I wrote on this blog about the case in New York where a disbarred attorney was denied reinstatement because he acted as a law expert - which he undoubtedly was and is.
Joel Brandes is not only an expert in the area of Family and Matrimonial law, but an author of several books - and he was denied reinstatement because he acted as an expert, while the same New York State allows unlicensed professors of law to act as experts without being licensed just the same.
I already wrote about the in-arrears ad-hoc (case-by-case) determinations by courts as to what constitutes unauthorized practice of law, which is NOT how notice of prohibited conduct should be given through criminal statutes.
Now, the top New York State Court is going to hand out a decision - can an attorney be punished, denied reinstatement - because the attorney is good, skillful and knowledgeable?
It is interesting what the NYS Court of Appeals' decision will be in Joel Brandes' case.
I will follow this story with great interest and report on it.
Stay tuned.
Tuesday, September 13, 2016
Monday, September 12, 2016
New York attorney disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini refuses to comply with the rules of the U.S. Supreme Court
I am about to file my petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.
And, the U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29(3) requires me to serve an electronic version of my petition upon my opponent, and to engage in reasonable efforts to obtain the opponent's e-mail address.
I've got an earful of yelling for my reasonale efforts to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court rule of service today.
My opponent, the Attorney Grievance Committee for the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 4th Judicial Department, 5th Judicial District, does not list their e-mail address anywhere - even though it is a public record.
So, in order to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court rule, I called the Grievance Committee, explained the reason why I am calling, and asked for their e-mail address for purposes of service.
The woman on the other side of the line first simply refused to give me the e-mail address claiming that they do not accept service by e-mail.
I explained to them that the service by e-mail is not my whim, and is the requirement of the U.S. Supreme Court. Then, I repeated my request.
After that, the woman on the other side, who was apparently, my disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini, flew off the handle.
She started to yell, at the top of her lungs, calling me by my first name - which I never gave her permission to do (I do not call her "Mary") - and asking me, in return, why don't I accept personal service from her, which was completely irrelevant.
I was asking her a question about her e-mail address, which was a public record, and which was required for service of a petition for a writ of certiorari upon Mary Gasparini in compliance with a U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29(3).
Moreover, service of an electronic copy is a convenience for Mary Gasparini and not for me - because otherwise Mary Gasparini will receive her 3 booklets, but they are not word-searchable.
The U.S. Supreme Court's requirement of service of an electronic copy is a convenience for the opposing parties and not for petitioners.
So, Mary Gasparini refused to accept what was convenient for her, and did it in an extremely rude manner.
I am posting our exchange that I, of course, recorded, in order to avoid accusations against me that I did something wrong.
Mary Gasparini , of course, should have known that I was going to record her because of our prior dealings - and yet she could not deny herself the pleasure of yelling me and being disrespectful to me.
I will post the recording of our conversation later in the day, I need to do some work on the petition at this time.
It was quite an interesting experience today talking to Gasparini.
Mary Gasparini expressed a complete disdain to the rule of law and to the Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court, simply because she - very obviously - does not like me, which is an understatement of the century.
I still don't get it why Gasparini finds it appropriate to call me by my first name - but that's the cultural level of New York disciplinary prosecutors, I guess, they do not need to be polite - who will prosecute them if they are rude, after all?
And, the U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29(3) requires me to serve an electronic version of my petition upon my opponent, and to engage in reasonable efforts to obtain the opponent's e-mail address.
I've got an earful of yelling for my reasonale efforts to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court rule of service today.
My opponent, the Attorney Grievance Committee for the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 4th Judicial Department, 5th Judicial District, does not list their e-mail address anywhere - even though it is a public record.
So, in order to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court rule, I called the Grievance Committee, explained the reason why I am calling, and asked for their e-mail address for purposes of service.
The woman on the other side of the line first simply refused to give me the e-mail address claiming that they do not accept service by e-mail.
I explained to them that the service by e-mail is not my whim, and is the requirement of the U.S. Supreme Court. Then, I repeated my request.
After that, the woman on the other side, who was apparently, my disciplinary prosecutor Mary Gasparini, flew off the handle.
She started to yell, at the top of her lungs, calling me by my first name - which I never gave her permission to do (I do not call her "Mary") - and asking me, in return, why don't I accept personal service from her, which was completely irrelevant.
I was asking her a question about her e-mail address, which was a public record, and which was required for service of a petition for a writ of certiorari upon Mary Gasparini in compliance with a U.S. Supreme Court Rule 29(3).
Moreover, service of an electronic copy is a convenience for Mary Gasparini and not for me - because otherwise Mary Gasparini will receive her 3 booklets, but they are not word-searchable.
The U.S. Supreme Court's requirement of service of an electronic copy is a convenience for the opposing parties and not for petitioners.
So, Mary Gasparini refused to accept what was convenient for her, and did it in an extremely rude manner.
I am posting our exchange that I, of course, recorded, in order to avoid accusations against me that I did something wrong.
Mary Gasparini , of course, should have known that I was going to record her because of our prior dealings - and yet she could not deny herself the pleasure of yelling me and being disrespectful to me.
I will post the recording of our conversation later in the day, I need to do some work on the petition at this time.
It was quite an interesting experience today talking to Gasparini.
Mary Gasparini expressed a complete disdain to the rule of law and to the Rules of the U.S. Supreme Court, simply because she - very obviously - does not like me, which is an understatement of the century.
I still don't get it why Gasparini finds it appropriate to call me by my first name - but that's the cultural level of New York disciplinary prosecutors, I guess, they do not need to be polite - who will prosecute them if they are rude, after all?
Should I call her "Mary" next time we meet - in court?
Sunday, September 11, 2016
On 9/11, let's mourn all the victims
I mourn all the victims who died on the planes and in the twin towers on 9/11, all 2,977 of those who perished that day in New York City, Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.
I also mourn 182,000 of civilian deaths in the war that the U.S. unleashed against Iraq falsely claiming Iraq was responsible for 9/11.
I also mourn 31,000 deaths in Afghanistan caused by the war the U.S. unleashed there, also falsely claiming that Afghanistan was somehow responsible for 9/11.
I mourn the injured, the loss of families, the devastation in Iraq and Afghanistan, caused by the unlawful U.S. invasion.
I mourn the deaths and injuries of young men and women in the American Arms Forces who had no business going to Iraq and Afghanistan to kill and maim and be killed and maimed.
In 2001, I lived in the U.S. and was attending an online law school in the U.S.
That online law school was attended by working professionals, older students, some with adult children, some with adult children in the military.
I still remember how many of my co-students, adult men and women, U.S. citizens, sent e-mails to the law school discussion board collecting signatures to "inspire" their adult children in the military to rain bombs upon Iraq and Afghanistan with "Remember 9/11" plus "[The Name of the School], Class of the [Year of Graduation]" painted on those bombs.
And I still remember how viciously I was attacked through e-mails by the future lawyers of America when I wrote four words in response: "NOT IN MY NAME".
When I see today the reports of mourning in America of only those who died on 9/11, I believe, it is wrong.
We must mourn all the innocent victims of 9/11.
But, we must also mourn, at the same time, those who died, were maimed or whose livelihood was destroyed by us as a result of our government inflaming us into allowing the government to use our collective resources to unleash wars in two countries on another continent that had nothing to do with 9/11.
Our money was used to kill and maim civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our money was used to send thousands of our young men and women in the military to kill and maim in two countries that had nothing to do with 9/11.
We must mourn all victims, and make sure that we and our resources are not again used by our government as a tool of hatred against innocent people.
Not again.
Not in our names.
I also mourn 182,000 of civilian deaths in the war that the U.S. unleashed against Iraq falsely claiming Iraq was responsible for 9/11.
I also mourn 31,000 deaths in Afghanistan caused by the war the U.S. unleashed there, also falsely claiming that Afghanistan was somehow responsible for 9/11.
I mourn the injured, the loss of families, the devastation in Iraq and Afghanistan, caused by the unlawful U.S. invasion.
I mourn the deaths and injuries of young men and women in the American Arms Forces who had no business going to Iraq and Afghanistan to kill and maim and be killed and maimed.
In 2001, I lived in the U.S. and was attending an online law school in the U.S.
That online law school was attended by working professionals, older students, some with adult children, some with adult children in the military.
I still remember how many of my co-students, adult men and women, U.S. citizens, sent e-mails to the law school discussion board collecting signatures to "inspire" their adult children in the military to rain bombs upon Iraq and Afghanistan with "Remember 9/11" plus "[The Name of the School], Class of the [Year of Graduation]" painted on those bombs.
And I still remember how viciously I was attacked through e-mails by the future lawyers of America when I wrote four words in response: "NOT IN MY NAME".
When I see today the reports of mourning in America of only those who died on 9/11, I believe, it is wrong.
We must mourn all the innocent victims of 9/11.
But, we must also mourn, at the same time, those who died, were maimed or whose livelihood was destroyed by us as a result of our government inflaming us into allowing the government to use our collective resources to unleash wars in two countries on another continent that had nothing to do with 9/11.
Our money was used to kill and maim civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Our money was used to send thousands of our young men and women in the military to kill and maim in two countries that had nothing to do with 9/11.
We must mourn all victims, and make sure that we and our resources are not again used by our government as a tool of hatred against innocent people.
Not again.
Not in our names.
Saturday, September 10, 2016
No good deed goes unpunished - attorney discipline for effective representation of clients and consumer choice of service providers
Recently, legal blogs exploded with criticism of decision by Minnesota Supreme Court punishing a Colorado-licensed attorney for unauthorized practice of law in Minnesota - for trying, without coming to the state, to settle a case for his in-law by e-mail.
The Colorado-based attorney contacted, by e-mail, the Minnesota attorney who was representing plaintiffs threatening to sue Colorado's attorney's in-laws.
The Minnesota attorney asked if the Colorado attorney was licensed in Minnesota.
The Colorado attorney said "no", but that he will get admitted pro hac vice if the case goes to court. Then, Minnesota attorney (who was not disciplined for aiding and abetting unauthorized practice of law) continued to communicate with the Colorado attorney in discussion of a potential settlement, and, only after a dozen such e-mails exchanged, turned the Colorado attorney in to the Minnesota disciplinary authorities for unauthorized practice of law.
Here is the decision of the Minnesota disciplinary court pointing out all the facts.
The case relied upon a California disciplinary case against an attorney who was licensed in New York, for the proposition that an attorney who has never set foot in the disciplining state, can still be deemed to be unlawfully practicing law in that state without a license.
There was a strong dissent in the Minnesota disciplinary decision stating:
The whole dispute was, reportedly, for $2,368.13 between the lawyer's out-of-state in-laws and their condominium association.
The Colorado lawyer was fully competent and experienced to handle the case, and handled it for his in-laws for free.
Legal blogs, as well as the dissent, commented that the disciplinary proceeding was not worth the effort, was against the ABA rule 5.5 promoting multijurisdictional practice in our increasingly inter-connected world.
A prominent legal blog also pointed out an idea
"no good deed goes unpunished", an idea that slowly makes it into the mainstream.
Some blogs are trying to make a distinction between the UPL by attorneys who are licensed in one state - but not in another - which they think is too heavy-handed an approach, and UPL by an individual who "is not a lawyer anywhere".
Yet, this distinction without a difference misses the point of whether services provided for the client were actually competent services, and whether the client was or was not injured.
By the way, California, the state from which Minnesota disciplinary court borrowed grounds for its disciplinary decision against Colorado attorney - for UPL - has claimed that lack of license because of attorney discipline had nothing to do with ineffective representation of counsel.
So, California, the state upon whose UPL decision Minnesota relied, claimed that, even though it is a crime of UPL for a New York-licensed attorney to practice in California without a license, and the New York-licensed attorney is not entitled to a fee because he was not licensed in California, a criminal conviction where a suspended attorney (attorney without a license) represented the criminal defendant, should not be overturned for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Makes a lot of sense, doesn't it?
Attorney licensing is declared to exist for the SOLE purpose of PROTECTING CONSUMERS from unskilled, incompetent and dishonest attorneys.
The Colorado attorney was neither incompetent nor dishonest, and the disciplining court did not even interest itself with the question whether actual services provided by the Colorado attorney to his in-laws (members of class protected by attorney licensing) were of good quality or not.
Which brings me to the issue of choice by consumers.
The Colorado lawyer's in-laws CHOSE their son-in-law to represent them in a small claims matter with their condominium association.
The Colorado lawyer, a service provider CHOSEN by his clients, did apparently a good job - otherwise the opposing counsel would not have turned him in after a dozen e-mails (not the first e-mail).
If attorney licensing exists for protection of consumers, there was nothing to protect Colorado lawyer's in-laws from.
And, my point is that a consumer must be given a choice of service provider, and their choice must be the beginning and the end of all governmental inquiries into propriety or impropriety of such representation.
The in-laws were not complaining about the quality of their son-in-law's services. It is the opposing counsel who complained. And, the opposing counsel was in no position to protect the in-laws' rights as consumers. And, the opposing counsel was not sanctioned for aiding and abetting unauthorized practice of law by knowingly engaging in settlement negotiations with a Colorado attorney for months - while knowing that the Colorado attorney is not licensed in Minnesota.
There is a definite conflict of interest here - the Minnesota counsel was using attorney discipline that is meant as a shield to protect the Colorado lawyer's in-laws (Minnesota counsel's opponents) as a sword to strip them of free and effective representation of counsel.
To me, it is the Minnesota counsel who should have been punished - and much more severely than a reprimand - for the wrong use of attorney discipline in order to get advantage in litigation, and to have the Colorado lawyer's in-laws have to look for and pay for another attorney (which could be difficult for a small-claim dispute) instead of using their son-in-law's services for free.
The Colorado attorney did not have a license in Minnesota, and was trying to resolve a Minnesota legal case - that is unquestionable.
From that point of view, the Colorado attorney was in the same position as any other individual without a license to practice law in Minnesota. He was, indeed, practicing law in Minnesota without a license.
Yet, the case, really, boils down to the issue of the ACTUAL QUALITY of service provided, and the CONSUMER CHOICE of a provider.
A competent adult consumer may not be told by the government who they can or cannot choose to represent them in a private dispute - and the government should not be able to use the tool of removing service providers of choice from consumer's reach by the completely illogical use of attorney discipline, punishing service providers for providing GOOD, and free, services, as a mere formality.
Various government officials, once in a while, make statements about the existence and gravity of the so-called "justice gap", about the majority of Americans not being able to afford legal representation because attorney fees are out of sight
(and attorney fees are out of sight because of lawyer monopoly for court representation, and because of the high costs of legal education and maintaining a law practice - the costs that go into the legal fees).
Yet, the justice gap is only being widened by decisions such as the recent one in Minnesota - where a competent service provider of choice was sanctioned for being chosen by consumers and for providing good services for those consumers who chose him - for free.
After all, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Johnson v Avery many years ago that when a state cannot fix a "justice gap", it has no say who represents a consumer, even if that person was NEVER licensed to practice law ANYWHERE.
The Colorado-based attorney contacted, by e-mail, the Minnesota attorney who was representing plaintiffs threatening to sue Colorado's attorney's in-laws.
The Minnesota attorney asked if the Colorado attorney was licensed in Minnesota.
The Colorado attorney said "no", but that he will get admitted pro hac vice if the case goes to court. Then, Minnesota attorney (who was not disciplined for aiding and abetting unauthorized practice of law) continued to communicate with the Colorado attorney in discussion of a potential settlement, and, only after a dozen such e-mails exchanged, turned the Colorado attorney in to the Minnesota disciplinary authorities for unauthorized practice of law.
Here is the decision of the Minnesota disciplinary court pointing out all the facts.
The case relied upon a California disciplinary case against an attorney who was licensed in New York, for the proposition that an attorney who has never set foot in the disciplining state, can still be deemed to be unlawfully practicing law in that state without a license.
There was a strong dissent in the Minnesota disciplinary decision stating:
The Colorado lawyer was fully competent and experienced to handle the case, and handled it for his in-laws for free.
Legal blogs, as well as the dissent, commented that the disciplinary proceeding was not worth the effort, was against the ABA rule 5.5 promoting multijurisdictional practice in our increasingly inter-connected world.
A prominent legal blog also pointed out an idea
"no good deed goes unpunished", an idea that slowly makes it into the mainstream.
Some blogs are trying to make a distinction between the UPL by attorneys who are licensed in one state - but not in another - which they think is too heavy-handed an approach, and UPL by an individual who "is not a lawyer anywhere".
Yet, this distinction without a difference misses the point of whether services provided for the client were actually competent services, and whether the client was or was not injured.
By the way, California, the state from which Minnesota disciplinary court borrowed grounds for its disciplinary decision against Colorado attorney - for UPL - has claimed that lack of license because of attorney discipline had nothing to do with ineffective representation of counsel.
So, California, the state upon whose UPL decision Minnesota relied, claimed that, even though it is a crime of UPL for a New York-licensed attorney to practice in California without a license, and the New York-licensed attorney is not entitled to a fee because he was not licensed in California, a criminal conviction where a suspended attorney (attorney without a license) represented the criminal defendant, should not be overturned for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Makes a lot of sense, doesn't it?
Attorney licensing is declared to exist for the SOLE purpose of PROTECTING CONSUMERS from unskilled, incompetent and dishonest attorneys.
The Colorado attorney was neither incompetent nor dishonest, and the disciplining court did not even interest itself with the question whether actual services provided by the Colorado attorney to his in-laws (members of class protected by attorney licensing) were of good quality or not.
Which brings me to the issue of choice by consumers.
The Colorado lawyer's in-laws CHOSE their son-in-law to represent them in a small claims matter with their condominium association.
The Colorado lawyer, a service provider CHOSEN by his clients, did apparently a good job - otherwise the opposing counsel would not have turned him in after a dozen e-mails (not the first e-mail).
If attorney licensing exists for protection of consumers, there was nothing to protect Colorado lawyer's in-laws from.
And, my point is that a consumer must be given a choice of service provider, and their choice must be the beginning and the end of all governmental inquiries into propriety or impropriety of such representation.
The in-laws were not complaining about the quality of their son-in-law's services. It is the opposing counsel who complained. And, the opposing counsel was in no position to protect the in-laws' rights as consumers. And, the opposing counsel was not sanctioned for aiding and abetting unauthorized practice of law by knowingly engaging in settlement negotiations with a Colorado attorney for months - while knowing that the Colorado attorney is not licensed in Minnesota.
There is a definite conflict of interest here - the Minnesota counsel was using attorney discipline that is meant as a shield to protect the Colorado lawyer's in-laws (Minnesota counsel's opponents) as a sword to strip them of free and effective representation of counsel.
To me, it is the Minnesota counsel who should have been punished - and much more severely than a reprimand - for the wrong use of attorney discipline in order to get advantage in litigation, and to have the Colorado lawyer's in-laws have to look for and pay for another attorney (which could be difficult for a small-claim dispute) instead of using their son-in-law's services for free.
The Colorado attorney did not have a license in Minnesota, and was trying to resolve a Minnesota legal case - that is unquestionable.
From that point of view, the Colorado attorney was in the same position as any other individual without a license to practice law in Minnesota. He was, indeed, practicing law in Minnesota without a license.
Yet, the case, really, boils down to the issue of the ACTUAL QUALITY of service provided, and the CONSUMER CHOICE of a provider.
A competent adult consumer may not be told by the government who they can or cannot choose to represent them in a private dispute - and the government should not be able to use the tool of removing service providers of choice from consumer's reach by the completely illogical use of attorney discipline, punishing service providers for providing GOOD, and free, services, as a mere formality.
Various government officials, once in a while, make statements about the existence and gravity of the so-called "justice gap", about the majority of Americans not being able to afford legal representation because attorney fees are out of sight
(and attorney fees are out of sight because of lawyer monopoly for court representation, and because of the high costs of legal education and maintaining a law practice - the costs that go into the legal fees).
Yet, the justice gap is only being widened by decisions such as the recent one in Minnesota - where a competent service provider of choice was sanctioned for being chosen by consumers and for providing good services for those consumers who chose him - for free.
After all, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Johnson v Avery many years ago that when a state cannot fix a "justice gap", it has no say who represents a consumer, even if that person was NEVER licensed to practice law ANYWHERE.
Friday, September 9, 2016
Rob a waiter, share a footnote
An oh-so-witty footnote from a dissenting opinion filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on September 6, 2016 is being spread like wildfire by legal scholars and lawyers alike.
Here it is:
It is expounded as a witty pronouncement of dissent from the powerful judge Alex Kozinski and several of his colleagues, here is the full panel of dissenters:
The 10-judge dissent is from a decision denying review of a certain decision by the 9th Circuit "en banc" - by all judges of the court.
Here is the full list of 9th Circuit's judges listed on the court's website today:
So, why such a substantial number of judges - even though not a majority - "just" 10 out of 28 judges - voted to hear a certain case by a all judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit?
What kind of case that was?
A death penalty case?
A wrongful conviction case?
Police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct?
Abuse of power by social services?
Discipline of attorneys for criticism of judges as part of their jobs for their clients?
Let's remember that federal appellate court toss nearly 100% of civil rights cases through 2-3 page summary orders authored mostly by 80-year-old senior judges, and, as the same Judge Alex Kozinski acknowledged, without proper review of the case - because it requires, according to Judge Kozinski, "exponentially" more time to produce a full-fledged opinion of the court than a summary order.
So, civil rights cases are put on a fast-and-sloppy track and are tossed without looking by octogenarian judges.
As to topics, see above - that's nearly all civil rights cases.
So, what was SO IMPORTANT for the 9th Circuit judges to so vigorously dissent in a 25-page opinion?
A question, no doubt, of paramount importance, already decided by a 3-judge panel of the 9th Circuit:
Whether employers whose employees get tips as part of their jobs (in restaurants, casinos and the like) may involuntarily force such employees to share those tips with other people, like kitchen staff, who do not get tips for doing their work.
In other words - can employers, instead of paying the kitchen staff straight and proper living wages, force their servers/waiters to act as employers of kitchen staff and contribute to the portion of their wages, involuntarily?
The decision by 3 judges of the 9th Circuit said "no" - quite fairly, in my opinion. Moreover, the 3-judge decision did not rule in favor of the tipped workers - not yet, it only reversed a decision precluding a jury trial for such workers and sent the case back to the district court to be tried.
That was the most offending part. You know those juries - what if they actually rule for the poor, not for the employers?
So. 10 well-paid, privileged, men and women, used taxpayers' scarce resources, yours and mine, to produce a 25-page full-fledged dissenting opinion explaining in top-lofty legal theory terms why that is wrong.
In that opinion, they talk:
Here it is:
It is expounded as a witty pronouncement of dissent from the powerful judge Alex Kozinski and several of his colleagues, here is the full panel of dissenters:
- Judge Alex Kozinski,
- Judge Diarmuid Fionntain O'Scannlain,
- Judge Ronald Murray Gould,
- Judge Richard C. Tallman,
- Judge Jay S. Bybee,
- Judge Consuelo Maria Callahan,
- Judge Carlos T. Bea,
- Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.,
- Judge Sandra S. Ikuta, and
- Judge N. Randy Smith.
The 10-judge dissent is from a decision denying review of a certain decision by the 9th Circuit "en banc" - by all judges of the court.
Here is the full list of 9th Circuit's judges listed on the court's website today:
11. Paez, Richard A.
|
16. Bybee, Jay S.
|
18. Bea, Carlos T.
|
20. Ikuta, Sandra S.
|
21. Smith, N. Randy
|
22. Murguia, Mary H.
|
23. Christen, Morgan
|
So, why such a substantial number of judges - even though not a majority - "just" 10 out of 28 judges - voted to hear a certain case by a all judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit?
What kind of case that was?
A death penalty case?
A wrongful conviction case?
Police misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct?
Abuse of power by social services?
Discipline of attorneys for criticism of judges as part of their jobs for their clients?
Let's remember that federal appellate court toss nearly 100% of civil rights cases through 2-3 page summary orders authored mostly by 80-year-old senior judges, and, as the same Judge Alex Kozinski acknowledged, without proper review of the case - because it requires, according to Judge Kozinski, "exponentially" more time to produce a full-fledged opinion of the court than a summary order.
So, civil rights cases are put on a fast-and-sloppy track and are tossed without looking by octogenarian judges.
As to topics, see above - that's nearly all civil rights cases.
So, what was SO IMPORTANT for the 9th Circuit judges to so vigorously dissent in a 25-page opinion?
A question, no doubt, of paramount importance, already decided by a 3-judge panel of the 9th Circuit:
Whether employers whose employees get tips as part of their jobs (in restaurants, casinos and the like) may involuntarily force such employees to share those tips with other people, like kitchen staff, who do not get tips for doing their work.
In other words - can employers, instead of paying the kitchen staff straight and proper living wages, force their servers/waiters to act as employers of kitchen staff and contribute to the portion of their wages, involuntarily?
The decision by 3 judges of the 9th Circuit said "no" - quite fairly, in my opinion. Moreover, the 3-judge decision did not rule in favor of the tipped workers - not yet, it only reversed a decision precluding a jury trial for such workers and sent the case back to the district court to be tried.
That was the most offending part. You know those juries - what if they actually rule for the poor, not for the employers?
So. 10 well-paid, privileged, men and women, used taxpayers' scarce resources, yours and mine, to produce a 25-page full-fledged dissenting opinion explaining in top-lofty legal theory terms why that is wrong.
In that opinion, they talk:
- separation of powers;
- division of powers between the executive and legislative branches;
- what the U.S. Congress may and may not delegate;
- how to read and interpret federal regulations;
- what can and cannot be found through interpretation in federal regulations.
All of that stuff.
And, remember, the famous footnote that spread like wildfire on Twitter. About separation of powers, circuit splits and being lonely in the universe.
All in favor of powerful employers, restaurants, hotels, casinos, supporting a proposition that such powerful employers may "legally" rob a waiter, a bell-boy, a casino workers who get the majority of their income from tips - of a share of their tips in favor of their other underpaid employees.
I wonder how loud a scream will come from the same 9th Circuit if we "pool" the judges' salaries with those of support staff - secretaries, security officers, custodians. To even it out, so to say.
I also wonder, out of the 10 dissenting judges, how many were taken on trips to casinos, were catered for free in restaurants and in hotels, "to sweeten their views of the issues" in this case.
And, you know what I DID NOT see in that 25-page opinion?
A whole bunch of issues that self-respecting jurists should have put for consideration in a case like that.
I did not see in the entire 25-page dissent a verification whether the offending federal regulation in question, the "tip pooling restriction" of the U.S. Department of Labor, that allegedly extended the tip pooling restrictions of Section 203(m) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, was promulgated by the agency, the U.S. Department of Labor, for the declared purpose of the legislation and for the declared purpose of regulation - protection of the class of individuals covered by the statute and regulation, employees.
Actually, the regulation did seek to protect employees from being deprived by their employers from part of their wages, so it did act for the declared purpose.
After that, usually judicial review of propriety of a regulation STOPS (see, for example, how it usually happens explained from the horse's mouth - by the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in a law review article). Often it stops even earlier than that. In most court cases where administrative regulations are being reviewed by courts because of civil rights lawsuits claiming civil rights violations through such regulations, all that courts look at is whether the regulations have a rational basis. Any rational basis. Not necessarily the basis declared as the primary goal of the regulation.
In other words, if the regulation declares that it seeks to protect people from something, but actually does the opposite, courts still refuse to review it - saying that, based on the doctrine of "comity", they will not "look behind" the rationally-based text of the regulation to see how it ACTUALLY works.
So, in this case, there was a rational basis, and the court should have stopped.
The 10 judges know that. They regularly DO that in civil rights cases.
Yet, they disregarded their own principle, and proceeded further.
In this case, however, not only there was a rational basis for the regulation, but the rational basis coincided with the declared goal and the actual effect of the regulation, protection of employees from robbery by employers.
Do the 10 judges know that? Of course, they do. They did not get where they are without, mostly an Ivy League law school education, a long career as prosecutors (usually) and, mostly, a long career as judges.
The next point the 10 dissenters are raising is - but, the regulation EXCEEDED protections that the statute provided.
What the 10 dissenters are talking is about excess of authority, by the executive branch (the U.S. Department of Labor), and by their own colleagues, judges of the 3-judge panel, who reversed and remanded the case back to the district court, deciding that the Department of Labor acted properly even if their tip-pooling restrictions are MORE protective than the underlying legislation.
But, wait a minute, are the same judges so consistent in their separation of argument arguments if the matter concerns their own well-being, judges as a class?
Not at all.
There are not just one, not just two, but MULTIPLE, MANY judicially-created "principles" and "doctrines": immunities, deferences, comities, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, you name it...
To arrive at illegal judicial lawmaking decisions that have introduced immunities-deferences-comities etc. doctrines barring victims of civil rights violations from access to court, courts engaged in all kinds of tricks - the main ones being exploring the so-called "history and tradition", and claiming that "even if the U.S. Congress did not say [this and that] in so many words, it clearly must have implied [for example, to give absolute judicial immunity for malicious and corrupt acts on the bench]" - without any basis for such claims.
These ILLEGALLY created bars to federal jurisdiction - illegally created because determination of the scope of federal jurisdiction is the exclusive prerogative of the U.S. Congress - are applied as if it is "the Law of the Land".
And, the 10 dissenters did not engage in any meaningful analysis of what the U.S. Congress "may have implied" in enacting the Fair Labor Practices Act of 1938, the source of power for the U.S. Department of Labor to promulgate the rules that were sustained as lawful by the 3-judge panel.
Why such a discrepancy in attitude of judges?
Why such high cries, such lofty theory, so much effort extended to a case seeking, simply put, to legalize robbery of the poor (waiters' tips) by the rich (restaurant owners), why all these cries of violation of the doctrine of separation of powers
when the same courts, the dissenters included, SPIT at that same separation of powers from a high bell-tower, so to say?
Of course, courts disregard issues of separation of power when it concerns protection of government officials from lawsuits for treasonous conduct, violations of the U.S. Constitution, filed by victims of such violations - and that's the only, and the whole of the difference, all lofty legal theory in this 25-page dissent aside, witty footnotes and all.
Because here, the 3-judge panel that decided the case (and caused the ire of the 10 dissenters), actually did something right, actually - right by the people, right by the law, but wrong by the courts' self-imposed implied duty to protect the powerful in this country from the reach of statutes and regulations designed to protect the less-powerful from discrimination and infringement upon their civil rights.
Among issues that I did not see in the 25-page dissent, I did not see discussion of this very clear issue - is the involuntary taking of ALL tips of the servers/waiters by the restaurant owners and then involuntary distribution of such tips the way the restaurant owners like - a violation of the tipped waiters/servers due process of law right to property?
I do not share the popular belief that ANY and ALL waiters/servers in a restaurant MUST be tipped each time by every customer.
There are enough stories on the media where angry non-tipped servers describe the bad customers who left without a tip.
If the server provided good service - that is unfair.
If the server provided a bad service - that is exactly fair.
To me, it all depends on the quality of service.
If you come to eat out at a restaurant, and pay extra for your food, as compared to just cooking and eating at home, you expect your experience to be pleasant, and a good server may either enhance the pleasant experience from food and company, or take away from it.
The server cannot answer for the quality of food.
But, the server can answer for being polite, considerate, efficient, and, generally, for making a customer feel welcome.
Why is all of this relevant?
Well, because when a person tips a waiter, the person does not pay the restaurant for the quality of food, it rewards the particular person for doing their job in such a manner that that person, the server, deserves extra from the customer.
And, that extra belongs to the server, and to him or her alone. Not to be grabbed by the employer, not to be spread out to the kitchen staff or other, less hospitable servers who did not get tipped or who got tipped less.
Stripping the server of that money is not only wrong, it is illegal - as says the rationally based regulation of the U.S. Department of Labor, promulgated for the purpose of protecting those same servers - and actually protecting them.
That privileged and well-paid judges (each of the 10 dissenters gets paid by us the taxpayers $213,300 per year, with benefits), regularly tossing civil rights appeals without a review, found time and resources to expound on how wrong it is not to allow the rich to rob the poor - is simply disgusting.
Despite all the witty footnotes.
Thursday, September 8, 2016
The Schultz defense in LA - 1,000 criminal cases fixed over 5.5 years for $8,000 a pop, but judges and prosecutors knew nothing about it
Interesting news are coming from California.
A now-former court clerk, and 10 of his alleged accomplices, were indicted in a federal 38-count indictment for fixing court cases.
1,000 of them over the period of 5.5 years (since 2010), for $8,000 a pop.
Here are the names of the defendants:
And, of course, it is being claimed that judges and prosecutors who were supposed to handle and monitor all those cases were not aware of the case-fixing, where the clerk noted the bought-off cases on the court computers as fines paid when they were not, and as charges reduced when they were not.
I do not know who would believe in this bullshit.
First of all, that shows that judges and prosecutors do not do their job monitoring cases post-conviction.
Second, such a massive bribery scheme, going on over the years and involving 1,000 cases in 5.5 years in the court of one county (one courthouse) is not possible either.
That is 181 FELONY cases fixed in any given year - because nobody will pay $8,000 to pay for fixing a misdemeanor charge.
Not only judges and prosecutors had to be involved, but the charging police officers too. It is a matter of professional pride, not to mention record of employment, for the arresting officer in each case to monitor how the case progresses.
A lobotomy is required to believe that an officer would not be pissed off that his FELONY cases were reduced to nothing en masse.
And, we are talking about the same Orange County Superior court in California which was recently the center of a controversy where:
A now-former court clerk, and 10 of his alleged accomplices, were indicted in a federal 38-count indictment for fixing court cases.
1,000 of them over the period of 5.5 years (since 2010), for $8,000 a pop.
Here are the names of the defendants:
And, of course, it is being claimed that judges and prosecutors who were supposed to handle and monitor all those cases were not aware of the case-fixing, where the clerk noted the bought-off cases on the court computers as fines paid when they were not, and as charges reduced when they were not.
I do not know who would believe in this bullshit.
First of all, that shows that judges and prosecutors do not do their job monitoring cases post-conviction.
Second, such a massive bribery scheme, going on over the years and involving 1,000 cases in 5.5 years in the court of one county (one courthouse) is not possible either.
That is 181 FELONY cases fixed in any given year - because nobody will pay $8,000 to pay for fixing a misdemeanor charge.
Not only judges and prosecutors had to be involved, but the charging police officers too. It is a matter of professional pride, not to mention record of employment, for the arresting officer in each case to monitor how the case progresses.
A lobotomy is required to believe that an officer would not be pissed off that his FELONY cases were reduced to nothing en masse.
And, we are talking about the same Orange County Superior court in California which was recently the center of a controversy where:
- prosecutors did not tell defense attorneys that they were improperly using jail snitches to talk to represented criminal defendants;
- the Sheriff's office (whose various officers serve as arresting officers, jail/corrections officers and court security officers), knowing all that, were mum about it - for years; and
- the criminal defense attorney who outed the "practice", got beaten up by those "court security officers" in the courthouse - and charged for assault on the security officer.
So, we have a whole lot of grounds to trust in the integrity of prosecutors and local police officers for telling the truth whether they were not involved in the case-fixing.
And, we have a lot of grounds to trust integrity of Los Angeles judges, too - after they
- received, for years, unlawful addition of around $50,000 annually from the County that was appearing in front of them,
- disbarred and put in solitary confinement attorney whistleblower about that corrupt scheme Dr. Richard Fine, and
- when the scandal went too far, the California Legislature gave judges retroactive immunity for CRIMINAL liability - an unheard of thing.
Imagine that you commit a crime, and then the state legislators, to rescue you, gave you immunity from criminal liability going backwards.
Such legislative gifts will are never given to "ordinary Joes".
As to the "we didn't know anything" indictment-for-corruption in the Orange Count Supreior Court, I will continue to cover this story, which has only begun to develop.
Stay tuned.
Monday, September 5, 2016
On whistleblowers, pollution in Amazon, criminal conviction of federal judge Richard Wesley at the time of confirmation, and the workings of the American, Taiwan, Ecudorian and Canadian courts
In 2004, a person, 48-year-old Elena Sassower was arrested, convicted and put in jail for 6 months in Washington, D.C.
Why?
Because she wanted to testify in the U.S. Congress at the confirmation of a federal judge, against such confirmation, which was her right as a taxpayer, was not allowed to do that, tried to do that anyway and - see above.
She was offered probation, no jail time, with strings attached.
She was supposed to:
What was that explosive matter that Elena Sassower was so vigorously blocked from producing in the U.S. Congress at the confirmation hearing of Judge Wesley?
Some information about Judge Wesley's misconduct as judge of New York State Court of Appeals, and the deliberate tossing of facially meritorious citizens' complaints about him, without an explanation or reasoning by the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct (the Commission keeps doing it now, too).
And Judge Wesley's own questionnaire for judicial nomination.
Containing this information:
Why?
Because she wanted to testify in the U.S. Congress at the confirmation of a federal judge, against such confirmation, which was her right as a taxpayer, was not allowed to do that, tried to do that anyway and - see above.
She was offered probation, no jail time, with strings attached.
She was supposed to:
- stay away from certain senators (Senator Hillary Clinton included - Elena Sassower had the audacity of asking her Senator for help);
- write a letter of apology - to "senators Hillary Clinton, Charles E. Schumer, Orrin G. Hatch and Saxby Chambliss and for Judge Richard C. Wesley of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit", and, of course
- accept conditions of probation.
The courageous woman said that the letters of apology will not be sent because they will not be written and refused to accept SUCH conditions of probation.
She was sent to jail for 6 months, the maximum sentence, even though the prosecution (there was prosecution) did not ask for jail time.
Elena Sassower did what her father and mother, George and Dorris Sassowers, did - blew a whistle about judicial misconduct.
George and Doris Sassowers is a spousal couple who both lost their licenses for exposing judicial misconduct and corruption.
Elena Sassower's condition of getting jail or not getting jail was writing a letter of apology to the very same judge whose confirmation she was trying to prevent by statements about his unfitness for the appellate federal bench.
By the way, she has made a motion to recuse the judge presiding over her criminal case, the one who refused to do that, and retaliated against Elena Sassower for making the motion to recuse by sending her to jail for speaking to the government on issue of public concern.
In my previous blog post, here, I wrote about attorneys who were disciplined for criticism of the judiciary, listing Elena Sassower's both parents.
Elena Sassower is not an attorney, she belongs to a larger group of whistle-blowers punished by the American government for speaking their minds and exposing governmental, and specifically judicial, corruption.
Let's list the heroes of that 12-years-ago case. I will follow their careers, save for Judge Wesley, in a separate blog.
U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer,
Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss,
Judge Richard C. Wesley, and
Senator Hillary Clinton - the one who
Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss,
Judge Richard C. Wesley, and
Senator Hillary Clinton - the one who
- did not help her constituent get in front of the U.S. Congress to testify against confirmation about what the constituent believed, based on evidence she wanted to bring, a "bad apple" judge; and
- did not help that same constituent when she was slapped with a clearly illegal criminal prosecution for trying to speak out to her elected representatives on issues of public concern that was the topic of the session where she wanted to speak.
Now Senator Clinton ducked, through personal connections, criminal charges for exposing national security of this country, and is running for president.
But, this post is not about Clinton or above-listed Senators. It is about Judge Wesley. The now "high-ranking" senior federal appellate court judge Wesley.
But, this post is not about Clinton or above-listed Senators. It is about Judge Wesley. The now "high-ranking" senior federal appellate court judge Wesley.
Judge Richard C. Wesley, of the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, the one whose confirmation Elena Sassower was trying to prevent.
Some information about Judge Wesley's misconduct as judge of New York State Court of Appeals, and the deliberate tossing of facially meritorious citizens' complaints about him, without an explanation or reasoning by the New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct (the Commission keeps doing it now, too).
And Judge Wesley's own questionnaire for judicial nomination.
Containing this information:
The question is straightforward - judge, have you ever been convicted of a crime?
The answer is - no.
But then, in answer as to whether the judge was subject to administrative or civil lawsuits, the judge suddenly discloses this:
The answer is - no.
But then, in answer as to whether the judge was subject to administrative or civil lawsuits, the judge suddenly discloses this:
Here it is - convicted of a crime in Taiwan.
For his involvement in a "bar admission matter".
Judge Wesley lied even about what kind of "matter" precipitated his criminal conviction in another country.
Certainly it was not a "bar admission matter". It was a disbarment matter, of an immigrant attorney, an Ivy League graduate Liang-Houh Shieh (and, while in law school, one of the editors of the school's Law Journal, the highest honor for a law student) in 1997:
That was an immigrant non-white attorney who sued BigLaw for racism (BigLaw firms? racial discrimination amongst their own lawyers? you don't say!) and was slapped with over $500,000 in sanctions for that.
And branded "vexatious litigant" (as it usually happens with people raising issues of human rights against the big and powerful in this country).
And - oh, yes, here it is again - attorney Shieh moved to recuse a judge as a "purely vindictive" move. Of course, he had to be disbarred.
But, attorney Shieh obtained criminal conviction against judges who brought about his disbarment - in Taiwan.
Reportedly, the conviction was "rescinded" in 2003 - reportedly, on May 23, 2003.
But, the confirmation hearing of Judge Wesley happened on May 22, 2003, when the conviction as not yet overturned.
And, when Elena Sassower sought to expose Judge Wesley's unfitness, she knew nothing about what may happen in the future. The reason why the conviction was rescinded was, likely, jurisdictional.
Yet, the reason why it was first granted, was, likely, based on evidentiary facts supplied by attorney Shieh - he evidentiary facts that needed to be reviewed by the U.S. Congress as a matter of public concern about fitness of a judicial candidate regardless of whether somebody was at that time "working" on overturning or "rescinding" the judicial candidate's criminal conviction in another country.
According to Judge Wesley's statement in the judicial questionnaire, New York Attorney General was fighting it, but, at the time Judge Wesley answered the questionnaire, "the process is not as of yet successful".
And, Judge Wesley was STILL nominated - despite a criminal conviction in another country.
And STILL confirmed by the U.S. Congress - while the only protestor against such a confirmation, a middle-aged woman, was dragged out by the police for wanting to testify against the confirmation.
Of course, this was explosive information - that a judge nominated by the President and scheduled to be confirmed by the U.S. Congress, for life, for a federal appellate court, had a criminal conviction in Taiwan at the time of his confirmation hearing.
Enough to gag a woman wanting to speak on an issue of public concern before that same session of the U.S. Congress.
Enough to put her in jail for refusing to apologize to the judge whose "unresolved" criminal conviction - and lying on the questionnaire that he has no criminal convictions (at least, none of importance to the judge) - she was trying to expose.
But - wait a minute.
If the U.S. does not have respect to a Taiwan's order of criminal conviction, Taiwan will not have respect to judgments of American courts.
Right?
Who is Judge Wesley and what are his real connections and his real backing that the U.S. Congress risked an international scandal and a refusal of an entire, fast-developing, country and business partner to honor judgments of U.S. Courts?
One thing is clear: after the stormy confirmation, and exposure of his criminal conviction by the bad, bad, bad Elena Sassower, daughter of two bad, bad, bad attorney-whistleblowers of judicial corruption George Sassowers (disbarred for that in 1988) and Doris Sassower (suspended for that in 1991), Judge Wesley had a definite grudge against those bad, bad, bad international courts that would convict him of a crime for a pesky "bar admission matter" of their citizens.
And definitely against international courts in general defending their citizens against powerful Americans. Like Judge Wesley. Like Chevron Corporation.
Right.
It was Judge Richard C. Wesley who was "chosen", I would say, hand-picked to decide the fate of the enforcement of the multi-billion judgment from Ecuador against Chevron Corporation.
Reportedly, Judge Wesley tried - at least outwardly - to be fair to the Ecuadoran court (possibly, understanding that his actions can be viewed by the international community through the prism of his criminal conviction in Taiwan and his resulting grudge against international courts).
Yet, Judge Wesley signed off on the order barring enforcement of the multibillion dollar judgment, and that, of course, helped raise the stock of Chevron.
Makes a difference if a company you invest your nest egg into does or does not have a nearly 9 billion dollar judgment against it, right?
By the way, a high-ranking official in Chevron has reportedly dumped some Chevron stock on August 26, 2016, after Judge Wesley's convenient court order in its favor brought he stock prices up, and in anticipation of an appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court. Make money while you can, right?
And, the fight over the 9 billion judgment is not over yet - or is it?
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Williams v Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. ___ (2016) this year that if one disqualified judge sits on a judicial appellate panel, all judges are tainted (and then remanded the case back to the same panel of judges, sans the disqualified one).
But - how can I put it mildly?
A judge who had a criminal conviction from an overseas court at the outset of his career, and who had a woman put in jail for exposing it, now rules that a nearly 9 billion dollar judgment, coincidentally also from an overseas court, is somehow unenforceable because of judicial corruption - of that overseas court?
Judge Wesley has a poetic streak in him, in addition to the criminal one.
And our poet, now a "high-ranking" judge, was considered back in 2011 for the position of the new dean of my alma mater - the Albany Law School. Great! Judge Richard Carl Wesley can teach the young generation of lawyers a lot.
How to have whistleblowers of judicial corruption - like Elena Sassower - packed away in prison.
How to have whistleblowers of international environmental pollution by corporation - like Steven Donziger - sanctioned and vilified because Steven Donziger, one man, single-handedly, corrupted the entire court system of Ecuador, the country where Chevron handled cases in those same court before and after that judgment, without any complaint about judicial corruption.
Imagine.
Judicial corruption.
In Ecuador.
Fought by a judge convicted of a crime, likely also of judicial corruption.
In Taiwan.
Poetic.
Here he is, once again.
The poet (of judicial corruption).
But, as to Chevron - the injured Ecuadorans asked for enforcement of the Ecuadoran judgment against the assets of Chevron Corporation not only in the U.S., but also in Canada, by the Canadian highest court that affirmed the 2015 decision of the Canadian lower courts, also deeming the multi-billion dollar Ecuadoran judgment against Chevron's assets as good for enforcement in Canada.
And the Canada Supreme Court does not believe - as Judge Wesley does - that the Ecuadoran highest court's judgment against Chevron is unenforceable as brought about through corruption. Instead, it believes that it is fully enforceable - and Chevron is reportedly defying that Canadian court order.
Isn't it just a LITTLE bit coincidental that defying the Canadian court order, ordering enforcement of the Ecuadoran court judgment of 8.6 billion dollars against Chevron as successor to Texaco, was reported on July 27, 2016, less than two weeks before a U.S. Court gave Chevron's assets in the U.S. a reprieve and blocked enforcement of the same judgment against Chevron's assets in the U.S.?
Actually, Chevron's Executive Vice-President was actually not very confident as to the outcome in the 2nd Circuit and dumped over 2 million dollars worth of stock of his own corporation 6 days before the judgment of the 2nd Circuit came - he should have worried so. Judge Wesley took care of it.
Now attorney Steven Donziger who brought about that judgment is glorified in Ecuador, glorified by the world community, glorified in Canada, but villified in his own country - for doing his job and for doing it right, trying to get justice for his injured clients from a powerful corporation.
Why is it not surprising?
And, why is it not surprising that, while it was reported that the American district judge's decision 497-page decision will not survive an appeal to the 2nd Circuit, it did - and even triumphed, over international law, comity, fairness, propriety and common sense.
Toxic waste dumped in Amazon region, poisoning the living environment for thousands of people does not matter for American judges.
Chevron was awarded "the Public Eye" worst-in-the-world environmental record corporation in 2006, based on the same Ecuadoran judgment, and that is the assessment of the whole mess by the international community.
Now it appears that, while the Ecuadoran judgment was confirmed as valid in Canada, it urgently needed to be disaffirmed in the U.S, and Judge Wesley and the other two judges on he "panel" obliged.
As to Judge Richard Carl Wesley, putting a judge who had a personal grudge against other countries' courts ruling for their citizens, over an appeal claiming that a giant corporation was hurt by corruption in a court of a small nation orchestrated by ONE attorney was utterly shameless.
But, while Ecuadoran victims may not be unable to obtain justice in U.S. courts, let's look what will happen next in Canada though, where Judge Wesley is not a judge yet - thank God, and where the Canadian Supreme Court has spoken on July 27, 2016, and ordered enforcement of the judgement against Chevron's assets within Canada.
Maybe, it is not by chance that the Chevron Executive Vice President was dumping all that stock of his own company on August 2, 2016? And another Vice-President and Comptroller dumped just under a million dollars worth of stock on August 26, 2016? Something is a-coming to Chevron, possibly, from the snowy Canada, so that the insiders started to dump their own stock?
I will follow this circus with interest - and continue to report on it.
Of course, those who follow this case may be monitored by the government and by Chevron helped by the government nowadays,
but anyway.
We'll see what happens. Stay tuned.
For his involvement in a "bar admission matter".
Judge Wesley lied even about what kind of "matter" precipitated his criminal conviction in another country.
Certainly it was not a "bar admission matter". It was a disbarment matter, of an immigrant attorney, an Ivy League graduate Liang-Houh Shieh (and, while in law school, one of the editors of the school's Law Journal, the highest honor for a law student) in 1997:
That was an immigrant non-white attorney who sued BigLaw for racism (BigLaw firms? racial discrimination amongst their own lawyers? you don't say!) and was slapped with over $500,000 in sanctions for that.
And branded "vexatious litigant" (as it usually happens with people raising issues of human rights against the big and powerful in this country).
And - oh, yes, here it is again - attorney Shieh moved to recuse a judge as a "purely vindictive" move. Of course, he had to be disbarred.
But, attorney Shieh obtained criminal conviction against judges who brought about his disbarment - in Taiwan.
Reportedly, the conviction was "rescinded" in 2003 - reportedly, on May 23, 2003.
But, the confirmation hearing of Judge Wesley happened on May 22, 2003, when the conviction as not yet overturned.
And, when Elena Sassower sought to expose Judge Wesley's unfitness, she knew nothing about what may happen in the future. The reason why the conviction was rescinded was, likely, jurisdictional.
Yet, the reason why it was first granted, was, likely, based on evidentiary facts supplied by attorney Shieh - he evidentiary facts that needed to be reviewed by the U.S. Congress as a matter of public concern about fitness of a judicial candidate regardless of whether somebody was at that time "working" on overturning or "rescinding" the judicial candidate's criminal conviction in another country.
According to Judge Wesley's statement in the judicial questionnaire, New York Attorney General was fighting it, but, at the time Judge Wesley answered the questionnaire, "the process is not as of yet successful".
And, Judge Wesley was STILL nominated - despite a criminal conviction in another country.
And STILL confirmed by the U.S. Congress - while the only protestor against such a confirmation, a middle-aged woman, was dragged out by the police for wanting to testify against the confirmation.
Of course, this was explosive information - that a judge nominated by the President and scheduled to be confirmed by the U.S. Congress, for life, for a federal appellate court, had a criminal conviction in Taiwan at the time of his confirmation hearing.
Enough to gag a woman wanting to speak on an issue of public concern before that same session of the U.S. Congress.
Enough to put her in jail for refusing to apologize to the judge whose "unresolved" criminal conviction - and lying on the questionnaire that he has no criminal convictions (at least, none of importance to the judge) - she was trying to expose.
But - wait a minute.
If the U.S. does not have respect to a Taiwan's order of criminal conviction, Taiwan will not have respect to judgments of American courts.
Right?
Who is Judge Wesley and what are his real connections and his real backing that the U.S. Congress risked an international scandal and a refusal of an entire, fast-developing, country and business partner to honor judgments of U.S. Courts?
One thing is clear: after the stormy confirmation, and exposure of his criminal conviction by the bad, bad, bad Elena Sassower, daughter of two bad, bad, bad attorney-whistleblowers of judicial corruption George Sassowers (disbarred for that in 1988) and Doris Sassower (suspended for that in 1991), Judge Wesley had a definite grudge against those bad, bad, bad international courts that would convict him of a crime for a pesky "bar admission matter" of their citizens.
And definitely against international courts in general defending their citizens against powerful Americans. Like Judge Wesley. Like Chevron Corporation.
Right.
It was Judge Richard C. Wesley who was "chosen", I would say, hand-picked to decide the fate of the enforcement of the multi-billion judgment from Ecuador against Chevron Corporation.
Reportedly, Judge Wesley tried - at least outwardly - to be fair to the Ecuadoran court (possibly, understanding that his actions can be viewed by the international community through the prism of his criminal conviction in Taiwan and his resulting grudge against international courts).
Yet, Judge Wesley signed off on the order barring enforcement of the multibillion dollar judgment, and that, of course, helped raise the stock of Chevron.
Makes a difference if a company you invest your nest egg into does or does not have a nearly 9 billion dollar judgment against it, right?
By the way, a high-ranking official in Chevron has reportedly dumped some Chevron stock on August 26, 2016, after Judge Wesley's convenient court order in its favor brought he stock prices up, and in anticipation of an appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court. Make money while you can, right?
And, the fight over the 9 billion judgment is not over yet - or is it?
Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Williams v Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. ___ (2016) this year that if one disqualified judge sits on a judicial appellate panel, all judges are tainted (and then remanded the case back to the same panel of judges, sans the disqualified one).
But - how can I put it mildly?
A judge who had a criminal conviction from an overseas court at the outset of his career, and who had a woman put in jail for exposing it, now rules that a nearly 9 billion dollar judgment, coincidentally also from an overseas court, is somehow unenforceable because of judicial corruption - of that overseas court?
Judge Wesley has a poetic streak in him, in addition to the criminal one.
And our poet, now a "high-ranking" judge, was considered back in 2011 for the position of the new dean of my alma mater - the Albany Law School. Great! Judge Richard Carl Wesley can teach the young generation of lawyers a lot.
How to have whistleblowers of judicial corruption - like Elena Sassower - packed away in prison.
How to have whistleblowers of international environmental pollution by corporation - like Steven Donziger - sanctioned and vilified because Steven Donziger, one man, single-handedly, corrupted the entire court system of Ecuador, the country where Chevron handled cases in those same court before and after that judgment, without any complaint about judicial corruption.
Imagine.
Judicial corruption.
In Ecuador.
Fought by a judge convicted of a crime, likely also of judicial corruption.
In Taiwan.
Poetic.
Here he is, once again.
The poet (of judicial corruption).
But, as to Chevron - the injured Ecuadorans asked for enforcement of the Ecuadoran judgment against the assets of Chevron Corporation not only in the U.S., but also in Canada, by the Canadian highest court that affirmed the 2015 decision of the Canadian lower courts, also deeming the multi-billion dollar Ecuadoran judgment against Chevron's assets as good for enforcement in Canada.
And the Canada Supreme Court does not believe - as Judge Wesley does - that the Ecuadoran highest court's judgment against Chevron is unenforceable as brought about through corruption. Instead, it believes that it is fully enforceable - and Chevron is reportedly defying that Canadian court order.
Isn't it just a LITTLE bit coincidental that defying the Canadian court order, ordering enforcement of the Ecuadoran court judgment of 8.6 billion dollars against Chevron as successor to Texaco, was reported on July 27, 2016, less than two weeks before a U.S. Court gave Chevron's assets in the U.S. a reprieve and blocked enforcement of the same judgment against Chevron's assets in the U.S.?
Actually, Chevron's Executive Vice-President was actually not very confident as to the outcome in the 2nd Circuit and dumped over 2 million dollars worth of stock of his own corporation 6 days before the judgment of the 2nd Circuit came - he should have worried so. Judge Wesley took care of it.
Now attorney Steven Donziger who brought about that judgment is glorified in Ecuador, glorified by the world community, glorified in Canada, but villified in his own country - for doing his job and for doing it right, trying to get justice for his injured clients from a powerful corporation.
Why is it not surprising?
And, why is it not surprising that, while it was reported that the American district judge's decision 497-page decision will not survive an appeal to the 2nd Circuit, it did - and even triumphed, over international law, comity, fairness, propriety and common sense.
Toxic waste dumped in Amazon region, poisoning the living environment for thousands of people does not matter for American judges.
Chevron was awarded "the Public Eye" worst-in-the-world environmental record corporation in 2006, based on the same Ecuadoran judgment, and that is the assessment of the whole mess by the international community.
Now it appears that, while the Ecuadoran judgment was confirmed as valid in Canada, it urgently needed to be disaffirmed in the U.S, and Judge Wesley and the other two judges on he "panel" obliged.
As to Judge Richard Carl Wesley, putting a judge who had a personal grudge against other countries' courts ruling for their citizens, over an appeal claiming that a giant corporation was hurt by corruption in a court of a small nation orchestrated by ONE attorney was utterly shameless.
But, while Ecuadoran victims may not be unable to obtain justice in U.S. courts, let's look what will happen next in Canada though, where Judge Wesley is not a judge yet - thank God, and where the Canadian Supreme Court has spoken on July 27, 2016, and ordered enforcement of the judgement against Chevron's assets within Canada.
Maybe, it is not by chance that the Chevron Executive Vice President was dumping all that stock of his own company on August 2, 2016? And another Vice-President and Comptroller dumped just under a million dollars worth of stock on August 26, 2016? Something is a-coming to Chevron, possibly, from the snowy Canada, so that the insiders started to dump their own stock?
I will follow this circus with interest - and continue to report on it.
Of course, those who follow this case may be monitored by the government and by Chevron helped by the government nowadays,
but anyway.
We'll see what happens. Stay tuned.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)