Published the first book on defense of parents in child abuse and neglect cases in New York Family Courts

I have finally published today the first of the books I have been working on for a long time - the beginning of the series "Defense of parents in child neglect and abuse proceedings in Family Court in New York".
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Update as of March 25, 2018: Amazon.com listed the book as a "#1 new release in Parent/Juvenile Family Law"

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Here is the cover of the book, it is available right now in both the Kindle (electronic) format, and in a paper format on Amazon.com.

As far as I know, there are no other books available on the issue of trial advocacy on behalf of parents in child neglect and abuse cases at all, and in such cases in New York Family Courts in particular.

This subject is not taught in law schools and is not tested on bar examinations, so there is no guarantee for the parent, if the parent either hires an attorney or has an attorney assigned to him in court, that the attorney actually knows this area of law - because attorneys usually learn this law by either self-teaching or being mentored by other attorneys.

This first book of the planned series is dedicated to the subject that causes the most number of fatal mistakes made by parents at the very beginning of CPS investigation, before any court case is filed and before any attorney gets into the picture - the mistake of believing the CPS that the case is "civil" in nature, that no criminal investigation is done at the same time as the CPS investigation in every single case.

Believing CPS (and police who often comes with CPS to the parent's home), parents talk to CPS, open their homes for their searches, and sign any number of papers driven by fear that otherwise the parent will lose his child.

The book provides an overview of statutes showing that proceedings in Family Court may be constitutionally characterized as criminal in nature; and, even if courts resist that characterization, provides techniques of proving to the Family Court, in the event the parent is called to testify against himself, which CPS often do, that the parent is entitled to the 5th Amendment protection, not to testify and not to be subject to contempt of court for refusing to testify.

The book has an extensive case study, with an analysis of constitutionality of court decisions, as well as with an analysis of mistakes that have caused the drastic consequences for the parent.

While the electronic format of the book does not allow a lot of latitude in providing lists of authorities, the table of authorities is included in the paper version of the book.

Buyers of the paper version of the book are allowed to get the electronic version of the book at a deep discount.

While the electronic version may be convenient to take with you on our phone or tablet without showing what you are reading, a paper book can be conveniently used by parents, law students and attorneys working in this area of law because of the listing of all legal authorities.

Statutes in this area of law are written in a deliberately confusing, convoluted way, and attorneys with large caseloads often do not have time to do the kind of research that was presented in this book.

The book contains a section explaining how to transform texts of New York statutes into a readable format to make them more understandable.  Examples of such transformations, and what such a transformation does to improve understanding of such statutes is provided.

The book contains constitutional analysis on important issues relevant to the topic of the book, criminal aspects of "civil" child neglect and abuse proceedings in New York Family Courts, including but not limited to:

• analysis of what makes a court proceeding civil or criminal in nature, from a constitutional standpoint;
• analysis of several contempt and contempt-like statute that may be used against parents by Family Courts in order to put parents in jail for "non-compliance" with various court orders, a detailed analysis, based on mandatory precedents, of constitutionality of such statutes, and of constitutionality of Family Court practices in application of such statutes;
• verification what makes a contempt proceeding civil or criminal in nature, what is the difference in mandatory constitutional procedure, and how Family Courts often confuse or misuse criminal-in-nature contempt statutes under the guise of civil proceedings;
• constitutional issues involved in forced "evaluations";
• constitutional issues involved in forced drug-and-alcohol testing;
• constitutional issues involved in court orders giving social services a blanket authority to "supervise" parents and to order them to undergo any "evaluations" and tests at all, and procedures required by the Family Court Act and by the U.S. Constitution to be followed by courts to issue such orders;
• constitutional issues involved in branding parents "sex offenders" where they were never convicted (and often were never even charged) for a sex offense, the New York State policy of such branding that comes with a requirement to separate the so-branded parent from his children;
• constitutional issues of punishing parents for inability to pay for evaluations, or for asserting their true legal status as a non-sex offender;
• constitutional issues of punishing parents for any type of "noncompliance" by separating them from their children, or by threats of such separations;
• constitutional issues involved in forced speech of parents during the "civil" Family Court child abuse or neglect proceedings - in court-ordered evaluations and in forced testimony of parents, when they are called to testify against themselves at trial;
• constitutional issues involved in presence of criminal prosecutors in Family Court proceedings and of their access to record of such proceedings and of the central state child maltreatment register;
• constitutional issues and procedures related to three types of searches in Family Court - of the parent's home, body and mind.

I hope that the book will be helpful, as a textbook and a reference in this sensitive and difficult area of law.

A judge is allowed to torture a defendant in open court with electric shock without consequences for the judge - and is taught by the appellate court how to punish the defendant for suing the judge and making a motion to recuse again, and in a way that the appellate court will accept

I have written a lot on this blog about retaliation by the judiciary against anybody who dares to even try to ensure in any court proceeding a litigant's federal constitutional right to an impartial judicial review.

Parties and their attorneys are sanctioned, attorneys are suspended or disbarred, in May of 2016 in the State of Nevada, a public defender was handcuffed, and in October of 2016 in federal court in the State of Oregon, an attorney who was making a legal argument on behalf of his client was

• physically tackled by 9 U.S. marshals;
• tasered;
• handcuffed;
• arrested;
• taken into custody; and
• charged with contempt of court.

But, all of that was outdone by a Texas judge - still on the bench - George Gallagher.



After he was sued by a criminal defendant in federal court:

"Morris contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his counsel's motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest, as Morris had filed a lawsuit against his counsel in federal court"; "[w]hen Morris continued to speak and mentioned his motion to recuse and federal lawsuit against the trial judge, the trial judge asked his bailiff to intervene by activating the stun belt attached to Morris' leg" (by the way, the lawsuit was hidden from public view, and is not accessible on Pacer, I checked),

Judge Gallagher obviously devised a very interesting point of retaliation against the presumed-innocent criminal defendant.

First, he refused to allow the defendant's attorney, a public defender, to withdraw - because the defendant was suing his own attorney, too.

That created an interesting situation:  the defendant was "represented by counsel", and for that reason, only his counsel (who the defendant was suing, and who was, thus, angry at the defendant and unwilling to do his job for the defendant) could make any motions, including motions to recuse.

And, of course, the public defender was not making any such motions.  The court cannot even accept for filing written motions from represented parties filing pro se.

Which, as the judge correctly predicted, provoked the defendant to make such a motion, for lack of other opportunity, right during the trial, in open court.

And boy was Judge George Gallagher prepared for that occasion.

Criminal defendant - kept in pretrial detention - was not allowed to take a shower properly, which caused his DEFENDER, his own attorney, to make a speech in front of the jury IN HIS DEFENSE pointing out that his client smells badly.  That's some defender...

Yet, while not being allowed to follow minimum sanitary norms - which could be done intentionally, to incite the jury against the "smelly" defendant, and the defendant's own attorney (sued by the defendant and who the judge refused to allow to withdraw) made sure the jury would notice - the local Sheriff had enough time to follow George Gallagher ILLEGAL order (not following the preliminary required procedure) and to outfit the defendant for trial with a 50 000 Volt electric shocker-belt.

And, during the trial, when the defendant tried to preserve his right to impartial judicial review - and to preserve the issue of judicial bias on appeal - the judge gave repeated orders to the court attendant to torture the defendant with electric shocks. 50 000 volts each time.

And the court attendant did so - in front of multiple witnesses who, including the defendant's own attorney, did NOTHING to stop the torture.

After the torture, the judge was not arrested.

Instead, he was allowed to continue with the trial - in the defendant's absence.

And, if you think the defendant was given medical assistance after torture - you will be mistaken.

He was taken to a "holding cell".

And, if you think the judge stopped the trial to allow the defendant to regain his health and ability to "assist" his attorney (whom he was suing) in his defense, you are mistaken, too.

Judge Gallagher proceeded with the trial right away, in the defendant's absence.

Of course, by the time of sentencing, the judge magnanimously sent a court attendant to ask whether the defendant wanted to appear in court.

And, when the defendant told the court attendant that he is fearing further torture, the court attendant gave the defendant a fatherly advice - just do not "run your mouth against the judge" (read: "do not make any more motions to recuse, or any other legal arguments that your attorney who you are suing is not willing to make on your behalf"), and everything will be hunky-dory.

Well, the defendant, for some inexplicable reason, still continued to fear the torture and did not come for the sentencing.

And, the judge considered that "failure to come to the courtroom" to be "voluntary", and continued with the sentencing stage.

Where the defendant's attorney (who the defendant sued and who the judge refused to allow to withdraw) said the following to the jury in his closing speech:

"You may not like Terry Morris. I don't like him. Kind of rude. Smells bad, you know."

That's SOME defender!

He did not have a voice to make a motion to recuse on behalf of his client.

He did not have a voice to refuse to proceed to trial while he was sued by his own client.

He did not have a voice to protest his client being tortured in open court for making legal arguments.

He did not have a voice to protest his client not being given medical assistance after torture.

He did not make a motion to recuse the judge BECAUSE he tortured his clients.

He did not make a motion to recuse the judge and did not protest for the order that the trial should proceed in the defendant's presence, while the defendant was JUST tortured and needed long, long time to recover before he could reasonably be ready to stand trial.

But, he somehow found his voice, in his client's absence, behind his back, to say that:

• the attorney did not like his own client (likely, for suing the attorney);
• that the client was rude, and
• that the client smelled bad.

That was a "defense", in a case that has sent the man to prison for 60 years.

But, the glory of this case is not even the well-groomed torturer #JudgeGeorgeGallagher

who still holds his law license and is still on the bench.

These three good-looking and obviously smart women did not put ONE SINGLE WORD into the case - while reversing it because of "egregious" conduct of the judge that the judge was BIASED and should not hear the case again, on remand.

In fact, they not only sent the case back to the torturer judge (and to the attorney who hates his client and was already instrumental to intentionally obtain a 60-year sentence for him), but they practically TAUGHT Judge George Gallagher how to punish the defendant who dared to sue the judge in federal court - so that the punishment would stick and not be reversed on appeal:

"We agree with the State that the trial court was within its power to order Morris removed from the courtroom for his conduct; disrespect of the court, talking out of turn, and disrupting proceedings are recognized as valid reasons to exclude a defendant from proceedings (and had that been the only thing the trial court did in the lead up to Morris' removal, this case would be an easy affirmance)".

That's what the New York 3rd Department court did in 2006.

It remanded a case where a judge punished an attorney for making a motion to recuse incorrectly (instead of simply dismissing the self-serving sanctions of the judge), to the same judge, with an instruction for the then-Rensellaer County Judge Cristian Hummel (who was also not arrested for the federal crime, 18 U.S.C. 242, violation of constitutional rights, 1st Amendment retaliation, and who instead was promoted to become a federal magistrate in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York) how to punish an attorney better on remand.

And boy, did Judge Cristian Hummel do that - see the transcript of a hearing of that galore of punishment where Judge Cristian Hummel acted as a "victim", unsworn witness, accuser, prosecutor and adjudicator - he even marked his own exhibits instead of the court clerk.

Our three ladies of the Texas Appellate Court, of course, outdid the New York State's 3rd Department appellate court - after all, Cristian Hummel did not use electric shocks on attorneys or parties for making motions to recuse (at least, not just yet).

Let's go over the instruction to Judge Gallagher as to what to do on remand from the Texas Appellate Court once again:

"We agree with the State that the trial court was within its power to order Morris removed from the courtroom for his conduct; disrespect of the court, talking out of turn, and disrupting proceedings are recognized as valid reasons to exclude a defendant from proceedings (and had that been the only thing the trial court did in the lead up to Morris' removal, this case would be an easy affirmance)".

A new rule, therefore, emerges in Texas:

a criminal defendant can be denied effective assistance of counsel by being forced to accept an attorney who the defendant is SUING - and will have absolutely no recourse, because if such defendant dares to make motions to recuse in open court, 

"the trial court [will be] within its powers to order [such defendant] removed from the courtroom for his conduct; disrespect of the court, talking out of turn, and disrupting proceedings".

Do not disrupt proceedings with your silly constitutional arguments - that's the new rule.

And, by the way, the court pointed out a very interesting thing, indicating why the appellate court did not overrule Judge Gallagher's refusal to grant the defendant's request to remove the defense attorney who he was suing:

"The State asserts that any error the trial court made in shocking Morris three times for his disobedience and disrespect of the trial court was waived by Morris' failure to object, both at the time he was fitted for the stun belt and each time the trial court electrocuted him."

Consider the morality of a prosecutor - who, as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Berger v United States in 1935, 

"is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one".

With that dual obligation in mind, let's reread what prosecution in that case said - and the prosecutor was ALSO not disqualified from this case for bias by the Texas appellate court:

"The State asserts that any error the trial court made in shocking Morris three times for his disobedience and disrespect of the trial court was waived by Morris' failure to object, both at the time he was fitted for the stun belt and each time the trial court electrocuted him."

The logic is:

the defendant waived his "objections to being tortured" with 50 000 shocks, and thus objections to judicial bias - because his COUNSEL (who defendant was suing and who the judge refused to remove from the case and who gladly remained on the case to be able to retaliate against his own client for suing him and to tell the jury that his own attorney did not like the defendant, that the defendant was "rude" and "smells bad") did not make objections on his behalf.

So, the case is going back:

• to the same judge;
• the same prosecutor; and
• the same criminal defense attorney

with instructions how to DO THE SAME THING to the defendant - deprive him of a fair trial, including by throwing him out of court and conducting a criminal trial in his absence, BECAUSE HE TRIES TO DO A JOB ON HIS OWN BEHALF THAT HIS CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY INTENTIONALLY DOES NOT WANT TO DO - only without torture.

That's some rule of law.

Impeachment, disbarment and criminal charges against George Gallagher are clearly in order, as well as impeachment and criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. 242 (violation of civil rights) against:

Texas appellate judges:

• #AnnCrawfordMcClure;
• #YvonneTRodriguez;
• #GinaMPalafox -

and against all prosecutors who handled this case.

Proceeding to trial after the defendant was tortured, in his absence, and, especially, making arguments on appeal that the defendants "waived objections to torture" because his attorney (sued by defendant) stood there and did not say a word, relishing in the torture of his client - is an all-time low that should garner these prosecutors a disbarment.

And, my question to the Texas judicial disciplinary authorities, Texas state criminal prosecutors, and federal criminal prosecutors:

what else do you need to charge Judge Gallagher with multiple assault charges in addition to these statements from the court case:

"[w]hen Morris continued to speak and mentioned his motion to recuse and federal lawsuit against the trial judge, the trial judge asked his bailiff to intervene by activating the stun belt attached to Morris' leg";

"THE DEFENDANT: Sir, that's beside the point. There's serious allegations that I have in the United States District Court against this man. No one wants to be represented by someone they have a lawsuit against. No one wants a judge to preside over their case who the lawsuit is against. No one wants to be tortured because they're an MHMR defendant prevented from saying anything in the Court in front of the jury pertaining to any such cases such as the grand jury –

THE COURT: Mr. Morris, are you going to answer my question?

THE DEFENDANT: I've asked you, I've filed a motion asking --

THE COURT: Would you hit him again.

(Deputy complies)

THE DEFENDANT: -- to recuse yourself from the Bench off my case.

After electrocuting Morris a third time, the trial court again asked Morris whether he would be obedient. When Morris did not answer with a “yes” or “no,” the trial court had Morris physically removed from the courtroom".

Oh, I completely forgot - criminal prosecutors, those with a constitutional "dual role" to be fair to the defendant - will never charge Judge Gallagher.

First, the judiciary holds in their hands the law license and livelihood of each state prosecutor.

And, second, a prosecutor will never shoot himself in the foot by filing criminal charges against the judge who tortured the defendant and gave a victory, no matter how unfair - to that same prosecutor.

The "obedience" part:

After electrocuting Morris a third time, the trial court again asked Morris whether he would be obedient. When Morris did not answer with a “yes” or “no,” the trial court had Morris physically removed from the courtroom"

was sustained on appeal - where the appellate court said that, but for the torture, the judge was absolutely correct for removing a criminal defendant for insisting on his right to a fair trial, an attorney without a conflict of interest and a judge without a conflict of interest:

"We agree with the State that the trial court was within its power to order Morris removed from the courtroom for his conduct; disrespect of the court, talking out of turn, and disrupting proceedings are recognized as valid reasons to exclude a defendant from proceedings (and had that been the only thing the trial court did in the lead up to Morris' removal, this case would be an easy affirmance)".

And, the appellate court allowed Judge Gallagher a second chance to "teach a lesson" to the "disobedient" criminal defendant - now the "right way", so that the retaliation will now stick on appeal.

When dementia strikes a judge...

I wrote on this blog about several federal judges who were stricken with grave mental illness, but the system refused to acknowledge that until there was no denying the fact - a judge gets into a rehab for an alcoholic delirium, or goes wandering in his car and gets lost in the woods, not knowing where he is or what he is doing.

It appears that something like that is starting to  happen to the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

And dementia is the kindest way to characterize what the judge has been doing lately.

Throughout social media, this image keeps occurring.

On my feed, it is constantly offered as a "suggested post".

I don't think anybody forced Judge Ginsburg (I cannot bring myself to call her a "justice", "justice" has a connotation that I cannot possibly ascribe to Ruth Ginsburg) to sell and advertise T-shirts with herself, the retired judge O'Connor and two other sitting judges of the U.S. Supreme Court - Kagan and Sotomayor - on it.

If anybody did, Judge Ginsburg is even more overdue with her retirement.

But, whatever her reasoning for doing this was, selling T-shirts to promote the cause of a group "We Miss The 44th POTUS" while stubbornly presiding over cases of "The 45th POTUS" and while consistently making public statements against "The 45th" is outside of enough.

Retire already.

Refusal of American courts to enforce a $9 billion Ecuadorian judgment was based on bribery?

I wrote in August of 2016 about a completely crooked decision of an American court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, that took an exception to its usual doctrine that a court does not have final jurisdiction to sit in appeal of a final judgment of a court of the state (or of another country) - and refused to enforce a 9-billion-dollar verdict against Chevron.

Of course, when such decisions are made, the question is not whether judges were bribed, the question is - when will it be revealed to the public and who and how much was bribed.

Fast-forward 1.5 years, things started to pop up.

First, it came out that a judge who refused to enforce the judgment against Chevron appointed as a Special Master his own former law partner who was paid by Chevron.

Second, it came out that Chevron paid $2 million to its leading witness in a bench trial.

And, third, it came out that Chevron is now trying to have the lawyer who fought for Ecuadorans hurt by Chevron and won that judgment for them in the first place - in Ecuador - disbarred in the United States.

Oh, well.