leave the legal profession because of, among other things:


(1) long hours;
(2) because family obligations are regarded by the law partners (and often by courts) as a hindrance to discharging the attorney's presumed duty of having to work 24-7 without distractions;
(3) lack of promotion within the large law firms;
(4) discrimination in court by the "good old boys club", including male judges and male attorney opponents.


Multiple sources have so far reported on the discrimination against female attorneys in the legal profession, and about, literally, exodus of women from the legal profession.


Yet, the situation is not remedied and becomes worse.  Why?  Because discrimination and humiliation of females in the legal profession is practically unassailable.


There are no trade unions in the legal profession to protect females from discrimination or negotiate "equal pay" contracts or promotion.


Female attorneys are afraid to complain about their employers because they will never get a job if they do complain.


How many times I was perceived as a party, not an attorney simply because I am not dressed in a suit, I am a female and I have an accent...


How many times I was talked down to by a male attorney, when that same attorney would not dream to talk this way to a male counterpart.


How many times I was talked down to or humiliated by a male judge who, similarly, would not dream to talk this way to a male attorney. 


Female attorneys are afraid to complain about sexist conduct of judges because judges who are subject of the complaint have power to affect the attorney's license and end her legal career, thus putting years of costly education and years of acquiring skills and reputation down the drain with a few lines of a retaliative (and incorrect) court order imposing arbitrary sanctions upon an attorney - and your livelihood is done for good, because once your license is pulled, you will not be employable anywhere.


Recently, a female attorney was denied an adjournment of a hearing because she gave birth and the baby was too young and nobody was available to take care of her.  So, the attorney brought the child into the courtroom to avoid a citation of contempt and a loss of rights for her client - only to be publicly chastised by the same judge who denied her the adjournment.  The press reports that an adjournment was given to the attorney, but did not report whether the attorney made a motion to recuse a judge who publicly and unnecessarily humiliated her. 


The attorney did file a complaint about the judge that was being investigated.  I wonder how this judge will be ruling in this attorney's cases after the situation went public.  With the lack of temperament suitable for a judge that the judge already demonstrated, it is naïve to presume that the judge will not use his power to retaliate against this female lawyer in the future, for trying to combine being a mother and being a counsel of her client's choice. 


I doubt that the judge will ever be disciplined for his sexist attitude and uncivilized behavior.  Yet, these are occasions that makes a female attorney think whether it is worth it to remain in the environment so hostile to her simply because she is a woman.


In my own experience, a judge can tell a female attorney:


(1) stop the catfight - about a legal argument - and get away with it;
(2) close your mouth - and get away with it;
(3) yell and humiliate a female attorney at every turn - and get away with it;
(4) retaliate against the female attorney when she complains by imposing arbitrary sanctions - and get away with it.


Please, tell me what is the attraction in using your intellect in order to come to court and be humiliated by a pompous jerk in a black robe who will rule against you no matter what because (1) you are a woman and should know your place; and (2) because he does not like you or your client.


You have to be a masochist to the bottom of your heart to want to earn your living this way.  There are many ways to help people without being an attorney and without subjecting yourself to this endless humiliation.

When victims of police torture are denied a legal remedy and their torturer is paid a pension at their expense as taxpayers - that's the ugly, but true face of access to justice in the U.S.

The highest court of the state of Illinois decided that the former cop who has brutally tortured suspects to get confessions out of them, can keep his state-paid pension of $4,000.00 a month.

At that same time, court-created statutes of limitations, even for constitutional violations, which abound here, prevent victims of the torture from obtaining any compensation.

This case, of all cases, shows why there should not be statutes of limitations on torture and statutes of limitations for victims of torture to sue their torturers. 

Let me ask you - why the German Nazi criminals are tracked down and put through trials for their crimes, without any statutes of limitations, while a torturer like this walks free, and his victims are denied compensation? 

There is no statute of limitations written into the federal Civil Rights Act, it is a judicial creation to prevent the court dockets from being overwhelmed with civil rights claims. 

Yet, victims of torture must have a remedy at all times, especially because they were prevented from suing their torturers by the same government which is now paying pension to Mr. Burge. Let's not pretend naivete by saying that they could sue within the 3-year judicially-established statute of limitations even when they were behind bars. 

Federal courts claiming that everybody is equal under the law treat prisoners and their lawsuits like garbage. 

Moreover, filing a lawsuit against a police officer while you are still in prison can invite more brutality against you, now by corrections officers who will beat you up outside of reach of video cameras and then use your own bruises against you claiming that it was you who assaulted police officers and not vice versa. 

People only end up injured, possibly dead, or at the very least in a solitary confinement for a very long time or with more falsified charges, now for assault of police officers, if you try to sue public officials from within prisons. 

With just 5% of the world's population, the U.S. has 25% of prison population, and the prison population only keeps growing, thus only aggravating the problem with access to justice.

Corrections officers' brutality in American prisons is rampant and not even nearly addressed the way it should be. 

Instead of addressing the issue of torture, both before and after conviction, the U.S. Government enacted long ago the so-called "Prisoners Litigation Reform Act", introducing a pre-condition that a prisoner must first exhaust administrative remedies in the prison before being able to sue for brutality or other unconstitutional prison conditions in federal court.  The "statute of limitations" imposed by that condition precedent is a whopping 15 DAYS!!!

In other words, if a prisoner does not officially complain about police brutality within 15 days of the occurrence - while the prisoner is still within the prison and his health and life is in the hands of the very same people who he is complaining about - the prisoner will not be allowed by federal courts and the U.S. Congress to address the issue of torture at all. 

That is "the law" in the U.S.

And that law and the law that was just created by allowing the torturer to keep his taxpayer-backed pension while his victims cannot obtain any compensation from him directly or from the state who hired and empowered him should be taken off the books as a shame of this nation.

Let's put it this way - Mr. Burge is now the face of the level of access to justice in the U.S. 

The ugly face, but the true face.

Judges in New York are not amenable to discipline unless they are judges who are not attorneys and unless they upset a prosecutor - and then all bets are off and no law applies

Many times I made documented complaints about egregious misconduct of judges in New York State Courts.

Naturally, most of the complaints dealt with courtroom behavior of judges, as I witnessed that behavior as an attorney or a party in legal proceedings.

All of the complaints, other than those which are pending, were dismissed by the Judicial Conduct Commission with an indication to me that where a judge's misconduct occurred during a court proceeding, my avenue to address it is on appeal.

Yet, when I sued judges for misconduct, my lawsuits were dismissed on the basis of the so-called absolute judicial immunity conferred upon the judges even when they are sued for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench, specifically because discipline is (supposedly) available for their acts on the bench.

Now, you see the circular logic here.

A judge may not be sued for acts in a court proceeding, because you have the alternative to have him disciplined.

AND

A judge cannot be disciplined because you are complaining about his acts in a court proceeding.

And an appellate court will rubber-stamp anything the judge said and reject any allegations of bias.

And the Court of Appeals will refuse to see any constitutional violations.

And it is easier to squeeze through a needle's eye than to get a review in the U.S. Supreme Court.

And your federal claims that the judge is violating your federal constitutional rights will be rejected by a federal court while the state proceeding is pending on a judicially created "Younger abstention", and, after the biased judge ruled against you, and the appellate court rubber-stamped the ruling, your federal claims will be rejected by the federal court under the so-called "Rooker-Feldman doctrine".

So, if you move to recuse a judge in the court below, the judge may punish you (in a civil case) and your attorney with a fine of up to $10,000.00 and with your opponent's attorney's fees which your opponent's attorney will be happy to inflate since such a windfall fell into his or her lap.

But - guess what - there seems to be an interesting exception in New York to this "do not criticize a judge, or else" rule.

(1) If a judge is a not an attorney, and
(2) If a judge, in a criminal case, upset a prosecutor by ruling for the criminal defendant.

Look at what happened to Judge Daniel J. Evans of the Norwich City Court.

Judge Evans dismissed, sua sponte (on the court's own motion), a traffic ticket, which was a clearly judicial act, yet the Commission for Judicial Conduct claimed that Judge Evans undermined

That was clearly an act on the bench, a judicial act.

And the "policy" of the Judicial Conduct Commission would be to tell the prosecution to appeal the dismissal if they are not happy instead of prosecuting a judge.  Had Judge Evans been a judge of an upper court, and had Judge Evans been an attorney, no investigation would have been conducted, no testimony would have been taken, the complaint against Judge Evans would have been tossed and Judge Evans would still be on the bench now - as numerous judges (who are attorneys) who were subject of much worse complaints, still remain.

Yet, a proceeding erupted where Judge Evans was hauled as a witness against himself, was grilled as to why he (1) did not engage in an ex parte communication with the prosecution and (2) why he did not conduct his own discovery on the case before he dismissed it.

 Note that the judge admits to an ex parte with Mr. Dunshee, and the ex parte communication, in the Commission's view, is necessary to prevent discipline of the judge - because then the Commission found that the judge lied to the Commission, that there was no ex parte communication with Stephen Dunshee and THAT was the reason why the judge was taken off the bench.

Note that the judge did not go outside of the record when he dismissed the ticket and did not contact the insurance company - which is what the judge was not supposed to do anyway, that would have been judicial misconduct had the judge tried to collect relevant evidence himself.

Here Judge Evans admits to an ex parte communication with the prosecutor Mr. Dunshee after the defendant was already served with the traffic ticket:

Judge Evans also admitted that he actually started seeking evidence from outside of the record when the Commission started its investigation of him - but obviously, Judge Evans did not engage in this "expected" judicial misconduct soon enough for the Commission's liking.

Note also that Judge Evans would not dismiss a ticket without "approval" (on an ex parte basis, naturally) from Stephen Dunshee, Judge Evans' former personal attorney, and that Judge Evans considered issues of liability in a POSSIBLE civil lawsuit in his considerations to dismiss or not to dismiss a traffic ticket, which is not a lawful consideration for a traffic judge to make.  That was NOT the basis of charges for misconduct against Judge Evans.

The basis of charges was that Judge Evans in this case allegedly dismissed the ticket WITHOUT obtaining the ex parte approval of the prosecution.

Stephen Dunshee appeared and testified about his representation of Judge Evans.

Note that Stephen Dunshee claims that the Town of Norwich paid for his representation of a judge accused of judicial misconduct - and why did taxpayers have to pay for such representation?

and offered testimony where he admitted to routinely engaging in ex parte communications with judges.

Stephen Dunshee's testimony against Judge Evans, Stephen Dunshee's own former client, was inconsistent and sometimes mumbling:

Look how Stephen Dunshee describes his own employment history:

Here Stephen Dunshee is completely incoherent: "Before that I had a private law practice which I was with the district attorney's office three or four years".  What does that mean? Would you like such reasoning faculties in a magistrate judge that Stephen Dunshee has just become?


So, in my experience, the Judicial Conduct Commission, following its own policy, does not even investigate judges if they are accused of misconduct on the bench, claiming that the only remedy is on appeal.

Yet, Judge Evans was taken off the bench because of a judicial act, the sua sponte dismissal and because he did not consult with the ADA before the dismissal!

So now, for a judge of a justice court, not to lose his judgeship, is necessary to actually engage in ex parte communications with prosecutors of traffic tickets.

This stuff is, really, for the Last Week Tonight show...

Yet it is the reality in New York...

And - judges who are attorneys, packs of them, are not hauled into the Judicial Conduct Commission and are not prosecuted for not following procedural law, NO MATTER WHAT THEY DO.

And, had the sua sponte dismissal been of a civil case, the civil plaintiff would have banged his or her head against the door of the Commission in vain, they would  have simply tossed his complaint.

It is because a prosecutor was upset, the judge (a non-lawyer judge) was taken off the bench.

Also, Judge Evans was taken off the bench for failure to disclose that he has been represented 3-4 years prior by the Assistant District Attorney Stephen Dunshee in the same Conduct Commission, when Stephen Dunshee appeared in front of him as a prosecutor.

Yet, Judge Carl F. Becker appeared as an Acting Supreme Court Justice in Delaware County in a DEC case where the NYS Attorney General, at that same time representing Judge Becker in a lawsuit against Judge Becker in his individual capacity, was a plaintiff's attorney. 

Judge Becker made no disclosures of representation, rejected any claims of impropriety, and the appellate division, after a financial incentive from the Governor in the form of nomination of the presiding judge of the appellate panel Judge Leslie Stein to the Court of Appeals, affirmed that Judge Becker's non-disclosure was ok.

So, we have a real double-standard here.

One judge (who is not an attorney and who pissed a prosecutor, who was "coincidentally" the judge's own prior attorney) has been taken off the bench for exactly the same reasons as to why another judge was not, despite complaints filed by me about non-disclosure of involvement with the New York State Attorney General as the judge's counsel in an individual matter.

Not only Judge Becker was not taken off the bench in 2011, with a prohibition, like in Judge Evans' case, not to take the bench again, but Judge Becker was  allowed to run and be re-elected for a new 10-year term, retained his appointment as an Acting Supreme Court justice entitling him to a higher salary and to a higher pension on retirement.

So, when you are told next time about the so-called "rule of law" in the State of New York...   Read the proceedings against Judge Daniel Evans on the website of the NYS Commission for Judicial Conduct.

A prosecutor is elevated into the judiciary after engaging in an ex parte communication with a judge

I have written on this blog that I complained to the Judicial Conduct Commission about Judge John Wiedman of the Oxford Village Court, New York, for, among other things, engaging in an ex parte communication with a prosecutor, First Assistant District Attorney of Chenango County Stephen Dunshee.


The judge recused without denying the fact of the ex parte communication, the ex parte communication on the merits of a criminal case was supported by affidavits of two witnesses.


Moreover, on the date of my last appearance when Judge Wiedman recused, Stephen Dunshee was trying to publicly humiliate me by asking me in court absolutely irrelevant questions.  The case was a misdemeanor, and Mr. Dunshee considered it necessary and appropriate to ask me questions whether I ever defended an A-2 felony case (I actually did, and not one A-2 felony case,  but that was, once again, irrelevant to the discussed matters).


At the same time, Mr. Dunshee failed to timely respond to a motion to disqualify where, based on affidavits of witnesses, allegations were made that Mr. Dunshee engaged in an ex parte communication with a judge, was intimidating a witness and concealed from the defense the Brady material (exculpatory evidence).


Since then, Mr. Dunshee reportedly resigned because he was actually elevated into a judicial position of a support magistrate.


Now Mr. Dunshee who obviously has major ethical issues and issues pertaining to discrimination of professional women and women with an accent (at least judging as to his behavior in regards to me), is going to be a support magistrate, with fact-finding powers.


I keep wondering if one of the major qualifications for a judge in New York is the judge's ability to abuse a position of power and to violate the rules of ethics with arrogance.


Mr. Dunshee's case only confirms my experience.


I actually practice in the Chenango County Family Court in support matters.   So now my clients and I will have to face the risk that Stephen Dunshee will have a full swing at me and my clients for making a motion against him in a criminal matter to disqualify him for misconduct. 


It is notorious that it is practically impossible to get a judge to recuse on a motion to recuse, where judges decide motions to recuse against themselves, even for the most egregious misconduct, and have the power to penalize the party or attorney who made the motion with up to $10,000.00 in civil penalties, attorney's fees for a counseled opponent and irreversible damage to the attorney's reputation.


So, Stephen Dunshee, after his prosecutorial misconduct was pointed out to the court on a still pending motion, and after Stephen Dunshee demonstrated his sexist attitudes in open court, was, instead of being disciplined, was promoted to a judicial position and, by this move, removed from the reach of attorney discipline, because disciplinary committees refuse to discipline judges.


I wonder who has made this wonderful move of rewarding Stephen Dunshee for his misconduct with elevating him to a judicial position and removing him from the reach of attorney discipline...


All I can say, litigants and attorneys - beware of Magistrate Stephen Dunshee.

Judges indebted to others - the saga continues

As an attorney and a party, I have appeared in many cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York.

Attorneys are expected (pretty much required is a better word) to presume integrity of presiding judges.

I would rather call it giving them the benefit of the doubt.

Usually, a federal district judge and a magistrate are assigned to any given case filed in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of New York.

In several of the civil rights cases, Bracci v. Becker, Neroni v. Becker, Neroni v. Zayas, Neroni v. Peebles, a partner from a certain law firm, Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, appeared.

In the first case I was a counsel and a party, in the second and third cases I was only an attorney, in the fourth case I was a pro se party.

Neroni v. Becker was dismissed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe, appealed, partially reversed and remanded to the same judge and dismissed again.  The first dismissal was with sanctions for frivolous conduct against both my husband (the only party in the case) and against myself as my husband's counsel.  In Neroni v. Becker misconduct of Hiscock & Barclays and its partners was part of the record, thus making them witnesses in the case.

Neroni v. Zayas as partially dismissed by Judge Lawrence Kahn, even though without a finding of frivolous conduct.  In Neroni v. Zayas misconduct of Hiscock & Barclays and its partners was part of the record, thus making them witnesses in the case.

Neroni v. Peebles was dismissed before it was served by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby, with a ruling that the lawsuit was frivolous.   In Neroni v. Peebles misconduct of a partner from Hiscock & Barclays was a defendant in the case.

Additionally, Hiscock & Barclay, LLP appeared as attorneys of record for a defendant in a pro se civil rights case filed by my husband, Neroni v. Coccoma, also dismissed by Judge Gary L. Sharpe with sanctions and attorney fees against my husband for frivolous conduct.

Moreover, on October 20, 2014 Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe brought a sua sponte "civil rights action" against my husband, citing to Bracci v. Becker, Neroni v. Becker, Neroni v. Zayas (still pending) and Neroni v. Grannis (see my recent posts about misconduct of Judge Leslie Stein and the Governor) and Neroni v. Coccoma (see my post 'Assigned counsel for the rich').

In all of these actions, dismissals were without reaching the merits, and when a court dismisses a case without reaching the merits, pleadings are presumed to be true, so there is nothing to punish the civil rights plaintiff for.

Judge Sharpe brought his action against my husband pretty close to the time when I criticized Judge Sharpe on Forbes.com, a well-read and respectable blog, indicating that Judge Sharpe punished me for correct reading of the 11th Amendment that Judge Sharpe was sworn to uphold.  Seems pretty much like retaliation to me.

Judge Sharpe also failed to disclose to Mr. Neroni, while bringing this action, that:

(1) Several Hiscock & Barclays attorneys either were prior employees of the court, mostly confidential law clerks of judges (one of them, Jason C. Halpin, a recent law clerk to Judge Suddaby, the presiding judge in Neroni v. Peebles before it was even served, while a partner from Hiscock & Barclay was one of the defendant in the action) and two partners are part of the court's judge-selection and local rules committees;

Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Hon. Frederick J. Scullin	Law Clerk	1.  Aungier, Brittany E.	Associate
	Confidential Law Clerk	2. Hennessey, Yvonne, E.	Partner
	Clerk	3. Melvin II, Edward G.	Partner
Frederick J. Scullin, as judge-by-designation of U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit	Assistant
Hon. Howard G. Munson, former Chief Judge	Law Clerk	4. Barrer, Robert A.	Partner
Magistrate David R. Homer	Office employee	5. Burch, David G.	Associate
Hon. Howard G. Munson, Senior Judge	Law Clerk	6. Cook, John D.	Partner
Hon. Norman A. Mordue, then Chief Judge	Law Clerk	7. Cornish, Kathryn D.	Associate
	Confidential Law Clerk	Hennessey, Yvonne, E.	Partner
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby	Law Clerk	8.  Halpin, Jason C.	Associate
Magistrate George H. Lowe	Law Clerk	9.  Southwick, Karen	Associate
Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe	Law Clerk	Jason Hughes	Associate
Local Rules Committee	Member	John P. Langan	Managing Partner
Judicially appointed founding member of Federal Bar Association Merit panel for appointment and re-appointment of magistrates	Member	John D. Cook	Partner

(2) the managing partner of Hiscock & Barclay John P. Langan has been judicially appointed to panels to pick magistrates for the court (see the same table);

(3) yet another partner of Hiscock & Barclay John D. Cook is a member of the "Local Rules Committee", which means that HB participates in making rules of the court by which other litigants must live (see the same table);

(4) that Judges Kahn (Neroni v. Zayas) is the president of a social networking organization American Inn of Court for Intellectual Property and Innovation where a HB's partner is a "Program Chair" and where Judge Kahn regularly meets with that HB partner, a witness in a case in front of Judge Kahn, behind closed doors, not to mention that Judge Kahn is in business together with an HB partner and may receive free perks like wining and dining from the Inn of Court;

(5) that Judge Peebles (assigned magistrate on Neroni v. Zayas, Neroni v. Becker, Neroni v. Coccoma, defendant in Neroni v. Peebles) is a counselor/vice-president and trustee of the same American Inn of Court where Judge Kahn is the president;

(6) that Judge Mae D'Agostino (Bracci v. Becker) and Judge Frederick Scullin of the same court are members of the same American Inn of Court;

(7) that not only Hiscock & Barclay's partner is the Program Chair in the Inn of Court where Judge Kahn is President and Trustee, Judge Peebles is Vice-President, Counselor and Trustee, and Judges Mae D'Agostino and Scullin are members, but 7 more attorneys from Hiscock & Barclays, both partners and associates, are members of the Inn of Court.  

No.	Name	Associate, partner, of counsel or counsel
1.	Elizabeth A. Cominolli	Associate
2.	M. Eric Galvez	Associate
3.	John T. Gutkoski	Partner
4.	Jason C. Halpin	Associate, former law clerk of Judge Glenn T. Suddaby (dismissed Neroni v. Peebles, where HB’s partner John Casey was a defendant, before the action was served)
5.	Douglas J. Nash	Partner, Program Chair in the Inn of Court
6.	Michael A. Oropallo	Partner
7.	Bella S. Satra	Associate
8.	Denis J. Sullivan	Partner

It is also interesting to see how judges of NDNY were trying to hide there involvement with this particular Inn of Court.  Talking of the guilty mind...

Here is the snippet of my printout from the "Officers" webpage of the Albany Inn of Court for Intellectual Property and Innovation dated May 13, 2014, which I provided to the NDNY in Neroni v. Peebles (dismissed by Judge Suddaby before it was served while Judge Suddaby's law clerk J.Halpin came to work for HP, and HP's partner was a defendant in the action):

Judge Lawrence E. Kahn is listed there as a president.

After the lawsuit was filed, and even after it was dismissed, on August 19, 2014, I checked the same website again, and here is what I found:

No judges were listed as officers.

I posted a blog asking a simple question - if you think you are right, why hide your involvement?

After that, NDNY judges posted their involvement not only as officers, but also as members, and here is what is on the Inn's "Officers'" website now:

Between the time when the first and the last snippets of the "Officers" page were taken, NDNY court ruled against both Mr. Neroni and myself that we are doing something frivolous, dismissed a case where HB's partner was a defendant, dismissed a case where HB represented several high-standing defendants, and awarded to HB thousands of dollars in legal fees against my husband.

Endearing and indebting judges pays off.

Such a situation creates possibilities for NDNY judges to (1) regularly engage in ex parte communications with Hiscock & Barclays attorneys, witnesses, parties or attorneys in my cases or cases of my husband, and (2) to receive financial perks such as regular free dining and wining, if only that, through the Inn of Court sponsored and run by Hiscock & Barclays.

Moreover, Hiscock & Barclays endears itself to the courts not only by participating in selection of judges or creation of court rules, and not only by wining and dining judges behind closed doors through the American Inns of Court, but also through employment of high-standing public officials that the courts simply cannot resist to rule for:

NEW YORK STATE SENATE
NYS Senator Charles E. Schumer	Office Employee	Vellano III, F. Paul	Associate
NYS Senator Douglas H. Barclay	Senator (1965-1984) Chair: Codes Committee; Chair: Select Task Force on Court Reorganization; Chair: Joint Committee on Housing & Urban Development; Chair: Select Committee on Moral Obligation Financing; Chair: Corporation Committee; Chair: Senate Republican (Majority) Conference	Dougals H. Barclay	Of Counsel
NYS Senator Neil D. Breslin	Senator, present	Neil D. Breslin	Partner
NYS Senate, State Select Committee on Moral Obligation Financing	Counsel	Farr, Jan R.	Of Counsel
NYS Senate, Energy Committee	Counsel	Maureen O. Helmer	Partner
NYS Senator William Smith	Special Counsel	Reynolds Jr., Ransom P.	Of Counsel
NYS ASSEMBLY
NYS Assemblyman for the 124th District William A. Barclay	Assemblyman	William A. Barclay	Partner
NYS Assemblyman Sam Hoyt, 144th District	Summer Intern	Bard, Jonathan H.	Associate
NYS Assembly Office of Minority Counsel	Deputy Director	Maureen O. Helmer	Partner
NYS Assemblyman Lawrence Rulison	Legislative Assistant	Donald M. Mawhinney Jr.	Of Counsel
NYS Assembly Majority, Office of Counsel	Legal Intern	Merriman, Courtney M.	Associate
NYS Assembly, Speaker Perry Duryea	Administrative Assistant	Nahal, Henry J.	Of Counsel
NYS Assembly Minority Leader	Special Counsel	Reynolds Jr, Ransom P.	Of Counsel
U.S. SENATE
U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs for the Special Investigation of Hurricane Katrina	Special Counsel	Adelberg, Arthur W.	Partner

GRIEVANCE/CHARACTER AND FITNESS COMMITTEES
Attorney Grievance Committee, 7th Judicial District, NYS	Member	Gaddis, Sheila A.	Partner
Attorney Grievance Committee, 8th Judicial District, NYS	Former member	Wettlaufer, Catherine T.	Partner
Chief Judge’s Task Force on Attorney Professionalism and Conduct	Former member
Attorney Grievance Committee, Appellate Division 4th Department, 5th Judicial District	Former member (2007-2013)	Barrer, Robert A.	Partner
Professional Conduct Committee, Appellate Division 3rd Department	Former member (2007-2013)	John R. Casey	Partner
New York State Committee on Professional Conduct	Prosecutor	Katzoff, Susan R.	Partner

	FORMER PROSECUTORS
	STATE PROSECUTORS
Name of agency, position in agency	Name of Hiscock & Barclay’s attorney	Position in Hiscock & Barclays
Schenectady County, ADA 1.  Chief ADA Legal Intern	Casey, Brian D. O’Connor, Thomas J. Salkin, Justin L.	Partner Partner Associate
Westchester County ADA	Devendorf, Jon P.	Partner
Middlesex County 2.  Special ADA 3. Special ADA 4.  Special ADA 5.  Special ADA	Gutkoski, John T. Scibelli, Anthony A. Stanganelli, Joseph L. Whiteley, Brian E.	Partner Partner Partner Partner
6.  Nassau County ADA	Larkin, Matthew J.	Partner
Suffolk County DA’s Office, Certified Student Prosecutor	Marcotte, Carolyn A.	Associate
Chemung County DA’s Office, 7. Chief Trial Attorney	Reynolds, Jr., Ransom P.	Of Counsel
Kings County DA’s Office, Legal Intern		Associate
Erie County DA’s Office 8. Bureau Chief	Solomon, Jerry M.	Of Counsel
Monroe County DA’s Office	Van Strydonck, Thomas M.	Of Counsel
	FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
Northern District of New York	Aungier, Brittany E.	Associate
	Forward, Zachary D., Summer intern	Associate
	French, Dan, U.S. Attorney	Of Counsel
	Southwick, Karen S., Extern	Associate
Western District of New York	Bard, Jonathan H. Law Clerk	Associate
	Walker, Kristin L. Extern	Associate

Civil rights plaintiffs are people whose constitutional rights are violated by the government.

For judges of the NDNY Hiscock & Barclays IS the government because it employs a lot of people from the government and, most importantly, it also provides steady employment for NDNY outgoing personnel and serves as benefactors and support system for judges of NDNY court.

Judges NDNY appear to be so endeared - and indebted - to HB, in different ways, that there is no way that NDNY judges would acknowledge that Hiscock & Barclays attorneys are doing anything wrong, there is no way NDNY judges can resist whatever requests HB attorneys put in front of them, whether supported by law and fact of the case or not, and there is no way NDNY judges can abstain from the pleasure of using their power to return the favor and award legal fees to HB attorneys, whether they are warranted or not.

Of course, if the rule of law was followed by the NDNY court, its ties to the HB firm had to be disclosed, and the court should disqualify itself from all cases where Hiscock & Barclays and its attorneys appear in any capacity - as attorneys, parties or witnesses.

Yet, since those ties are long-standing and were not disclosed to date, nor does the court have the decency to recuse from cases where Hiscock & Barclays' attorneys appear, on the opposite, the court acts as a gatekeeper protecting HB from harm and as a benefactor showering HB with legal fees even where they are clearly not entitled to it, there is no point holding one's breath to await such disclosures any time soon.

It is obvious that it is completely futile to make any motions to vacate any decisions made by these judges who did that despite glaring conflicts of interest, since the only result will be additional sanctions and attorney's fees awarded against us.

So much about presumptions of integrity of judges.