The state of the law in the State of Georgia: it is criminally punishable to seek proof of judicial racism in the courtroom



I've just published an article regarding the recent trend of intimidation of investigative reporters who seek open records of government corruptions, with the use of arrests and criminal charges among other means of intimidation.

I mentioned in that blog the arrest of publisher/reporter Mark Thomason and his attorney Russel Stookey and promised to run a more detailed report about the case.

Here it is.

In June of 2016, in the State of Georgia, Chief Judge Brenda Weaver of Appalachian Circuit asked her own former law clerk, and now the local prosecutor Alison Sosebee to prosecute investigative journalist and publisher Mark Thomason and his attorney Russel Stookey for making an open records request seeking evidence of corruption in her own office.

Alison Sosebee obliged the judge, in front of whom Sosebee appears or may appear as a prosecutor and has a stake at pleasing her in order to win cases, and charged Mark Thomason and attorney Russel Stookey, had them arrested and put in jail.

The crime?

Here are the anti-heroes and heroes of this story: 

#JudgeBrendaWeaver, Chief Judge of Appalachian Circuit Superior Courts, State of Georgia

and Judge Weaver's former law clerk, #DistrictAttorneyAlisonSosebee who Judge Weaver asked to criminally prosecute a reporter and the reporter's attorney for investigating whether certain checks in court operating account was cashed illegally, through open records requests and subpoenas on the bank:

the racist judge Roger Bagley whose racist comment that was supposed to be reflected in the court audio file Mark Thomason and Russel Stookey seek through a lawsuit where the supboenas that are the basis of the criminal chargers were issued, I understand, by attorney Stookey:



and the victims of misconduct of the above three individuals, along with those who colluded with them, publisher Mark Thomason and his courageous attorney Russell Stookey:

 

Let's note that Mark Thomason and Russel Stookey, both white, filed a lawsuit and went to jail over their stance to fight racism in the courtroom by this white judge, now former judge Roger Bradley, where Judge Bradley resigned, of course, because "the planets aligned" in favor of his resignation, not because he outed himself in a criminal proceeding as a racist.   

Let's also note that both sets here, the three anti-heroes in this story, two judges and one prosecutor who is one of the judges' former law clerk, are white, too, and that the whole fight is over a record that would prove a racist slur uttered by a quickly-resigned white male judge at a criminal proceeding against an African American criminal defendant.   

By the way, in her election campaign, prosecutor Alison Sosebee pledged the following:

Prosecutor Sosebee, apparently, forgot to mention that she will use her authority to provide protection, at taxpayer's expense, to her former boss, Judge Weaver, protection against investigative journalists.

Mark Thomason sent the public records requests - and subpoenas - to the banks where judicial expense accounts are maintained, and asked for copies of checks "cashed illegally".

Judge Weavier claimed that for subpoenas Mark Thomason had to have judicial approval. 

I am not sure about the laws of the State of Georgia, but in New York, for example, an attorney can issue a non-judicial subpoena seeking bank records.

And, on subpoenas, the name of the judge appears even though an attorney signs it - that is, once again, a routine occurrence, and such power is actually given to attorneys, with some exceptions.

Usually, when a non-judicial subpoena is signed by an attorney, the court (or the supboenaed organization or individual) simply rejects that subpoena - although in some cases, like a divorce case that was reported to me recently, a New York #judgePhillipRumsey wholly endorsed an attorney, Dolores Fogarty, signing judicial subpoenas that had to be signed by a judge, after a motion brought in a certain way (which Fogarty, of course, never brought).

Of course, attorney #DoloresFogarty who has connections to local judges, was never charged with identity fraud at all.

By the way, Judge Rumsey retaliated against me for criticizing his actions in the divorce case, including favoritism to Dolores Fogarty.

Even if Mark Thomason and his attorney Russel Stookey had to have judicial approval for subpoenas and did not seek that approval, that was a mistake at best, and not a crime, and criminally charging for what must be available through an open records request, is a clear violation of the 1st Amendment of Mr. Thomason and of due process of his attorney Russel Stookey.

And yet, the reporter and his attorney were charged criminally, at the request of the investigated person, a judge, with identity fraud and attempted identity fraud, as well as arrested, kept overnight in jail and released only on $10,000 bail, with conditions of bail such as random drug tests.

And, by the way, reportedly, Judge Brenda Weaver presides over the state Judicial Qualifications Commission, so she is supposed to be the cleanliest of the squeaky clean of the Georgia state judiciary.

Georgia is a death penalty state, so all judges in a state where judges are allowed to take people's lives should be of the highest integrity and moral order.

Judge Weaver did not even conceal the fact that she retaliated by requesting to criminally charge the reporter and the reporter's attorney for investigations into her own behavior, reportedly stating regarding her request to prosecute Mr. Thomason and attorney Stookey: 
 
“I don’t react well when my honesty is questioned".  Really?  So, the judge openly admitted to this level of retaliation, and she is still on the bench?

Judge Weaver does not have a dislike to reporters in general.

In fact, she was very nice talking to a reporter Josh Becker who was advertising the judge's superior moral qualities in two video interviews.

In the interview, Brenda Weaver stated that she recently became a president of the Council of the Superior Court Judges of the State of Georgia and that her goals as the President of that organization are:

1. obtain a pay raise for Superior Court Judges in the State of Georgia, including appellate judges - but, of course! that must be an "over-arching goal" in a State with a death penalty, racist justice system, high illiteracy and poverty;
2. develop a "better working relationship with state representatives and senators" - in other words, lobbying in the State Legislature on behalf of judges;
3. proliferation of "accountability courts" in the State of Georgia and encouraging judges to become accountability court judges, making sure every Circuit in the State of Georgia has some type of  "accountability courts";

In her videointerview Judge Weaver stated that she is

"very humbled to be able to serve the citizens of [her] Circuit and State", that

she is "very lucky to get up every day", that she loves what she does.

Judge Weaver stated that being a judge in a felony court, Veterans and Drugs court "makes every day a wonderful experience" for her, because she gets an opportunity to make a change or cause people to make a change in their lives, and that portion of her job (that makes her every day a "wonderful experience") is what makes her to continue her job as a judge - "for another 20 years if possible", she said (after 15 she already worked as a judge by the time of the interview).

Yet, Judge Weaver's "wonderful experience" apparently also includes protecting from disclosure bank expense records of the court, and of the former #JudgeRogerBradley who quickly resigned from office after being exposed for using a racial slur against a criminal defendant in court proceedings and after the judge, or somebody else in authority in the court system, which could be Judge Brenda Weaver herself,  had the stenographer remove that racial slur from the transcript of court proceedings, which is public fraud.

Judge Roger Bradley reportedly repeated the pitch of a prosecutor who, when calling the next case on the docket, called an "N-word Last Name".  Neither Judge Bradley nor the prosecutor were sanctioned, apparently indicating that what they did was appropriate for Judge Brenda Weaver and a standard procedure of dealing with African American defendants in court - the "wonderful experience" that keeps Judge Weaver on the bench for the last 15 years.

The reporter Mark Thomason sought the audio recording from which the stenographer made the transcript. 

Access to that digital filie was denied, and when Mark Thomason sued for access to the audio file, the stenographer sued Mark Thomason for 1.6 million dollars in a defamation counterclaim.

The stenographer then withdrew her counterclaim, ending it as a matter of law, but still sought attorney fees against Mark Thomason, and somehow that frivolous claim was allowed to proceed, even though normally, if you withdraw a claim, it dies, and everything with it dies.

Mark Thomason's lawsuit for the audio file was dismissed for alleged failure to prove that the audio file was altered, without giving him that audio file for discovery.  It is interesting a person can be expected to prove something in the initial pleading in order to be allowed to see what he seeks to see.

That's the problem I recently discussed regarding the Fenton case and other civil rights cases where federal courts change the pleading standard from claim/notice pleading to factual pleading, requiring plaintiffs to prove what they seek to prove through the lawsuit.

Obviously, the state of Georgia made the same shift - specifically to protect its judiciary from claims of misconduct.

After all, it would have been a decidedly awkward situation if prosecutor Alison Sosebe, former law clerk of Judge Weaver, would have to investigate and charge Judge Weaver and other judges and court personnel, with committing public fraud.

And, had the audio file been released in discovery and expert analysis of the audio file, it would have been a simple "yes" or "no" answer - as to whether the audio file was authentic or edited, whether Judge Rodger Bagley did or did not use that racial slur, and whether the tape was edited, and whether the transcript was doctored.

For example, in a similar case, recently in the state of Louisiana an attorney, Christine Mire, actually obtained an audio recording of a court proceeding before judge #JeanetteKnoll, and has proven, through testimony of witnesses, that the recording, specifically the place where the judge allegedly made disclosures about her conflicts of interest, was added -  was "spliced" and contested content added.

When attorney Mire said there was no disclosure of later-discovered conflicts of interest by Judge Knoll at the hearing where attorney Mire was present and was thus a witness, the transcript said there was, and the audio file was edited and contents added on specifically as to that disclosure.

Who was disciplined after and because attorney Mire obtained proof that the court audio file was cooked?

The judge?

The stenographer?

Of course, not.

Attorney Mire was disciplined, on Judge Knoll's complaint.

The judge #JeanetteKnoll was elevated to the appellate court, complained to that appellate court, and that appellate court suspended attorney Mire's law license - for being too good at investigation of judicial misconduct.

As to Mark Thomason's case, if the audio file would be shown to be authentic, unredacted and exactly matching the stenographer's transcript - with no racial slur stated by former Judge Roger Bradley, there was no point to block access to it, was it?

Nor would a judge resign if he knew that the audio file did not contain the racial slur and that he is being accused improperly.

Yet, Mark Thomason's access to that record was blocked twice, once when he sought the audio file through an open records request, and another time when he did that through a lawsuit.

And, "coincidentally", the attorney who had the courage to take the case seeking records of judicial misconduct on behalf of Mr. Thomason, Russel Stookey, ended up charged with a crime, arrested and put in jail.

So, the court system in the State of Georgia, and its Chief Judge Brenda Weaver, shamefully continue to cover up for a racist judge, now by asking her former law clerk, a prosecutor, to intimidate by criminal charges, arrest and jailing those who seek evidence of her own and her subordinates' mismanagement of state money - paying out of public court expense account the $16,000 to the stenographer's attorneys in order to to kill the lawsuit seeking the audio file with the racial slur of Judge Bagley.

Mark Thomason was seeking copies of checks for those attorney fees to the stenographer's attorney, reportedly authorized by Judge Weaver.

A lot of integrity on behalf of Judge Brenda Weaver and prosecutor Alison Sosebe.

Just as promised in their respective public statements to voters.

As I already described earlier in this blog, the judicial system, although unquestionably racist, viciously fights against anybody who tries to fight that racism.

In Kentucky, a #JudgeOluStevens was recently suspended for insisting on constitutionally required process of picking criminal juries and preventing a racist prosecutor from eliminating African Americans from the juries in trials of African American defendants, a requirement of the U.S. Supreme Court's  so-called Batson rule.

On May 23, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction for violation of the Batson rule and of skewed racial composition of the jury.

Yet, in the State of Georgia African-American criminal defendants, and other litigants, do not have to worry about the Batson rule where both the judge and the judge's former law clerk, and now prosecutor, vigorously seek to intimidate and punish two people for seeking proof that a judge is a racist, and that the court system paid for the cover-up of that racism with taxpayers' money.

I wonder whether Judge Weaver and prosecutor Sosebee will be disciplined for their role in the arrest of Mark Thomason and attorney Russel Stookey.

The Society of Professional Journalists of Georgia already called for investigation of Judge Brenda Weaver, and for recusal of Judge Weaver (who is the Chairman of the commission that is supposed to investigate her) from such investigation.

Good luck with that - in my case, I was suspended for seeking recusal of a judge because of collusion with Vice-Chair of the Commission for Judicial Conduct in the investigation of the judge regarding a collusion in a criminal case.

I was also punished for seeking investigation and disbarment of attorneys for two disciplinary committees when they adamantly refuse to investigate themselves (from which they are obviously disqualified) or to have a special investigator and prosecutor appointed.

The same refers to judges sought to be recused for misconduct - they usually refuse and lash out against the challenger, as it happened in my case and in many more cases I am aware of.

If Judge Weaver stooped to using her former law clerk to criminally prosecute investigative reporters who sought public records that may implicate her or her subordinates in mishandling public money, there is not much Judge Weaver will not consider too low to stoop down to.

And, let's not forget that reporter Thomason is also charged with "making a false statement in an open records request" - requesting copies of checks "cashed illegally".

Please, tell me, what is a false statement in a request?

How is it possible to make a false statement in a request?

If a person asks for copies of checks "cashed illegally", the answer can be - if there are no checks cashed illegally, then the request is denied becuase there are no records answering the request, the way it is worded, that's all.

But, there is no legal possibility of charging a person for fraud for making a false statement in an open records request - other than if the prosecutor is the friend and former law clerk of the judge who asks for the prosecution.

I wonder whether the judge and her former law clerk, the prosecutor, will be charged by the State Attorney General for a crime based on their respective roles in this story.  At least, such a request has been made to the Attorney Genera of the State of Georgia.

That is, despite Mark Thomason - and people like him, seeking open records of the government - was addressed in a demeaning manner, by a "former public prosecutor", as a "public gadfly", something stinging, but decidedly with a negative connotation of a pest.

I do not see anybody discussing Judge Weaver were addressing Judge Weaver with any labels.

The only label I am going to give her, and prosecutor Sosebee, is that of a public anti-hero who should be removed from their positions immediately.

For continued coverage of this mess, stay tuned.

Good news from the U.S. Supreme Court - my writ of certiorari has been docketed

I received good news today from the U.S. Supreme Court - my writ of certiorari in the disciplinary case has been docketed. 

The docket No. is 16-664. 

Filings in the case may be accessed here.

The text of the petition can be read here.

Coincidentally, at about the same time as my petition was docketed, the ABA has become interested in the issue of lawyers disciplined for criticizing judges - see an article about Louisiana attorney Christine Mire disciplined for making a motion to recuse based on painstaking diligent research that showed that the judge may have been involved in changing the audio file of a court proceeding in order to show that she did disclose her irreconcilable conflict of interest to the parties and attorneys - when, according to attorney Mire, who was present at the proceeding, the judge did not disclose the conflict of interest.

The article was written by David L. Hudson Jr., a First Amendment expert and a Vanderbuilt Law School professor who, reportedly, serves as a First Amendment Ombudsman for the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center.

Professor Hudson's article shows that the American Bar Associations cannot any longer ignore the issue of attorneys disciplined for criticizing judges.

In view of the interest of the American Bar Association to the issue of attorney discipline for criticism of judges - which is what my petition to the U.S. Supreme Court is about - I am wondering whether the U.S. Supreme Court may now actually take my case and review it.

If that happens, it may make a huge and long-awaited difference for the country, for both the party litigants and the bar, on the issue of independent and competent representation in court. 

If the U.S. Supreme Court strikes discipline of attorneys for criticism of judges as unconstitutional, and especially when such discipline is imposed without an evidentiary hearing, and based on sanctions imposed by the judge who was the subject of the motion to recuse, the legal profession in the U.S. may be then relieved of the fear it is seized with now, and will no longer be considering an untenable dilemma - whether to fight for their client's constitutional right to impartial judicial review, or whether to intentionally not fight for their clients on that issue, in order to preserve their own license and livelihood.

I will continue to cover the issue of attorney discipline for criticism of the judiciary.

Stay tuned.

My letter testimony to the U.S. Congress requesting enactment of new federal laws against judicial retaliation and discrimination against pro se parties in court

Yesterday I posted a blog about the new petition I started on Change.org.  The post is a featured post in the top right corner of this blog.

I request support and signatures from my readers.

Since yesterday, I have added an update to the petition, a supporting letter to the U.S. Congress which I provide here with formatting, for easier reading (Change.org removed formatting when I posted it).

==

TATIANA NERONI

ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

P.O. Box 3937

Pawleys Island, SC 29585

To:      U.S. Congress (Senate and House) Committees for the     

            Judiciary

            Senator Robert Goodlatte;     

            Representative John Conyers

           

            Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen:

Arbitrary and disproportionate application of court-created "rules of frivolous conduct" against parties and attorneys raising constitutional arguments in court, especially, arguments criticizing the government and the judiciary, unreasonably infringe on litigants' right of access to court under Petitions Clause of the 1st Amendment, and federal legislation is needed to protect that right from further chilling

Courts across the country increasingly sanction attorneys and parties for "frivolous" conduct for making constitutional arguments.

"Frivolous conduct" rules are not statutes, they are introduced and arbitrarily applied by courts.

Lawyers and parties who are sanctioned for "frivolous conduct" are often sanctioned for as much as filing motions to recuse judges, by the challenged judges.

Such conduct is prohibited in many states, and is considered judicial misconduct, but is condoned and accepted in other states.

In the State of Texas, judge Christopher Dupuy was criminally charged and convicted for abuse of office for retaliation against attorney Lori Laird for making a motion to recuse on behalf of a client.

In the State of Louisiana, attorney Christine Mire was suspended from the practice of law for making a motion to recuse, even though there was sworn testimony indicating that a court audio recording regarding the judge's disclosure of her conflict of interest was altered, and the disclosure was added into the audio file.

In the State of New York, attorney Tatiana Neroni was suspended from the practice of law for making a motion to recuse a judge who she sued together with her pro bono client, by the challenged and sued judge.

State laws greatly varied as to whether to allow a peremptory challenge to remove a judge or not, whether to allow the judge challenged with a motion to recuse to decide the motion for timeliness, legal sufficiency or on the merits, or whether to stay or not to stay court proceedings while the motion is pending.

In the states where judges challenged with motions to recuse are allowed to decide those motions, retaliation against attorneys and parties often happens, as it also happens in federal courts.

In 1993, Rule 11 (sanctions) was changed because it disproportionately affected civil rights litigants.

On September 17, 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. Bill 758, the so-called Lawsuit Abuse Litigation Act, which was voted against in the Senate by several senators because it will once again affect civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys and will make impossible such cases as Brown v Board of Education.

Even though Rule 11 clearly requires a motion to be made and a 21-day "safe harbor period" allowing the party accused of "frivolous" conduct to withdraw the allegedly frivolous argument, federal courts obviate this requirement and disproportionately punish civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys for frivolous conduct, for contents of their constitutional arguments, based on the "inherent power of the court" and 28 U.S.C. 1927.

The essence of arguments regarding "frivolous conduct" is that argument of civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys, or of parties and attorneys in family court litigation where sanctions for frivolous conduct are most often imposed upon attorneys protecting parents' constitutional rights, is not "reasonable".

"Reasonable" in the court's understanding is "mainstream".

Constitutional arguments in civil rights cases are most often novel and not mainstream.

Applying the "unreasonable" standard to constitutional arguments prevents and chills development of constitutional law and deprives victims of constitutional violations from having legal representation in court, because civil rights attorneys are increasingly fearful of sanctions in raising any novel constitutional argument.

The U.S. Supreme Court often reverses what it considered unreasonable years ago.

Rules of frivolous conduct, if they existed at the time, would most likely prohibited argument against slavery, decriminalizing racial and other forms of discrimination, inter-racial marriages, contraception, abortion, same sex relations and same sex marriage.

At this time, in many states it is impossible to find an attorney who would be willing to file a motion to recuse a judge, even if there is proof of misconduct.

Such fear led to situations where public safety was jeopardized to the point that judges who were selling children in return for kickbacks to juvenile incarceration were allowed to be on the bench for years, because attorneys were afraid to turn them in – until federal authorities had to step in, arrest and criminally prosecute those corrupt judges.

Since the judiciary controls licenses to practice law and thus livelihoods of criminal defense, family court and civil rights attorneys, litigants across the country are deprived of independent court representation and exposed to "defensive lawyering" who routinely refuse to make motions to recuse judges for fear of retaliation.

In fact, making a motion to recuse is universally recognized in the American legal profession as a "professional suicide".

At this time, in view of the above circumstances, litigants' constitutional right to impartial judicial review is not protected in this country, and this petition is a request the U.S. Congress to rectify the situation and introduce statutory protections to ensure that people's right to impartial judicial review is truly protected.

The U.S. Supreme Court has a large body of cases prohibiting content-based regulation without strict scrutiny.

Yet, despite that large body of precedents, courts continue to punish litigants and their attorneys for contents of their arguments, mostly for contents of their arguments critical of the government, which is within core protections of the 1st Amendment, as a matter of discretion, without any scrutiny.

Since such routine, and increasing practices by state and federal court undermine access to court of the poorest and most under-served and under-privileged litigants, intervention by a federal statute protecting the right to impartial judicial review from retaliation of the government and specifically of the judiciary is needed.

One-size-fits-all restrictions on page limits in civil rights lawsuits unreasonably burdens civil rights litigants' access to court in violation of the 1st Amendment Petitions Clause, and federal legislation protecting that right is needed

The petition additionally calls for attention to practices of courts to control their caseloads by imposing undue burdens on presenting constitutional arguments to court, and many of those burdens violate the fundamental right of people to access to court under the Petitions Clause of the 1st Amendment by not being narrowly construed to any compelling governmental purpose.

The U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts routinely issue decisions where complex constitutional questions are decided on tens pages, sometimes reaching well over a hundred pages, small font, single-spaced.

That means that complex and novel constitutional arguments need a lot of space to be properly presented to the public.

Yet, federal courts, including the same U.S. Supreme Court, severely restrict incoming constitutional arguments of litigants by page limits, making litigants to under-develop their important arguments, or drop some important constitutional arguments altogether in order to fit into the prescribed page limit and to have any chance at all for judicial review of federal courts of all levels.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that, at the same time, page limits are "one-size-fits-all" requirement and applies without regard how many plaintiffs with varying claims are in a certain civil rights lawsuit, how many defendants are in that same civil rights lawsuit, and how many claims are in that lawsuit – and when litigants are required to bring varying claims based on the same factual situation against multiple defendants at the same time, or waive (lose) their rights to bring a lawsuit for constitutional violation.

Moreover, in actions for a declaratory judgment inclusion of certain defendants is required by courts in order for the civil rights lawsuit could survive.

Thus, when a civil rights litigant is required to group all of his or her multiple claims against multiple defendants, but at the same time is restricted to a page limit as to constitutional argument in opposition of a practically inevitable pre-answer motion to dismiss to, let's say, 24 pages, and if there are 20 defendants against whom multiple varying claims are asserted based on the same factual situation, the litigant is forced to drop development of certain important arguments and is put into an unequal position with a litigant who sues only one defendant on only one, relatively simple, claim.

This petition asks to eliminate page limits for constitutional arguments as a "one-size-fits-all" unreasonable restriction on access to court in civil rights cases, since caseload control and convenience of judges and clerks is not a compelling interest to justify restriction of issues and the depth of development of those issues that litigants may present to judicial review.

Providing exclusive rights to e-file to counseled litigants unreasonably discriminates against pro se civil rights plaintiffs by burdening or blocking their access to court and causing them to miss deadlines that counseled parties can easily meet by filing electronically, in violation of pro se parties' access to court right guaranteed by Petitions Clause of the 1st Amendment, and federal legislation is needed to eliminate this type of discrimination that courts refuse to eliminate on their own

Yet another barrier to raising constitutional arguments in court by or on behalf of poor litigants is unavailability of e-filing to pro se parties in federal courts and relegation of civil rights lawsuits to a separate review track, where less efforts are dedicated to review of civil rights appeals while the same filing fee is charged for such appeals as those appeals who are reviewed with an opinion.

Federal courts routinely allow or even mandate electronic filing for attorneys and/or represented parties, and routinely prohibit electronic filing, without an explanation, to pro se litigants.

Such practices unreasonably burden and discriminate against pro se litigants as opposed to counseled parties.

A counseled party has the following advantages over a pro se litigant in federal and state courts where e-filing is allowed only to counseled parties.

1) A pro se party is given less time to prepare for the same deadline as a counseled party, and filings by a pro se party require additional costs of travel to court or mailing to court with guaranteed delivery.

A counseled party's pleading is timely electronically filed if it is filed 1 second before midnight on the day of the deadline.

A pro se party must either personally bring his/her pleading to court, during business hours of the court, and make sure the clerks file the pleading in the party's presence, often requiring a confrontation with court personnel that does not want to scan the pleading into Pacer.gov immediately.

The alternative is to mail the pleading, where the only guaranteed delivery is by U.S. express mail, which is expensive, and delivery can still be "mis-routed" or delayed, thus missing the deadline.

Thus, where a counseled party's filing does not require additional mailing or travel costs, filings of pro se parties do require additional efforts.

Thus, availability of e-filing to only counseled parties in federal court is unreasonable infringement upon access to court for pro se parties and should be eliminated by statute.

2) An attorney can e-file from anywhere in the world, while a pro se party not only will incur substantial mailing costs, but time required for mailing substantially cuts into his or her time to prepare the pleadings, as opposed to filings of a counseled party.

Such discrimination actually presents a paradox since more time is given to prepare pleadings to attorneys trained in law than to pro se parties who often lack legal training.

3) A pro se party, as opposed to a counseled party, does not have an instant proof of filing, or the advantage of automatic electronic service.

A pro se party must additionally serve parties by mail or by personal service, which incurs extra costs and is subject to claims that parties were not served.

A counseled party does not have such problems, where service of an E-filing is done by electronic notification, sent by e-mail instantly, which also constitutes proof of service.

4) Some courts, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, prohibit electronic filing of initial petitions completely, which blocks meritorious filings on the basis of wealth of litigants, an impermissible consideration under the 14th and 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has a "booklet" filing requirement in accordance with its Rule 33.

Rule 33 requires that all filings should be made on paper of:

1. non-standard format;
2. non-standard weight (60 pound);
3. the font is only of "Century" family that is not usually used for pleadings, decisions or transcripts in other courts;
4. non-standard binding as opposed to how pleadings are filed in paper format in other courts (saddle stitch or "perfect binding);
5. printed on paper without gloss;
6. printed on a laser quality printer or better quality;
7. printed double-sided;
8. presented as a typographic booklet;
9. presented in 40 copies;
10. presented with certain color covers for different documents; and where
11. the already made decisions of lower courts, transcripts and pleadings should be re-formatted in accordance to Rule 33 requirements to fonts, margins, spacing etc., requiring hundreds of hours of unnecessary work and thousands of dollars to pay for that work.

None of those requirements are necessary to provide effective judicial review.

In fact, introduction of electronic filing in the U.S. Supreme Court will:

• save paper;
• help the environment;
• eliminate hundreds of hours spent by the U.S. Supreme Court personnel on ensuring compliance with the technicalities of Rule 33;
• allow pleadings to be word-searchable in electronic format and zoomable in and out to adjust to the reading comfort level of the particular judge or law clerk.

The U.S. Supreme Court appears to be in no hurry to eliminate Rule 33 and introduce universal e-filing in that court, thus relieving the extreme burden created by Rule 33, and thus there is an appearance that Rule 33 exists for dual purpose of reducing the caseload of the court and, likely, providing work for "specialized" businesses that thrive on charging thousands of dollars for booklets satisfying the technicalities of Rule 33.

Neither the business purpose nor the caseload control are legitimate grounds to infringe upon parties' access to court, and especially when issues are constitutional violations, violations of human rights, and when the U.S. Supreme Court is the court of last resort and, unlike in other countries, where review by European Court of Human Rights or by the United States Court of Human Rights is available, such relief is not available for American civil rights litigants.

Additional costs required by compliance with Rule 33 are extreme, discriminatory and block access to the U.S. Supreme Court to all but wealthy individuals.

The U.S. Supreme Court filing fee is $300.

Yet, Rule 33 requirement adds several thousand dollars to the filing fee, causing many potential appellants with meritorious constitutional claims important for resolution in this country to not pursue their claims for lack of funds.

While the U.S. Supreme Court does have applications for a poor person standard, a person can easily be ineligible for a poor person standard, but still not afford several thousand dollars in costs of 40 copies of petitions.

U.S. Supreme Court Rule 33 imposes extreme additional financial burden upon litigants and unreasonably infringes upon their 1st Amendment right of access to court.

Yet, failure to file an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court is reviewed by other courts as a "waiver" of certain rights and finalizes decisions of lower courts, imposing the so-called Rooker-Feldman bar in civil rights litigation as to violations of constitutional rights, if such violations occurred in state court litigation.

Thus, people are barred from access to federal courts to obtain a remedy for violations of their constitutional rights by state governments simply because they cannot pay the artificially invented costs for review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Rule 33 is a problem only to those who cannot afford the costs imposed by that rule.  It is not a problem for wealthy individuals and businesses.  Thus, Rule 33 conditions access to the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis of wealth.

Over 85% of federal appellate review and nearly 100% of appellate review in civil rights cases is relegated to a less-than-diligent, separate track, thus discriminating against civil rights litigants.

The majority of civil rights cases are dismissed based on court-invented doctrines of immunity, comity, enhanced pleading requirements, abstentions, deferences and other court-created doctrines.

Thus, appellate review of constitutional cases is extremely important.

Yet, all federal appellate courts employ a double-track system where some cases (about 100% of civil rights appeals) are relegated to be decided by "non-precedential summary orders" where, as Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit admitted, "exponentially" less time is spent for review of cases and preparation of court decisions decided through such summary orders.

The court filing fees for review of cases on "diligent track" and "less than diligent track" are the same.

In the summary orders, federal appellate court usually use "rubber-stamp" templates.

 A summary order usually states that "the court assumes parties' familiarity with facts and procedural history of the case" and that the appellate court "affirms on substantially the same reasons as the thoughtful and well-reasoned decision of the district court".

Such template phrases preclude inclusion of the actual issues raised on such appeals into research and arguments of further litigants and legal scholars, and cause the same issues to be litigated again and again, thus increasing and not reducing the burden on the courts.

Moreover, civil rights cases decided by the "less than diligent" review leading to "summary orders" are mostly litigated by or on behalf of poor and underprivileged people who have to pay the same, quite high, filing fees, as the minority of litigants given the privilege of diligent appellate review and full opinions of the court.

Thus, by deciding 85% of appellate cases and nearly 100% of civil rights appeals by summary orders, federal appellate courts make poor and underprivileged people claiming constitutional violations of their rights by the government, to finance courts' appellate review of wealthier litigants, cases in diversity and cases brought by the government.

That is an impermissible discrimination and burden upon right of access to courts by civil rights litigants, yet, this practice continues for decades and will not change unless prohibited by a federal statute.

CONCLUSION

All of the above described problems are egregious violations of right of access to courts in the U.S., they continue to exist because of discriminatory court rules and practices, and will not stop unless a federal legislation prohibiting such practices, with an effective mechanism of enforcement, is introduced.

This petition asks to introduce such legislation.

Thank you for your attention.

                                    s/Tatiana Neroni

                                    Association of Independent Human Rights Defenders

==

Yesterday I received yet another inquiry, one of many I received since my suspension, for representation in federal court in a civil rights lawsuit against Social Services.

The attorney for the parent refused to sue out of fear of social services and fear to lose the attorney's license and livelihood.

It is heart-breaking to say to the person - yes, I am fully capable, knowledgeable, have skills and already brought a federal civil rights case to trial.

But, I am not allowed to help you - even where no other help is available.

Allegedly, for your own protection.

I am dangerous.

Because I am as skilled civil rights attorney who did not give a damn about the status of people I was suing on behalf of clients.

I cannot represent people and I must say "no" to them, otherwise I will be incarcerated - whether I am right or wrong, whether the government doing it to me and to my potential clients, is right or wrong.

But THIS I can do.

I can do petitions for everybody's benefit.

I can use my experience to draft them.

People can sign them.

And, altogether, we can make a change against discrimination in court.

Please, sign the petition.

Kansas Supreme Court is pitching a brand new spanking "rule" to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit: blame the victim (litigant) who obtained recusal of judges for errors in formation and errors in rulings of replacement courts

An interesting case has been reported out of Kansas.

A litigant (an attorney in a disciplinary proceedings) asked 5 out of 7 judges of the presiding panel to recuse.

Now, usually judges do not recuse no matter what.

The stakes and the fervor of the fight against judicial recusals (and thus against litigants' constitutional rights for impartial judicial review and access to court) has reached epic heights in the State of Wisconsin, for example, where:

• the commission that disciplines judges is sought to be subordinated to the same judges it disciplines (why not, the same setup has been in existence in federal courts for decades),
• attorneys are allowed to practice even when rejected by the State's Character and Fitness Committee, under the state's "state diploma privilege";
• a bunch of retired judge are even asking the State Supreme Court to act as a Legislature and set a rule allowing a certain sliding scale of judicial election campaign contributions (bribes) to the judge, while not mandating judges who received such bribes to recuse from cases of contributors, and where
• the state bar governors, over protest of attorney members, filed a collective statement disparaging the U.S. President for criticizing judges and attempting to instill into the public the notion that criticizing judges is wrong, and is equivalent with attacks on the U.S. Constitution and democracy in the United States, see the statement of the Wisconsin State Bar Governors here.

Of course, "independent judiciary" may not be independent from their own oath of office, which is what happens when the judiciary operates without any real "checks and balances" and while giving themselves a gift of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench (and, thus, for breaking the oath of office the moment it is taken).

Yet, judicial tyranny and freedom from all laws, all accountability and all criticism, as well as suppressing criticism is being promoted by lawyers who get their bread (via licenses to practice) from the very hands of the judiciary, is being thrust upon the public under the guise of advertisement of the idea of judicial "independence".

In New York, two attorneys that I know (John Aretakis in 2008 and myself in 2015) were suspended from practice for making motions to recuse, the same happened to attorney Christine Mire in Louisiana in 2016, the statistics of attorneys disciplined (including suspended and disbarred) for criticism of judges are ever growing across the country, the latest victim being, as far as I know, James G Miller, a 70+-year-old attorney who was suspended last week in Illinois for criticizing judges, who was considered so dangerous for the public that he was first suspended in April of 2016 while disciplinary proceedings were still pending and was then suspended again as a result of those proceedings, while the court rejected both the defense of truth and the defense of 1st Amendment protection.

But, even after a litigant has gotten himself through all the risks of sanctions for himself and his attorney, applied for recusal of judges and obtained recusal of judges, that does not mean that his right to impartial judicial review will now be maintained.

At least, not in the blessed state of Kansas where the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas has just come up with a most brilliant (read: obtuse) decision on judicial recusal I have ever seen in years, and I've seen a lot, specializing on active research of this particular topic for more than a decade.

The Kansas Supreme Court has stated to a litigant that, since he "has got what he wanted" (recusal of judges deciding his case), and "invited the error".

Just read the sleight of hands of how judges came to that conclusion:

• you have a constitutional right to access to court (1st Amendment) and due process right to impartial judicial review (14th Amendment);
• in order to obtain true access to court and that impartial judicial review, you make a motion to recuse;
• once you obtained that recusal and once another judge is assigned to the case, it is the understanding of the top court of the State of Kansas that your constitutional rights of access to court and to impartial judicial review (the rights that you were trying to secure by making the motion to recuse in the first place) suddenly disappears, and whatever the replacement-after-recusal judge does, including bias, is now your own "invited error", blamed against you.

The brand spanking new "rule of invited error" was submitted on behalf of Kansas Supreme Court in appellee's brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit (the current U.S. Supreme Court nominee Judge Gorsuch's court).

The rule that is asserted in this case, unfortunately, is not restricted to the unique way attorney discipline is imposed in the State of Kansas (and elsewhere in the U.S.), which is in stark contrast, and in violation of equal protection of attorneys, as compared to all other regulated profession - here, based on the uniqueness of attorney regulation, Kansas Supreme Court yet forged a general rule that will be applicable to all litigants in the state and, if affirmed on appeal by the 10th Circuit, to all states that are part of the 10th Circuit -  the new rule of judicial recusals announced by Kansas State Supreme Court in its Appellee's brief.

Here is where this claim is not only erroneous, but is frivolous and highlights one of the major inconsistencies of attorney regulation in all states - the use of the highest state court as the trial court in attorney disciplinary proceedings.

I have explored procedural differences between how attorneys and other professions are regulated in a lawsuit I filed on behalf of my husband in 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, and am exploring more fully in my upcoming book, in Russian and in English, about conceptual inconsistencies in attorney regulation in the United States.

The use of the highest state court not only as the legislator, prosecutor and adjudicator (conflation of three branches, violation of the principle of separation of power) in one proceeding, but also the use of the highest state court as the initial license revocation administrative agency and the first and last adjudicating court at the same time created exactly the problem that attorney Kline challenged in his lawsuit, if not in those same words.

Here is the structure of judicial system in the State of Kansas:

Note that, while Kansas Supreme Court has only 7 justices, the lowest trial courts of general jurisdiction, District Courts, have 31 judicial districts, each with more than 1 judge, and often, with 6 or more judges.

Now, let's compare procedural steps in contesting suspension or revocation of a professional license in Kansas by an attorney and non-attorney.

Had attorney Kline been not a licensed attorney, but, let's say, a licensed real estate broker, the procedure would have been as follows:

Stages of license revocation and attendant issues	Real estate broker	Attorney Kline
Administrative agency	Revokes professional license
District Court - the lowest court of general jurisdiction - review by one judge	Judicial review of license revocation, role reversal, license-revoking agency becomes a respondent (defendant) sued by the professional whose license is revoked
Appellate process - Kansas Court of Appeals, review by a panel of judges	Intermediate appellate court
Appellate process – highest appellate court, the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, review by a panel of judges	Final appeal in the matter	License revocation, Judicial review by legislator-prosecutor-adjudicator court and licensing agency; License revocation is combined with judicial review of the same; No role reversal in judicial review; No right for professional whose license is revoked to sue the agency that revoked the license
Appellate process out of state	The U.S. Supreme Court – discretionary appeal	The U.S. Supreme Court – discretionary appeal
Alternative judicial review	A civil rights case, no Rooker-Feldman bar, since professional license was not revoked by a court (jury trial, full discovery rights)	Right to file a civil rights action is blocked by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since license was revoked by a court and revocation order is deemed as “final court decision” – jurisdictional bar
Alternative appellate process	10th Circuit (appeal of all issues as of right)	Appeal of revocation decision is doomed, the only issues allowed to be raised outside the Rooker-Feldman bar are direct challenges to constitutionality of rules and statutes, but not practices of the state court in a specific proceeding
Alternative appellate process	The U.S. Supreme Court – appeal is discretionary and likely doomed because of the court’s unwritten policy not to review appeals from cases of attorney discipline, no matter what	The U.S. Supreme Court – appeal is discretionary and likely doomed because of the court’s unwritten policy not to review appeals from cases of attorney discipline, no matter what; plus a Rooker-Feldman-barred case, most likely, will be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court as an additional bar for court review

Observe that for attorneys, THREE procedural steps of litigation in license revocation process are skipped, as compared to non-attorneys, and the first and last stage of review in the State of Kansas in attorney license revocation is:

• by a licensing agency - unlike for real estate broker;
• by a licensing agency acting as the first (and last) trial court - unlike for real estate broker;
• without the right for judicial review where the licensing agency is subject to role reversal and a lawsuit by the professional who lost his license - unlike for real estate broker;
• without the right for 2-tiered appeal - unlike the real estate broker; without the alternative for review of license revocation, together with federal constitutional issues, in federal court - because, unlike in the case of the real estate broker, revocation of attorney license is subject to the Rooker-Feldman bar, even though the nature of proceedings (revocation of a professional license) is the same, and thus procedural protections, and levels of procedural protections, should also be the same.

Most importantly for purposes of attorney Kline's federal lawsuit though, the judicial system of the State of Kansas does not provide for ensuring attorney's rights to impartial judicial review: there are only

• 7 elected justices in the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas;
• Kansas Supreme Court is not equipped, due to jurisdictional restrictions, to act as the lowest trial court;
• Judges of Kansas Supreme Court must sit in panels with certain quorums, unlike judges in District Courts who sit just a single judge at a time;
• When a District Court judge recuses, there are over 150 other District Judges to choose from, while if Kansas Supreme Court judges recuse (especially, all of them, or 5 out of 7, as happened in this case), appointment/certification of questionable constitutionality is then triggered to provide an alternative panel.

Moreover, in the case of the former Attorney General of the State of Kansas (as Kline was), ALL state judges were attorney Kline's clients, attorney Kline was privy to ALL dirty little secrets of ALL state judges (including Kansas Supreme Court judges), including constitutional violations, and thus ALL state judges had a conflict of interest in presiding over license revocation against attorney Kline.

Additionally, in his complaint, attorney Kline mentioned bias of the new (appointed after recusal) panel because of political affiliations and campaign contributions to Kline's political opponents:

Whether attorney Kline was right or wrong in investigating abortion centers as the State Attorney General, appointing to his disciplinary panel attorneys who contributed to election campaign of his political opponents was clearly wrong and deprived attorney Kline of due process of law.

Attorney Kline mentions the following problems with the politicized disciplinary panel:

Attorney Kline then asserts that Kansas Supreme Court picked up where the disciplinary panel recommending discipline left of, by not providing to Attorney Kline even an opportunity to properly relate his claims to the court for purposes of judicial review (while the court was also the licensing agency, legislating the rules of conduct, and appointing prosecutors and investigators - a constitutionally impermissible conflict of interest under Williams v Pennsylvania, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016).

Attorney Kline's disciplinary case was tried in 2 TRIALS:

After those two trials, the panel issued a

• 185-page report finding
• 21 violations of disciplinary rules under
• 10 various factual scenarios.

It is obvious that more space on paper is needed to address 21 than 1 violation, and more space is needed to address legal issues that can be found in a 185-page report after 2 trials over 12 days, generating a considerable volume of transcripts.

Attorney Kline filed a 175-page report of exceptions (errors) in the 185-page panel report (not to mention that there were also transcripts to back up those errors):

Now, let's address this peculiar moment:  while there is no time restrictions in trials before a trial court, since the FIRST and LAST stage of court review was handled by the top state APPELLATE court, rules of page limit on APPELLATE BRIEFS was applied to REVOCATION proceedings (first stage trial level of judicial review).

Therefore, attorney Kline asked to give him adequate time to address all errors in the administrative panel's recommendations.

That right was denied, and attorney Kline was given permission only for 80 pages - so, he had to cut off MORE THAN ONE HALF of his exceptions, making further dismissal of his federal claim on Rooker-Feldman grounds, as if he already had opportunity for JUDICIAL REVIEW, a travesty of justice.

Attorney Kline also correctly points out that, while 21 rule violations were found against him, he was given only 30 pages more pages to argue legal errors as compared to attorneys charged with a single violation.  

In fact, attorney Kline was given just 8% percent (over 13 times less) of space to argue per violation, as compared to an attorney charged with a single violation.

Issue	1 violation	21 violations
Permitted page limit	50 pages	80 pages
Pages permitted to argue per violation	50 pages	3.81 pages

My husband and I raised the same issues of unconstitutionality (denial of due process and access to court) by one-size-fits-all appellate briefs irrespective of number of claims, number of parties, number of court decisions involved and the volume of generated proceedings and transcripts (and legal errors) to be addressed in such briefs - which were all rejected by courts who deem their own convenience, and restricting their own work to short briefs, even if such short briefs cut off necessary issues, and cut off in effect the right of judicial review - as it was done in attorney Kline's case.

Attorney Kline moved to recuse several judges of the court - in fact, all of them had to recuse due to the fact that attorney Kline was their own attorney, but that did not deter Pennsylvania judges in suspending State AG Kathleen Kane in the same and worse situation (during an ongoing investigation by AG Kane of one of the judges, Michael Eakin, while Judge Eakin found it acceptable for himself to be part of the suspension panel of attorney Kane).

In Kansas, 5 judges recused, other judges were appointed, but results were nevertheless, as attorney Kline claims, not different from the biased report of the politicized disciplinary panel:

All of the above are reversible errors, and, bias of the panel can be inferred from the mass of errors and their character.

Attorney Kline claims that there exists no authority under Kansas State Law to appoint replacement judges to Kansas Supreme Court when the majority of the court recuses, as happened in his case:

It is that error that Kansas Supreme Court, implicitly acknowledging the error, claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit to have been "invited" by attorney Kline.





Yet, a litigant, such as attorney Kline was in the recusal situation, has a FEDERAL constitutional right to impartial judicial review, and, when making a motion to recuse, does not have to:

• consider whether the STATE court handling his proceedings, under STATE law, has an ABILITY, a LAWFUL PROCEDURE to provide replacement judges instead of the recused judges.

If such procedure is ABSENT in state law, that is not the litigant's problem.

In such a case, it is a legislative problem, or a state constitutional problem, and the reviewing court must then:

• stop review, and
• apply to the Legislature to create legal procedure that would provide for replacement of the majority of recused judges of the court in order to allow litigants to secure their federal constitutional right for impartial judicial review.

But, that is not what Kansas Supreme Court did.

What it did is it utilized some self-made (and thus unconstitutional, under the State Constitution) procedure and appointed judges which generated a decision which was void under Kansas State Constitution because appointment of judges of lower courts on a temporary basis as Kansas Supreme Court judges was not approved by Kansas State Constitution - and that was definitely not the problem of the litigant asking for recusal, in order to secure for himself his federal constitutional right to impartial judicial review.

And, Kansas Supreme Court now is arguing to the 10th Circuit court of Appeals (judge Gorsuch's court) to spread this rule of judicial recusal - that the litigant asking for recusal is somehow to blame for the errors in formation or ruling of the replacement court because "he's got what he asked for" and should be estopped (blocked) from any review of a void-ab-initio order.

The claims is egregiously frivolous, and the only reason why Kansas Supreme Court judges and their attorneys were not sanctioned for this claim is because of their status.

If the court panel was not properly formed, as required by the State Constitution, attorney Kline is correct in claiming that decisions of such a court are void ab initio.

Void meaning "done without jurisdiction", null, as if it never existed.

Collateral estoppel argued by Kansas Supreme Court (by ALL of the court, including the RECUSED judges) presupposes jurisdiction.

Collateral estoppel argument to "estop" an argument that a decision was VOID, or without jurisdiction, is thus conceptually inconsistent and frivolous.

But, the worst in this argument is that Kansas Supreme Court is trying to spread the "blame the victim" argument and is trying to make the already nearly impossible plight of litigants trying to recuse biased judges into an even more impossible task - if the 10th Circuit buys this argument that the litigant is to blame for any errors of the replacement court after recusal, it will now be applied upon the entire jurisdiction of the 10th Circuit, and that is:

1. Oklahoma;
2. Kansas;
3. New Mexico;
4. Colorado;
5. Wyoming;
6. Utah;
7. Portions of the Yellowstone National Park;
8. portions of Montana;
9. portions of Idaho:

So, now, because some pissed-off political opponents of former Kansas AG Phil Kline wanted a piece of him, all litigants in

1. Oklahoma;
2. Kansas;
3. New Mexico;
4. Colorado;
5. Wyoming;
6. Utah;
7. Portions of the Yellowstone National Park;
8. portions of Montana;
9. portions of Idaho:

will be to blame for errors of incompetent, biased or illegally formed courts as "invited error", even if they accomplish the nearly impossible task of obtaining recusal of biased judges - and if such biased, incompetent or illegally appointed judges are replaced by no-less biased, incompetent and/or illegally appointed replacement judges?

I believe, whatever the controversy in question was, a court of law may not break the law in order to discipline an attorney, and especially if such discipline (in the name of "protection of the public") puts the public in jeopardy by taking away from the public in 9 JURISDICTIONS the right of impartial judicial review.

It is very clear what Attorney Kline wanted when he made a motion to recuse - an impartial judicial review by a lawfully composed panel.

If the State of Kansas does not have in its State Constitution and the laws:

1. the mechanism of replacement of recused judges of the State Supreme Court if the majority (or all judges) of the court recuse, such lack of mechanism does not deprive state court litigant from:
1. seeking recusal of Kansas Supreme Court judges, and from
2. seeking that the replacement be in accordance with existing law.

If the State of Kansas does not have in its State Constitution and the laws:

1. The mechanism of providing an impartial judicial review to the former State Attorney General who represented, by law, ALL state judges, and thus is blocked from disclosing their dirty little secrets as his CLIENTS in motions to recuse, the attorney is not to blame for the lack of mechanism creating this mess and this conflict of interest - he is STILL entitled to assert his right to impartial judicial review, and it is for the State Legislature to change laws of the state, and for the people of the State of Kansas to change the State Constitution accordingly in order to provide to the former AG his federally required right to impartial judicial review - by creating state laws, and by amending State Constitution, by referendum if that's the required process, for importing neutral judges from out of state if necessary.

Litigants do not have to bear the brunt of lapses of State Legislatures or for lapses in the State Constitution.

Litigants do not lose their federal constitutional rights because of lapses in State laws.

Instead, lapses in state laws that prevent litigants from securing their federal constitutional rights are separate constitutional violations.

Let's see what the 10th Circuit will say to that.

I will continue to monitor this case, and report my findings.

Stay tuned.