Judge threatens attorney who caught judge in an ex parte communication

At 9:30 am today I was scheduled to appear before the Hon. Christopher Cahill of New York State Ulster County Supreme Court.  The subject of appearance was three contested motions, two on my client's side, one on my opponent's side.


The appearance was listed on the E-courts of the NYS Unified Court website as a "preliminary conference", even though it was a motion to vacate a final judgment of the court and no conferences are envisioned for such a type of proceeding.


I saw Judge Cahill today for the first time in my life.


After a conference in judge Cahill's chambers, with participation of Judge Cahill, his law clerk, the opposing counsel Del Seligman and myself, judge Cahill told my opponent and myself to wait outside of his chambers while he confers with his law clerk. 


Del Seligman and I left Judge Cahill's chambers.


After some time, I heard that my opponent, Attorney Del Seligman of Kingston, New York, was called into the chambers, alone.


This was highly irregular, and, in fact, an invitation for a clear ex parte communication between Del Seligman and the Judge.  I have never had a judge call one attorney at a time into his chambers to discuss a pending motion.


With a purpose to prevent the ex parte communication, I have followed Ms. Seligman to the chambers in order to participate in the discussion, too.


By the time I reached the chambers, the door was already closed.


The clerk or secretary sitting in the office in front of the chambers prohibited me from entering the chambers, explaining to me that only Del Seligman was called in by Judge Cahill.


I explained to the clerk or secretary that it is an ex parte communication and that I most strongly object to it.


The lady sternly said to me, in a raised voice - "Go back and sit down". 


I could not disobey the direct order of the judge's employee acting obviously on the judge's orders.  I obeyed her direction and went back into the waiting room. 


The whole situation where attorney Del Seligman was called into Judge Cahill's chambers alone and when I was not allowed by Judge Cahill's clerk or secretary to come in, too, happened in front of multiple witnesses, including, but not limited to, my client, her stepfather, Del Seligman's client and another person accompanying him, and several attorneys waiting for conferences in the same waiting room.


When Del Seligman was called alone into Judge Cahill's chambers, it was loudly announced for everybody to hear, and Del Seligman went alone into Judge Cahill's chambers in front of these witnesses.


Del Seligman was in Judge Cahill's chambers alone for over 10-15 minutes.


Then she came out and told me in front of witnesses that now Judge Cahill is calling me, also alone.


I came to the door of Judge Cahill's chambers, opened it and asked judge Cahill if I can bring Del Seligman back.


The judge asked me why.


I explained that I am called in alone, I could not participate in an ex parte communication with the judge, and that I most strongly protest that the judge conferred with Del Seligman ex parte.


I also told the judge that I most strongly protest because I was blocked by the judge's employee, on judge's orders, from participating in the judge's communication behind closed doors with Del Seligman when I insisted on such participation and strongly objected to the ex parte communication.


The judge immediately got on the defensive and started yelling at me that he never denied me access when he talked with Del Seligman, even though multiple witnesses heard only Del Seligman being called into the chambers, saw and heard how I tried to get into the chambers and was prohibited to do so by the judge's clerk or secretary sitting in the office in front of the chambers, and saw me return back to the waiting room while Del Seligman remained for a prolonged period of time in the judge's chambers.


I asked Judge Cahill to recuse from the case because of his ex parte communication with Del Seligman.


He stated he is recusing, but then started to yell at me that he will turn me into the Professional Conduct Commission. 


It is interesting what that judge is going to turn me in for, that I caught him red-handed in a clear ex parte communication with the opposing counsel?  And the judge will turn me in because I actually refused violate Rules of Professional conduct and refused to engage in an ex parte communication with him when he called me into his chambers separately after he concluded his ex parte communication with Del Seligman?


What kind of judicial integrity we are talking about where a judge threatens a female attorney he sees for the first time in his life because she caught him in clear misconduct, in front of witnesses.  What kind of judicial integrity are we talking about when the judge loses his temper and makes that threat in front of multiple attorneys, multiple parties to litigation and multiple employees who had actually seen that the judge did in fact engage in an ex parte communication with Del Seligman and what I was saying was the truth that everybody present were witnesses to? 


I am definitely turning Judge Cahill into the New York State Commission of Judicial Conduct, and I hope they won't sweep this one under the rug, as they frequently do.

That mysterious rule of frivolous conduct: a tool controlling attorney independence

New York State courts, as many federal courts and courts of other states, sanction attorneys and litigants for what is called "frivolous" conduct in litigation.


In New York, such sanctions are imposed pursuant to a rule created by the New York State Court Administration, 22 NYCRR 130, bypassing the Legislature.


Under New York rule, the following conduct is considered "frivolous":


"(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:
(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;
(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or
(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false",  22 NYCRR 130.1-1(c).


Factual issues under New York State Constitution are triable to a jury.


Motions for determinations of frivolous conduct are decided by a judge, and often without any hearing or oral argument.


What I saw in how these rules of frivolous conduct are applied, they are applied by judges in accordance to their whims, and in accordance with the level of discontent of a particular judge with a particular attorney or party.


I would rather quote a judge's description as to how "difficult" judges can be, otherwise I will be punished for "impugning of integrity of the judiciary".  Well, I will be punished anyway, whether I quote another judge or not.  I was already punished for quoting statements of New York State Assistant Attorney General about fraudulent behavior of a retired judge and his son.  NYS Attorney General in question was not sanctioned for putting the statement into the public records in the first place, but I was sanctioned for quoting those statements.  Go figure...


Anyway, according to definitions of Federal Judge James F. Holderman, "difficult judges" can be of 6 categories, as follows:


quote
=====

1. "The Snap-Judgment Judge"
2. "The Stalled Judge"
3. "The Intrusive Judge"
4. "The Angry Judge"
5. "The Impaired Judge"
6. "The Biased Judge"

unquote
======


I don't suggest to carry this enlightenment from Judge Holderman into your court pleadings, you will be sanctioned for it for sure.


Yet, since Judge Holderman mentions these categories, and states that from his own experience, such categories must exist.  I have no reason to doubt Judge Holderman's word on that, especially that I have appeared in front of, I believe, all categories of "difficult" judges listed above.


When a "difficult" judge appears on your case and especially if he doesn't like you for any reason, to impose frivolous conduct rules against you is a piece of cake.


After all, what is and is not without merit is a judgment call.


What is supported by New York "laws", may be unconstitutional, but New York courts (1) routinely ignore constitutional arguments;  (2) routinely sanction attorneys for constitutional arguments.  Happened to me more than once.  You raise a constitutional argument, you receive back a decision where your constitutional argument is not analyzed "but for" a statement at the end of the decision "and the court has reviewed appellant's other arguments and found it without merit".  Period.  Why, what was the reasoning, how the constitutional question was resolved - nobody knows.  But the argument is without merit.   Even if it is based on a string of the text of constitutional provisions, U.S. Supreme Court precedents, articles of prominent law professors.


And when your constitutional arguments are reviewed (if at all) under the umbrella of "all other appellant's arguments", the interesting result of it is that, on the one hand, your opponent will claim issue and claim preclusion if you ever raise that issue again, and on the other hand, the resolution of that issue or of that claim will never be reflected as a precedent, because there was no specific resolution - just a conclusory statement about "appellant's other issues" being without merit.


Of course, there is case law where courts impose upon themselves requirements to make specific findings of why your conduct was without merit.


Yet, if the court found something under the state law, the court applies the doctrine of "constitutional avoidance" and simply "does not reach" your constitutional arguments.  The result is the same - you invoke constitutional arguments that must protect you from sanctions for the rule of frivolous conduct, and the court puts your constitutional arguments under the umbrella of "other appellant's arguments" which are allegedly without merit, for an unknown reason.


Reason is unknown, but sanctions are known.


The U.S. Supreme Court, in its seminal decision, Marbury v. Madison, through which the U.S. Supreme Court claimed its own authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution, indicated that any law that is contrary to the U.S. Constitution is void (as in "null and void").


Thus, issues of unconstitutional conduct of courts and of unconstitutional application of rules against frivolous conduct must be reviewed first.  Instead, at least the Appellate Division 3rd Department in New York reviews such issues last, or doesn't review them at all.   Yet, if actions of the lower court were unconstitutional, the lower court had no authority to act the way it acted, and, by reaching factual issues first, the appellate court thus violates the appellants' due process of law by applying the so-called "hypothetical jurisdiction", which the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed unconstitutional long time ago.


I turned the 3rd Department into the Commission for Judicial Conduct since 2009 for having a policy of consistently applying hypothetical jurisdiction to cases and jumping over jurisdictional issues in order to resolve factual issues, as a matter of expediency.  Alas, a justice of the 3rd Department, the Hon. Karen Peters, was sitting on the Commission at the time I complained, and the complaints were dismissed without investigation.  Recently, I've read a transcript of a hearing back in 1980s in the New York State Legislature discussing the first 10 years of discipline by the Judicial Conduct Commission.  The speaker lauded the Commission for effective discipline, because discipline actually plummeted from 58 judges during the first year of the Commission's work to somewhere around 16 judges a year in 10 years.  For the speaker, efficient stalling of citizen complaints, which is what is in essence, happening, was the equivalent of efficient judicial discipline.


So, back to the determination of what is or is not meritless.  It is subjective, and you can be sanctioned simply because you "fell out of grace" or never got into that grace.


My previous two blogs, about secret judges in NY and potential for secret influence upon judges through membership in the American Inns of Court, adds another layer to the question as to why judges would sanction some attorneys for conduct they do not sanction others for.


I intend to public in this blog documents that I have that show misconduct of attorneys who were not sanctioned.  I will also publish in this blog documents showing what I was sanctioned for, which was not misconduct, but assertion of constitutional rights of my clients.


The next prong of the rule, sanctions for actions undertaken "primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another".  Now, there is a cause of action in New York called "prima facie tort".  I once sued a powerful attorney on behalf of a client under this cause of action.  The court dismissed the complaint stating that for that cause of action the attorney must intend not to "primarily" "harass or maliciously injure another", but "solely" or "exclusively" intend to do so.  Since in any litigation any attorney can come with 300 reasons why he sued on behalf of a client, the "solely" element is simply unprovable against an attorney. 


As a result, the powerful attorney escaped liability, but I was sanctioned later on for making statements against that powerful attorney, based on the record, because my conduct was claimed to "primarily" "harass and maliciously injure" him.  Go figure.


Let's also focus on this mysterious "another".


To any reasonable reader "another" in this rule is not restricted to a party or attorney participating in the given litigation and can involve third parties.


Apparently, not only puts the judge into position of advocate for third parties who are not parties to litigation.  Moreover, my research shows that judges sometimes use the rule sua sponte, or without any motions from parties in front of them, to protect parties in litigation, which puts judges into the position of advocating for those parties, when those parties did not ask for such advocacy.  The situation is even more awkward that I only saw such sua sponte advocacy by judges on behalf of powerful and well-connected attorneys, and not on behalf of indigent clients or civil rights attorneys.


As an example, I was sanctioned for mentioning place of public employment and publicly available salary of an attorney as an example of selective enforcement of disciplinary rules (argument was on behalf of a client), where the higher the rank of the attorney the less likely it is that the attorney's misconduct, no matter how bad, will be addressed in New York, 3rd Department.  The judge sanctioned me for "invasion of privacy" of that publicly employed attorney for (1) quoting the account of his fraudulent shenanigans, as portrayed by Assistant New York State Attorney general in public court records;  (2) quoting that he was never disciplined and instead is in public employment;  and (3) quoting how much taxpayers are paying that attorney who should have been disbarred years ago for what he did.


What the attorney did is, being a law clerk for a Supreme Court Justice, and knowing that New York State Constitution prohibits his employer (judge) to practice law, the law clerk agreed to be a witness on the will and codicils to the will drafted by the judge where the judge was bequeathing to himself over 1/2 mln dollars worth of bounty.  When signing what his employer-judge drafted, as a witness, the judge's law clerk Denis Dineen also saw that other witnesses were, let's say, "members of a close club", Judge Robert Harlem's son Richard Harlem, Judge Robert Harlem's secretary Irene Mann (who in the future became Judge Harlem's wife), and such "close circle" of witnesses should have given any ethical attorney the creeps, because not only Judge Harlem was practicing law, not only he was bequeathing to himself hundreds of thousands of dollars in a will he was drafting while being a sitting judge, but he was also involving two court employees into the conspiracy of unauthorized practice of law by the judge, and the judge's won son.  Such a "close circle" of witnesses should have informed attorney Dineen to turn Judge Harlem into the Commission of Judicial Conduct for unlawful and unethical behavior.  Instead, attorney Dineen signed where he was told to sign and kept his job. 


I was sanctioned for bringing unethical behavior of Attorney Dineen in litigation, as "invasion of privacy". I do not believe unethical behavior of attorneys, reflected in the pleadings of New York State Attorney General in the Matter of Blanding, Otsego County Surrogate's Court public records, is invasion of privacy.  I do not believe pointing out such behavior is sanctionable.  Go figure.  I was sanctioned.


By the way, the court records of the Blanding case reflect that NYS AG turned attorneys Richard Harlem and Robert Harlem into the Professional Conduct Committee of the 3rd Department.  None of them were sanctioned.


But I was, for quoting the Blanding case in court proceedings involving Robert Harlem and Richard Harlem.


The third prong of the rule, asserting material issues that are false, is resolved by the 3rd Department quite simply.  It simply skips portions of the record as if it does not exist and affirms sanctions as if they were false, even though they were true, and the record reflects that.  While doing it, the 3rd Department knows that the chances of getting a review and reversing its rulings on appeal to the Court of Appeals and especially to the U.S. Supreme Court are slimmer than, as they say in the East, for a camel to get through a needle's eye.


The 3rd Department so far skipped the following:


1) 2 motions in one case affirming sanctions against me;


2) an entire transcript in another case affirming sanctions against me;


3) an entire motion in a criminal case People v. Quentin Tompkins affirming a criminal conviction (where the motion was to vacate because the presiding judge influenced the jury);


4) most recently, the fact that at sentencing, Judge Carl F. Becker of Delaware County Court relied upon his ex parte review of "videos from jail" allegedly showing defendant's movements, for purposes of determination of defendant's credibility and the issue whether to send him to prison or not (People v. Mitchell). 


The defendant then was denied access to such videos allegedly reviewed by the sentencing judge because


(1) the District Attorney did not have such videos "in his possession",


(2) the court administration is not amenable to FOIL requests, and


(3) the jail cannot release such tapes for security reasons. 


I have a copy of defendant's desperate correspondence with the court, the Delaware County District Attorney, the Delaware County Sheriff's Department and the Delaware County Board of Supervisors in a futile attempt to see the evidence based on which the defendant was sent to prison. 


In fact, the defendant was entitled to see any evidence upon which the court relies while taking away his liberty.


A judge who:


(1) engages in ex parte review of extrajudicial evidence and


(2) testifies sua sponte at the sentencing as an unsworn witness on behalf of the prosecution as to what the judge saw of defendant's alleged conduct on the jail tape which the judge mysteriously obtained bypassing both prosecution and defense and which tape mysteriously disappeared and was not available to the defendant after sentencing


Relying on extrajudicial evidence when making a life-changing decision for a party constitutes gross judicial misconduct.


Of course, knowing the "efficient" way of dealing with judicial discipline - sweeping complaints under the rug - I doubt that Judge Becker will be ever disciplined for his conduct toward Nicholas Mitchell.  After all, who is the convicted criminal Nicholas Mitchell and who is the respected judge Carl F. Becker? 


Here, a criminal defendant was sent to prison based on the sentencing judge's ex parte review of mysterious tapes which are not in the court record, were never available to the defendant and are not available after the conviction "for security reasons".


The 3rd Department affirmed Mr. Mitchell's conviction without even considering the issue of Judge Becker's ex parte review of the "jail videos", while only stating that the sentencing court "noted its own observations of defendant's mobility" and that such an inquiry was "sufficient" for purposes of sentencing.  The appellate court simply did not reach the issue that the "observations of defendant mobility" by the judge were based on ex parte communications with unknown parties and reviewing extrajudicial evidence not available to the defense (or prosecution, as the DA's letters to the defendants later demonstrated).  Thus, for an innumerable time, the issue of judicial misconduct was swept under the rug.  By the court which is supposed to uphold the law, not violate it by such "selective blindness" to judicial misconduct.

With this level of "precision" employed by the appellate court, what is false and what is not becomes a matter of the court's peculiar, selective and subjective opinion rather than of fact.


When I hear for the umpteenth time from some high judicial pulpit that there is equal protection of laws in New York courts, I wonder, do people saying that believe what they are saying?  Don't they see what is going on around them?  Not only I have eyes, not only I can read, judicial decisions which are contrary to the record are matters of public record and people DO TALK about them.


When an appellate court skips or contradicts portions of the record in arriving at a final decision which can and does change people's lives in the most profound ways, it is gross negligence and judicial misconduct.  Yet, I have not one, not two, but multiple examples where the 3rd Department does just that.


I am preparing to put documentary evidence into my blog and showing, by detailed legal analysis, how the 3rd Department screws people's lives, leaving them without recourse and, thus, interfering with fair administration of justice and destroying public trust in the integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law.


What Appellate Division 3rd does with its negligent or biased work, is dangerous to the public.


It sends people to prison instead of remanding their cases back to a different, unbiased judge.


It deprives people of their homesteads, as it happened to my elderly client Beverly Sines, because the 3rd Department, against its own rules and jurisdictional restrictions, decided to rule contrary to the contents of the record (see footnote 1 saying there was an attorney contingency clause in the contract of sale while the whole argument of appellant was based on the lack of such attorney contingency clause in that same document), and to rely upon un a sworn testimony of an attorney at the oral argument (see footnote 2 stating that respondent's counsel "affirmed at oral argument that plaintiff stands fully ready, willing and able to meet the contractual terms).


Oral arguments on appeal in the 3rd Department do not presuppose affirmations under oath, especially by attorneys, and especially on issues not reflected in the Record on Appeal, and that was exactly such a situation.  Going outside the record is attorney misconduct in appellate practice.  Yet, in this case, attorney misconduct was rewarded with a victory on appeal.  Go figure.

Once the 3rd Department or any other intermediate appellate court in New York has had their say, the rule of preclusion pops in.  The way preclusion rules work creates peculiar paradoxes.


For example, if the 3rd Department rules that the Sun is rising in the West, that is a factual determination and, if not appealed further (or, rather, if not appealed because NYS Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court do not take in appeals as of right on factual issues), the litigant will end up with a factual finding by the court that the Sun rises in the West and will be precluded from arguing otherwise anywhere.  For that litigant, as a matter of law, the Sun is rising in the West.


Some findings of the 3rd Department are exactly on the level of the "Sun rising in the West", yet, litigants have no recourse because the 3rd Department is the last-stop court for appellate review, and the court knows it well, which explains the arrogance of the Appellate Division in declining motions to vacate, renew and reargue, no matter how meritorious, without an explanation.  They know you have no recourse to challenge their arrogant ways anyway.  There is no appeal from denial of such a motion, no matter how wrong it was, under the applicable law.  


I have raised arguments in front of the 3rd Department on a disciplinary case of an attorney I was representing, pointing out that the decision of the lower court that the 3rd Department is using to apply collateral estoppel to it and to deprive the attorney of his due process hearing as to his license and livelihood after decades of practice, is clearly wrong, as a matter of fact, law and court records. 


The 3rd Department rejected my arguments by stating, whether the underlying court order was true or not, is irrelevant, it was final.  But the issue in attorney discipline was - whether the attorney is or is not dangerous to the public!  If the 3rd Department, the disciplinary body, does not care whether the underlying decision is right or wrong, why discipline the attorney? For what?  And especially - without a hearing or right to appeal? 


Yet, that's how the rules of preclusion work.   And that's how the court ruled, and the attorney in question was disbarred without a hearing, after 37 years of practice.  His "problem" was that, being a professional trial lawyer of several decades, he insisted that he did nothing wrong under the applicable law instead of scraping, bowing, saying "mea culpa" and pleading for forgiveness.


The same rules of preclusion will apply to incorrect court decisions by "difficult" judges about frivolous conduct, right or wrong, reasonable or unreasonable, crazy or not.


As a summary, the frivolous conduct rule, with its three prongs, the way it is applied by the courts, can only lead to further abuse of power by the courts and further arrogantly negligent and/or biased review of cases by the appellate courts, because attorneys appearing before courts have only obligations and no rights, their livelihood is controlled through licensing by those same courts attorneys must challenge, decisions of "difficult judges" are subjective, there is no effective or transparent judicial discipline, appellate review is scanty, often puts issues in the "cart-before-the-horse" order, skips chunks of record, and provides for finality without fairness.


So far, I saw frivolous conduct rules not applied in multiple situations where, if that rule is applied equally across the board, such rules should have been applied.   And, on the opposite, I saw that same rule applied simply when a "difficult judge" wants to "get" an independent attorney asserting constitutional rights of his or her client.


The rule of frivolous conduct never passed through the New York State Legislature, even though it:
allows the judge to practically convict an attorney or party of criminal behavior, while being, as it was in my case, the complaining alleged victim, investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury.


 In New York, harassment is a criminal offense and there is no civil cause of action for harassment.  For judges to protect themselves and those attorneys they favor, the NYS Court Administration, bypassing the Legislature, created a hybrid where the judge, without following the rules and constitutional protections of the Criminal Procedure Law, can commence, prosecute and adjudicate, in a civil proceeding, by preponderance of the evidence, without a hearing, without motion practice, without discovery, without the right to remain silent, a violation or misdemeanor level charge of harassment and impose twice the fine of an A felony for it. 


I believe, such a rule is of a level of legislative policy and requires to be enacted by the Legislature and not introduced, self-servingly, I must say, by the court system, giving judges a perfect and effective tool of vengeance against "inconvenient" attorneys.


 I believe, the Court administration or the Chief Judge of NYS Courts have no authority to legislate by changing causes of action and prosecution of essentially criminal proceedings in the way rule 22 NYCRR 130.1-1 allows. 


Whether and when this court will, if ever, be overturned by a court, is a question.  Yet, there is an easier solution, simply to contact your representative in the New York State Legislature and ask to abolish or amend it legislatively, correcting its overbreadth and vagueness, prohibiting the use of the rule as punishment for criticism of official misconduct, and introducing guidelines as to procedural protections and discovery in frivolity proceedings, now non-existing, as well as requiring elevated burden of proof and a determination by a jury at an evidentiary hearing.


As soon as the jury is injected into the equation, I bet that the rule of frivolous conduct will lose a lot of its attractiveness to the judiciary. 


Given overbreadth of the rule and its arbitrary application by the courts against predominantly civil rights attorneys and not against politically connected attorneys and law firms, given the devastating effect that a finding of frivolous conduct plus the exorbitant fines can have upon an attorneys license, livelihood and reputation, the tool is most effective tool of control over attorney independence, is unconstitutional and must be abolished, as depriving litigants of independent advocates in court.


Did I mention that under this rule judges, without a hearing, may impose upon an attorney or a party sanctions higher than fines for an A felony?  $10,000.00?  Against a sole attorney?  For each alleged "incident" of misconduct?  Good luck finding an attorney who would not be willing to sell his client out if a sensitive issue comes up, for fear of being blasted by a judge under this rule.  


When the legal profession (or the judicial profession) are called the honorable profession, I reserve my opinion.  I will reserve it until the judiciary:

• accepts transparent and efficient public discipline for misconduct of judges,
• drops protection of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench,
• provides truly efficient means of appellate review,
• stops violating its own rules in a self-serving manner, calling attorney rules of frivolous conduct mandatory, but applying mandatory rules of judicial recusal as committed to the "discretion" of the challenged judge;
• stops selectively applying its rules to the "high and mighty attorneys" and to sole practitioners,
• stops using financial sanctions and disciplinary proceedings as a sword against critics of judicial misconduct;
• stops accepting benefits from attorneys for elections and through secret memberships (see my blog regarding American Inns of Courts) and, most important,
• stops controlling attorney status of attorneys who challenge judicial rulings and judicial prejudices in motions to recuse, disqualify and in civil rights lawsuits.

I will similarly reserve my opinion as to whether the legal profession as a whole is an honorable profession until the legal profession, at the very least, regains its freedom of association, rises from its collective knees and claims its independence from the clutches of the judiciary where it left it.

Are your judge and your opponent communicating through American Inns of Court?

As a practicing attorney, I've had my moments after receipt of some judicial decisions when I was wondering how could a judge arrive at this particular opinion if it contradicted the record in front of him.


Was it negligence?


Was it bias?


Was it somebody's influence?


I can raise on appeal the first two issues, even though it's a risk: attorneys, including myself, were punished for raising issues of bias and negligence of judges.


When you are raising issues of potential influence upon a judge, even though the threshold for a motion to recuse/disqualify is "appearance of impropriety", and thus, your reasonable perception based on facts you know, the key is "facts you know".


What if your reasonable perception is based on the facts you do not know?


Enter American Inns of Court.


I've learnt about this organization only very recently.   Even though the existence of the American Inns of Court is not secret, I've not seen it advertised in my law school, Albany Law School, during my studies, it was never discussed in conversations with my fellow colleagues, and my fellow colleagues, some practicing for decades, never heard about it, I asked.


The essence of the American Inns of Court is that it is a national foundation, with regional chapters in, as I understand, every state and multiple Inns per state.  Also, there are Inns in federal bars.


The association is between lawyers, judges (and judicial law clerks) for the declared purpose of promoting excellence in the legal profession and promoting "collegiality" and ethics.


As an example, the Federal Inn of Court's mission statement is located on the webpage of the Federal Bar Council for the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit.


The mission of the Inn of Courts is announced, in part, as follows:


"the Inn endeavors to create a community of lawyers and jurists who care about the legal profession and each other, in the hope that members of the Inn will guide, mentor and befriend each other at formal meetings and in their spare time".


Membership in this particular Federal Inn is transparent, in most state Inns which I researched membership for both lawyers and judges is secret, see, for example, the site of The Intellectual Property and Innovation Inn of Court in Albany, New York.


Membership for lawyers from a private sector is far from free.  In the Federal Inn of Court for the 2nd Circuit the lowest that a lawyer from a private sector must pay to participate is $445.00 per year.  Judges and their law clerks who are also participating in activities and receptions preceding activities, pay nothing in the federal Inn, reduced fees (as compared to lawyer members) or nothing in various state chapters where information is available.


According to descriptions available at various Inn of Court sites, monthly member meetings are considered very important duty of members, often start with "light cocktails" and are either preceded or concluded with receptions.


Now, if judges do not pay for their participation, that means that judge's dinner fee with cocktails every month is covered by the lawyer members of the Inn.


While the main declared purposes of the Inns is promoting excellence and ethics in the legal profession, the way that excellence is promoted raises, to me, big concerns.


It is a problem to me if the judge on my case and my opponent "guide, mentor and befriend each other", as the Federal Inn mission statement suggests, behind closed doors.


While one at least has the benefit of seeing the roster of members in the Federal Inn for the 2nd Circuit, in other Inns even that is not available.


American Inns of Court, thus, present a distinct possibility that the judge on your case and the opponent attorney on your case may be secret members of an association which meets behind closed doors at least every month, where the judge receives the distinct financial benefit of a free or reduced-fee lavish meal with cocktails and where your judge and your opponent in litigation have plenty of opportunities to "guide, mentor and befriend" one another behind closed doors, without notifying you.


In legal terms, that is called an ex parte communication and grounds for disqualification of the judge and for discipline against both the judge and your opposing counsel, but you will never know whether such ex parte communication ever took place, because, once again, membership of judges and lawyers in most American Inns of Court is secret, and where it is not secret, as in the Federal Inn I described, what they discussed at their meetings is secret because public is not allowed in.


Just think that every time that any judge is looking down into the courtroom during a case and one of the lawyers of him belongs to the Inn, he might have a financial interest in the case because that lawyer is paying his bill for the drinks and food once a month and for any other activities sponsored for the judge by the Inn or the Inn Foundation.


I am saying "any judge", because membership in the Inns is secret and you do not know whether a particular judge on your case is or is not a member of an Inn.


As an analogy, let's say a lawyer owns a restaurant, and a certain judge can come there at least once a month and the tab is on the house, for all food and drinks.  If that same lawyer had a case in front of that judge, would you then consider it improper?  Right there you have a conflict of interest, or at least an appearance of impropriety where the judge knows that the lawyer appearing in front of him paid his last monthly restaurant bill and will pay the next months?  And wouldn't it be deceitful on behalf of both the judge and the opposing counsel when you or your attorney have no knowledge of these activities going on a regular basis?


Shouldn't the judge and the attorney disclose such a relationship when the judge is assigned to the case?  Did you ever receive such a disclosure from a judge, that he is a secret or open member of a certain American Inn and that the opposing counsel or his law firm is also a member and supports the judge with free monthly meals?


Additionally, American Inns of Court distribute scholarships, they hold regional and national conferences or meetings, there is also a "reciprocal visitation agreement" for individual members of American Inns of Court and English Inns of Court.


If a judge member of an American Inn of Court does not pay the membership fee or pays it at a reduced rate as compared to fees of attorney members, while through such membership a judge gets access to the "reciprocal visitation" benefits to go overseas, these opportunities raise even more concerns as to appearance of impropriety and potential of influence upon judges through the system of the American Inns of Court. 


This secret membership of judges in the Inns of Court where they meet on monthly basis with rich attorneys in order to "guide, mentor and befriend" each other presents the following practical concerns to me as an attorney, litigant, citizen and voter:

1. How can the voters who voted a certain judge into office be able to monitor whether the judge is or is not influenced in his decisions if the judge agrees to an open (as in Federal Inn) or secret (as in state inns) membership in an association where attorneys, also secret members, pay membership dues enabling them to meet with judges behind closed doors, wine and dine the judges, socialize with judges, befriend, mentor and be mentored by judges?  To me as a voter, such a possibility destroys presumption of integrity of any judge in any state, including my State of New York, because we simply do not know about membership in the Inns of any of the judges.
2. How can litigants and their counsel be assured whether or not the judge they appear in front of and the powerful or rich opposing law firm are not meeting at monthly receptions sponsored for the judge by membership fees of the law firm and discuss your case behind your back?  I asked once whether a judge's son worked for the opponent, and was slapped with sanctions by that judge who also refused to step down, even though I knew that the judge's son did work for the opponent in the action.  The same result can follow if an attorney or litigant would a question whether the judge and the opposing counsel are secret members of American Inns of Court, yet, since the membership is, once again, secret in most inns, and access to national Inn membership directory is part of the benefits members pay for, this is a distinct possibility.  The only way to protect an attorney or litigant asking such a question is to mandate such disclosure by the judge through a mandatory statute.

Yes, we do have freedom of associations in this country protected by the 1st Amendment of the United States Constitution.


And yes, judges do not check their constitutional rights as to what they do in their free time when they are sworn into office.


But the voters and taxpayers who pay judicial salaries and benefits do that on an assumption that judges maintain their oath of office, and the main component of judicial duty is independence.  Thus, judges must be careful in exercising their freedom of association in their free time, so that no to create an appearance that they are fraternizing with rich attorneys behind closed doors who, in return for monthly receptions and national and international travel, get to influence judicial decisions, "befriend and mentor" judges.


Ex parte communications between attorneys and judges are prohibited because they deny opponents due process and equal opportunities in litigation.


The problem with the Inns is not that such ex parte communications specifically about litigation are taking place.  I cannot say that for sure because I simply do not know who are the members attorneys in a particular inn, who are the member judges, what, if anything, the member judges are paying into the association, what benefits the judges and/or their family members receive from the Inn, but when such memberships simply exist, and such secret opportunities exist, that alone undermines public trust in the integrity and independence of the judiciary.


As federal taxpayer and voter and taxpayer and voter in the State of New York, I consider it necessary to make all judges, whether federal or state, to disclose their membership in the Inns and to mandate disclosure by the judge to litigants, on demand, all monetary and non-monetary benefits they receive through membership in American Inns of Court, and to do that as a matter of statute, because otherwise judges will simply stifle such inquiries with sanctions and retaliate against inquiring attorneys by taking their licenses and livelihoods, as they are doing to me (see my blogs herein) and as they are doing to many more attorneys in the country. 


I would also demand that, if judges are participating in American Inns of Court, thus creating a potential of influence upon their decisions, member directories of all Inns must be open to the public to be able to verify potential conflicts of interest and potential to influence judges in litigation.


Presumption of integrity of the judicial profession must be substantiated by lack of secret dealings behind closed doors between judges and attorneys, for a perceived financial benefit for judges.

The requirement that attorneys must maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as a condition to allow attorneys to practice law and earn a livelihood must be substantiated by information ensuring that such public confidence is justified.

I feel deceived by the system where I am required to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as a condition to hold my license (constitutionality of this condition is a separate topic), while the judiciary is undermining its own integrity by participating in closed-door monthly receptions sponsored by rich attorneys where judges and rich attorneys "guide, befriend and mentor" each other without disclosure of such relationships to the public, voters and litigants.

Secret participation of judges in the American Inns of Court, secrecy of membership for attorneys, reduced fees or no fees for judges and their law clerks and high membership fees for attorneys, combined with frequent and expensive benefits judges receive from such membership in terms of lavish monthly meals, drinks and availability of Inn-sponsored international travel, as well as the possibility of being "guided, befriended and mentored" by powerful lawyers behind closed doors over lawyer-paid meals severely undermines appearance of independence of the American judiciary.

What is judicial misconduct in Ohio is business as usual in New York...

In Ohio, a judge was recently disciplined with a suspended stay for a year for removing a public defender who dared to criticize a judge for abuse of discretion when the judge refused to accept a guilty plea from an indigent defendant who withdrew his consent and then agreed again.

 

In New York, Delaware County, Judge Carl F. Becker is allowed to do on the bench whatever he wants, while courts bounce lawsuits against him under various judge-created doctrines, the Commission for Judicial Conduct bounces meritorious complaints against him with barely an explanation or without any good faith explanation, while the judge viciously retaliates against complainants, knowing that there will be no discipline against him for such a retaliation.


New York is not Ohio, I guess.

 

So far, I have counted 11 lawsuits against Judge Becker in state and federal courts filed within the period from 2004 to 2013, only three are still pending, others were uniformly dismissed on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity, covering even malicious and corrupt acts on the bench.


Such a dismissal means that the court refuses to review whether Judge Becker did or did not engage in malicious and corrupt conduct on the bench, as claimed by the plaintiffs in these lawsuits, claimed under oath, by the way.

 

Yet, those dismissed cases make interesting reading.  Complaints in federal courts at least, are certified under oath.  By dismissing on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts, the courts essentially say in plain English the following:  "we know that what you might be saying about the judge engaging in malicious and corrupt acts on the bench might be true, but the concept of judicial immunity (that judges created in protection of judges) does not allow us to even look in that direction, so we are forced to dismiss your lawsuit, even if such a dismissal leaves you completely without a remedy". 

 

So far, 9 people dared to sue Judge Becker against all odds, obviously considering it important to at least signal to the public what Judge Becker is doing wrong:

 

1. David Roosa
2. Joseph Orlando
3. Michael Hazen
4. Alecia Bracci
5. Frederick J. Neroni
6. Tatiana Neroni
7. Joseph Goodnough
8. Maria Aron
9. Nicholas Mitchell

People who filed lawsuits against Judge Becker over a span of time from 2004 by David Roosa to 2013 by Nicholas Mitchell, claim that Judge Becker was involved in conduct reflecting his bias, discrimination against people with disabilities, retaliation against critics, using extrajudicial evidence and ex parte communications in his decisions, favoritism etc. etc. etc.  The list goes on.  Case law on the issue of judicial misconduct shows that Judge Becker has long ago passed the critical mass of misconduct which requires to take the judge off the bench.  Yet, he is still there.  For some reason that I, as a member of the public, would like to have the State of New York explain to me.


It is not easy to win a lawsuit against a judge.




Remember, his brother (or sister) judge reviews that lawsuit against a judge.




And his brother (or sister) judge will either invent a doctrine covering a member of her class, or will apply the doctrine created by another brother judge, and will not look whether such a doctrine does or does not comport with the Federal Constitution, as long as it serves "independence of the judiciary".  From the tenets of the law.




Lawsuits of David Roosa, Joseph Orlando, Michael Hazen, Alecia Bracci, Tatiana Neroni, Frederick J. Neroni and Joseph Goonough against Judge Becker were dismissed on immunity grounds, and only the case of Frederick J. Neroni was recently partially remanded by the appellate court on a narrow issue whether under the new precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court Mr. Neroni's challenge to constitutionality of two New York statutes can proceed in federal court.  Cases of Alecia Bracci, Tatiana Neroni and Frederick J. Neroni (another case) are pending on appeal.




The case Aron v. Becker, a case where Judge Becker denied a pistol license based on alleged hearsay statements of his own unspecified employees, which somehow outweighed 4 affidavits in support of Ms. Aron from people who knew her and her stellar life record, is still pending.




I already wrote about my own case in one of my first posts, describing how Judge Becker viciously sanctioned me and my husband after I sued him in state court, and added to those sanctions after I sued him for retaliation in federal court.




Time permitting, I will publish all of the lawsuits against Judge Becker (which are public records anyway) online, analyze them in detail and link that analysis, lawsuit by lawsuit, to this blog.


It is time to do something in New York with non-existent judicial discipline. 


Judge Becker continues to sit on 6 benches:

1. Delaware County Supreme Court;
2. Delaware County Court - as trial court;
3. Delaware County Drug Court - as extension of Delaware County Court (trial part);
4. Delaware County Court -as appellate court from local justice courts of Delaware County;
5. Delaware County Family Court;
6. Delaware County Surrogate's Court

Since Judge Becker occupies all benches in his county, people and especially attorneys, are afraid to speak out, because the judge can affect every single aspect of their lives, by taking away their children in Family Court, or holding them in child neglect, stripping them of a possibility of good employment and subjecting them to humiliating supervision of the judge's former client of 27 years Delaware County Department of Social Services, or taking away their property in Supreme Court or taking away their liberty in the criminal County Court...




The vengeance of this particular judge is vicious and systemic, as my case shows, and people have a right to be afraid.  Yet, there comes a time when being afraid will get you nowhere and will not protect you or your loved ones.




Meanwhile, New York State continues to condone Judge Becker's behavior, no matter how bad it gets, no matter how badly he bends or violates the law and people's rights, no matter what kind of trauma, stress, heartbreak, injury he leaves as his "legacy", no matter how openly he favors and disfavors attorneys and parties based on their social and political status and affiliation with the judge himself, or his friends and former co-workers.




New York state even provides to Judge Becker, when he is sued, free legal representation at taxpayer's expense.  Judge Becker's free legal counsel is the New York State Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman or one of 640 attorneys from Mr. Schneiderman's office, and all resources of the state of New York.  By the way, Eric T. Schneiderman was elected by you to the position of the New York State Attorney General on a platform that he will protect New Yorkers from fraud.  Yet, when such fraud, as an example, is committed by a judge on the bench, Eric T. Schneiderman does the reverse and protects the culprit from your rightful lawsuit, at your expense, while you might be scrambling to find an attorney willing to put his license and livelihood on the line to take your case. 




Why does New York State Attorney General, even though he was elected by you to defend you from public officials violating your rights, defends Judge Becker when he violates your rights, from your rightful lawsuits.


Apparently, his "obligation" to defend the politically powerful outweighs his promises to the voters before he was elected.  Moreover, do not forget that NYS Attorney General is himself a licensed attorney, and his license is within the hands of the judiciary.  Thus, the judiciary has independence from the law for malicious and corrupt act, and you have as a result a timid legal profession which scrapes and bows to judges no matter what they do, in order to keep their licenses intact.  Those who criticizes the judge, be he or she an attorney or not an attorney, does it only at her own peril.


But sometimes, no matter what the risk, you need to do what is right.  There are moments in life where you are squarely staring at a choice that you cannot shirk. 


So far, the 9 people from the list made those choices and filed those lawsuits alone.


Of course, whatever they are doing, can only make a dent in the armor of judicial immunity, if at all.


A systemic legislative initiative, or, possibly, a referendum to amend the State Constitution are needed to change the situation where judges usurped the power to be above the law, the power which nobody, not one person in the U.S. can have.




And such an abomination of justice is declared to help you as public in general to maintain independence of your elected judicial officers.  I as a voter do not need or want my elected public servants, judicial officers, to be independent from the law and the very Constitution that they take an oath to protect when and in order to get on that bench.




It is time to do something about it.




I am sure Judge Becker is not alone in having become a tyrant on the bench.




Immunity and impunity made him a tyrant.




You know that absolute power corrupts absolutely.




You will not expect not to discipline a child if he errs.  You know that if you don't discipline him, he'll err more and worse.




Not disciplining public officials, including judges, has the same effect.  Judges are only human.


If you don't treat infection, it has a potential of growing into a gangrene and killing you.




Judicial immunity is undermining America democratic traditions declaring that nobody is above the law and everybody is equal under the law.  It's time to make that maxim work, as applied to our public servants, judicial officers.




If we, the People of the State of New York, do not take action to end this shameful concept of absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts of judges on the bench, we will continue to suffer injuries from judicial misconduct while having no remedies for such injuries.




Maybe also (although there is little hope for that without public outcry and media attention), New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct will finally look into the matter and consider sworn allegations of Judge Becker's victims in those dismissed and pending lawsuits?



As well as sworn allegations of victims of misconduct against other judges? 




Judicial discipline does not require as a pre-requisite a judgment against such a judge and does not have statutes of limitations, at least that is what is being declared to the public.  Maybe it's time to practice what is being preached about equality under the law and that sun is the best disinfectant?




It is in our hands not to be silent, to call on our representatives in the State and Federal Legislatures to put an end to the perversion of justice called "absolute judicial immunity" and to introduce effective, transparent and open system of judicial discipline, with active public participation.

 

 

 

 

The secret judges in the state of New York

When you review the website of any court in the State of New York or judicial directory on the website of New York State Court administration, there is a big chance you do not know that the list of judges that you see may be incomplete for that particular court and is definitely incomplete as to the statewide judicial directory.


There is a corps of the so-called "judicial hearing officers" whose names are not published by the New York State Court Administration.


Existence of such judicial hearing officers is defined not by a statute introduced by the Legislature, and not by the New York State Constitution.  It is defined by the court system itself through their own regulation, 22 NYCRR 122.


The names of judicial hearing officers appointed under 22 NYCRR 122 are not known to the public, unless members of the public want to engage in a battle with the Office of New York State Court administration and spend money on copies of public records, as well as months on correspondence with NYS OCA's counsel who will reject any general FOIL requests as to the entire court system and will refuse to provide a list of judicial hearing officers currently serving in the State of New York, claiming that no such list exists as a public record.


It is a good trick for the NYS OCA not to create this list, and then to reject FOIL requests on this basis, while at the same time not publishing the names of such judicial hearing officers directly on the websites of courts where they serve, along with the names of judges and in the statewide judicial directory.


Yet, there might be great significance in knowing the names of such judicial hearing officers.


Such judicial hearing officers, as I learnt accidentally through a broadly cast FOIL request, are retired judges who, as attorneys, may be law partners in law firms representing parties in the same courts where they have members of their law firm serving as judicial hearing officers.


Such services, according to 22 NYCRR 122 and rules of conduct for judges, represent a direct conflict of interest.  Yet, neither you, nor your lawyer will know about it, because names of these judicial officers are not published along with the names of sitting elected judges of the courts where they are appointed to serve.


I raised this issue in a letter to the Appellate Division Third Judicial Department and to the New York State Court Administration.


My review of public records, and research on database Westlaw showed that Levene, Gouldin and Thompson continued to appear in front of Appellate Division Third Judicial Department while its law partner Eugene Peckham was serving as judicial hearing officer in that court.  Rules of that same court do not allow a former judge to appear in that court for 2 years after the judge's retirement.  In this case, the law firm of the court's own judicial hearing officer was appearing in front of the court at the same time as its law partner was serving as part of the court.


The Appellate Division 3rd Department never announced on its website that Eugene Peckham was its judicial hearing officer, nor does it announce the names of any other judicial hearing officers.


The Appellate Division 3rd Department refused to answer my inquiry as to the list of names of judicial hearing officers serving at the period of time when I was prosecuting or defending appeals in the court since 2009, in order to verify potential conflicts of interest.


Instead, the Committee for Professional Conduct which is appointed and supervised by the Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department, commenced a disciplinary proceedings against me, accusing me of not appearing to depositions at the time when I was not even practicing law.


I do not know until this day whether any law firms which opposed me at any time on appeals in front of Appellate Division Third Department were disqualified because their law partners or associates were serving as judicial hearing officers of the court.  The court is not forthcoming with this information and instead is trying to take my license and thus turn me into a disbarred attorney in order to reduce my credibility as a public advocate against official misconduct.


The public also must know that there is no age limitation for judicial officers under 22 NYCRR 122, even though the public of the state of New York just turned down a constitutional amendment to push the mandatory retirement age of judges to 80.  Judicial hearing officers may perform the same duties as judges perform, without any age limitations, in complete defiance of the public vote at the referendum.


Therefore, the wishes of the sovereign clearly expressed in a referendum in November of 2013 in not allowing judges past 70 to serve are flaunted by the court system through court rules, over which the public has no direct control, and the public does not even get to know the names of their public servants who are serving at the public expense, and at a great public expense.


For example, attorney and retired judge Eugene Peckham was, according to NYS OCA answer to my FOIL request, appointed as a judicial hearing officer in 25 courts in the year 2012, including 4 courts each in 6 counties and the Appellate Division 3rd Judicial Department.  Counties included Otsego, Delaware, Broome, Chenango and two other counties.  Broome County is where Attorney Peckham's law office is and where majority of his work is done.  Yet, I doubt that opponents of his law firm were made aware that he was judicial officer of the court in which his law firm was appearing.  Yet, I firmly believe that litigants and attorneys who were opponents of the law firm of a judicial hearing officer serving in courts where his law firm appears, were entitled to at least know that information in order to make a decision whether to raise the issue of disqualification or not.


As a member of the public, I do not find the fact that the names of public servants who have the same authority as judges, is not made known to the public by publishing their names along with names of sitting judges.


As a member of the public, I do not find it acceptable that the NYS OCA disregards the public vote pertaining to age of judges and promulgates and continues to enforce rules of appointment of judicial hearing officers which have no age limitation.


 I would presume that the public vote must mean something to the court administration.


There is still another issue of public concern pertaining to judicial hearing officers and attractiveness of this position to sitting judges who lose half of their pay at retirement.


Compensation for positions of judicial hearing officers are $300.00 per day, as defined by court rules.  If a judicial hearing officer works 250 business days a year in only one court, he gets $75,000.00, more than doubling his pension.  In fact, if a judicial hearing officer is assigned to 4 courts per county which are usually located in the same building (Surrogate's, Family, County and Supreme Courts), he can hold hearings in all four courts in one day, be paid for each court separately, and his pay per day may then become $1,200.00.  Nothing in 22 NYCRR 122, as far as I can see, precludes charging $300.00 per day from each separate court.  If a judicial hearing officer can make it the same day to a neighboring county, which is quite possible, and hold another set of hearings in the 4 courts of the neighboring county, his daily pay will become $2,400.00.


If such performance is multiplied by 250 business days a year, a single judicial hearing officer may potentially earn $600,000 on top of his pension and on top of earnings from his law practice, because judicial hearing officers are not prohibited to practice law, as sitting judges are , see New York Constitution, Article VI section 20(b)(4), 26(2), which is yet another area of concern.


New York Constitution, Article VI section 20(b)(4) specifically states the following:


"b. A judge of the court of appeals, justice of the supreme court, judge of the court of claims, judge of a county court, judge of the surrogate's court, judge of the family court or judge of a court for the city of New York established pursuant to section fifteen of this article who is elected or appointed after the effective date of this article may not:


...


(4) engage in the practice of law, act as an arbitrator, referee or compensated mediator in any action or proceeding or matter or engage in the conduct of any other profession or business which interferes with the performance of his or her judicial duties, " highlighting added.




The constitutional prohibition for sitting judges to practice law arises is motivated by the need to insulate a sitting judge from any influences upon a judge's judicial independence.  A judge is elected by public vote and can only act on behalf of the People of the State of New York and not at the bidding of his paying clients.  The same must be true for judicial  hearing officers who are given the same authority as sitting judges to hear and determine issues in litigation.


When judicial hearing officers are, on the one hand, given the same authority as a sitting judge, but are not prohibited to practice law, as Eugene Peckham's case demonstrates, the potential of influence upon such judicial hearing officer is there, and , respectfully, such service by judicial hearing officer violates the legislative intent of New York State Constitution prohibiting sitting judges to practice law in order to protect both independence of their judicial decisions and public trust in the integrity of the judicial system.


At this time, what kind of integrity of the judicial system can we talk about when the judicial system hides the names of judicial hearing officers from the public who is paying an arm and a leg for such judicial officers?  What kind of integrity can the judicial system claim when it allows judicial hearing officers to practice law in direct contradiction of the voter's will embodied in the New York State Constitution which prohibits judges to practice law and restricts their age of service to 70?


The numbers of compensation that judges can earn per day show how lucrative and coveted this position is and how much influence individuals who can approve or disapprove these appointments may be.


Of my particular concern is the fact that certain high-ranking judges who get to approve these perks, have relatives who are practicing attorneys appearing in courts, in front of sitting judges who are close to retirement and covet such post-retirement perks.  


One of such judges in a position to recommend or not recommend a retired judge for such a perk is the Hon. Michael V. Coccoma, Chief Administrative Judge of upstate New York, see 22 NYCRR 122 as to the procedure of whose recommendations are required for such appointments.  


Judge Coccoma is married to Ellen Coccoma.


Ellen Coccoma is, upon my personal knowledge, a practicing attorney, a special counsel in a large Binghamton law firm Hinman, Howard & Kattel and is also serving as Otsego County Attorney a full-time officer and employee of Otsego County.   My husband actually owns property in Otsego County and pays property taxes on it.  I wonder whether he also pays part Ms. Coccoma's salary and benefits for the time she works for a private law firm.  I know of at least one court case where Ms. Coccoma appeared multiple times and for multiple hours daytime when , I am sure, she is supposed to work for Otsego County as its full time employee and officer.


When a judge who is close to retirement rules in favor of, let's say , Ellen Coccoma in my example, the wife of Judge Coccoma who gets to recommend that judge to a lucrative and extremely well-paying post-retirment perk, there is no assurance to me as an attorney or member of the public that the decision the judge has made was not influenced by his aspiration to garner a favor of Ellen Coccoma's husband in order to secure the lucrative position of a judicial hearing officer in the future.


Such concern would not have existed if relatives of individuals who get to decide on judge's post-retirement perks would be prohibited to practice law, at least before judges who are close to retirement age.


Moreover, a judicial hearing officer may be similarly influenced to rule for attorney Ellen Coccoma, because if he doesn't he simply might not be reappointed and lose his perk.


Since Ellen Coccoma was taken in as a "special counsel" by a huge law firm, the appearance of favors flowing to Ellen Coccoma are flowing to the entire law firm and all of its clients.


In other words, any time any judge close to the age of 70 rules in favor of Hinman, Howard & Kattel, there are questions whether such rulings were influenced by considerations of appeasing Ellen Coccoma's husband the Hon. Michael V. Coccoma with a view for the judge to get a lucrative post-retirement perk.


New York State Constitution sought to block potential influences upon judges by prohibiting them to practice law.  Such constitutional intent, in my opinion, goes out the door where judges can be easily influenced through the lure of lucrative post-retirement perks.


To me, it is a serious issue of public concern that the public should know about.


I will appreciate input on these issues by the public.