New York follows California to create its own Brock Turner syndrome for a prominent and rich lawyer and sends women a clear message: you and your safety are dispensable when a rich lawyer is your assailant

New York judiciary is famous for gutting its anti-sexual harassment policy to defeat the lawsuit of a female attorney who was fired because she complained in writing against sexual harassment of a Supreme Court Justice of the State of New York who tried to force her to live with him as "man and wife" and talk to him in a "feminine singsong voice".

While fighting her detailed lawsuit, New York invented a completely crazy argument - that attorneys, law clerks to State Supreme Court justice in New York are hired not by the State of New York (that pays their salaries and benefits), but are personal employees of said justices - and, as such, certain legal protections of state employees do not apply to them.

And yet, if you think that New York could not sink any lower in continuing to stonewall and batter a victim of sexual harassment by a judge - it should that there is potential for sinking even lower.

As shown by the case of suspension of attorney, a law partner in a New York City "complex commercial and securities litigation" law firm Bragar, Eagle and Squires, P.C. - John Brandon Walker.

Of course, New York State court administration website shows his attorney status as of February 6, 2020 as still active, with "no record of public discipline".

While he was suspended 2 days prior.

Of course, on the website he is not listed as a partner of Bragar, Eagle and Squires, P.C. (yet another disciplinary violation) - but he actually listed as such on the law firm's website.

And - he has been suspended, for a whopping 4 months, after conviction for DRUNKEN ASSAULT ON A WOMAN he was dating.

And, guess what - here is the timeline of his "accomplishments":

1.  March 5, 2016, nearly 4 years ago - the drunken assault;
2.  April 27, 2017 - he pled guilty to a "reckless assault", in exchange of a sentence of NO JAIL, a "conditional discharge" and an alcohol abuse counseling.
3.  Suspended only on February 4, 2020, 3 YEARS AFTER THE CONVICTION!!!  And for 4 months only.

Gee.

His conduct was "disturbing", see?

But, he 

• accepted responsibility;
• has no other disciplinary history, and
• has had a good career - 

which, all in all, amounts to a 4 months' suspension for a convicted VIOLENT CRIMINAL who did THIS to a woman:

• grabbed her by the neck
• chocked her,
• threw her on the floor,
• kicked her ribcage with his foot, 
• leaving her with
• wrist fracture and
• bruises on her
• throat
• head, and
• wrist

Alcohol abuse counseling, and a 4 months' suspension - 3 years after the conviction.  Indeed!  That will remedy a lot.

And, his so-called "remorse" means much, I am sure, too.

Now, here is his information from the website of his law firm that may shed some light as to why the wheels of justice in his case were dragging so slowly and amounted in such a pathetic and disgraceful show of disdain to the law and to women's safety among the members of the "legal" profession regulated by the New York judiciary.

First, the "big picture" of the "hero", front and center.   Women should know him by face - and stay away.

The picture is also from his law firm's website.

As is this information about his "good career":

So, even though he was admitted to practice law in New York only in 2010, he is listed as having worked for a law firm Motley Rice as an "associate" for 2 years without a license - from 2008 to 2012.  This is a crime, too, as well as a disciplinary violation for both sides - employer and employee - but, neither he nor the law firm were prosecuted, and the information is remaining proudly online.

The next endeavor in this violent criminal's "good career" was a gig in yet another large law firm where people are not hired "from the street", just like in the previous one, Motley Rice - now he worked 4 years as an associate in Kirby McInerney LLP, and then, for 1 year - as a partner there.

And then, moved on to an even greener pasture, Bragar, Eagel and Squire, P.C., as a partner.

If salaries in big New York City law firms 5 years ago for a 1st year associate were $160,000 a year, you may imagine how much a law partner in such a firm is making.

Which actually explains why he has been given NO JAIL TIME in criminal court and just a 4 months' suspension in disciplinary court.

Such a New York City Brock Turner - oh, no, he did not rape the victim, supposedly, thank God for small wonders.

But, he was treated by judges of two courts just the same way as Brock Turner was treated by a California judge - as a rich privileged brat who is above the law.  Because he has a "good career" - thanks to his good "bloodline", no doubt.

It bears to provide the disciplinary decision here in its full glory:

======================

Matter of Walker

Matter of Walker 2020 NY Slip Op 00835 Decided on February 4, 2020 Appellate Division, First Department Per Curiam Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on February 4, 2020 SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION First Judicial Department 

Hon. David Friedman,Justice Presiding,
Judith J. Gische (adjunct professor, New York Law School)
Angela M. Mazzarelli
Ellen Gesmer
Cynthia S. Kern,Justices.
M-6828

[*1]In the Matter of John B. Walker, (admitted as John Brandon Walker), an attorney and counselor-at-law: Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department, Petitioner, John B. Walker, Respondent.

Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, John Brandon Walker, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Third Judicial Department on May 27, 2010.

Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney,

Attorney Grievance Committee, New York

(Raymond Vallejo, of counsel), for petitioner.

Michael S. Ross, Esq., for respondent.

PER CURIAM 

Respondent John B. Walker was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Third Judicial Department on May 27, 2010, under the name John Brandon Walker. At all times relevant to this proceeding, he has maintained an office for the practice of law within the First Judicial Department.

The Attorney Grievance Committee (Committee) commenced this disciplinary proceeding by a petition of charges (Judiciary Law § 90[2], and Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.8), alleging that respondent was guilty of certain misconduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) based upon his conviction for reckless assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00[2]) in that he engaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer, in violation of rule 8.4(b) and that he engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness as a lawyer, in violation of rule 8.4(h).

Responded admitted liability to the charges (Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rules 8.4[b] and [h]), and the parties filed a joint statement of undisputed facts. Following a hearing before a Referee as to sanction only, the Committee sought imposition of a one-year suspension, while respondent urged a public censure. By a report, the Referee recommended a public censure be imposed.

The Committee now moves for an order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.8(b)(1), affirming the findings of the Referee and imposing a sanction this Court deems appropriate. The Committee also moves for an order sealing Staff Exhibits 1-10 and Respondent's Exhibits B and C. Respondent seeks an order affirming the findings of the Referee and imposing a censure, as recommended by the Referee.

For the reasons set forth below, we now grant the Committee's motion to the extent of suspending respondent for a period of four months and grant its request to seal Staff Exhibits 1-10 and Respondent's Exhibits B and C.

Respondent's criminal conviction arose from his assault on a woman he met through a dating website. A year after the assault, on April 27, 2017, respondent pleaded guilty to reckless assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00[2]), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to a one-year conditional discharge and ordered to receive alcohol abuse counseling for one year, with periodic reporting every three to four months. Respondent fully complied with the sentence.

At the sanction hearing, the Committee presented the complainant as its sole witness. Respondent testified on his own behalf and presented three character witnesses. The Referee's report related the following information. On March 5, 2016, respondent and the complainant met for drinks at a restaurant. After several hours of drinking, they left the restaurant and went to respondent's apartment. While at respondent's apartment, the two began to kiss while sitting on respondent's couch. Respondent, who was highly intoxicated, asserted that he blacked out for an unspecified period of time. The complainant asserted that respondent grabbed her by the neck, choked her, threw her on the floor and kicked her ribcage with his foot. The Referee expressly found that complainant's assertions that she feared for her life during the attack were credible. As a result of respondent's actions, complainant suffered bruises on her neck, throat, and ribcage, contusions on her head, a scaphoid fracture, and bruises on both wrists, and continues to suffer psychologically and emotionally.

The Referee concluded that respondent's attack was aberrational and not in his character, noted that he has no disciplinary history, and respondent presented overwhelming evidence of his good professional and personal relationships. Respondent's three character witnesses and 20 character letters convincingly testified to his deep remorse and acceptance of responsibility, which the Referee noted were also palpable at the hearing. In further mitigation, the Referee found that the character witnesses described someone deeply devoted to his girlfriend, family, friends, colleagues and clients. The Referee found, however, there was no indication of any pro bono activity.

In ordering the appropriate sanction, we consider the seriousness of respondent's assault. 

Respondent's misconduct of drinking to the point of blacking out and assaulting a woman in his [*2]home is disturbing and was appropriately the subject of criminal proceedings. However, we also consider that respondent has accepted responsibility for his misconduct, has expressed sincere remorse, cooperated with the Committee and has an unblemished disciplinary history. Moreover, the character witnesses' universal opinion regarding the aberrational nature of respondent's behavior and his otherwise good character and fitness to practice are compelling.

On the issue of sanction, this Court generally accords significant weight to the recommendation of the referee (see Matter of Shearer, 94 AD3d 128, 132 [1st Dept 2012]).

However, in certain circumstances we will depart from the referee's recommended sanction (see Matter of Clarke, 71 AD3d 33, 38-39 [1st Dept 2009]; Matter of Mahoney, 56 AD3d 169, 176-77 [1st Dept 2008]). In our view, this is such an instance. A review of the cases cited by respondent and the Committee convinces us that respondent's misconduct in this case is more comparable to those cases imposing a suspension (see Matter of Tabacco, 171 AD3d 163 [1st Dept 2019]; Matter of Zulandt, 93 AD3d

77 [1st Dept 2012]; Matter of Jacoby, 86 AD3d 330 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Matter of Salami, 157 AD3d 37, 40 [2d Dept 2017]). The evidence before the Referee clearly established the seriousness of respondent's assault on an intimate partner. Even when taking into consideration the mitigating circumstances, a period of suspension for such an assault is warranted in order to maintain the honor and integrity of the profession and deter others from committing similar misconduct (22 NYCRR 1240.8[b][2]).

The Committee also seeks an order sealing Staff Exhibits 1-10, and Respondent Exhibits B and C, which contain photographs and text and email exchanges between respondent and complainant. After reviewing the record, and considering the sensitive nature of the exhibits contained therein, this Court grants the request (see Matter of Scudieri, 174 AD3d 168, 173-74 [1st Dept 2019]).

Accordingly, the Committee's motion is granted to the extent of suspending respondent for a period of four months and until further order of the Court, and sealing Staff Exhibits 1-10 and Respondent's Exhibits B and C.

All concur.

Order filed. [February 4, 2020]

=======================

Now.

USUALLY, if there is a court order, and especially a criminal court order as a basis of discipline, there is NO HEARING given to an attorney subject to discipline.   None at all, not for the facts, not for the discipline.

It is called "collateral estoppel".

Here there was a criminal conviction for assault, a plea of guilty in criminal court - but, there is no mentioning of the Committee submitting to the court, or Referee reviewing - the transcript of the plea allocution (where the defendant acknowledged in criminal court what he did and how).

Instead, there was a hearing given ANEW, where the victim had to testify - which is incredible, as compared to how New York usually resolves disciplinary cases where there are underlying court orders.

Let's go further.

The Referee hears the testimony of the victim (after conviction - she is a true victim as a matter of law), establishes her testimony as CREDIBLE, that she has CREDIBLY testified about the following actions and injuries that the attorney has inflicted upon her:

• grabbed her by the neck
• chocked her,
• threw her on the floor,
• kicked her ribcage with his foot, 
• leaving her with
• scaphoid wrist fracture, and
• bruises on her
• throat
• head, and
•  both wrists,

Moreover - the Referee has found credible the victim's testimony that she feared for her life and that she continues to suffer psychologically and emotionally.

And YET, the Referee, having found THIS kind of CREDIBLE testimony, the Referee recommends - "public censure" only, no suspension at all - because John Brandon Walker is such a good man, loves his girlfriend, family, friends, colleagues and clients.

What does his love to other people has to do when he has brutally beaten a woman and put her in real fear that he will kill her?

But no - he is a good boy and that drunk rage where he KICKED A WOMAN IN HER RIBCAGE was totally "aberrational and not in his character".

Now, a drunken state often releases not "aberrational behavior", but, on the opposite, the person's true inner self.

It is hard to imagine a "good boy", no matter how drunk he is, to start kicking a woman, a romantic partner, especially, in her ribcage and to try to choke her.  That comes with entitlement - which this particular "good boy" had in droves.

And both the criminal case with a conditional discharge and counseling, no jail time, for an assault of this seriousness, and the disciplinary slap on the wrist "for remorse and good character witnesses" will only give him more of a sense of entitlement, that he is truly above the law.

A good judge material.

Note in the disciplinary decision, too, that in attorney disciplinary proceedings there are no legislatively set rules as to when a suspension of a license is or is not mandated.

The court, instead, "explores" its own prior decisions, trying to make what it clearly intends to do - let a violent criminal go scot free - a little bit more palpable.

Instead of public censure (no suspension) the court gave John Brandon Walker a 4-months' long vacation from work, to enjoy with his girlfriend, family and friends.

4 women justices and 1 man declared that a woman's health, bodily integrity, safety and life are dispensable - if the assailant is a "good" rich boy.

I wonder how much was donated to these judges behind the scenes to get the required result.

Yet, the fact remains.

New York judiciary suspends lawyers like me for 2 years for - substantiated - criticism of themselves WITHOUT A HEARING, as a matter of "collateral estoppel", based on a decision of a judge who acted, in violation of all plausible and implausible constitutional rules, as a complainint witness, alleged victim, prosecutor and adjudicator in the sanctions proceeding that he then turned into the disciplinary court to rubber stamp my suspension.

When another woman attorney, a court employee is sexually harassed by a judge, she is fired and the judge has kept both his position and his law license, to this day, and is supervising judge of all courts imaginable:

But, when a rich young lawyer assaults a woman in a drunken rage, breaks her bones, bruises her, chokes her and makes her fear for her life - he gets NO JAIL TIME and a suspension of just 4 months - "to maintain integrity of the legal profession", no less.

While the Referee (I wonder what was his/her name and how much of a bribe he received, too) recommended just PUBLIC CENSURE for a violent assault.

So, criticism of a judge - the female attorney is suspended for 2 years, without a hearing and without opening proceedings to the public, as she requested and had a right, as a matter of law, to do, and in the decision the court cowardly refuses to disclose the true reason for the suspension - criticism of judicial corruption and misconduct.

Because she did not express remorse for doing her professional duty to her clients - ensuring their federal constituitonal right to an impartial judge hearing their case, not the corrupt king of the hill that has run from the bench chased by the FBI several months before my suspension - but I was suspended anyway, for no lawyer should be allowed to criticize regulators of his license, judges, who have positioned themselves well and truly above the law in this country and in the State of New York.

Reporting a judge for SEXUAL harassment - the female attorney is fired, the judge remains in full glory, keeps his black robe and his law license.

Violent assault by a rich young lawyer on a woman, kicking her in the ribcage, breaking her bones, bruising her, choking her and putting her in the fear of her life - why, that's a whole different story.

No jail time in criminal court.

A hearing - instead of a collateral estoppel disciplinary suspension - and just 4 months suspension, for being such a good boy with such a good career.

Integrity of the legal profession.

Indeed.

Why the IDV (integrated domestic violence) courts in New York are blatantly unconstitutional

Both the Federal and the State Constitutions (of all states in the United States) have embedded into them a concept of the so-called separation of powers, with courts not possessing authority of legislative or executive branch.

Yet, courts in New York - as well as across the United States - unconstitutionally legislate in a variety of ways.

Of course, such "legislating from the bench" is always portrayed as being for the good of the people in general and of certain groups of "victims" in particular.

This is exactly the way New York state court system has unconstitutionally created a system of "courts, but not courts" - a variety of "helping courts", such as 

• drug courts, including separate "opioid courts";
• "family treatment courts", and 

- the latest invention -

the so-called "Integrated Domestic Violence Courts".

Here is how the New York Court Administration describes these courts on its website:

Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Courts

What is an Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Court?

IDV Courts are specialized Supreme Court Parts developed to better serve families in crisis. Our current court structure often requires domestic violence victims and their families to appear in multiple courts (in front of multiple judges) to address their criminal, family, matrimonial and other legal problems. IDV Courts, by contrast, are dedicated to the idea of "One family-One judge," allowing a single judge to hear related cases involving domestic violence victims and their families. The goal of the court is to change the way the justice system treats families and children by promoting more informed judicial decision-making, creating consistency in orders of protection and reducing court appearances, as well as providing enhanced services to victims and ensuring defendant accountability. 

What cases are included in the IDV Court?

Related criminal, matrimonial and family court cases filed in the same county which involve a single family may be eligible for the IDV Court. Allegations of criminal domestic violence form the threshold requirement for entry into the IDV part, with related cases in at least two of the three areas of law. Although the cases will be heard in the IDV Court part, each case will retain its individual integrity and will not be consolidated with each other.

How do IDV Courts operate?

The goal of the IDV Court is centered around the coordination of related domestic violence cases, victim safety, defendant accountability and addressing the needs of families affected by domestic violence. IDV Courts are unlike Drug Courts where the focus is on rehabilitation of the criminal defendant. In IDV Courts, judicial monitoring of offenders is a cornerstone of the IDV Court and there is a Compliance Part component to the IDV Court to address the issue of defendant accountability. In addition, IDV Courts also assist families in accessing community services and resources in a coordinated team manner.

How will the transfer of cases into the IDV Court part occur?

An administrative order is issued identifying eligible cases that can be transferred to the IDV Court part. Cases that are eligible for the IDV Court are identified through the contributing courts, along with the cooperation of attorneys, law enforcement, victim advocates, and other community service providers. The ultimate determination as to whether the cases will be transferred to the IDV Court is made by the IDV Court Judge who issues the Transfer Order that is sent to the originating courts, counsel or parties.

Now, why are these courts unconstitutional - and blatantly so?

Well, first of all, they are not provided for by the New York Constitution, or New York legislature.

Second, there is no legislatively set procedure governing operation of these courts.  They are fly-by-night courts formed at the whim of judges and going by whatever "rules" judges create on the go.

Yet, the LIMITED authority of the judicial branch is only to:

• Adjudicate (decide) cases brought in front of courts created by the legislature by parties,
• following legislatively set procedures (rules),
• and in accordance with substantive laws also created by the legislature.

That's it.

The judicial branch is not authorized to create:

• separate courts;
• separate rules for them.

Third, what else is a huge "no-no" for courts is the so-called "pre-judgment" of the case.

And, treating the supposed plaintiffs (or prosecution's complaining witnesses in criminal proceedings) as "victims" and holding courts to "help" them  - before they are actually determined to be victims by the FINAL decision of the respective cases (civil or criminal) - is unconstitutional.

Now, the fourth problem in operaton of such courts is that they - deliberately, on purpose - break JURISDICTIONAL barriers that they are not allowed to break, creating a procedural mess for all cases involved.

The legislature created specific rules of "consolidation" (merging) of court cases.

Here is what the New York Court administration says about consolidating of Family Court, criminal court and Supreme Court cases which are marked "eligible" for the "Integrated Domestic Violence" (IDV) "Courts":

What cases are included in the IDV Court?

Related criminal, matrimonial and family court cases filed in the same county which involve a single family may be eligible for the IDV Court. Allegations of criminal domestic violence form the threshold requirement for entry into the IDV part, with related cases in at least two of the three areas of law. Although the cases will be heard in the IDV Court part, each case will retain its individual integrity and will not be consolidated with each other.

Once again:

"Although the cases will be heard in the IDV Court part, each case will retain its individual integrity and will not be consolidated with each other. "

Of course, no explanation is given as to how, in practice, such cases will be merged, but not merged.

And, there is a reason for this vagueness.

As I mentioned above, in New York there are strict, legislatively set, rules of consolidation of court cases.

1. A criminal case may never be consolidated with a civil case - from Family Court or from the Suprem Court (the lower general jurisdiction court in the State of New York is called "Supreme Court").
2. A Family Court domestic violence case (Article 8 of the Family Court Act) may never be consolidated with a Supreme Court divorce case.

And, finally, there may not be a "one family - one judge" case (even if consolidation of criminal and civil cases were allowed) when:

1.  there is a combination of a Family Court domestic violence (Article 8) case and a justice court criminal misdemeanor case - because the local Family/County/Surrogate's court judge who is supposed to decide the Family Court case as a TRIAL jurisdiction must serve as an APPELLATE jurisdiction for misdemeanor criminal cases out of local justice courts - and the same judge serving as both a trial and an appellate judge in the same case is unconstituional, the New York State Court of Appeals has confirmed it in a specific precedent on this issue in 2017,  OR WHEN
2. a certain Family Court judge was simply not appointed by the New York Chief Administrative Judge as an "Acting Supreme Court Justice", in other words, a Family Court judge under such circumstances has no authority to hear issues from a divorce case out of a Supreme Court; and
3. If the Family Court judge IS also an Acting Supreme Court justice, he/she may not supersede (cancel) the supposedly existing "random assignment system" assigning judges to court cases, which is operated by the respective Judicial Administrative District.  And, if the judge seeks the so-called "consistency" across these three types of courts, he may just as well direct it to the assigning administrative judge, and not create his own "rules" bypassing assignments.

And, if the domestic violence criminal case is a felony, it may only be adjudicated through an indictment of the grand jury, while a felony case in New York usually starts in a justice court.

So, putting together an initial stage of a felony case out of a justice court that did not yet go through an indictment process adds an additional jurisdictional violation.

So, the supposed "problem" -

What is an Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Court?

IDV Courts are specialized Supreme Court Parts developed to better serve families in crisis. Our current court structure often requires domestic violence victims and their families to appear in multiple courts (in front of multiple judges) to address their criminal, family, matrimonial and other legal problems. IDV Courts, by contrast, are dedicated to the idea of "One family-One judge," allowing a single judge to hear related cases involving domestic violence victims and their families. The goal of the court is to change the way the justice system treats families and children by promoting more informed judicial decision-making, creating consistency in orders of protection and reducing court appearances, as well as providing enhanced services to victims and ensuring defendant accountability. 

that "Our current court structure often requires domestic violence victims and their families to appear in multiple courts (in front of multiple judges) to address their criminal, family, matrimonial and other legal problems"

may not be resolved administratively by the state Court administration, but must be resolved only legislatively.

4. Moreover, there is a HUGE problem with the difference in the factfinders:

• The Family Court domestic violence case is decided exclusively by a judge (a bench trial);
• In the Supreme Court divorce case some issues may be decided by a jury (grounds for divorce) and the rest of it - by the judge; and
• the criminal case, by the State and Federal Constitution, is decided STRICTLY by the jury - unless the defendant waives his right to a jury trial in writing, 
• in the Supreme Court tort (assault, battery) case the factfinder is also the jury - unless the case is decided by a summary judgment is facts are not in dispute by parties.

5.  Since Family Court domestic violence and Supreme Court divorce and tort cases are considered "civil" cases, they may be decided without a trial at all - by a motion for a "summary judgment".

No summary judgments are allowed in criminal cases, which must be proven by the prosecution to the jury - beyond a reasonable doubt.

6.  There are completely different rules of discovery in civil and criminal cases in New York.

While in criminal court there was - with much theatrics - introduced a so-called "discovery reform", it still did not change the core difference between a civil and a criminal case: availability in civil cases of a 

• LIBERAL (wide) discovery, not a strictly restricted one to certain enumerated positions, and
• most especially - of availability in civil, but not in criminal, cases of the right to FORCE the opponent to answer, under oath, questions asked by a party OUT OF COURT, orally (a deposition) or in writing (an interrogatory, a notice to admit).

7.  Moreover, Family Court domestic violence cases and Supreme Court divorce cases are SEALED - while criminal cases and Supreme Court civil "tort" (assault, battery) cases are OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.

Not to mention that

8.  In criminal cases the defendant has a right to remain silent THROUGHOUT the proceeding, including an appeal from a "guilty" verdict and a sentence, which respondents in Family Court and civil defendants in the Supreme Court do not have, so an "IDV judge" may not force a criminal defendant to talk about his case for any reason whatsoever, defeating the purpose of the "court".

Which means that the only way IDV courts can exist is by forcing criminal defendants to plead guilty in order to "enter" such an "IDV court" - in exchange for some promise of leniency, usually a false promise, just to lure people into a setting where judges can submit such people as captive patients to judges' friends - "providers of services", under the threat of contempt of court.

9.  And, PARTIES in Family Court, Supreme Court and criminal court are different.

• In Supreme Court parties are ONLY the divorcing spouses (their children may be assigned a separate attorney, but they are not mentioned in the court case as separate parties);
• In the Family Court parties to a domestic violence case may be people restricted to categories defined by Article 8 of the Family Court Act;
• In a Supreme Court tort (assault, battery) case there is no restriction on who may be the plaintiff and who the plaintiff may sue as defendant in terms of a family relationship
• In a criminal case the plaintiff is "The People of the State of New York" against the defendant, and the complaining witness of the prosecution (the ALLEGED victim of domestic violence) is not a party in the proceedings at all, 

so, an IDV "court" may not 

1. pre-judge a specific case making an alleged victim a true victim as a matter of law, and make decisions based on such a determination; or
2. make the alleged victim a party in a proceeding where the alleged victim is not a party.

and, last, but not least,

10.  In a Supreme Court divorce case, while issues of domestic violence may be raised if one of the divorcing parties insists on, instead of a "no-fault" divorce (the majority of divorce cases nowadays in New York and an easy adjudication of the grounds), a "cruel and inhuman treatment" - which is not the same, as a matter of New York law, as what is considered "domestic violence" in the Family Court Act, Article 8, THERE IS NO REMEDY provided under the law to the victim of such violence - even if a judge finds that a spouse was, indeed, subjected to "cruel or inhuman treatment".

NO REMEDY means NO REMEDY - a transfer to an IDV "court" may not create such a remedy when the law does not provide for one.

In divorce cases parties often try to claim that the court must take into account domestic violence in dividing property among spouses - but, the law does not allow to take domestic violence into account when dividing property, the issue of domestic violence is irrelevant to the issues of equitable distribution, as a matter of law.

And nearly the same in custody of children.  Violence of one partner against the other, if done outside of the presense, view and/or hearing of children may - and often is - ignored by New York courts in awarding custody of children.

So, as it was shown above, domestic violence cases with issues raised in Family Court, Supreme Court (divorce and tort cases) may not legally be merged with one another, and with criminal cases.

And, hearing them in an IDV "part", by "one family - one judge", actually VIOLATES the law, and constitutional rights of the accused - instead of "helping victims", who, as it was mentioned above, are not "victims" at all before the case has gone through 

•  full discovery, 
• full trial (a jury trial in the criminal and a part of the divorce case), and
• a final verdict is obtained - making the IDV "court" unnecessary.

So, if a case is "identified" as an IDV case and people are forced into an IDV court by an "administrative order", they try to challenge the whole idea of IDV court's existence in federal court, as a violation of multiple constitutional rights:

1.  right to remain silent and for a jury trial - in criminal cases;
2. right to due process, not to have their cases pre-judged by calling complaining wintesses/parties as "victims" before the final decision in the court case;
3. right to an impartial judicial review;
4. right to by tried by a real court, not an administratively created tribunal, like an "IDV court", not set by the State Constitution or legislature;

When saying that 

Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Courts

What is an Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Court?

IDV Courts are specialized Supreme Court Parts developed to better serve families in crisis. Our current court structure often requires domestic violence victims and their families to appear in multiple courts (in front of multiple judges) to address their criminal, family, matrimonial and other legal problems. IDV Courts, by contrast, are dedicated to the idea of "One family-One judge," allowing a single judge to hear related cases involving domestic violence victims and their families. The goal of the court is to change the way the justice system treats families and children by promoting more informed judicial decision-making, creating consistency in orders of protection and reducing court appearances, as well as providing enhanced services to victims and ensuring defendant accountability. 

the creators of the illegal system of the IDV "Courts" know full well that they have NO RIGHT at all to destroy jurisdictional barriers between civil and criminal, Family Court, Supreme Court (divorce and tort) and criminal cases.

Moreover, as one MAJOR problem - creators of such a system know that, if a court does not have jurisdiction over a case (and there is no such thing as an IDV court in New York state laws, so there IS no jurisdiction in IDV courts or "parts"), constitutionally, a person may not legally give consent to such non-existing jurisdiction.

Making all decisions out of such an IDV "Court" void - not void-ABLE, but void, as in ZERO, NULLITY, ZILCH, NOT EXISTING AT ALL.

Which, in turn, makes creation of such courts and financing them with taxpayer money - a huge waste of taxpayer money, on top of being a gross miscarriage of justice.

Once again, you simply may not legally review/try together these vastly different - jurisdictionally, too - cases:

## Issue New York State Family Court New York State Justice Courts New York State County courts New York State Supreme Court . Nature of proceedings Civil Criminal Criminal Civil – Tort (a lawsuit for assault, battery) Civil - DIvorce 1. Purpose of proceedings against domestic violence perpetrators Order of protection Jail time up to a year per episode of DV that is charged as a crime and/or fine and/or restitution Jail time over a year (according to the letter-grade of the charge) and/or fine and/or restitution Monetary compensation/ Damages for the plaintiff, injunctive relief (order of protection) Divorce, Equitable distribution, Custody of children, no remedy for domestic violence other than the divorce 2. Who is the factfinder Judge Jury Jury Jury Jury – grounds for divorce, the rest – judge

So, there are grounds to ask a federal court for a declaratory judgment declaring IDV "Courts" in New York what they very obviously are - unconstitutional.