Judges as advocates for causes in their own courtrooms: A military veteran judge disciplined for advocating on behalf of his brother, an army veteran, a violent felon "Green Beret" who committed a hate crime against a presumed Muslim

In a bizarre turn of events, a Florida judge Gregory P. Holder agreed to a reprimand for his role in acting as an advocate for an army veteran, Green Beret Clay S. Allred.

Here is what Clay S. Allred did:

"An Army National Guard reservist at the time, Allred was staying in a hotel in Ybor City while waiting to move into an apartment that was being painted. His Jeep was loaded with the few things he owned — three rifles registered to him, some body armor he used during training, clothing, dishes, ironing board, computers, guitar and cables.

He spent a good part of Aug. 21 drinking. On the way back to his apartment, he finally had a break with reality at a gas station on Fowler Avenue and Bruce B. Downs Boulevard, at a corner of the USF campus.

For Allred, the memories of what happened next are hazy. Much of what he knows comes from a video taken of the incident.

He says he wanted to use the bathroom but was told it was only for customers. He tried to buy an energy drink, but the clerk wouldn’t break his $100 bill.

Then he urinated on the counter and yelled “I hate you people” to the clerk, Quadratullah Hassan, who is Muslim.

Hassan chased Allred out to his car.

As Allred pulled away, he fired three shots from his Glock 26 pistol into the air."

Ok, so we have:

1) driving while intoxicated;
2) urinating on the counter in a public place - that's public lewdness,  a sex crime in many states;
3) aiming a Glock 26 pistol at a clerk, and
4) firing a pistol into the air - three times - in a public place, and at a gas station, which could have caused fatalities.

Clay S. Allred was already given tremendous leniency, a house arrest and probation, a leniency that can only be explained by the military veteran-judge's partiality to a military veteran who, instead of being prosecuted for felonies, was given a slap on the wrist.

Allred was charged with "discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a second-degree felony with a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, as well as aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a third-degree felony punishable by up to five years in prison, and criminal mischief, a first-degree misdemeanor" - but, interestingly enough, he was not charged with public lewdness (urinating in a public place), a sex crime.

After all that, Allred was given a house arrest and probation, and his "brother", an army veteran judge Holder engaged in advocacy on his behalf even after he was convicted.

Judge Holder wrote to the Allred's university that expelled him after he committed a crime, asking to restore him as an online student.

In many online programs, students must take some exams in person and thus appear on campus.  

It is thus understandable that the university refused to enroll the convicted violent felon, protecting other students and people on campus from violent outbursts of this trained-to-kill army veteran who hates Muslims to the point that he already shot (in the air for now) when seeing a person of Middle-Eastern descent and who engaged in public lewdness - for which he was never even charged.

The judge himself is a retired colonel.

With all that in-built bias, the judge presides (and was left to continue to preside) over a Veterans Treatment Court - while obviously acting as an advocate and not as an impartial judge, and letting dangerous, trained-to-kill, felons to have a slap on the wrist and remain free to commit more crimes.

After Allred's case was closed - with house arrest and probation for several violent felonies - Judge "Holder continued to lobby for Allred. In November, he wrote a letter to USF's president asking that Allred to be readmitted to the university as an online student. He pleaded before the school's board of trustees, enlisted the support of Veterans Affairs Secretary Robert McDonald in Washington, D.C., and sought help from U.S. Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla."

What is amazing is that the Veterans Affairs Secretary Robert McDonald considered it appropriate to help a judge advocate on behalf of a violent felon to enroll that violent felon into the university - which is another shooting waiting to  happen, just wait until Allred drinks again to the point of urinating on the counter in a public place.

When the university, protecting its students, employees and visitors from another potential campus shooter, refused to enroll Allred, the judge "called the university's response "an absolute abdication of their responsibility to their students, especially their student veterans."

In fact, what the university did in refusing to enroll Allred was a complete opposite - a responsibility to the students, employees and visitors.  But, for the judge the only thing that mattered was that Allred was his "brother", a military veteran - and for the judge, the benefit for the "brother" was more important than the danger to the lives of thousands of people on campus and in the community.

For that - the judge "agreed" to a reprimand only.

When a judge starts to engage in advocacy for a person with the same background as the judge himself - the judge should be taken off the bench immediately, not "agree" to a reprimand.

At this time, since the judge received only a slap on the writs and was allowed to stay on the bench, he will simply disguise his advocacy into what will be deemed as "judicial discretion".  But he remains an advocate for the veterans, even for those who present a danger to the public, like Clay S. Allred, a former Green Beret who Judge Holder allowed to escape violent hate-crime charges.

Since Judge Holder was given only a slap on the wrist, expect more of the same - and worse - from him.

Since Clay S. Allred was given only a slap on the wrist, expect more of the same - and worse - from him, too.

Remember, Clay S. Allred is a trained Green Beret who hates Muslims, and who discerns whether a person is or is not a Muslim by how he or she looks.

Clay S. Allred "completed mental health counseling.

He logged more than the required number of community service hours.

And he has stayed away from alcohol."

It is acknowledged in the article that "in another courtroom, those accomplishments wouldn’t have meant as much.

But on this Friday, Allred, a former Green Beret staff sergeant, was appearing in Hillsborough County’s Veterans Treatment Court, where the steps he’s taken mean the difference between prison time on felony charges and house arrest."

This is not a non-violent crime.

This is a person trained to kill pointing a loaded gun at another person because he hates that person for no other reason than his presumed religious affiliation.

Clay S. Allred faced 20 years in prison for his crimes.

He escaped with no jail time at all, thanks to Judge Holder.

I wonder if the victim of Clay S. Allred's crime was consulted about propriety of such leniency.

"The Veterans Treatment Court was launched in October 2013 by county Circuit Judge Richard Weis, a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserves, who saw a steady stream of misdemeanor charges filed against veterans suffering from service-related mental illness, traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder."

The Veterans Treatment Court was established for veterans charged with misdemeanors - but, when Clay Allred was charged with hate crimes, felonies, the Veterans Treatment Court was conveniently expanded to encompass army veterans charged with felonies, too - just to accommodate Clay Allred.

Just like that - a military veteran judge creates a separate court for his "brothers", military veterans, so that it is not the jury who would be considering "service-related mental illness, traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder" as AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES to violent crimes of army veterans, but military veteran judges who would advocate for defendants as their "brothers".

And just like that - the program expands to make an ineligible army veteran, charged with violent felonies and facing 20 years in prison, eligible for a slap on the wrist - a "house arrest".

This judge-advocacy court exists for 3 years by now - with nobody opposing this singling out for special treatment of criminal defendants who are the most dangerous since they are trained to kill and unbalanced enough to use their skills to mass-murder, as it happened, for example, at the Camp Lejeune military base in North Carolina.

Leniency to dangerous criminals, whoever they are, because they are the judge's "brothers" is called corruption of the court system.

And both "judge advocates" - the one that instituted the Veterans Treatment Court, and the one who advocated for leniency to a person who pointed a loaded gun at an unknown person simply because he hated Muslims and thought his victim was a Muslim - should be removed from the bench and the Veterans Treatment Court dissolved.

The most dangerous criminal defendants should not be sentenced to "house arrest" instead of 20 years in prison, simply because they are army veterans.

If they are a danger to society, they must be held accountable in accordance with the law as everyone else.

And the same refers to judge-advocates.

And, please, note that there are 50 of other army veterans who were charged with misdemeanors and felonies who are currently in judge Holder's Veteran Treatment court.

With Holder's approach to "treatment" of violent felons who are his "brothers", we can only expect that Holder will keep unleashing dangerous trained-to-kill felons upon the society.

Because they are his brothers, and he can do nothing less for them, everybody else's right to life be damned.

Judges as advocates for causes in their own courtrooms: a novelist Kentucky #JudgeTomPhilpot promotes marriage as "Biblical analogy for God's love" while acting out his novel in the courtroom

Here is a judge, a Kentucky judge Tim Philpot who could not abstain from using court proceedings in front of him to impose upon people his personal and religious views - and do it for his own financial profit, in addition to his judicial salary.

Judge Tom Philpot wanted to put his experiences as a judge into a book.

He first reportedly wanted to share his knowledge of what is going on in divorce courts by writing a "serious scholarly about marriage"  - but then found it to be "just too complicated".

When a judge finds writing a "serious scholarly book" on the subject he is supposed to be an expert in "too complicated" - an issue of his competency already arises.

But, what the judge did is simply beyond bizarre - he wrote a novel in lieu of a "serious scholarly book", invented procedures in that novel, took his invented procedures from the novel into his courtroom, and is acting out those procedures upon litigants.

Judge Philpot's "pro marriage" novel promoting marriage as a "Biblical analogy of God's love" is trading for $20 at the website http://www.judgezbook.com/.

Since Judge Philpot admits that he is "pro marriage" and that he wrote the novel in lieu of a "serious scholarly" book on divorce, because writing a "serious scholarly book" was "just too complicated", it is safe to assume that judge Philpot put his own personal views into the book.

And that is already a problem for litigants who must now think whether to come with their divorces in front of a "pro marriage" judge, and whether to come with their custody cases of children born out of wedlock in front of a pro marriage judge.

Judge Philpot also wrote in his book about the alleged bad consequences of marriages broken up - such as children born out of wedlock.  It is, of course, an insult to any parents who consciously made their decision not to marry and to stay together without marriage, having children together.  This judge considers their relationship, and children born of such a relationship a "bad consequence" of the broken institution of marriage - and publicly expresses that view in a book.

And that is a big issue for parents of children born out of wedlock appearing in front of Judge Philpot in custody, or child neglect proceedings where such parents never planned to marry in the first place - because there is a clear possibility that Judge Philpot may rule adversely in their cases simply because they were not married when they gave birth to a child.

Moreover, in his book Judge Philpot promoted his religious views - he "writes about marriage as the Biblical analogy for God’s love", so when he is promoting marriage in his courtroom, he is promoting also his religious views on that issue.

Unfortunately, Judge Philpot did not stop at writing a novel in lieu of a "serious scholarly book" because writing "serious scholarly" books is "just too complicated" and putting in his novel his personal views about the vices of having children born out of wedlock and the virtues of marriage "as the Biblical analogy for God's love".

Judge Philpot started to also act out his novel's plot in his courtroom, because the judge "decided if I was going to write about a crazy judge, I had to act a little crazy myself".

Well, at least, Judge Philpot recognizes that he was acting "crazy [him]self".

The issue that concerned the judge the most was - was marriages that people wanted to dissolve "irretrievably broken" enough to actually dissolve those marriages.

In other words, can couples be forced to stay married if one of the spouses wants out?

Judge "Philpot said he has recently been conducting short, informal Irretrievably Broken Hearings in divorce cases assigned to him that involve children. When a couple’s testimony makes him think there is a chance for reconciliation, he asks them to attend a “discernment counseling” session to better think through their decisions.

Philpot said it is too soon to say if the process has stopped any divorces. Because he is acting within the 60-day waiting period allowed by Kentucky law, there is nothing couples who object or their attorneys can do but grumble privately."

Now, one thing is to share custody of the children.

Quite another is to be coerced or forced to stay in an intimate relationship with a person you don't want to stay in that relationship with - for a variety of personal reasons.

It is apparent that the judge does not make a distinction between these two issues.

"Philpot said it is too soon to say if the process has stopped any divorces. Because he is acting within the 60-day waiting period allowed by Kentucky law, there is nothing couples who object or their attorneys can do but grumble privately" - so, the judge uses the guise of the 60-day "waiting period" to force his religious views upon parties in divorce proceedings, so "there is nothing couples who object or their attorneys can do but grumble privately".

A great approach by a judge, isn't it?

Philpot actually conducted an off-the-record "Irretrievably Broken hearing", acting out his novel, in front of a newspaper reporter trying to coerce a couple seeking an uncontested divorce to reconcile.

And, after that off-the-record "acting out the judge's novel" hearing, the judge ordered the couple to attend a "discernment counseling session".

Again, these people wanted out of their marriage, they wanted an uncontested divorce, and that's why they came before the judge.

Wanting a divorce is not good grounds to order people into counseling of any kind.  They obviously could do that before they came to court.

It is also obvious that they were going to amicably share custody of their children, but that does not mean that anybody, including a judge, has the power or right to invade their privacy and force them to stay together in an intimate relationship if they do not want to.

I also resent the fact that Judge Philpot openly advertises his proselityzing in the courtroom by inviting a reporter, telling him about his novel, about marriage as the "Biblical analogy of God's love" and by even demonstrating his obviously illegal off-the-record "Irretrievably Broken hearing" spawned not by the law, but by the judge's novel.

Consider that litigants and attorneys will probably be afraid to even raise the issue of judicial misconduct in this case, and of judges imposing his own personal views, including his religious views, on the divorcing couples.

Yet, what Judge Philpot is doing - is judicial misconduct.  Whatever Judge Philpot's intentions are, he is imposing his personal views, including his religious views, upon people in lieu of the law of the State of Kentucky, and makes it harder, longer and more expensive for people to divorce - court-ordered counseling does not come free.

It is also disgusting that the judge uses his taxpayer-paid job to spawn books, and then uses courtroom proceedings and live people as guinea pigs to advertise that book and boost his sales.

I wonder if the judge also gets kickbacks from the "discernment counselors" where he sends the divorcing couples.  

Judge Philpot already lack integrity enough to use his position not only to impose his personal, and religious, views upon litigants in his courtroom, but to use his courtroom proceedings as a source of additional profit, so I would not put it beyond such a judge to get a little more profit by sharing in the proceeds of discernment counselors.

I will follow the story whether Judge Philpot will be disciplined for his shenanigans in the courtroom.

When a judge starts to use the courtroom as a playroom and as a religious pulpit, acting out procedures he invented in novels, because writing a scholarly treatise in the subject he is supposed to be an expert in is "just too complicated" for him - he should be taken off that bench immediately.

Judge Philpot is right.

It is not just a judge acting as an advocate.

It is not just a judge acting as a proselytizer of his religious beliefs in the courtroom.

It is not just a judge deriving additional financial benefit from court proceedings and using litigants as captive actors to advertise his book.

It is simply crazy.

It is like reality-TV for this judge to get noticed and advertised for his book - there is no justice in this courtroom where a judge simply acts out scenes out of his book for his own financial benefit and seeks to create new scenarios he can write about.

It is like a sneak-preview for reporters - see, this off-record "Irretrievably Broken hearing" will be part of my next book.

Crazy.

In Delaware County, NY, child neglect proceedings appear to have been illegitimate - for years

When a child neglect or abuse proceeding in New York concludes with an adjudication (court decision) of child neglect or abuse, the proceeding moves to a "dispositional stage".

At the dispositional stage, the court must order "services" in accordance with the social services plan.

Social Services Law 34-a(2)(b) requires that a "summary of understanding" between the social services and the local District Attorney's Office must be made part of that plan.

I asked, on a FOIL request, for the summary of understanding between the Delaware County DSS and the Delaware County District Attorney's Office.

Here is the response I've got:

If the plan did not comply with statutory requirements, it was not valid.

If it was not valid, no services could be provided, ordered by the court - or funded - without first satisfying statutory requirements.

New York State Comptroller actually audited the County in 2014-2015, and specifically audited its Department of Social Services.

They did not see this?

Or somebody's hand was greased enough not to see it?

The fact remains - without full compliance with applicable statutes, the "multi-year services plan" in Delaware County is illegal, and without a legal services plan, all child neglect and abuse adjudications are also illegal.

The law is the law - right?

A 321 pages long cell phone bill for Delaware County (NY) employees - why?

I continue to publish responses of Delaware County, NY, to my FOIL request.

The country denied my request for the latest cell phone bill of the County claiming that I need to pay $87.60 ($80.25 for copies plus $7.35 for postage) for the paper copies of the bill that I asked to scan and send to me by e-mail.

In response, I filed a FOIL request for the inventory of Delaware County's scanning equipment, since the County is required by law to provide scanned copies of paper documents if they have scanners that scan as easily as the documents can be copied, and I am sure the County, with its multi-million-dollar budget (that my husband and I contribute to, as captive cash cows, owners of property in Delaware County) does have such scanners.

It is obvious that Delaware County is playing a game - trying to delay or stall disclosure of any information that can lead to charges of corruption against the County or raising issues of improper use of government equipment.

New York State Comptroller already found that County employees misused county-assigned vehicles - for years.

And, that the county never submitted to public bidding their contracts - for decades.

I only asked for a cell phone bill - that is a public record, without exceptions.

I asked for it in electronic, scanned format.

I asked for it on April 29, 2016, by e-mail.

It had to be provided within 5 business days, also by e-mail.

Today is June 6, 2016, and I only have a demand that I either pay for paper copies (that I do not need) and for postage (that I do not need - I asked for disclosure by e-mail, and the County has no right under FOIL to charge for postage) - or be denied these records.

Ok, I understand the game.

But, inadvertently, while denying me the records, the county still gave me significant information.

The most recent cell phone bill of Delaware County consists of 321 pages (!!).

That is in the county of about 48,000 people, with a per capita income of $22,695 and a median household (not individual) income of $43,000.

A county supported by poor taxpayers has a need to assign cell phones to so many employees that a monthly bill consists of 321 pages?

I recently published e-mails and cell phones of Otsego County employees (information that is still claimed to be for employees only on the Otsego County website).

The number of assigned cell phones begs a question - WHY?

Why so many county employees who have landlines also are assigned cell phones, at taxpayers' expense?  So that they can connect with friends and family on the go, watch movies and post on Facebook?

The same question refers to Delaware County - why the County's cell phone bill is 321 pages long?

Can you, Delaware County taxpayers, afford this?  

I am filing an administrative appeal now, and will publish a copy of the bill when it is provided to me.

Stay tuned.

Parents of children held in foster care in Delaware County, NY, be aware of reimbursement rates for foster parents in Delaware County, NY

I posted this information in my other blog, and am re-posting it here.

For some reason, links are not working on this site today, so I am reposting the full text from my other blog.

*  *   *

Recently, I received a response to my FOIL request from Delaware County (NY) on a number of issues.

As part of the response I received rates of reimbursement established by Delaware County (NY) for foster care parents, which I am publishing here:

Based on the daily "regular service and maintenance" rates, the following calculations as to monthly and yearly reimbursements can be made:

		per day	per month	per year
Normal	0-5 years	$      15.89	$       476.70	$   5,799.85
Normal	6-11 years	$      19.14	$       574.20	$   6,986.10
Normal	12+ years	$      22.13	$       663.90	$   8,077.45
Special	Any age	$      38.22	$    1,146.60	$13,950.30
Exceptional	Any age	$      62.43	$    1,872.90	$22,786.95

Parents whose children are in foster care have a right to verify at which level their children are labeled, and how their foster parents are reimbursed for their care - and whether the monies provided for the "care and maintenance" are actually used for the purpose of "care and maintenance", or simply goes into the foster parents' pockets.

Apparently, it is very lucrative for a foster parent in Delaware County (and many foster parents in Delaware County, NY get such positions because they are officers or employees of local governments) to get a child into foster care who is still young (and does not eat much), but who is labeled "special" (behaviorally difficult) or "exceptional" (whichever the Commissioner deems "exceptional") - because keeping such a child pays more.

Please, remember that when a child is grabbed by social services and put into foster care, it often happens to poor parents whose children are on Medicaid and monthly SSI payments from the federal government.

And, that social services always bring child support proceedings against parents for children in foster care.

So, parents whose children are in foster care have a chance to verify whether the monies from the feds (SSI), from Delaware County as per reimbursement schedules I publish here, and monies squeezed from parents in child support, are actually used for the child, or simply soaked by the County into its "general account" and used for purposes unrelated to the child's care, which is fraud.

Here are also money allowances or "stipends" that must be provided to foster care children - so parents can verify whether that is done by foster parents or not.

There is also clothing allowance:

0-5 years	$        1.10	$         33.00	$      401.50
6-11 years	$        1.54	$         46.20	$      562.10
12-15 years	$        2.39	$         71.70	$      872.35
15 + years	$        2.92	$         87.60	$   1,065.80

So, if your child is in foster care in Delaware County for a year, and he is, let's say, 12 years old, and he has "behavioral problems", the rate of reimbursement for him will be:

$13,950.30 - care and maintenance

$240.00 - allowance

$872.35 - clothing allowance

---

TOTAL: $15,062.65

That is what the County provides out of its budget to take care of that child in foster care. 

First, the County then cannot get more than that from the parent per year - and should take into account the monies it receives from Social Security for the child on a monthly basis.

Moreover, the County must report to Social Security as to how the monies received from Social Security is used for the child's benefit.

As to children 0 to 3, there is also a diaper allowance.

When a child is put into foster care, there are, as shown above, powerful financial incentives involved to keep the child there, not reunite the child with his parents, as Social Services are required to do by law.

Delaware County (NY) DSS attorneys are allowed to derive private benefit from their public employment

Policies of Counties in New York are, very clearly, made under the guidance of a County Attorney.

The Delaware County Department of Social Services is engaged in the following activities:

(1) as a "neutral" court-appointed investigator for purposes of adoption;
(2) as an investigator of child neglect and abuse, which may result in removal of children from parents into foster care where the Department of Social Services is the child's legal guardian, and adoption of the child out of foster care, for which DSS gets federal incentive money.

It is very clear that attorneys for DSS as an investigator for purposes of all adoptions in the County, as legal guardians for children in foster care, as initiators of adoption proceedings out of foster care - should not have their own private adoption practice on the side, it is a complete conflict of interest.

I also know that former judge Carl Becker did have a private adoption practice on the side, concocted indicted reports on the Social Services side in cases where his private clients were involved absolving his clients so as to keep his lucrative private business intact.

I also know that the current County Attorney Porter Kirkwood was engaged in private practice representing individuals sued for elder abuse - which was completely contrary Porter Kirkwood's obligation as a prosecutor of elder abuse as DSS attorney.

With that in mind, I made a FOIL request with Social Services whether there are policies prohibiting private practice, and specifically, private adoption practice to DSS attorneys.

And, once again, County Attorneys are those who "guide" the County in creating (or not creating) such policies.

Obviously, County Attorneys and Assistant County Attorneys (for DSS) saw a direct financial benefit NOT to create policies prohibiting them a private practice on the side, or, specifically, a private adoption practice on the side.

So, DSS attorneys are at the same time acting as attorneys for investigators for all adoptions in the county, as prosecutors of child neglect which may result in removal of children and supply of children for adoption in the county, and as private adoption attorneys.

Nothing too corrupt.

Does Trump have a right to impartial judicial review - even though he is Trump?

The social media is buzzing with discussions whether it was appropriate for Donald Trump to raise the issue that there was an appearance of impropriety for a judge with:

1) Mexican immigrant parents and

2) who is a former colleague of one of the plaintiffs' attorneys

to preside over the class action for fraud against the Trump University and to rule adversely against Trump.

My personal opinion (and I am NOT a supporter of Trump as president of the United States) is - Trump has a right to raise that issue, publicly and in a motion to recuse and disqualify, and to vacate any rulings if such rulings were made by Judge Curiel without proper disclosures of what constitutes a potential appearance of impropriety, 28 U.S.C. 455(a).

Here is a most interesting statement in such a discussion.  I raised the issue that the threshold basis for disqualification is "appearance of impropriety", not "evidence" of impropriety - and that this law is established by statute, 28 U.S.C. 455(a) and by the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).

To this, I received a response that, I believe, is at the heart of many problems with judicial partiality and favoritism:

The person (who I do not know), but who represents herself to be a lawyer, says:  

"there are dozens of lawyers from my old law firm and former undergraduate and law school acquaintances of mine who are now judges.  They might even remember my name.  We may have even spoken at a company picnic years ago or sat at a table where we shared an occasional lunch ... but that does not make them predisposed to rule in my favor".

Now.

Wouldn't you, if you are on the other side of this attorney, like to know whether a particular judge is:

(1) her former colleague;

(2) her former college or law school classmate;

(3) socialized with her at any time at picnics or other social events;

(4) has lunch with her, and thus a potential to talk to her outside of court?

Wouldn't you?

Imagine that the situation that is represented to you as innocent - a judge is a human being and has to eat his lunch somewhere, and people happen to be close to him, or even at the same table, right - is happening between a juror and a defense attorney.

It will be an instant disqualification of the juror and sanctions against the defense attorney, for non-disclosure of a potential conflict of interest.

Somehow, the situation with judges is deemed to be different - because it is apparent that the lawyer is concerned for the potential for disqualification of judges who are spawned by large law firms who continue to appear in front of such judges.

The whole problem is that lawyers and judges who made their careers out of large law firms, in order to preserve their ability to appear in front of their former colleagues, (or classmates) who are now judges - have engaged in efforts, for years and decades, to "desensitize" the public to the idea that appearing, without disclosure, in front of a judge who you personally know from out-of-court socialization or work - must be subject to disclosure to opponents in court, and may be subject to motions to disqualify, the law firm and the judge.

That means to lawyers loss of business where they would not be able to appear in certain courts.

Each such disclosure would mean for a judge a nick in his reputation - inadvertently so.  And, judges do not disclose such potential conflicts.

And, when such information emerges, judges engage in self-defensive tactics and often lash against the messenger.

Here, the mass media jumped in to kick Trump for raising the issue which is important for all of us - judicial impartiality, a right of an "unpopular" litigant to impartial judicial review.

Trump's motive to raise the issue is obviously subjective - he is doing it for himself.  Yet, because he is a presidential candidate, he just raised the issue as part of a presidential campaign, and that is extremely important.

Trump is wrong on many issues.

On the issue that a litigant has a right to impartial judicial review, he is absolutely right.

What Trump was raising is not only the Mexican heritage of the judge (which was bad enough, because Trump made multiple public statements that could ignite against him anybody with Mexican immigrant parents), but also that the judge worked in the same office as one of the plaintiffs' attorneys - and apparently did not disclose it when he got assigned to the case and before he ruled adversely against Trump.

If we start to judge, which is exactly what is being done in mass media, who is and who is not entitled to impartial judicial review by their identity or public statements, that means that the rule of law in this country has ended.

Because Trump is Trump, he is not entitled to raise an issue that bothers him, that the judge (1) should have disclosed his potential conflicts of interest, (2) should have recused from the case or at least (3) should have allowed, after disclosure, to Trump to make a motion to recuse - before the judge made adverse rulings against Trump University?

If the judge had a potential to socialize with the plaintiffs' attorney, he had a duty to disclose that, and Trump has a right to raise that issue in a motion to disqualify for appearance of impropriety, under the statute and under a U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

Judge Curiel's "stellar" reputation has nothing to do with his:

(1) failure to disclose what can be perceived by a reasonable person as a potential conflict of interest; 

(2) failure to recuse in a case where his impartiality can reasonably be questioned, and

(3) adverse ruling against a person who could have insulted, badly, the judge's heritage and parents.

It is clear as day that judges are humans, and that insults to anybody's heritage can inflame a person with the most "stellar" reputation.

That's why insults going to the person's heritage are considered "hate speech" and are often not protected by the 1st Amendment.

If the judge has Mexican immigrant parents, and Trump is gathering crowds (rightly or wrongly) by claims that, if he is elected as President, he is going to build a wall blocking illegal immigrants from crossing the Mexican border into the U.S., and, basically, equates Mexicans with criminals -  the judge had to have the decency to recuse himself, or to disclose it.

Here are some of Trump's statements about Mexicans:

"“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”

Donald Trump, presidential announcement speech, June 16, 2015

In that statement, Trump does not make a distinction whether the people "Mexico sends" are legal immigrants or illegal immigrants.

I have no access to documentary evidence as to whether Judge Curiel's parents were legal or illegal immigrants, there are claims that Judge Curiel's father came to the U.S. as a temporary worker under some war-related labor agreement between the U.S. and Mexican government, but, once again, such documents were not published, and thus, whether that was true or not, we do not know.

But, Trump's statement above maligns all Mexican immigrants, whether they immigrated legally or illegally.  

To Trump, only "some" of Mexican immigrants are good people, but otherwise, to Trump, they are criminals - including rapists.

To say that a judge with parents who are both Mexican immigrants, is unaffected by those statements, is to insult anybody's intelligence.

Here is Trump's other statement about Mexican immigrants, publicized last summer:

 “What can be simpler or more accurately stated? The Mexican Government is forcing their most unwanted people into the United States. They are, in many cases, criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.”

–Trump, statement about his June 16 comments, July 6, 2015".

It is an appearance of impropriety, to me, when a judge continues to claim that heritage of his own parents has nothing to do with his adverse rulings against Trump who may have deeply hurt the judge's parents, and the judge himself, where it hurts the most - by making hate-speech statements about the judge's heritage, about Mexican  immigrants as potential criminals, drug dealers and rapists.

It is as good as telling anybody with Mexican heritage - you've come from the stock of rapists, criminals, drug dealers.

To even assign a judge with a Mexican heritage to a case of such a litigant is, to me, an appearance of impropriety because, with such a judge presiding, the litigant has no chance for impartial judicial review, and here it is not just Trump personally who is sued, but his organization, the Trump University.

There IS an appearance of impropriety in that a judge with Mexican immigrant parents created a sensational ruling, adverse to Trump, taking away potential votes, and making it during Trump's election campaign. 

Appearance of impropriety, as a legal threshold for making a motion to recuse, is subject to reasonable perception of the person who is making the motion.

What constitutes a "reasonable" perception, differs from one reasonable person to another, that's why we have juries to decide court cases, and that's why we have rules requiring for a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases and for a supermajority jury verdict in civil cases.

All of the jurors picked through the appropriate voir dire process are presumed to be reasonable fact-finders, and yet, their opinions differ.

And, because opinions may differ as to whether there was or there wasn't appearance of impropriety in Judge Curiel presiding over the case against Trump University - it does not make Donald Trump's perception "improper" or his criticism of the judge inappropriate.

Donald Trump has a right to feel the way he feels, under the circumstances, and to raise the issue of appearance of impropriety.

If we deny the right to challenge impartiality of a judge under the statutory and constitutional appearance of impropriety standard to Donald Trump, we deny it to everybody else, including ourselves.

And, what is important the most is - a potential for the judge of knowing the litigant or litigant's attorney outside of the court proceeding that creates an unfair advantage in litigation, most often relates to the judge's prior employment in the government or a large law firm.

Pro se litigants and small-firm lawyers most often do not have a chance to boast, like the lawyer on Facebook did, that "dozens" of her former law firm colleagues have become judges.

So, to even out the scales of justices, information about being a classmate or a former colleague of a judge, or having lunches with judges, or socializing at picnics with judges - should be disclosed, by both the judges and by attorneys appearing in front of judges.

And, if that disclosure is not done, that should already be a proper ground for a motion to recuse, if discovered.