Hurricane Matthew

Just a brief notice to my readers that the author of this blog is located in South Carolina where Hurricane Matthew is expected tonight or tomorrow.

We may soon lose electric power, and the outage may last for a long time, and if that happens,  I will be unable to blog frequently,  as I usually do.

The blog will resume as soon as it will become possible.

Sullivan County Judge Frank Labuda has taken a forced leave pending criminal investigation into a possible assault with the use of an ATV

There are bizarre news - and there are even more bizarre news.

I appeared in front of Sullivan County (New York) Judge Frank Labuda as a criminal defense attorney.

Here is Judge Labuda's photo:

He was tough, but I cannot say he was unfair.

And, even though I did not appear in front of Judge LaBuda often, so my experience is limited, I never saw him lose his temper.

That's why I perceived the news that Judge LaBuda took an "annual leave pending investigation" - a criminal investigation - into his brother's complaint that Judge LaBuda allegedly ran over his brother in an ATV as extremely bizarre.

Of course, as every criminal defendant, Judge LaBude is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and we will see how the case will unfold.

And, reportedly, Judge LaBuda maintains his innocence and that it was an accident, while his brother insists that it was intentional.

Peter LaBuda reportedly suffered a broken legs and several broken ribs.

The Sullivan County DA requested New York State Attorney General to investigate as a special prosecutor.

Yet, there will be a pronounced conflict of interest in such an investigation, since New York State Attorney General is, by statute - Public Officers Law 17 - an attorney for all State judges, including judge LaBuda.

The interesting detail is that Peter LaBuda's girlfriend, "lawyer Cheryl Beverson, has sought orders of protection on his behalf, filing in Delaware County".  Cheryl Beverson is of Middletown, New York.

It is unclear why the filing was done in Delaware County if the incident occurred in Sullivan County.

Peter LaBuda and his girlfriend/attorney Cheryl Beverson claim that the Sullivan County Sheriff's office intentionally did not collect the necessary evidence - they allegedly allowed Judge LaBuda to leave the scene of the incident and did not verify whether Judge LaBuda has been drinking.

Reportedly, Peter LaBuda's daughter (and Judge LaBuda's niece) witnessed "the events".

It is interesting to see whether investigation of a judge will be conducted fairly or will be swept under the rug.  Part of it already was - since the judge was not properly processed at the scene, and the local police refused to require a Breathalyzer test on him.

Of course, even if criminal charges are not brought against Judge LaBuda, a civil case against him for assault and/or negligence is possible.

I will continue to cover this story.

Stay tuned.

New York changes its disgraceful foreclosure law - to a more disgraceful law

In many foreclosure cases where I represented homeowners, I pointed out to the court that it is unfair to indigent homeowners to provide to them assigned counsel after a foreclosure conference when they already defaulted by failing to file an answer (which they obviously did not know how to do without counsel), and without giving them a right to file a late answer.

My motions on that topic were rejected by courts claiming there is no unfairness or unconstitutionality involved in such a situation.

Yet, the lack of comprehension of homeowners who had no legal education, as to how one needs to respond to service of a foreclosure lawsuit, until it was too late (21 days after personal service of a complaint) resulted in innumerable foreclosures across New York State.

Imagine a criminal defense attorney being assigned to a criminal defendant after half of the proceedings is over and after all rights of the criminal defendant are forfeited - that's what was happening in foreclosure proceedings in New York.

Yet, now, finally, New York amended its disgraceful legislation - after, I wonder, how many people lost their homes because they could not afford an attorney and because an attorney was assigned to them only when it was too late.

Unfortunately, the amendment may be even worse than having no amendment at all, since it will create in people a false illusion of trustworthiness of the court as the defendant homeowner's legal advisor, and can lead to even more foreclosures because people will be filing only answers, and no affirmative defenses.

As of December 20, 2016 the following changes come into law, as stated in a recent decision of Westchester Supreme Court that, following the spirit of the legislation that has yet to come into effect, allowed the homeowners to file a late answer, after a foreclosure settlement:

"Effective December 20, 2016 CPLR § 3408 Mandatory settlement conference in residential foreclosure, will be amended to add the following relevant provisions:

(l) At the first settlement conference held pursuant to this section, if the defendant has not filed an answer or made a pre-answer motion to dismiss, the court shall:


1. advise the defendant of the requirement to answer the complaint;


2. explain what is required to answer a complaint in court;


3. advise that if an answer is not interposed the ability to contest the foreclosure action and assert defenses may be lost; and


4. provide information about available resources for foreclosure prevention assistance."

The legislation, of course, did one good thing and two VERY bad things.

The good thing is that finally homeowners will have a right to file a late answer after the foreclosure conference.

The bad thing is that the legislation puts the judge in the position of a legal advisor to litigants, even though judges of New York Supreme Court, by the New York Constitution, may not practice law.

The problematic thing is that there are over 40 so-called "affirmative defenses" that, depending on the circumstances of the case, may be raised, and, if a certain affirmative defense applies, it must be raised at the same time as the Answer, otherwise it will be waived and lost.

One of the most significant of such affirmative defenses in foreclosure proceedings is the foreclosing plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue.

Banks are notorious in having mortgages obtained through agents, without proper formalities, then improperly securitizing already defaulted mortgages and assigning them to security trusts after banks are already went bankrupt, and such chains of assignments usually have at least one, often more, flaws, allowing the homeowner to have the foreclosure action dismissed.

The new version of CPLR 3408 requires the judge to advise homeowners only of their right to file an answer, and "explain what is required to answer a complaint", but I doubt that any judge will give a comprehensive legal advice to homeowners, one of two adversarial parties in litigation in front of that judge, as to what affirmative defenses need to be raised in that answer, what is the significance of raising such defenses and what can be lost if those defenses are not raised in the answer.

Yet, most likely, homeowners will be now lulled into an illusion that since the judge advised them on the law, they will be safe following the judge's advice - and will be filing only an answer without affirmative defenses, thus forfeiting the most significant affirmative defense of the foreclosing plaintiff's capacity to sue.   

As it appears, the new CPLR 3408 is a half-measure and a sellout of homeowners - again - which also puts courts in the awkward position of advisors-adjudicators, a disqualifying position.

The inadequate discipline against California #JudgeEdmundWClarke for mistreating prospective jurors - Part II, juror 4688

I am continuing the report on disciplinary decision (admonition only) against the California judge Edmund W Clarke who was discipline for mistreating 4 prospective jurors in a murder trial.

In the previous blog, I described misconduct of Judge Clarke who retaliated against prospective juror 7122 after that woman, who had a severe anxiety problem, criticized in open court Judge Clarke's clerk for rudeness.

The next victim of Judge Clarke was also a Spanish-speaking female juror, juror 4688 who asked for an excuse from service as a juror in the murder trial because she did not understand English well.

Naturally, that would be a big concern in a murder trial, with a potential life in prison sentence or death penalty, depending on the result of the vote in November of this year.

A juror is a fact-finder of evidence and must be able to understand the language in which the evidence is presented.

Here is the exchange between juror 4688 and Judge Edmund W. Clarke:

Now, being able to say "good morning" in a foreign language does not indicate that the person saying it has any command of that language at all.  Modes of address like that is the first tourists learn in a foreign country, while knowing absolutely nothing of the language other wise.

Yet, that was the immediate hook for Judge Clarke's bullying to start:

Now, whether it is a good idea to live in a country and not know its government language is not relevant here.  Especially that Spanish, increasingly, is used as second government language in many localities in the U.S.

The only relevant question for purposes of jury picking in a murder trial is - is the juror's command of the English language enough to follow the evidence presented in the trial verbally, through documents and testimony in English?

For that, knowledge of how to say "good morning" is definitely not enough.

In some counties in California, according to census and literacy group reports, illiteracy in some counties reaches 34%.  That is, 1/3 of population lacking basic literacy skills.

With that in mind, Judge Clarke's lashing out against the Spanish-speaking juror appears even more outrageous:

Judge threatened the juror who was unsure whether her command of English was enough to be a fact-finder in a murder trial, of lying, and threatened her of having to stay longer in court and away from family and her obligations because of her supposed lie.

There are people who are in this country 25 years and more and do not speak the language - just walk down Brighton Beach in New York City.

Whether that is good or bad, is another question - but it is a fact that it is possible, especially for a Spanish-speaking person, to never learn English at the level required to engage in fact-finding in a murder trial.

Judge Clarke "impeached" juror 4688 by her own answer in the juror questionnaire checking a "yes" box as to the question whether she knows "basic English".

Having a Masters degree in teaching English as a foreign language, I would tell you that the question whether your command of English is "basic" is a trick question.

If a person is illiterate, he or she cannot answer that question.

If a person answers "yes", that is subjective, as what is "basic" for one person, is no knowledge at all for another.

Additionally, a person answering such a question may fear that if they answer "no", some repercussions from the government may follow.

So, judge Clarke, as promised, punished juror 4688 by sending her to sit in the hallway.

Then, he recalled her and started to interrogate, this way:

So, Judge Clarke made juror 4688 to sit in the hallway and used taxpayer money to get a certified Spanish interpreter to interrogate juror 4688 after she waited for the second time to be called back.

Actually, engaging a Spanish interpreter to verify whether the juror knew enough of English to be a fact-finder at a murder trial where facts were presented in English, was useless.  A Spanish interpreter could not prove one way or another whether the juror knew enough of English language to be a juror at a murder trial.

Nevertheless, an interrogation through a Spanish interpreter followed:

Even that did not stop the Jerk Clarke from continuing to embarrass juror 4688.

Through the interpreter, juror 4688 explained why she did not speak English even though naturalized for 25 years - because she was naturalized as a 2-year-old, sent to Mexico and returned to the U.S. as a grown up, so she never needed to study English for a naturalization test.

Even then, Judge Clarke did not simply excuse her, but excused her with an instruction to learn English better so that the court can use her as a juror in the future:

To which the poor woman said that in order to do that, she would have to quit one of her two jobs:

In the case of juror 4688, same as in the case of juror 7122, Judge Clarke also tried to lie to the disciplinary panel, claiming that he did not accuse the juror of lying, but only "expressed skepticism as to her command of English - which was found by the disciplinary panel not to be true:

With all that, amazingly, the Alliance of California judges filed an amicus brief in support of Judge Clarke - the bully in the courtroom, the liar and the abuser of female jurors.

After Judge Clarke mistreated two female jurors, juror 7122 and juror 4688, he mistreated two more in that same case - and both of the other jurors Judge Clarke mocked and humiliated because of their poverty, and still escaped with simply an admonition, and with no attorney discipline, by the way.

I will report on Judge Clarke's misconduct as to two other jurors separately.

Stay tuned.

California #JudgeEdmundWClarke admonished for mistreating prospective jurors in a murder trial - Part I, juror 7122

California judicial disciplinary authorities just imposed discipline - admonishment only - upon Judge Edmund W Clarke, for mistreating prospective jurors in a murder trial.

Here is the description of Judge Clarke's misconduct in the disciplinary decision.

The judge first excused juror 7122 on the basis of severe anxiety - and then ordered her to stay behind in the hall and wait for him to discuss things with her (against her will) after she added, in a public proceeding, that the judge's clerk was disrespectful with her.

Surprise!  Court personnel disrespectful with lay people with no power?  Does not ever happen.  Right?

And, when it does happen, and the victim of that disrespectful conduct has the courage of challenging that disrespectful conduct openly in front of a judge - the judge lashes out.  Against the victim, of course.

The judge made FORMER juror candidate 7122 to wait in the hallway for an hour, until the end of the session.  The woman obeyed, crying.

Here is the exchange between the judge and the woman after she was already excused - but still ordered to wait for the judge's tongue-lashing.  For an hour.

At the very proceeding the woman felt so intimidated by the ordered detention in the hallway for an hour that she started to communicate with the judge with an apology - which was the effect the judge, apparently, sought.

Since the woman was deposed at the end of the session, most likely, the public was excused at the time of the tongue-lashing.

So, public criticism of misconduct of a public official is now "going after her like that".  And, the judge is very obviously bullying the women, is putting her on the defensive.  For criticism of a public employee, the judge's long-time clerk (of 7 years, as the judge disclosed later on).

"Attacked her in open court in front of a judge with your criticism" - that is the gravest of offenses for the judge, apparently.  And, since the judge was merely "admonished", and remains on the bench, the people of the State of California can expect more of the same from this judge, as well as from other judges.

Now, this is beyond mean.

Criticism of a public official, open criticism, was and is the prospective juror's right as a citizen.  The judge had absolutely no right to go into the person's employment background and not-so-thinly threaten her to complain to her employer, in retaliation for the woman's complain about rude behavior of the judge's clerk.

Let's note that the judge engaged in tongue-lashing of a critic of his clerk's RUDE behavior without any investigation of that behavior.  So, for the judge, the mere facts that:

1) the clerk worked for the judge for 7 years, and that
2) this was the first complaint about her behavior in 7 years - means that the complaint is untruthful.

The judge, without an investigation, on record, in open court, accuses a woman who has an anxiety problem and who was already a victim of his clerk's rude behavior, of a lie.

 Let's count.

The judge

1) accused the woman of "going after" the judge's clerk;
2) accused her of lying - without an investigation, and based on his own unsworn character testimony on behalf of his clerk;
3) accused the woman of "no longer [able to see] that other people are struggling and doing their best";
4) accused the woman of "looking immature and selfish and not contributing to the society that we're supposed to support".

And, the judge let the woman go with a final branding her that her "accomplishment" is to be the only one out of thousands of prospective jurors to ever complain against the judge's clerk. 

Let's remember that at all times after the judge excused prospective juror 7122 he no longer had the power to detain her, and detaining her, forcing her to come in front of him in open court and abusing her verbally was all illegal conduct and conduct without authority.

Let's remember that the judge already excused the prospective juror 7122 because of a severe anxiety problem, which would bind the judge to treat that woman as a person with disability suffering from a severe anxiety, not trying to aggravate that problem, as he did.

But, the clerk was, in fact rude:

Yet, for the judge what actually occurred did not matter.  He steamrolled through a woman with anxiety and accused her of wrongful criticism of his clerk without verifying whether the clerk was actually rude with the woman or not.  For the judge, his personnel is simply above reproach - and above the law.

And, as it often happens when judges are themselves challenged with disciplinary proceedings, Judge Edmund Clarke lied to the disciplinary panel.

First, Judge Clark lied that he did not see anxiety in juror 7122 - even though he excused her on that basis.

Second, Judge Clarke lied that he did not excuse the juror 7122 when he sent her to the hallway - because otherwise he would have to have known his conduct was illegal, so he tried to backtrack.

Third, Judge Clark lied that he detained juror 7122 because he had an "ethical obligation" to investigate her complaint - while Judge Clark did nothing to actually investigate, and instead assumed juror 7122 is lying, ordered her to sit and wait (for an hour) for being called back into the courtroom, and when she was called, used that time not to investigated, but to bully her for criticizing his clerk.

There was a squabble between the special master, the examiner and the disciplinary panel in the disciplinary proceeding where the  special master and the disciplinary panel tried hard, in different ways, to save Judge Clarke's sorry ass:

Now, if judge Clarke did excuse juror 7122, he should have known that his conduct in ordering her to wait, then calling her back into the courtroom for a tongue-lashing was outside of the judge's authority - and the woman did believe that she was called back in not to be heard, but to be chided for criticism of the judge's clerk:

And, of course, if Judge Clarke lied to the commission that he did not excuse the juror when he did, that would be a severely aggravating circumstance for the outcome of his case - which means, the issue whether the juror was or was not excused, was of utmost importance and required a factual finding by the disciplinary panel.

Here is what happened.



The special master found - against the record - that Judge Clarke first excused juror 7122, and then reversed the excuse after she criticized the clerk.

The significance of this finding is to protect judge Clarke giving at least a semblance of legitimacy to his order to the juror 7122 to sit in the hallway, keep her there for an hour and then order her back into the courtroom for a tongue-lashing.

The honest examiner disagreed with the special master's finding as not supported in the record.  In other words, the examiner pointed out that the special master lied.

What disciplinary panel, instead of resolving the conflict of findings between the special master and the examiner, on the MOST important issue involved - whether the judge acted illegally, and whether he lied to the commission about it - chose to claim this:

So, the disciplinary panel, consisting of "market players" (attorneys and judges) preferred to protect Judge Clarke's ass and make no findings on the most significant issue, whether judge Clarke knowingly acted illegally, and whether he lied to the disciplinary panel about it.  Moreover, the disciplinary panel claimed that the issue in question is not necessary in their determination of misconduct.

I just bet that if the disciplinary panel consisted of LAY CITIZENS, judge Clarke would have been taken off the bench - for mistreating that one juror and for lying to the disciplinary panel about it.

Nevertheless, as to juror 7122, the disciplinary panel concluded this:

But, juror 7122 was not the only one bullied by Judge Clarke in jury selection for that case.

Judge Clarke was disciplined - by admonishment only - for misconduct regarding 4 prospective jurors, and I will continue to analyze the disciplinary decision, juror by juror.

Stay tuned.

In Alabama, Texas and New York, sexual misconduct of judges is not deemed a basis for attorney discipline

While the Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore was suspended for disobeying the same-sex marriage precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court (while other judges happily throughout the country continue to disobey a variety of U.S. Supreme Court precedents concerning civil rights litigation), one thing that Judge Roy Moore's attorney pointed out is really spectacular:  from the point of view of discipline, it is a worse offense for a judge to disobey the precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court than to sext with a litigant appearing before a judge.

What was meant is just 6-month suspension for sexting with a litigant for judge Leon Archer of Alabama.

The same is happening in New York, both in terms of attorney discipline and judicial discipline.

I recently wrote that, in New York, an attorney, Barry Dolgoff, who admitted in court to committing what qualifies as a felony by stealing from his clients' trust fund (reportedly, $149,000), received a lighter discipline than the attorney whose only "fault" was criticism of a judge in motions to recuse on behalf of her clients, one of them pro bono.

As to sex crimes, in New York, judge Bryan Hedges was relatively recently taken off the bench for sexual child abuse, sexual molestation of a deaf-mute 5-year old niece, see determination of the New York Commission for Judicial Conduct here, but remains a licensed attorney with "no record of public discipline".

So, Alabama, same as in New York, embraces criminals, including sexual predators, as licensed attorneys and judges - and sends to the public an unmistakable message that all assurances the attorney licensing exists to protect the public is a sham.

The sexting judge in Alabama is not the only sexting judge exposed recently.

In Texas, Judge Joel Baker recently resigned during a sexting investigation.

A criminal complaint was filed against judge Baker back in 2011, for stalking a woman - but Judge Baker remained on the bench, and the investigation was swept under the rug.

Despite criminal complaints for stalking, resigning during sexting investigation and criminal indictments for violation of open meetings law, former judge Joel Baker remains, as of today, a licensed attorney in the State of Texas:

Well, before it was only civil rights attorneys who were kicked by the system for doing their jobs the way they understand it.

Now joining the crowd of attorneys punished for their correct legal opinions is Chief Judge for the State of Alabama, suspended for stating the obvious - that precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court are not the Law of the Land, not being part of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and thus not mandatory for enforcement in the State of Alabama.

Let's see what the U.S. Supreme Court says to that - if Judge Moore's case goes that far.

As a summary of the sorry cases of Judges Leon Archer in Alabama, Judge Bryan Hedges in New York and Judge Joel Baker in Texas, I bet that the American public should feel extremely protected through attorney licensing when sexual predators are allowed to remain licensed attorneys with "no record of public discipline".

New York reacts to a criminal defendant's request for a non-attorney counsel of his choice - with a psychiatric evaluation and lockup

I wrote on this blog about what I thought to be the first known case of a consumer of legal services to file a motion requesting the court to allow him to be represented in court by an individual of his choice who is not a licensed attorney.

I was wrong stating that the motion filed in early 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York was the first case where a consumer of legal services would ask the court to allow him representation in court by an individual of his choice, whether a licensed attorney or not. 

There was another, earlier, case in 2014, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, by an indigent pro se civil rights plaintiff Cory Townsend, I am publishing the entire complaint of Cory Townsend here, which I obtained from Pacer.gov.

Cory Townsend raised, among other issues, that he was improperly denied representation by "counsel" of his choice, who was a non-attorney.

The 6th Amendment provides for a right to "counsel" in criminal proceedings. 

Nowhere does the 6th Amendment say that the "counsel" must be a government-approved (licensed) attorney, and courts have no authority to narrow constitutional rights through interpretation, that is usurpation of authority of the People to make amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

So, the plain language of the 6th Amendment requires the court to accept the defendant's choice of court representative.

Recently, in an article addressing the "justice gap" and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonya Sotomayor's statement that she would endorse mandatory pro bono work by attorneys to bridge that gap (you can read here about the results of mandatory assignments to criminal cases of attorneys not specializing in criminal defense in Louisiana), law professor Ilya Somin suggested to give vouchers for assignment of public defenders to criminal defendants - so that they could choose their attorneys themselves.

That is not a revolutionary concept, because relationship with a court representative is a fiduciary relationship, a relationship of trust which cannot be ordered by a third party, or by the government, as it happens nowadays through court-appointed counsel in criminal cases.

After all, if "monied" litigants can hire private counsel of their own choice, indigent litigants should have their choice of counsel, too, even though the state pays for it.

Yet, courts are "unprepared" to give choice of a court representative to poor litigants, even when monies for legal representation and non-legal services auxiliary to such representation (experts and investigators) for the indigent are provided for by law.


In my husband's motion filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York in early 2016, the court ducked the motion by refusing to address it at all and claiming that my husband is under an anti-filing injunction for new actions, even though the motion was filed in an old action, with a motion to vacate.

In Cory Townsend's case, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed his claim that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not allowed representation by a non-attorney of his choice without an explanation, reasoning or even without litigation - before the complaint was even served, so the court was acting as an advocate for the defendants.

Cory Townsend repeatedly objected to state-court-appointed attorneys and insisted on a non-attorney representing him, he was sent to an involuntary in-patient (locked up) psychiatric evaluation for his request, in the best traditions of Soviet punitive psychiatry against dissidents raising issues or expressing views as to government misconduct that the government considers inconvenient or dangerous.

Licensed attorneys are neither better educated, nor do they necessarily pass the bar testing their knowledge of the law of the state where they are practicing, based on reciprocity agreements between states on attorney admission.

And, statewide, not area-of-law-wide law licenses permit licensed attorneys to practice in the area of law of which they have absolutely no concept.

And, while justice gap in New York ever widens, New York itself invents ways of having the poor represented by unlicensed and uneducated individuals, while squeezing out qualified attorneys working for the poor, as explained in my pending petition to the U.S. Supreme Court - with a detailed explanation of mechanisms of how it is done.

But, when New York is squeezing out qualified counsel for the poor, including criminal defense attorneys, and invents "stop-gap solutions" where the poor are offered inadequate substitutes of qualified counsel of their choice, New York insists on one thing - that whenever the poor are, in fact, given counsel where counsel is constitutionally required (by Gideon v Wainright), the choice of counsel must be the presiding judge's and not the poor criminal defendant's.

Well, one criminal defendant in New York, Cory Townsend, did not want to accept the choice of his counsel, a relationship of trust, from the presiding court - and filed a federal complaint about it in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of New York, in 2014.

He was given a "poor person status" - but only to dismiss his case before it was served upon the parties, on various theories

His claim that he was entitled to representation by "counsel" under the 6th Amendment by any individual of his choice, whether licensed or unlicensed, went unaddressed.

The dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

I will have to split analysis of Cory Townsend's complaint into several blogs, as it raises a number of important constitutional issues that would be better to analyze separately.

Here, I will address that Cory Townsend objected to appointment of a public defender:

1. On September 27, 2012 Judge Curtis Farber appointed public defender Iliana Santiago over objection of criminal defendant;
2. On October 1, 2012 Judge Farber had a proceeding where the defendant was not present, with Cory Mescon as his public defender - while he objected to a public defender;
3. On November 26, 2012, defendant was brought into court before Judge Alexander Jeong, represented by public defender Cory Mescon who Cory Townsend claimed did not represent Cory Townsend properly;
4. On February 19, 2013, defendant was brought to court before judge Danny Chun, and objected against representation by public defender Mijin Chung Kang; his objections were ignored, but Cory Townsend claims he was not properly represented by attorney Kang;
5. On April 17, 2013, Cory Townsend was brought before the court again, and attorney Kang against whose appointment Cory Townsend objected, was there representing him, against his wishes, again;
6. On May 21, 2013, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Kang again;
7. On June 26, 2013, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Kang again;
8. On September 25, 2013, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Kang again;
9. On October 21, 2013, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of public defender Christiana Giardino;
10. On December 3, 2013, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Giardino again;
11. On January 16, 2014,  at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Kang again;
12. On February 6, 2014, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Reginald W. Haley III;
13. On March 20, 2014, at another court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation of attorney Craig Lee Newman;
14. On May 1, 2014, at a court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to "recusal" of attorney Craig Lee Newman as his representation - I am following the complaint;
15. On May 2, 2014, at a court appearance, Cory Townsend objected again to "recusal" of attorney Craig Lee Newman as his representation;
16. On May 20, 2014, at a court appearance, Cory Townsend objected to representation by appointed attorney David Michael Walensky;  despite Cory Townsend's objection to representation by David Michael Walensky, he claims he was coerced into agreeing to a psychological evaluation with Walensky as his counsel;

On June 10, 2014 the court ordered an in-patient competency evaluation and had Cory Townsend detained in a psychiatric facility.  No court representative of Cory Townsend's choice was present at the hearing.

At that hearing, Cory Townsend wanted to be represented by a non-attorney, as stated in the court order of federal court dismissing his complaint.

On June 18, 2014, a petition for habeas corpus was filed on Cory Townsend's behalf.

On July 2, 2014, at a court appearance, a trial was scheduled for September 10, 2014 - meaning that competence of Cory Townsend should not have been in question, otherwise he could not be tried.

All that Cory Townsend wanted is the appointment of a non-attorney Lidya Radin to represent him in court at a hearing which eventually sent him to an in-patient competency evaluation, and that was denied to him.

Federal court, while acknowledging that Cory Townsend raised the issue that he wanted a non-attorney represent him at the involuntary competency hearing, said nothing further of that issue, did not analyze it and dismissed that claim without an explanation, analysis or statement of legal grounds.

Based on the fact that a trial was scheduled after the order for a competency evaluation, Cory Townsend was deemed competent.

So, what occurred is that:

1. a person who was presumed to be competent was brought as criminal defendant before a criminal court;
2. the criminal defendant objected to appointment of public defenders at least 16 times in court;
3. defendant's objections were ignored and public defenders not of his choice, against whose representation he vigorously objected, continued to represent him, represented him in a manner that he objected to, including in his absence;
4. defendant's request for a non-attorney to represent him at the competency hearing was ignored by the court, and the court ordered his competency in-patient (locked up) evaluation in a psychiatric hospital while he was represented by an attorney who was forced upon him by the court and against whose representation he vigorously objected;
5. then, he was deemed competent, and was convicted.

We come back to the same issues:

1. does a competent consumer of legal services have a choice of his own fiduciary agent, a court representative, whether the representative of the consumer's choice is licensed (approved by the government to "help" him with his choice) or not?
2. is it constitutional - to force a consumer of legal services, and especially one sued by the government, to accept a government-approved, government-appointed court represented as his only alternative to pro se representation?

I will continue to analyze Cory Townsend's civil rights lawsuit, and decisions (trial and appellate-level) dismissing it.

Stay tuned.