In this case, federal court said that members of the public (victims of misconduct) have absolutely no say (standing) to complain about non-prosecution of judicial misconduct.
And, the New York Commission for Judicial Conduct has permanent budget constraints, which ostensibly prevents it from properly handling the majority of complaints. That is not true, of course - once I did talk to an investigator from the Commission when I did call them, and the person on the other end refused to send me documents by e-mail citing their "policy", the "policy" being that they are supposed to send out anything they send out only by fax.
Sending anything by fax in our day and time is not only technologically obsolete, but it also has the advantage - for the Commission - that such a transaction does not leave a record of what was sent, unless an e-mail. Some policy.
Moreover, New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct is conflict-ridden. Most members of the Commission are attorneys (whose licenses and livelihoods are regulated by judges) and judges. The public is not allowed to have a say as to competence and integrity of judges, it is all decided behind closed doors by a "good ol' boys' club".
As a result, the majority of judges (double digits with 4-digit number of complaints filed each year) disciplined by the Commission are not licensed attorneys, they are justice court judges who wield much lesser power than those who the Commission allows to continue to sit on the bench, no matter what misconduct they engaged in.
Guess what, the NY Senate has just voted, and the NY Assembly is expected to vote this week on the law establishing a commission to deal with prosecutorial misconduct - fashioned after the useless New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct.
The sad part about this vote is that groups of wrongfully convicted New Yorkers support creation of this dangerous illusion.
Why it is a dangerous illusion?
Well, first of all, if it is fashioned after the Commission for Judicial Conduct, it will work the same way - only then it will be claimed that the mere fact that such a Commission exists is somehow giving the public a remedy against prosecutorial misconduct and the resulting wrongful conviction, which will not be true - as the case Bracci v Becker raising the issue of non-availability of appeals when complaints against judges are dismissed without investigation are filed by victims.
The supposed "remedy" is that there will be yet another group formed out of attorneys and judges, the cause of the problem, to deal with prosecutors behind closed doors, without the public being able to take part in the decisions or to contest it.
There are several problems that the Commission will be unable to meet.
The first is the identity of prosecutors who have caused wrongful convictions for people who have served years in jail.
It is an open secret that "serving" as a criminal prosecutor in the United States (and in the State of New York, too) is the stepping stone to become a judge. The overwhelming majority of American judges are former prosecutors.
The number of convictions is used as the evidence for voters of "being tough on crime" in judicial elections of a prosecutor.
There is a very high probability, therefore, that prosecutors who have gained wrongful convictions are already judges at his time.
If the general rule of attorney discipline is applied to prosecutorial misconduct, that there is no statute of limitations for attorney misconduct (including prosecutorial misconduct), but the prosecutor has become a judge, the following problems appear.
1. judges are regulators of attorney licenses and livelihoods, they will not disbar their own for former prosecutorial misconduct;
2. there is already in place the system of attorney discipline in New York, hearings were held in 2015 before a special commission on attorney discipline, issues that attorney grievance committees refuse to deal with prosecutorial misconduct for political consideration were raised, see testimony of Bill Bastuk before that commission (Bastuk was formerly counsel, coincidentally, for the Judicial Conduct Commission and one of the supporters of a separate commission for prosecutorial conduct fashioned after the useless and conflict-ridden Judicial Conduct Commission where Bastik once worked) and rejected by the commission.
If there is no statute of limitations on attorney misconduct, including prosecutorial misconduct, and attorney disciplinary bodies (under the guidance and as part of courts) have been working in New York for decades, why wasn't prosecutorial misconduct handled through these bodies?
Does it mean that attorney discipline in New York is handled as a selective, political process, and prosecutors are "spared" discipline - after being granted by the U.S. Supreme Court immunity for malicious and corrupt conduct in office specifically because discipline is (theoretically) available?
If that is true - and the Senate's vote to create an alternative Commission for prosecutorial conduct has already proven it - what does it say about the integrity of the judiciary, regulator of attorneys, and of the integrity of those commissions, "arms of the judiciary", consisting of attorneys, sworn "officers of the court"?
And why do we need "regulation" of attorneys - and, through attorneys, of access to courts - that is now admittedly selectively political in nature?
It appears as if the public was duped first by the U.S. Supreme Court - that gave prosecutors immunity from lawsuits for civil rights violations (which are federal crimes, 18 USC 242), and then by state courts and their attorney disciplinary committees who refuse to apply discipline that was used as a pretext to give prosecutors that immunity.
Now, the public is about to be duped for the 3rd time - by expending money on creating and maintaining a "commission" that will block the public from dealing with the issue of prosecutorial misconduct directly.
There is still no remedy, the Commission is not creating a remedy, it is taking it away, and sucking up the much needed funds that could have been used otherwise.
And, there also exists an issue that the secretive Commission can, indeed, be used, but in the way opposite to the declarations of why it is created (same as with attorney discipline) - to disenfranchise the public and remove from office elected public prosecutors who actually do their jobs, but have stepped on toes of powerful public officials.
As attorney discipline was used against Pennsylvania elected public official, Attorney General Kathleen Kane. Kathleen Kane had the misfortune of investigating the very people who suspended her license and caused her demise as an elected public official.
Yet another secretive body to deal with an elected public official, a prosecutor, is a very bad idea.
There is the procedure of impeachment.
As the recent recall of judge Aaron Persky in California showed, matters of misconduct of public officials causing grievous injuries to the public - and wrongful convictions are such injuries - must be subject to a recall of the prosecutor through a referendum.
And, if the same NY Senate put the same effort it did into creation of the useless secretive Commission for Prosecutorial Conduct, consisting predominantly of attorneys and judges and not of non-attorney members of the public:
into legislation abolition of prosecutorial immunity, prosecutorial misconduct would have disappeared overnight.
Only that would not happen - too many careers of too many powerful people depend on that.
So, urge your representatives in the Assembly to vote NO to the creation of the Commission of Prosecutorial Conduct.
It is a dangerous illusion, a waste of much needed public funds, and a delay of the much needed reform in regulation of prosecutors, attorneys, judges and of access to justice in New York.
An important silver lining of the Senate's vote, as I mentioned above, is an admission by the NY Senate that attorney disciplinary committees, "arms of the court", are politically selective in regulation of prosecutors and do not do their jobs in attorney regulation of the only powerful people who have authority to put corrupt attorneys, corrupt prosecutors and corrupt judges (regulators of attorneys) in jail, through grant juries.
It is interesting how the current regulators of attorneys deal with attorney discipline:
- favoritism of the judiciary, regulator of attorneys, specifically to prosecutors, as revealed by the supposed necessity to create a separate body to regulate prosecutors, speaks loud and clear - gifts (immunity and no discipline) to prosecutors in return for non-prosecution of judges (unless prosecutors commit the ultimate no-no and criticize judges - the only prosecutors discipline in New York since the 70s were two prosecutors, the Albany DA Paul David Soares, and the Manhattan DA Elizabeth Holtzmann, for criticizing judges, regulators of their licenses);
- punishment for "regular attorneys" who do not have the power to assemble and advise a grand jury to indict, let's say, a corrupt judge - for speaking out against judicial corruption.
And, the public should demand a legislation on recall of prosecutors (and judges), and a legislation on access to grand juries bypassing prosecutors with their grievances of crimes committed by public officials.
Foxes do not do a good job guarding chicken coops, attorneys (including judges and prosecutors) do not do a good job guarding consumer interests, consumers can do it well themselves.
It is logical and reasonable, especially based on the necessity to create a separate commission to deal with prosecutorial misconduct, for consumers, voters to demand the NY Senate and Assembly to finally do their jobs and promote not legislation lobbied by yet another attorney-senator (as this particular bill's "sponsor" Senator John DeFrancisco is), not a legislation that will give power and jobs to yet another bunch of attorneys while blocking victims of prosecutorial conduct from having a remedy for wrongful convictions, but through an independent public review.
And that independent public review, the "sunrise review" of a packet of legislation to revamp the public's access to court and to criminal justice, should exclude SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS at every single stage of it:
- market survey - by independent experts only, not connected to attorneys, prosecutors or judiciary;
- bill sponsoring - not by attorneys ("officers of the court") whose license and livelihood, theirs and their family members' (like John DeFrancisco's son with whom he co-owns a law firm) are in the hands of those same people who fail to regulate attorneys properly - which caused the Senator to veer the public away from the actual problems, prosecutorial immunity, lack of public access to grand juries, lack of recall procedures for public officials;
- composition of any publicly funded bodies, or bodies having power of investigation or prosecution.