THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:
"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.
“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).
“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.
It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.
" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.
"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.
“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.
Saturday, March 4, 2017
100% of reprisal cases in federal pilot whistleblower protection program was decided against whistleblowers. Matches 98% cases decided against whistleblower attorneys
Here is the report to Congress.
The report indicates that 100% of reprisal cases against whistleblowers heard by the "pilot program" (44 out of 44) were decided AGAINST whistleblowers, so there is no whistleblower protection, even in a program that was specifically created and designed to provide such protection.
The number, 100%, matches, with only a slight deviation, the number in cases of discipline against attorneys who criticized judges - according to attorney Paul Ogden of Indiana, who did the research, such cases were decided against whistleblower attorneys in 98% of cases.
So, as Judge Andrew Napolitano said before in his book I keep coming back to,
The numbers are disheartening.
And, while the U.S. Congress reviews the report and prepares to take action on it, it should also take action on all whistleblower reprisals by the government in the country - and especially on reprisals against attorney whistleblowers, which prevents effective access of the public to impartial judicial review.
Thursday, March 2, 2017
Delaware County (NY) Sheriff's Department violates Freedom of Information Law - as a matter of policy
My very first FOIL was fulfilled by the County only after I complained to the NYS Committee on Open Government many years ago, and the Committee interfered.
Yet, Delaware County did not learn its lessons and continues to violate FOIL, now under its new Acting County Attorney Amy Merklen.
Here is the webpage of the County's Sheriff's Department stating conditions of access to records under FOIL.
The conditions violate FOIL in two areas:
- Fees, and
- a policy of blocking release of public records during the pendency of a criminal proceeding.
- If people ask for scanned copies, they get the records for free, if the agency has a scanner that help the agency scan records as fast as the agency can produce copies. Of course, the County at this time is stalling my demand to certify that they do not have an inventory of scanning equipment, but I assure FOIL inquirers with the County that I have seen a fast-speed scanner in the County Department of Social Services with my own eyes, and, unless it has been stolen or sold since then (and I FOILed the County about the movement of printing, scanning and copying equipment, too), it should still be there, so the County cannot pretend it has nothing to scan records for purposes of FOIL requests.
- People can come and review ORIGINALS of records on site, during business hours of the agency. No fee should be charged for that.
- People can bring their own copier or scanner to the agency and make their own copies or scans with their own equipment from the originals of public records. No fee should be charged for that. Any smart phone or tablet can take pretty good pictures of records, and there is also such a technological wonder as wand scanners with wifi and large expandable memory - available in stores, as far as I know, under $100.
That is an illegal policy.
There is a presumption of disclosure in Freedom of Information Law, and an agency can only deny access to records based on a provision that is in that statute.
Of course, the Delaware County Sheriff's Department did not cite to any statutory provision for its policy of denying access to public records "in regards to" a pending criminal case until the criminal case concludes.
The Sheriff CAN deny access to records in connection with a criminal case in response to a FOIL request if:
- such disclosure will interfere with a criminal investigation - but a court case is STARTED only when the investigation is FINISHED, so that section does not apply; or if
- such disclosure will interfere with judicial administration, with a pending court case - that reason must be stated each time, in response to each specific FOIL request, with a specific explanation as to how request for specific records in a specific FOIL request would interfere with a specific criminal case. This exemption is not a blanket policy exemption allowing denial of access to records "in regards" to any pending criminal case.
There are, of course, records that cannot be disclosed during the pendency - or even after conclusion - of a criminal case.
Those are:
- materials of the grand jury proceedings;
- documents subject to attorney-client privilege (here, the attorney is the prosecutor, and the "client" is, presumably, the police);
- documents pertaining to trial strategy (correspondence regarding the trial between the District Attorney and the Sheriff);
- possibly, but not necessarily, list of witnesses to be called at trial;
- records disclosing the identity of witnesses who are confidential informants;
- investigative techniques of law enforcement which, if disclosed, will thwart future investigations or jeopardize lives;
- medical or mental health records of a detained criminal defendant.
But, that's about all.
And, the presumption of disclosure still applies to records sought under FOIL, even if they are "related to litigation".
The Committee on Open Government issued an advisory opinion on that same topic, citing to some New York Court of Appeals cases on the subject:
"FOIL does not require that the party requesting records make any showing of need, good faith or legitimate purpose; while its purpose may be to shed light on governmental decision-making, its ambit is not confined to records actually used in the decision-making process (Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Kimball, 50 NY2d 575, 581.)
Full disclosure by public agencies is, under FOIL, a public right and in the public interest, irrespective of the status or need of the person making the request.
"CPLR article 31 proceeds under a different premise, and serves quite different concerns.
While speaking also of 'full disclosure' article 31 is plainly more restrictive than FOIL.
Access to records under CPLR depends on status and need.
With goals of promoting both the ascertainment of truth at trial and the prompt disposition of actions (Allen v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 21 NY 2d 403, 407), discovery is at the outset limited to that which is 'material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action'" [see Farbman, supra, at 80].
CPLR 31 is the statute governing, in New York State, discovery in civil proceedings.
Discovery in criminal proceedings is governed by a different statute, but the applicability is the same.
Discovery is a right RESTRICTED to:
- status of the person in the court proceeding;
- need for disclosure;
- legitimacy of disclosure;
- relevance to the pending court case.
- a presumption of disclosure;
- for any purpose, legitimate or not;
- by any person, party to a pending litigation or not, local resident or not, American citizen or not, located within the U.S. or not;
- for any need, and without restriction to its "relevance" (as the Sheriff's Department said - "in regards to") whatever issue or whichever court case, pending or concluded.
Neither the Sheriff, not the Acting County Attorney have legislative power to re-write the Freedom of Information Law. And, their invented restrictions on FOIL requests in criminal cases are unlawful.
- presume disclosure, and,
- if the Sheriff's Department seeks to deny access to record,
- state clearly and specifically:
- the statute under which the exemption applies; and
- explain why that statutory exemption applies in this particular situation -
Or - should they be?
New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision violates Freedom of Information Law
The recognizes that on its own website - kind of:
Why "kind of"?
Because the Department violates 2 provisions of FOIL by:
- requesting too much contact information about the inquirer (FOIL is subject to requests by "persons", and all information that an agency may request is to ascertain that the person inquiring is a "person" and not a computer robot, and as to where to send the requested information. New York DOCCS, instead, demands to know:
- your first name;
- your last name
- your e-mail address - which will be already sufficient for information to be provided, but no, NYS DOCCS further requires
- your "street address" (not P.O. Box!), city, state and zip code.
- restricting FOIL requests to "175 words or less" - there is no such restriction in the law.
Tuesday, February 28, 2017
Massachusetts to judges: it is unethical to reveal to the public the judge's true feelings and biases
First, in December of 2016, it issued an "ethical" opinion for state judges advising them that they cannot really attend the so-called "Women's March" (which as in reality an anti-Trump march, the next day after the new President's inauguration) - because that will reveal the judge's political preferences.
So, even on the judge's free time (it was a Sunday), not wearing the black robe, the judge cannot reveal his or her true feelings.
Massachusetts judges are, thus, given an unmistakeable message - if you have biases, hide them.
Displaying your biases is unethical.
On the same day, December 9, 2016, Massachusetts ethical advisory board issued yet another astounding "ethical" opinion - in an intricate situation.
Massachusetts, unlike other states, apparently does not require that suspended or disbarred attorneys are prohibited to work in a law office as paralegals.
So, the judge, before coming to the bench, employed a disbarred attorney as a paralegal, at the direct permission of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.
Now the judge wanted, as the disbarred attorney's former employer, to testify for the attorney in his reinstatement proceedings voluntarily.
The advisory opinion said - "no", you can't do that.
A judge, in the opinion of the State of Massachusetts, can only testify at such a proceeding about his own experience as an employer BEFORE he came to the bench, if he is subpoenaed.
While the rationale of the opinion is that the judge, by voluntarily testifying for an attorney, is "lending the prestige of judicial office" to his testimony, of course, that's bullshit.
The judge actually wants to testify, he is actually friendly to the former employee, friendly to the point of agreeing to sacrifice his time to testify for him in his reinstatement proceedings.
There must be no difference for the reinstatement commission whether a witness is testifying voluntarily or on a subpoena - and whether he is a judge or not a judge.
But, it DOES matter in the future if the same attorney, once reinstated, appears in front of the same judge, and the issue of bias is raised because the judge volunteered to testify for the attorney in his reinstateme proceedings.
What the advisory opinion does is it protects the judge of future motions to recuse, pointing out a way of how to duck such a possible future motion by saying - oh, now, I did not really want to testify there, but it was outside of my control, I was subpoenaed.
Of course, that would be a lie, but - advisory opinions are clear.
Appearances matter.
Common sense or showing actual judicial biases to the public do not.
Wisconsin Commission of Judicial Conduct is to be subordinated to the court it is supposed to investigate
Of course, that would be a major conflict of interest, because the bosses will be those who are to be investigated and prosecuted by the Commission.
I wonder whose bright head or heads is behind that wonderful idea.
I will continue to monitor the news about this attempt to let the fox guard the fox-hunter and will report it on the blog.
Stay tuned.
Monday, February 27, 2017
What is in common between college football players and attorneys
"In no other job does a worker's ability to remain on the job depend on a factor having nothing to do with his or her job performance".
That was about football players, and that was about academic performance of those same football players.
I would disagree that "ability to remain on the job depend[s] on a factor having nothing to do with his or her job performance" for college football players - or for any other college athletes.
After all, they are students who were admitted into college on an athletic scholarship, and the scholarship requires them to maintain a certain academic standing to remain students.
If they drop out of college, not being able to maintain their academic standing, they drop out of the job.
Because, otherwise, if it is simply "a job", it should be a separate job, with hiring and firing process, not a "kind of a job" acquired through application for an athletic scholarship.
Apparently, student athletes are in college to get not only to play football, but also to receive college education, so the phrase about their remaining on the job depends on a factor (academic performance) unrelated to the actual performance on the job is somewhat stretched.
But, what drew my attention to that particular phrase was also that the "no other job" argument seems to be even more incorrect.
Lawyers are yet another such job.
In this blessed profession, and especially in civil rights litigation, the better you are, the more your are eligible to be kicked out on some contrived disciplinary charge - and the better you dig for evidence of governmental misconduct - like, for example, attorney Christina Mire from Louisiana did - the more you are prone to be kicked out for actions "interfering with proper administration of justice".
Just another paradox of the profession.
And, by the way, while the ABA paid lip service to the fact that attorneys must be entitled to the same 1st Amendment rights as anybody else, and to a right to do their job criticizing a judge in motions to recuse - even though there are hints dropped that attorney Mire's criticism of a judge - who, as I described before in a blog:
- did not disclose a disqualifying conflict of interest;
- had the court stenographer fight and even sue Christine Mire in order not to give her minutes from a hearing where such conflict of interest was supposed to be, but was not disclosed;
- and, when the court did order disclosure of the minutes,
- the audio file was sent to a professional technician to "splice" (add, glue in) a piece of audio file, and the judge's disclosure of conflict of interest (that Christine Mire who was present at the hearing says was never mentioned by the judge) was put into the audio file and into the minutes.
The judge was supposed to be taken off the bench and criminally prosecuted for this.
Yet, the judge was elevated to an appellate court, and, instead, attorney Mire was suspended for a year - and made to pay for "costs" of the fabricated disciplinary proceedings against her, on the shameless complaint of that same judge. The government made Christine Mire, as a measure of "protection of consumers" (because that's the declared reason for existence of attorney licensing in the first place) to pay around $30,000 for being right when the judge was wrong, exactly as Judge Andrew Napolitano describes in this book:
So, being kicked off the job FOR BEING RIGHT is, same as George Leef says about football players, a "factor having nothing to do with his or her job performance".
In fact, being kicked off the job for doing the job well is counter-intuitive.
And, in this case, illegal.
But who cares, right?
The ABA ran a lip-service piece about Christine Mire's case, ran it only after Christine Mire was reinstated as an attorney.
At the very same time as the ABA ran the piece on Christine Mire's fate, my certiorari on the very same subject - punishment of an attorney for making a motion to recuse a judge while the attorney was right, punishment that is being increasingly imposed on civil rights attorneys and is widening the justice gap in the U.S. - was pending with the U.S. Supreme Court.
Had the U.S. Supreme Court taken the case, it then would have had to decide in my favor - its own precedents were on my side.
But, the ABA did not consider it worth its time to support the certiorari, and the U.S. Supreme Court, including Justice Sonya Sotomayor whose personal statements about the justice gap I quoted in the certiorari petition, refused to review the petition without an explanation.
Instead, the ABA continues to treat wrongfully suspended and disbarred attorneys, suspended and disbarred for being right when the government is wrong as not worthy to be part of the ABA, and that applies to civil rights attorneys subject to persecution by courts within the U.S. and by foreign governments - in other words, the ABA distances from wrongful suspensions and disbarments in order not to put itself into a situation when it has to criticize judges, as a matter of cowardly and self-serving self-preservation.
Because, the ABA's president recently produced a formula in connection with President Trump's criticism of a wrong and corrupt decision of the 9th Circuit and of the underlying district court decision:
to criticize a judge = to attack the U.S. Constitution.
No, we cannot have that.
We cannot "attack the U.S. Constitution" by criticizing those who violate it.
Especially when it can hit us in the pocket - as it is in the case of the ABA.
So, as things are now, since the ABA did not consider it important to support a certiorari about the use of disciplinary proceedings to remove from the reach of consumers a civil rights attorney for doing their job and making a motion to recuse for an indigent client where the case so required - and since the U.S. Supreme Court similarly refused to uphold its own "mandatory" precedent - the country's litigants' rights to impartial judicial review will continue to be illusory and resting upon the unlikely chance that an attorney will sacrifice himself or herself in order to help their client.
I will quote from my certiorari petition:
"Litigants cannot seriously rely upon a federal right that can be secured only by an attorney willing to sacrifice his or her entire investment into his law education and career, and his own and his family's lifetime's well-being for one client".
But that, ladies and gentlemen, is now "the law" in the U.S.
And being good is a "factor" qualifying a lawyer in this country for being deprived of a right to work.
So, college football players are not the only ones whose "ability to remain on the job depends on a factor having nothing to do with his or her job performance".
For lawyers the "law" is even worse.
Here it is, once again:
Attorney #AndrewLavoottBluestone's "Attorney Malpractice" blog makes false claims about Neroni v Follender case
I have extensively covered the case Neroni v Follender on this blog and thought I knew everything about it - after all, I've litigated it.
Apparently, I didn't.
An attorney who specializes in legal malpractice, revealed on his blog that allegedly I was sued by Follender and lost before I "turned around and sued the plaintiffs".
Using a case you obviously did not read and do not have a clue what it was about, as an advertisement of your alleged abilities to represent people is kind of stupid.
Andrew Lavoot Bluestone, an attorney with 38 years of experience, should know better than to make claims about cases without reading them.
And, attorney #AndrewLavoottBluestone who, without reading the case, falsely alleged that:
- I was sued, as a party, by Follender or his client before suing in Neroni v Follender; and that
- I lost in that prior single lawsuit
Underlying
case No. 1
M &
C Brothers, Inc. v. Torum
Delaware
County Index No. 2007-280
|
Underlying
Case No. 2
M &
C Brothers, Inc. v. Torum
Delaware
County
Index No. 2011-884
|
||||
Nature of the case
|
Civil action for breach of
contract/fraud
|
Nature of the case
|
Homestead petition
|
||
Case started
|
2007
|
I was not admitted to the bar at the
time the case started, was not an attorney or attorney of record in the case
and was not a defendant in the action
|
Case started
|
Filed in 2011, a couple of weeks
before Case No. 1 was concluded and jurisdiction in Case No. 2 was lost
|
I NEVER stepped into that case and was
NEVER an attorney of record in that case
|
Parties and attorneys:
|
Parties and attorneys:
|
||||
Plaintiff
|
M & C Brothers, Inc.
|
Represented by Jonathan S. Follender
|
Petitioner
|
M & C Brothers, Inc.
|
Represented by Jonathan S. Follender
|
Defendants
|
And Genevieve Gorder
(an HGTV host and designer)
|
Represented by Gregory Kottmeier
In the underlying real estate
transaction represented by former Delaware County Attorney Richard Spinney,
friend, colleague and former boss of 27 years of presiding judge Carl Becker
|
-
|
||
Defendants
|
Brad Torum,
Samme Chittum
|
Represented by Frederick J. Neroni
In the underlying real estate
transaction represented by Delaware County District Attorney John Hubbard,
friend and former undisclosed law partner of presiding judge Carl Becker
|
Brad Torum,
Samme Chittum,
|
Respondents
|
Pro Se (I am listed in the case as an
attorney on the NYS Court website, because Follender claimed I am an attorney
of record, for his convenience, while I never appeared in the case, there is no notice of
appearance or any other evidence that I am attorney of record, and Respondents appeared pro se
– THAT was the misrepresentation
that was the underlying part of the lawsuit, that Follender was fraudulently
claiming I abandoned my clients in a case where I was not even an attorney of
record
|
- Delaware County Attorney Richard Spinney and then ADA (and former law partner of a judge) John Hubbard were the real culprits in the action their clients were sued for;
- The case was settled by the two TV celebrities, Tyler Harcott and Genevieve Gorder, because Follender was harassing them, and their attorney Gregory Kottmeier pointed out Follender's misconduct and misrepresentations in court pleadings, and in private to me;
- The judgment was rendered in favor of incompetent and corrupt Follender in Case No. 1 by Eugene Peckham who later allowed his law firm to appear in the same case where he previously presided as a judge, so Peckham had no clue what judicial integrity is about - and Peckham granted the judgment to Follender, without any legal basis, only because he was also a judge in Ulster County;
- I stepped into the case only after the judgment was already rendered, after I was admitted to the bar in 2009;
- My motions to vacate were denied and I was sanctioned by Judge Becker who was trying hard to save his two friends, Richard Spinney and John Hubbard, from malpractice and disbarment for their actions;
- then everybody was pretending that I was the culprit in everything that everybody else did - and Follender continued to badmouth me for allegedly abandoning my "clients" in Case No. 2 where I:
- never appeared - and an attorney cannot be simply 'included' into a case as an attorney of record without being HIRED for that case by the clients and without APPEARING in that case - neither of which happened in Case No. 2.
One more important issue that Professor Bluestone "forgot" to mention - that in 3 Appellate Divisions (1st, 2nd and 4th Departments) I would have won the lawsuit in Neroni v Follender because Follender defaulted by serving his and his client's pre-answer motion to dismiss and all of his other pleadings himself, while being a party in the action.
The 3rd Department alone - as an "exception" for me and Follender (who is a judge in a town justice court in Ulster County while remaining a practicing attorney) - decided that disregarding that clear statute is a "mere irregularity" and not a jurisdictional defect.
Yet, in three quarters of New York courts service of a pre-answer motion to dismiss by a party, like Follender did in Neroni v Follender would have resulted in a DEFAULT AGAINST Follender and his client.
The 3rd Department though, in order to block vacating of my disciplinary decision (where Neroni v Follender was, without disclosure, considered because the trial judge sent his decision to the disciplinary court), disregarded clear statutory law by an attorney-judge against an attorney-critic of judges, as it does often in favor of politically connected parties, and considered disregarding clear statutory law that its 3 sister courts consider a jurisdictional defect - "a mere irregularity".
Of course, such a nuance was not important for Professor Bluestone who allegedly specializes in Judiciary Law 487 cases, to consider and report in his blog.
Consumers beware: if Professor Bluestone can so misread a case where all underlying facts are reflected in multiple court records, does it with complete indifference to the truth of what is in the record, and invents things to make up for his lack of knowledge of the case - anybody should think twice before putting his own litigation case and livelihood into Andrew Bluestone's careless hands.
One more interesting thing: I've left a comment on Andrew Bluestone's blog, pointing out his misrepresentation. It was never published - Andrew Bluestone, unlike me, carefully weeds out comments unfavorable to him.
I wonder, how many other people posted comments like mine, about misrepresenting their cases that Attorney Bluestone became so wary of public opinion as to hide from it behind moderation?