On
constitutionality of government regulation of opponents’ representatives in
court
in
the United States
Tatiana Neroni,
Juris Doctor
October 2, 2021 ©
Court cases
Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)............................................ 2
Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340
(1916).......................................................... 2,
3
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478
(1978) 1
Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)................................................... 2
Matter of Giuliani, 2021 NY Slip Op
04086, 197 AD3d 1 (1st Dept., June 24, 2021)................................................ 2,
3
New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)................................... 3
Statutes
42 U.S.C. 1988(b), Proceedings in
vindication of civil rights, attorney’s fees....................................................... 2
Other Authorities
James E. Moliterno, Politically
Motivated Bar Discipline, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 725 (2005)............................................ 3
Jones, Ira. Critical Race Theory Remakes Connecticut
School District | National Review, Indiana Conservatives for reason, July 19,
2021..................................................... 3
Storace, Robert. Attorney Miller Believes Deck Is Stacked
Against Her for Reinstatement to State Bar.
Civil rights attorney Josephine Smalls Miller will make her case for
reinstatement to the state bar on Sept. 1, Connecticut Law Tribune, August 21,
2021........... 3
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution, Amendment 6, Right
to Counsel............................................ 2
The U.S. Supreme Court has included into its
requirement of fair court proceedings adversarial nature of such proceedings[1].
There may be no true adversarial court proceeding where
one opponent (especially – the more powerful one) controls the other, or its
representative, by means outside of the particular court proceeding, where
1. A
party in litigation must choose its trusted representative in court from the
list approved by its opponent in litigation, which undermines any possibility
of trust to such a representative; and
2. A
powerful party in litigation (the government) may remove representatives of its
opponents in litigation at a whim, without knowledge or consent from the party
who has chosen that particular representative.
Yet, this is exactly what is happening in the American
courts – and the recent case of New York’s suspension of Rudy Giuliani’s law
license[2] is just one of such
examples.
Back at the beginning of the 20th century
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the only business that may be constitutionally
regulated by the government[3] is a business of such a
nature that without a legislative regulation a lot of people will suffer
serious harm[4].
At the same time, the U.S. Constitution recognizes the
important role of an attorney in cases where an individual opposes the
government in court, by
· its
direct text[5],
· federal
statutes providing financial incentives for attorneys to sue the government on behalf
of indigent individuals for human rights abuses[6] and
· by
US Supreme Court precedent[7].
States also provide free counsel to indigent
defendants in “quasi-criminal” settings where proceedings threaten loss of
constitutional rights, such as child neglect/abuse proceedings by social
services against parents and “civil” contempt proceedings.
In view of importance of the right to counsel in cases
where the government is the opponent in litigation, whether the government is the
plaintiff (criminal, CPS cases) or a defendant (federal civil rights lawsuits),
it is important for litigants to have a choice of representatives in court whose
livelihood is not controlled by opponent in litigation, the government.
Yet, not only livelihoods of such attorneys are, in
fact, controlled by their opponent in litigation, the government, but such representatives
of opponents of the government in litigation are actually targeted by
the government in license revocation proceedings, to remove the counsel of
choice from the opponent, without opponent consent, and to gain this way an
advantage in litigation.
The license revocation of the civil rights lawyer
Rudy Giuliani who dared to bring a civil rights lawsuit against the
government claiming improper actions of government officials in several
states presidential elections in 2020[8] is one of the most recent
and the most illustrative examples of this targeting[9]. The license revocation was targeting not only
Giuliani himself, but, very obviously, his client Donald Trump who was deprived
of his chosen counsel in and out of court by his opponents in litigation.
Another recent example is revocation of the license of
a black civil rights attorney from Connecticut, for suing a judge and “slandering
the judicial system” of the state, specifically, for accusing the state court
system of racism[10]. Similarly, it was attorney Miller’s clients –
opponents of the government in civil rights lawsuits – who were stripped of her
services without their consent, by their opponents in litigation, when license
was revoked by the government from civil rights attorney Miller, on contrived
grounds:
· slandering
a system, and especially a government system, is not possible to do legally in
the USA, since in American jurisprudence, one cannot “slander a system”, only a
person,
· the
judge attorney Miller sued in federal court never counter-sued her for
defamation,
· had
the judge done so, he would have lost because of high pleading standards and
high burden of proof put on government officials in defamation lawsuits in the
U.S. Supreme Court 1st Amendment jurisprudence[11],
· the
reason for this political targeting and punishment of the civil rights attorney
in Connecticut for asserting that state courts are racist becomes tragi-comical
in view of the same state’s decision to teach in its schools the “Critical race
theory”, asserting that systemic racism permeates all governments (including,
obviously, the state courts), and the entire society in the United States[12].
Not in Connecticut, not in New York, not anywhere else
in the United States, did legislatures determine, in order for the government
to regulate representatives of its own opponents in litigation, civil rights/criminal
defense/defense-against-CPS attorneys, that business of these lawyers is of
such nature that without legislative control over such services a lot of people
will come to a lot of serious harm[13].
On the opposite, a lot of people are obviously coming
into a lot of serious harm when they are given no choice by the government,
but to choose representatives in court, when sued by the government,
representatives whom they must trust with secret details of their lives and
entrust the future of their own life, liberty, property – only from the
lists approved by their powerful opponent in litigation.
In fact, while such control exists, services of
counsel in defense of civil rights situations that are so highly valued – in words,
at least - by the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes and the U.S. Supreme Court
precedent are stripped of their value through control over them by the powerful
opponent in litigation, the government.
Moreover, while such control exists, none of court
decisions in cases where government is a party in litigation may be considered
legitimate, since the process used in arriving at those decisions lacked the
true independence of the representatives of the government’s opponents in
litigation, and thus lacked the true adversarial nature required by the U.S. Supreme
Court for court proceedings.
It is obvious that regulation by the government of criminal
defense, defense-against-CPS and civil rights lawyers is unconstitutional as
regulation of representatives of government’s opponents in litigation since it
· emasculates
people’s right to counsel given by the U.S. Constitution or federal statute,
· allows
the most powerful party, with the burden of proof in criminal and child abuse/neglect
cases, to always have an unfair advantage in such litigation,
· destroys
legitimacy of court decisions in cases where the government is a party in
litigation by removing the required element of court proceedings – a true
adversarial nature of such proceedings.
Regulation by the government in the US of representatives
of its own opponents in court must stop.
[1] Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478 (1978) (“the
safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private
damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. The
insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent
in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process,
and the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on
malicious action by judges”, emphasis added).
[2] Matter of Giuliani, 2021 NY
Slip Op 04086, 197 AD3d 1 (1st Dept., June 24, 2021)..
[3] The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that the “practice of law” is a business in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (regulation of lawyers may not forbid business
advertisements of their services by lawyers).
[4] Brazee v. Michigan, 241
U.S. 340 (1916) (“Considering our former opinions it seems
clear that, without violating the federal Constitution, a state,
exercising its police power, may require licenses for employment
agencies and prescribe reasonable regulations in respect of them,
to be enforced according to the legal discretion of a Commissioner. The
general nature of the business is such that, unless regulated, many persons may
be exposed to misfortunes against which the legislature can properly protect
them”, emphasis added).
[5] U.S. Constitution, Amendment 6,
Right to Counsel.
[6] 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), Proceedings in
vindication of civil rights, attorney’s fees.
[7] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[8] Matter of Giuliani, 2021 NY
Slip Op 04086, 197 AD3d 1 (1st Dept., June 24, 2021)..
[9] See e.g. Moliterno, James
E. Politically Motivated Bar Discipline,
83 WASH. U. L. Q. 725 (2005).
[10] See Storace, Robert. Attorney Miller Believes Deck Is Stacked
Against Her for Reinstatement to State Bar.
Civil rights attorney Josephine Smalls Miller will make her case for
reinstatement to the state bar on Sept. 1, Connecticut Law Tribune, August 21,
2021.
[11]
New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)..
[12] See e.g. Jones, Ira. Critical Race Theory Remakes Connecticut
School District | National Review, Indiana Conservatives for reason, July 19,
2021.
[13] Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916).