You shall not impeach a son of a judge - even if he is obviously lying to the court...

On June 23, 2014 there was a hearing in the Mokay saga case.  The hearing was on legal fees for making a motion to vacate retaliatory sanctions of Judge Becker imposed upon me and my husband after we sued the judge based on misconduct of Judge Becker that so far escaped judicial review on the merits.

The motion was found frivolous by Judge Dowd, who selectively recused from a related action, but not from the Mokay saga one.  That is, of course, a separate ground for disqualification of Judge Dowd, because if a judge recused from one case where Mr. Neroni is a party, he cannot preside over a related case where Mr. Neroni is also a party.  

At the same time, Judge Dowd is still a defendant in a federal action, dismissal of which is currently appealed, and where my husband sued him to enjoin (block) him from presiding over my husband's cases due to appearance of a mental instability, specifically for claiming during a child visitation proceeding/divorce action that a law school allegedly built a urinal in Judge Dowd's honor.

During the hearing on legal fees for allegedly making a frivolous motion to vacate, Attorney Richard Harlem, son of the late Supreme Court Justice Robert Harlem, who also was, in his time, the Chief Administrative Judge of the 6th Judicial District (and Richard Harlem reminds every court of his late father's status as a judge by placing it on his letterhead), Richard Harlem answered two questions that I asked on cross-examination.

And, as I believe, answered them falsely.

But - since I do not believe Richard Harlem will ever be investigated, prosecuted or sanctioned for his wrongdoing due to his political connections, I believe that the remaining way to deal with his obvious misconduct is to make it public.

I believe that Attorney Harlem did make two false statements in court on material issues, and that it can be proven through documentary evidence which I present here.   

Moreover, in his previous decision Judge Dowd expressed his personal view that it was allegedly inappropriate for Mr. Neroni to even question, through me as his attorney, veracity of statements of attorney Harlem, simply because attorney Harlem is "an officer of the court".   

Apparently, Judge Dowd held such a view even if the attorney is the main witness in the case and has a personal interest in the outcome of litigation where all claimed damages are his legal fees.

Now, if attorneys, and thus, officers of the court, in Judge Dowd's view, do not lie, then why a criminal article, Judiciary Law 487, even exists in New York?

Judge Dowd's personal opinion about attorneys being unable to lie, and specifically about Richard Harlem being unable to lie led Judge Dowd to do the following:

1) Judge Dowd refused to see that Richard Harlem lied to the court during the hearing on June 23, 2014 even though Judge Dowd took judicial notice of a case which provided evidence that Richard Harlem lied to the court;

2) Judge Dowd refused me a right to impeach Richard Harlem, by documentary evidence or my own testimony as an expert witness and told me that I am somehow "bound" by Richard Harlem's answer;

3)  Judge Dowd found it "mind-boggling" that I even went into a hearing and did not settle - and for that Judge Dowd added attorney's fees for the hearing, the very hearing where Richard Harlem lied to the court.

In other words - Richard Harlem was compensated by Judge Dowd, out of my client's and my family's pocket (my client is my husband) - in the amount of $750.00 that my husband has to pay Richard Harlem for lying to the court. 

That is how I understand what has happened.

Now to the facts and documents.

On June 23, 2014, in a court proceeding where Attorney Harlem was the main witness claiming his own legal fees, I asked Attorney Harlem two simple questions:

Question No. 1:  is there a common billing practice among lawyers to absorb costs of copying and postage?

Harlem said "no".

New York State Attorney General, in its "objection to account" contesting Richard Harlem's legal fees back in 2000 said " yes", and said that Richard Harlem inappropriately charged:





My Question No. 2 was - was Richard Harlem ever investigated by the New York State Attorney General for inflating legal fees.

He answered that he wasn't so investigated.

This is the Objections to account by New York State Attorney General showing that not only Richard Harlem and his father, Robert Harlem, were investigated for inflating legal fees, but the New York State Attorney General made such an argument in court, and Richard Harlem cannot claim he did not know about that:

So - it appears that Richard Harlem lied to the court as to whether 

(1) there is a common practice of not including postage and copying into legal fees; and

(2) whether he was investigated by the New York State Attorney General for inflating legal fees.

Yet, for Judge Dowd - who took judicial notice of the Blanding case during the hearing - it appeared to be irrelevant that Richard Harlem lied to the court.

Moreover, Judge Dowd told me that I am bound by Richard Harlem's word and am not allowed to impeach him - contrary to what New York State law says.

Now, this is a judge who is going to preside over a jury trial where issues of fact and mixed issues of law and fact, precisely about propriety of Richard Harlem's legal fees as damages is going to be tried.

Judge Dowd delayed the jury trial without a date, on request from Richard Harlem, delayed it twice, in November of 2013 and in May of 2014, and now delayed it without a date - in a case where proceedings are pending since 2007.

Judge Dowd was sued by my husband to get him off the case for talking about urinals built in his honor during child visitation proceedings - which to any reasonable objective observer would be a sign of mental instability of a judge that should result in removal of that judge from the bench.

My husband did not want such a judge, whose actions give appearance of mental instability, to preside over his case.

Judge Dowd sanctioned my husband for allegedly frivolous conduct after that action was filed by my husband.  Sanctions of Judge Dowd have all the signs of retaliation for embarrassing him through the federal lawsuit.  I did not represent Mr. Neroni in his federal lawsuit, but I was sanctioned by Judge Dowd anyway, along with Mr. Neroni.

And, at the hearing, Judge Dowd has proven just what my husband was trying to prove through his federal lawsuit - that he does not know or does not care about the law, that he decides cases on a whim, that he assigns veracity of witnesses upon people's social and political status (as he did with Richard Harlem), and that he makes me bound by Richard Harlem's word as a witness, even though in New York a witness is impeachable by either his own statements or by testimony of other witnesses and by documentary evidence which is contrary to the testimony of the witness, irregardless of the witness's political or social status.

Moreover, this is a judge who told my husband and I that we can only make motions upon an Order to Show Cause - which in layman terms means that we need to prepare the motion, pay the motion fees, but there is no guarantee that Judge Dowd will agree to hear the motion.

In other words, even though based on Judge Dowd's behavior at the hearing, a new motion to recuse and disqualify is clearly in order - I have no assurance that such a motion, if prepared, filed and filing fee paid - will ever be heard by the very judge whose misconduct I will be addressing in such a motion - and who holds in his hands the claimed right to punish me for making such a motion on behalf of my client.

As Judge Dowd said in that same hearing - it is mind-boggling, mind-boggling...

It is mind-boggling that Judge Dowd is still on the bench.

Can an attorney bill for legal services of a non-attorney? Judge Dowd says he can - and for the judge it is mind-boggling to even contest that

I have written about the "mind-boggling" hearing that I had in the "Mokay saga" case where Judge Dowd ruled that our motion to vacate Judge Becker's sanctions and all decisions of Judge Becker (based on Judge Becker's pattern of misconduct spanning many court proceedings and out-of-court actions, conduct that to date escaped judicial review on the merits - and still escaped review because Judge Dowd did not want to review it) is somehow frivolous.

The motion was one of the five motions I made, to vacate sanctions imposed by Judge Becker upon me and my husband after we sued the judge.  Elementary due process of law allows people to challenge decisions made by judges who are engaged in a pattern of misconduct before and after sanctions were imposed, misconduct that shows egregious bias of the judge against an attorney and a party - which Judge Becker cogently demonstrated.  Apparently, due process of law is not applicable in Judge Dowd's court.

Judge Dowd decided to punish my client and husband for making the motion.

I recently received the transcript of the hearing and will start publishing it, portion by portion, with comments.

It appears that I will need to publish portions of the transcript issue by issue, as there are so many and all of them deserve be presented to the public separately.

I view this post as my service to the public - because many times, litigants appearing in front of Judge Dowd are either represented by timid attorneys who do not want to take the judge on for fear of being "blackballed", or not represented at all, lack funds to obtain transcripts, lack funds to hire an attorney to analyze the judge's mistakes.

The public needs to know about possible incompetence of a public servant, especially with the tremendous power that a Supreme Court justice has in New York.

So - the first cluster of issues that I will analyze in the series of posts about Judge Dowd's evidentiary rulings is whether an attorney can bill a client for legal services of a non-attorney, and do it without the client's knowledge or consent.

In the evidentiary hearing on counsel fees, attorney Richard Harlem presented to the court an exhibit showing that he charged his 6 clients, at $100.00, for legal research and for drafting of legal documents, done by a Patrick Orr, who was at that time not admitted to New York State bar.

I contested legality of such billing.

Mr. Harlem claimed that Patrick Orr's work in doing legal research and drafting legal documents was "beneficial" to Mr. Harlem's clients - and apparently, to Mr. Harlem everything else is irrelevant.

Moreover, attorney Harlem further claimed that in an application for attorney fees the only issue that a court must consider is whether the fees are "fair and reasonable", 

and that was in rebuttal to my argument that to be fair an reasonable, the fees claimed must also be legal and in compliance with applicable law and rules:

I made my arguments not only based on the law, but on my own and my client (and husband)'s personal experience with how that law is applied.

My husband had to sue the disciplinary committee to get off his back and stop prosecuting him for unauthorized practice of law for merely sitting at his desk in his own home and talking to a visitor - and the inquiry specifically included whether my husband, a disbarred attorney, talked to my clients and drafted anything at all.

If my husband, who does not have a law license because he lost it, is not authorized to practice law by doing legal research and drafting legal documents for me, an attorney, in my legal practice - why Patrick Orr who did not have a law license because he did not get it yet can still practice law and do what my husband is not allowed to do?

And why I was personally investigated for the mere suspicion of allowing my husband to do exactly what Richard Harlem not only allows a non-attorney to do - but bills for those legal services - and is blessed for that by Judge Dowd?

Attorney Harlem confirms that he allowed Patrick Orr to draft "a portion" of the combined affirmation and memorandum of law - and that he billed his clients for it.

Yet, Judge Dowd denied my request to strike any fees out of the exhibit for unauthorized legal services of a non-attorney.

And, to strengthen his decision legitimizing Attorney Harlem's billing for legal services of a non-attorney, while Attorney Harlem did not provide a retainer agreement to the court and "did not recall" whether, in the retainer agreement, his clients agreed to be billed for services of auxiliary personnel, Judge Dowd simply offers his own unsworn testimony on behalf of Mr. Harlem - in violation of the "judge advocate" rules and Canons of judicial conduct.  

Of course, working for a District Attorney, where practice of law by legal interns is officially allowed by rules of the Appellate Division, and allowing a private counsel to bill for legal services of an intern who was not admitted to practice law are two different things - but not to Judge Dowd.

Judge Dowd appears to be thinking that he is the only law in his courtroom - and acts that way.

To the judge it is "mind-boggling" that I even went into a hearing instead of settling with Mr. Harlem - and he punished my client for not settling by awarding against him fees for legal services services of a non-attorney.  

So, I guess we have a double standard for people who are themselves disbarred attorneys or who are wives of disbarred attorneys and for attorneys who are sons of deceased judges, as Richard Harlem is...

At least, in Judge Dowd's court...

So much for access to court;

So much for the rule of law;

So much for equal protection of laws to all.

New York Appellate Division 3rd Department - when the Neronis are concerned, ex parte communications, soliciting unauthorized practice of law, soliciting unethical behavior from the court's own attorney, denying access to the file and engaging in "selective recusals" are business as usual

I already wrote in this blog about the disciplinary proceedings that were started against me based on sanctions of a judge imposed by the judge upon me after I sued him.

By the time the disciplinary proceedings were commenced against me in January of 2013, my husband was disbarred for a year and a half, since July 7, 2011.

In my own proceedings, I moved to disqualify the Appellate Division based on bias against me and to transfer my proceedings to another court, the Committee opposed my motion and called it frivolous - until suddenly the Committee made a secret ex parte application for the same relief and had it granted without having me served.  The Committee, by the way, had the audacity of serving me with the Notice of Entry of the order obtained based on its ex parte application - without sending to me the application or papers upon which it was granted.

My disciplinary proceedings which commenced in January of 2013 had, at least by reading the disciplinary petitions, nothing to do with my husband's disciplinary proceedings which concluded on July 7, 2011.

There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to engage in ex parte communications with the Disciplinary Committee.

There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to re-start court proceedings against an attorney after he was disbarred.  At the time of disbarment, the Appellate Division, as a licensing authority, simply loses authority to do anything to Mr. Neroni.

There is no law or rule allowing the Appellate Division to merge several disciplinary proceedings against several attorneys.

Here is the order of the Appellate Division, 3rd Department dated June 11, 2014 with a caption "In the Matter of Tatiana Neroni, an attorney (registration number) and Frederick J. Neroni, a disbarred attorney (still with an attorney registration number).

Such a caption normally indicates to a reasonable attorney reading this document, as to Frederick J. Neroni, the following:

(1) that there are court proceedings in the Appellate Division, Third Department, against Frederick J. Neroni;
(2) that these court proceedings are merged/consolidated with court proceedings against Tatiana Neroni.

In reality, none of that was true.

1. There was no motion to consolidate (merge) proceedings against me and against my husband, at least, I as an attorney for myself and an attorney for my husband, was not served with such a motion.
2. The appellate court had no jurisdiction to merge proceedings which are pending with proceedings which are already concluded.

Now as to how the so-called application by the Committee was granted.

There is no law or rule allowing the Committee, a Petitioner and party in an attorney disciplinary proceeding, to communicate with the presiding court ex parte, and there is no authority in the presiding court to review and grant ex parte applications and then deny access to such applications to the parties affected by them.

That's exactly what happened in my husband's case.

The confidential order clearly states that it was granted the Committee's application to transfer "all inquiries, complaints and/or disciplinary proceedings involving Tatiana Neroni and/or Frederick Neroni to a different Judicial Department".

Now, such an "application" should have been in writing, as any motions.

The usual motion practice of the Appellate Division is that even applications made on an ex parte basis (for an Order to Show Cause) must be served upon the opposing party.

I have attended hearings (on the phone) on such motions made on an Order to Show Cause in this same Appellate Division in other civil cases and know its rules and practices.

I was not served with the Committee's "application" for a transfer as either my husband's attorney in the concluded disciplinary proceedings, or as my own attorney in my own disciplinary proceedings.

Moreover, motion practice in my case has concluded, and deadlines for filing extra pleadings without a leave of court has long ended.

The confidential order makes no mention of an application by the Committee on an Order to Show Cause, for a leave of court to make another motion.  It appears that the Committee opens the door of the Appellate Division with their feet any time they want, for any reason they want and without any rules governing such "applications" - and the Appellate Division grants the Committee, on an ex parte basis no less, anything the Committee wants.

My husband asked for a copy of the application and all documents upon which the ex parte application was granted, and for a list of documents transferred to the Appellate Division, 4th Department.

I also asked for the same.

On July 10, 2014 the Appellate Division sent to us two letters.

In a letter to my husband, below, the Appellate Division indicated that his disciplinary proceedings were concluded, no court proceedings were transferred to the 4th Department and what was transferred is only currently pending inquiries and complaints.

My husband was not served with any pending inquiries and complaints against him, and the Committee is already being sued by my husband for conducting any investigations against him post-disbarment and for denying him access to his file.

If what was transferred (allegedly) is inquiries and complaints against other attorneys filed by my husband with the Committee, the Committee still continued to review inquiries and complaints by me, as demonstrated by a letter of the Committee dated June 25, 2014, two weeks after the confidential order of transfer of June 11, 2014, where the Committee rejects my complaint against an unnamed attorney.

One thing that is readily noticeable in the letter: that the Chairman of the Committee, Michael St. Leger, Esq., is no longer listed on the Committee's letterhead - I wonder whether it was the result of my lawsuit against him that was dismissed by the court which was itself one of the defendants in the same action.  The lawsuit was dismissed by the court before I had the opportunity to even serve the lawsuit,  but I certainly plan to appeal the dismissal.  Appears that Mr. St. Leger resigned from the Committee after the lawsuit.  It is interesting to know the reason of such a resignation...

By the way, since the letter regarding my inquiry does not show the name of the attorney the inquiry was about, nor even an inquiry number, the letter of rejection is useless.  It also shows that there is no real archiving procedure existing in the disciplinary Committee where no indexation of inquiries even exists.   Since no indexation of inquiries exists, there is no way to say which inquiries or complaints were subject to the order of transfer of June 11, 2014.

Moreover, since both Mr. Neroni and I complained against attorneys for the Committee, the rejection letter could just as well mean that the Committee investigated itself and is rejecting the complaint against itself and their own attorneys and attorney members - which the Committee has no right to do, as a due process point, and because such actions would be in violation of the "confidential order" of the court dated June 11, 2014.

So - as to Mr. Neroni - the Committee had no authority to investigate or prosecute any inquiries or complaints against Mr. Neroni after his disbarment,  Mr. Neroni was not served with any new complaints or inquiries against him, and the Committee continued to investigate inquiries made by us after the date of the confidential order of June 11, 2014.

Moreover, in the letter of July 10, 2014 to Mr. Neroni, the Appellate Division indicated that only new and pending inquiries were transferred, but refused to even consider releasing the list of documents transferred to the 4th Department, which raises all kinds of issues whether any documents were transferred at all, and for what reason the application and the order was made - especially that during the time of the application and granting of the ex parte order both the Committee and all of its members and attorneys, and the Appellate Division 3rd Department, and all of its judges, were defendants in my lawsuit to explore their potential (surprise!) ex parte communications through American Inns of Court and similar "quasi-public" or networking organizations.

At the same time, Mr. Neroni was suing the Committee and the court for (surprise!) denying him access to his file.

Well, as to me, the Appellate Division was even more harsh and arrogant.

It stated to me, basically, that I do not know how to read their decisions and said nothing about why the decision was granted ex parte, and said nothing about giving me access to papers upon which the order of transfer was granted.

Should I also mention that James S. Ranous was an individual defendant in the just dismissed (sua sponte, by the court-defendant) federal action about the American Inns of Court?

Now, reading together the above four documents - the confidential Decision and Order of June 11, 2014, the Committee's letter of June 25, 2014, and the court's letter replies to Mr. Neroni dated July 10, 2014 and to me dated July 10, 2014, it appears that the inquiries and complaints that are transferred are not by us against attorneys, but against both of us.

Therefore, it is even more interesting to see the ex parte application of the Committee for the Decision and Order of June 11, 2014, as, in my humble opinion, if the Committee deems itself disqualified to  consider complaints against us, how can the Committee be still deemed impartial in considering complaints against other people, including the Committee's attorneys, by us?  

It is interesting to mention that in May of 2014, shortly before the "confidential order" of June 11, 2014, in a federal civil rights lawsuit where I was an attorney of record for two indigent plaintiffs and not a party, the 3rd Department, through its attorney, asked the court to make me sign a settlement agreeing to dismiss the federal lawsuit with prejudice (without the right to re-file), where such a settlement was negotiated with the 3rd Department's counsel, New York State Attorney General, by an attorney not admitted in federal court, and not an attorney of record in federal court for the plaintiffs, behind my back...

Thus, it was apparent that the 3rd Department, a court prosecuting me for allegedly attorney misconduct, and which disbarred my husband for allegedly attorney misconduct, does not care whether it is engaging itself and engaging its counsel NYS AG and the attorney who was not admitted to the federal bar, in attorney misconduct - as long as the result suited the 3rd Department.

And this appears to be the motivation of the court in its dealings with Mr. Neroni or myself.

On June 20, 2014 I have filed several letters requesting recusal of the Appellate Division 3rd Department from cases where Mr. Neroni or I were parties and where appeals were pending in the Appellate Division 3rd Department.

At the time the letters were sent it was clear that the Appellate Division 3rd Department 

(1) engaged in an ex parte communication in regards to Mr. Neron's and my case - based on confidential order of June 11, 2014; and 

(2) attempted, through federal court, to put malpractice liability upon me and demonstrated that the court does not really care whether it condones and engages attorneys in unethical behavior - based on the court's request to make me settle in a federal case on the basis of negotiations between NYS AG and a non-attorney of record and a non-attorney in federal court.

The 3rd Department arrogantly answered me that I must make a motion of recusal in every single appellate case.

With every motion comes a motion fee of $45.00 and hours of work.

I am already in a disciplinary proceedings specifically for making motions to recuse which a judge (whom I sued) considered improper and sanctioned me, so by directing me to make a motion to recuse, the 3rd Department invited me to fall on my sword - several times, and at our own expense.

So much for fairness, justice and the rule of law in the Appellate Division 3rd Department in New York.

American Inns of Court revisited - additional "creative" ways judges invent to "regulate" the judiciary system without authority from the public and without public oversight

I have written in this blog about the potential impropriety of judges and attorneys meeting behind closed doors through the American Inns of Court, a private association with secret membership where attorneys sponsor judges’ monthly lavish meals, and, according to scarce information available about this organization, at least some sections of this organization sponsor national and international travel for judges and their family members.

I have also written about the devastating consequences for litigants where a judge was presiding over cases where her Facebook friends appeared as attorneys – Facebook friends who the judge openly acknowledged on her personal Facebook page open to the public.

I have written in this blog that I have brought a federal lawsuit to verify membership of judges who presided or are presiding at this time over my personal lawsuits, in the American Inns of Court, or in any other organization with secret membership where judges and attorneys have an opportunity to communicate behind closed doors, without participation of or oversight from the public.

I have also written that my federal lawsuit, where the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, its Chief Judge, and several of its District Judges and Magistrates were named as parties, in their official and individual capacity, dismissed the case against itself before the lawsuit was served, instead of transferring the case to another venue, as was proper and as I requested.

In fact, one of the state judges who was sued through that lawsuit, who did receive the federal form requesting a waiver of service, was astonished when he tried to make a disclosure about the federal lawsuit in two motion hearings and heard from me that the lawsuit was dismissed before he was actually served.  To him, such a procedure clearly appeared as irregular, same as to me.

To me, the sua sponte, ex parte dismissal of my federal lawsuit, by the court which is a defendant in that lawsuit, shows to what extraordinary steps the judicial system will go in order to protect their own members.

My federal lawsuit was covering all organizations where judges and politically powerful attorneys had opportunities to meet behind closed doors, those I knew about and those I did not know about.

Now I introduce to the public yet another organization where membership is not transparent, goals are not transparent, activities are not transparent and authority upon the organization exists and is acting is not transparent, but the organization exists, is powerful , “advises” state and federal courts and is comprised of state and federal judges and members of the legal profession whose interactions within the organization are not subject to public scrutiny.

I did not find any published information as to what is the source of power in State-Federal Judicial Councils, I did not find any registration of such councils as business entities or associations, I did not find lists of members of such councils, except for the occasional press-releases where a powerful law firm would proudly announce that one oftheir law partners has been “appointed” into an Advisory Committee of such acouncil. 

Who appointed them – nobody knows.  But - these attorneys are "advising" federal and state judiciary.  About what - also nobody knows.  On what grounds - also nobody knows.

How the appointment happened, what is the procedure of appointment, what is the procedure of advising the state and federal judiciary before whom attorneys continue to appear in fee-generating cases – nobody knows or can check. 

And, lo and behold, such councils have as members of “advisory committees” powerful attorneys who appear in front of both state and federal judges in court proceedings while “advising” those same judges behind closed doors.

So, since creation of such councils in 1972 no court decision in this country was free from the taint of whether it was done by a judge who was “advised” by the counsel who appeared in front of him - or who participated in a “state-federal judiciary council” behind closed doors where the judge had an opportunity to talk with “state law officers”, including parties to litigation.

Such “councils” provide a great opportunity for corruption and/or undue influence on judges behind closed doors by attorneys practicing in front of those judges, or between judges and governmental defendants in civil rights cases. 

Yet, same as in the case of the American Inns of Court, the State-Federal Judicial Councils are proclaimed to be “quasi-public” entities working toward more “efficient” system of justice, and toward “better serving” the American public.

As I wrote above, my federal lawsuit which was supposed to take the veil off such ventures and to verify just in what kind of relationships certain judges and certain attorneys are, was dismissed by the same court which was the defendant in the action.  

It is obvious that neither a person nor an entity has a power to dismiss a lawsuit against itself, yet, that’s exactly what happened.  What remains to me is to try to verify what is available from open sources – and to make my findings public.

Same as the American Inns of Court, the idea of State-Federal Judicial Councils was introduced by a U.S. Supreme Court. 

So far, I have found only one source describing the goals of the State-Federal Judicial Councils, a law reviewarticle written by Jack B. Weinstein, the Chief Judge of the U.S. DistrictCourt for the Northern District of New York at the time the article was written ( “Coordination of State and Federal Judicial System” , St. John's Law Review, Issue 1, Volume 57, Fall 1982, Number 1, Article 1).

Judge Weinstein claims in his law review that “… the organization of state-federal councils blossomed after Chief Justice Burger suggested their employment as a method of reducing the tension created in part by increased federal constitutional safeguards that affected state judicial and criminal procedures” (citations omitted, emphasis added).

At the very beginning of the law review article Judge Weinstein announces  his view that the power to coordinate state and federal judicial systems belongs to:

• state and federal legislators,
• executive agencies, and, in the case of criminal matters,
• to prosecuting attorneys and police personnel.

Now, to me as a criminal defense attorney and a civil rights attorney, such a view, especially coming from a Chief Judge of a federal trial court, presents a big problem.

Prosecuting attorneys in criminal matters are attorneys for a party appearing before the court.

Police personnel, if it appears in criminal matters, appears only as witnesses in criminal proceedings.

Thus, Judge Weinstein, the Chief Judge of a U.S. District Court which handled death penalty cases, publicly announced his view that he actually thought that attorneys for a party and witnesses for a party have the power to coordinate the federal judicial system.

I do not know how many criminal cases Judge Weinstein presided over while being a judge – but I do think that such views require reconsideration of every one of such cases where the criminal defendant was convicted.

Judge Weinstein makes further comment, that “cognizant of limitations [of power of enumerated coordinators” “courts should take whatever steps possible to ensure that the two systems properly mesh”.

What constitutes “proper meshing” between the state and federal judiciary, is surely not reflected in the U.S. Constitution, but that does not deter Judge Weinstein.

Judge Weinstein states that “[t]he primary responsibility for better coordination rests with the legislature since it can provide a more rational division of jurisdiction and substantive law.”  

Judge Weinstein has what appears to be a “functional” rather than “constitutional separation of power” approach to the issue of coordination of the judicial system.

Judge Weinstein goes on by stating that “[t]he executive branch, moreover, particularly prosecutors and police, must cooperate in allocating prosecutorial roles in order to prevent a breakdown of both federal and state systems of criminal justice.”  What this means, nobody knows. 

How a public prosecutor, an elected public official in New York State and an appointed public official in federal agencies, whose duty is to prosecute crimes is supposed to “cooperate” to “prevent a breakdown of both federal and state systems of criminal justice”.

Why would a state prosecutor, once again, an elected public official usually elected by the voters of a particular county, “cooperate” in consideration of any goals other than the goal for which he was elected, prosecuting crimes, is anybody’s guess.

Yet, that prosecutors “must cooperate” in view of such a goal, is Judge Weinstein’s conviction that was publicly announced through a law review article in support of activities of State-Federal Judicial Councils.

Furthermore, while being sworn to uphold the U.S. Constitution which does not allow federal judges to legislates, Judge Weinstein, the Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York at the time the article was written, states the following: “[o]ccasional decisions [by federal courts] that slightly modify the law so as to eliminate sources of friction between state and federal law officers also may be helpful”  (emphasis added).

It is interesting to mention that in civil rights actions the “state law officers” are often defendants in front of federal “law officers”.  When that is occurring, Judge Weinstein’s suggestion that the federal judiciary should legislate from the bench to eliminate “sources of friction” with parties appearing before federal judges suggests that not only criminal convictions where Judge Weinstein presided, but civil rights lawsuits decided for “state law officers” where Judge Weinstein presided, should be reviewed and verified as to whether Judge Weinstein applied in those lawsuits is policy to “slightly modify the law” in order to “eliminate sources of friction” with state defendants, or, in other words, acted with unconstitutional a bias which was part of his policy.

Judge Weinstein presents the unconstitutional “state-federal coordination” of the judicial systems as, of course, being done to better serve the American people. 

“Coordinating” state and federal judicial systems behind closed doors with the party defendants in civil rights lawsuits and claiming that prosecutors, attorneys for a party, are coordinators of state and federal judicial systems, have nothing to do with judges’ constitutional duties.

How acts in violation of the U.S. Constitution and state Constitutions are supposed to better serve the American People, is also anybody’s guess.

Yet, what strikes me is the arrogance of the judiciary to continue this “coordination”, behind closed doors, while dismissing lawsuits against itself challenging constitutionality of such coordination and having the audacity of claiming that the judiciary can actually change the law in order to “eliminate sources of friction” between state and federal courts – even when state courts are defendants in federal civil rights actions.

If “eliminate[ing] sources of friction” between “state and federal law officers” are the function of the federal courts, the courts carry out that function beautifully.

Federal courts increasingly dismiss the majority of civil rights lawsuits as “frivolous”, or “failing to state a claim”, or for lack of specific pleadings despite the fact that federal rules of procedure do not require specific pleadings in a civil right lawsuit, or for any other judicially invented reason.

I bet a state defendant in a federal lawsuit may have a lot of “sources of friction” with the presiding federal judge.

But, for the federal judge to actively seek to “eliminate” these “sources of friction” is called bias – at the least.  And such bias requires the judge who holds such views to step down from any cases where state “law officers” appear in front of such a judge. 

If such bias amounts to a policy, and to a policy of the entire court, as it appeared to be in Judge Weinstein’s court, based on the fact that Judge Weinstein was the Chief Judge of a large federal district court in New York State, such a policy spells out a crisis of both the state and the federal judicial systems.

It appears that for federal, as well as state judges, the constitutional oath of office, once taken by a judge, means absolutely positively nothing, where judges gave themselves immunity from suit for malicious and corrupt behavior on the bench, where judicial discipline is non-existent, and where judges openly profess as their goals “eliminate[ing] sources of friction” with “state law officers” which obviously includes defendants in civil rights lawsuits in federal court.   

Thus, instead of following the mandates of the U.S. Constitution that judges are sworn to uphold, it appears that all that judges seek is to (1) clear their dockets and reduce their own workloads;  (2) protect themselves and the state “law officers” from any kind of liability;  (3) eliminate any possibility of stepping on the toes of the state “law officers”.

In my humble opinion, such goals are not even close to serving the American people through the judiciary systems.

There is no need for “quasi-public” “gray cardinal” “co-ordinators” of the state and federal judicial systems.

The public must be assured that judges presiding over court proceedings have no ex parte communications, involvement with or potential for influence over them through any social networking or civic organizations.

I have a firm belief that State-Federal Judicial Councils and their mysterious “Advisory Committees”, same as the American Inns of Court, while declaring service to the public, taint integrity of judicial proceedings with their existence and secret proceedings outside of public oversight.

 

The whole country of lawyers is paying money to learn the "pet peeves" of judges for an ethics and skills credit - and that is called the rule of law?

Recently, I wrote about a Continued Legal Education (CLE) seminar where I was invited and where, for $359, I was supposed to be given credits for skills and ethics for learning "pet peeves" of judges and exploring judges preferences and whims in the courtroom "without jeopardizing clients' cases".


If one follows declarations of presumption of integrity of the judiciary, there is nothing jeopardizing my clients if I simply walk into the courtroom without knowing the judge personally, without knowing his or her whims, and fully expecting the judge to simply follow and apply the law.


It is interesting to mention that the post about the "pet peeves" of judges has been one of the 10 most read posts on my blogs, which is determined automatically and without my control, simply by the number of views of the posts.


Recently, I referenced that blog and followed the link to the seminar that was offered to me.  The link led me nowhere.


I went to the company which offers those CLE seminars around the country and ordered a word-search as to what the "judges want you to know".   The search returned a staggering 1132 seminars around the country, where attorneys around the country were offered to pay and receive skills and ethics credits for, basically, learning how to brown-nose a judge.


My other major concern was that judges actually participated in the panels, which raised at least the following questions:

• are judges being paid for participation?
• If "yes", how much?
• doesn't it create a conflict of interest for the judges to see that attorneys who attended the seminar paid to learn about their "pet peeves"?
• Shouldn't the seminar rosters (attorneys attending) be made public, so that other attorneys and litigants may consult those lists and decide whether they want to recuse a certain judge or disqualify a certain attorney because of an appearance of impropriety, because it appears that the attorney paid the judge to learn about his or her "whims" in the courtroom and thus can expect a favorable treatment from the judge?
• especially in view of budget constraints in the court system, who allowed the judges who attended the seminars to be present there during taxpayer-paid time?
• how did the judge's absence from the courtroom while the judge was instead present at the seminar affect the judge's calendar and rights of litigants over whose cases the judge presides?

Once again, this problem is pervasive, such seminars are happening around the country.


Remember - attorneys can be admitted to the bar and allowed to practice law only after they learn the law in an ABA-accredited law school, where they take Constitutional law and ethics as mandatory courses, and then must pass rigorous bar exams.


Yet, an attorney will still jeopardize his client's case if he comes to a court room without knowing a particular judge's personality and does not cater for the judge's whims?  Maybe, regulation of the legal profession is then unnecessary because all that is needed is not knowledge of the law, but knowledge of a judge's, available for money through a seminar?