THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Monday, June 6, 2016

Does Trump have a right to impartial judicial review - even though he is Trump?

The social media is buzzing with discussions whether it was appropriate for Donald Trump to raise the issue that there was an appearance of impropriety for a judge with:

1) Mexican immigrant parents and
2) who is a former colleague of one of the plaintiffs' attorneys

to preside over the class action for fraud against the Trump University and to rule adversely against Trump.

My personal opinion (and I am NOT a supporter of Trump as president of the United States) is - Trump has a right to raise that issue, publicly and in a motion to recuse and disqualify, and to vacate any rulings if such rulings were made by Judge Curiel without proper disclosures of what constitutes a potential appearance of impropriety, 28 U.S.C. 455(a).

Here is a most interesting statement in such a discussion.  I raised the issue that the threshold basis for disqualification is "appearance of impropriety", not "evidence" of impropriety - and that this law is established by statute, 28 U.S.C. 455(a) and by the U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).

To this, I received a response that, I believe, is at the heart of many problems with judicial partiality and favoritism:


The person (who I do not know), but who represents herself to be a lawyer, says:  

"there are dozens of lawyers from my old law firm and former undergraduate and law school acquaintances of mine who are now judges.  They might even remember my name.  We may have even spoken at a company picnic years ago or sat at a table where we shared an occasional lunch ... but that does not make them predisposed to rule in my favor".

Now.

Wouldn't you, if you are on the other side of this attorney, like to know whether a particular judge is:

(1) her former colleague;
(2) her former college or law school classmate;
(3) socialized with her at any time at picnics or other social events;
(4) has lunch with her, and thus a potential to talk to her outside of court?

Wouldn't you?

Imagine that the situation that is represented to you as innocent - a judge is a human being and has to eat his lunch somewhere, and people happen to be close to him, or even at the same table, right - is happening between a juror and a defense attorney.

It will be an instant disqualification of the juror and sanctions against the defense attorney, for non-disclosure of a potential conflict of interest.

Somehow, the situation with judges is deemed to be different - because it is apparent that the lawyer is concerned for the potential for disqualification of judges who are spawned by large law firms who continue to appear in front of such judges.

The whole problem is that lawyers and judges who made their careers out of large law firms, in order to preserve their ability to appear in front of their former colleagues, (or classmates) who are now judges - have engaged in efforts, for years and decades, to "desensitize" the public to the idea that appearing, without disclosure, in front of a judge who you personally know from out-of-court socialization or work - must be subject to disclosure to opponents in court, and may be subject to motions to disqualify, the law firm and the judge.

That means to lawyers loss of business where they would not be able to appear in certain courts.

Each such disclosure would mean for a judge a nick in his reputation - inadvertently so.  And, judges do not disclose such potential conflicts.

And, when such information emerges, judges engage in self-defensive tactics and often lash against the messenger.

Here, the mass media jumped in to kick Trump for raising the issue which is important for all of us - judicial impartiality, a right of an "unpopular" litigant to impartial judicial review.

Trump's motive to raise the issue is obviously subjective - he is doing it for himself.  Yet, because he is a presidential candidate, he just raised the issue as part of a presidential campaign, and that is extremely important.

Trump is wrong on many issues.

On the issue that a litigant has a right to impartial judicial review, he is absolutely right.

What Trump was raising is not only the Mexican heritage of the judge (which was bad enough, because Trump made multiple public statements that could ignite against him anybody with Mexican immigrant parents), but also that the judge worked in the same office as one of the plaintiffs' attorneys - and apparently did not disclose it when he got assigned to the case and before he ruled adversely against Trump.

If we start to judge, which is exactly what is being done in mass media, who is and who is not entitled to impartial judicial review by their identity or public statements, that means that the rule of law in this country has ended.

Because Trump is Trump, he is not entitled to raise an issue that bothers him, that the judge (1) should have disclosed his potential conflicts of interest, (2) should have recused from the case or at least (3) should have allowed, after disclosure, to Trump to make a motion to recuse - before the judge made adverse rulings against Trump University?

If the judge had a potential to socialize with the plaintiffs' attorney, he had a duty to disclose that, and Trump has a right to raise that issue in a motion to disqualify for appearance of impropriety, under the statute and under a U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

Judge Curiel's "stellar" reputation has nothing to do with his:

(1) failure to disclose what can be perceived by a reasonable person as a potential conflict of interest; 
(2) failure to recuse in a case where his impartiality can reasonably be questioned, and
(3) adverse ruling against a person who could have insulted, badly, the judge's heritage and parents.

It is clear as day that judges are humans, and that insults to anybody's heritage can inflame a person with the most "stellar" reputation.

That's why insults going to the person's heritage are considered "hate speech" and are often not protected by the 1st Amendment.

If the judge has Mexican immigrant parents, and Trump is gathering crowds (rightly or wrongly) by claims that, if he is elected as President, he is going to build a wall blocking illegal immigrants from crossing the Mexican border into the U.S., and, basically, equates Mexicans with criminals -  the judge had to have the decency to recuse himself, or to disclose it.


"“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”

Donald Trump, presidential announcement speech, June 16, 2015

In that statement, Trump does not make a distinction whether the people "Mexico sends" are legal immigrants or illegal immigrants.

I have no access to documentary evidence as to whether Judge Curiel's parents were legal or illegal immigrants, there are claims that Judge Curiel's father came to the U.S. as a temporary worker under some war-related labor agreement between the U.S. and Mexican government, but, once again, such documents were not published, and thus, whether that was true or not, we do not know.

But, Trump's statement above maligns all Mexican immigrants, whether they immigrated legally or illegally.  

To Trump, only "some" of Mexican immigrants are good people, but otherwise, to Trump, they are criminals - including rapists.

To say that a judge with parents who are both Mexican immigrants, is unaffected by those statements, is to insult anybody's intelligence.


 “What can be simpler or more accurately stated? The Mexican Government is forcing their most unwanted people into the United States. They are, in many cases, criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.”

–Trump, statement about his June 16 comments, July 6, 2015".

It is an appearance of impropriety, to me, when a judge continues to claim that heritage of his own parents has nothing to do with his adverse rulings against Trump who may have deeply hurt the judge's parents, and the judge himself, where it hurts the most - by making hate-speech statements about the judge's heritage, about Mexican  immigrants as potential criminals, drug dealers and rapists.

It is as good as telling anybody with Mexican heritage - you've come from the stock of rapists, criminals, drug dealers.

To even assign a judge with a Mexican heritage to a case of such a litigant is, to me, an appearance of impropriety because, with such a judge presiding, the litigant has no chance for impartial judicial review, and here it is not just Trump personally who is sued, but his organization, the Trump University.

There IS an appearance of impropriety in that a judge with Mexican immigrant parents created a sensational ruling, adverse to Trump, taking away potential votes, and making it during Trump's election campaign. 

Appearance of impropriety, as a legal threshold for making a motion to recuse, is subject to reasonable perception of the person who is making the motion.

What constitutes a "reasonable" perception, differs from one reasonable person to another, that's why we have juries to decide court cases, and that's why we have rules requiring for a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases and for a supermajority jury verdict in civil cases.

All of the jurors picked through the appropriate voir dire process are presumed to be reasonable fact-finders, and yet, their opinions differ.

And, because opinions may differ as to whether there was or there wasn't appearance of impropriety in Judge Curiel presiding over the case against Trump University - it does not make Donald Trump's perception "improper" or his criticism of the judge inappropriate.

Donald Trump has a right to feel the way he feels, under the circumstances, and to raise the issue of appearance of impropriety.

If we deny the right to challenge impartiality of a judge under the statutory and constitutional appearance of impropriety standard to Donald Trump, we deny it to everybody else, including ourselves.

And, what is important the most is - a potential for the judge of knowing the litigant or litigant's attorney outside of the court proceeding that creates an unfair advantage in litigation, most often relates to the judge's prior employment in the government or a large law firm.

Pro se litigants and small-firm lawyers most often do not have a chance to boast, like the lawyer on Facebook did, that "dozens" of her former law firm colleagues have become judges.

So, to even out the scales of justices, information about being a classmate or a former colleague of a judge, or having lunches with judges, or socializing at picnics with judges - should be disclosed, by both the judges and by attorneys appearing in front of judges.

And, if that disclosure is not done, that should already be a proper ground for a motion to recuse, if discovered.


Sunday, June 5, 2016

The 9th Circuit overturns a conviction for conspiracy to sell drugs - that's the same 9th Circuit that refused to reverse a murder conviction despite clear facts in favor of such reversal

Ok, so the 9th Circuit is now portrayed in a legal blog as a hero fighting wrongful convictions again.

It reversed a conviction for conspiracy to sell drugs because the defendant was not charged with the sale of drugs, was only charged with a conspiracy to sell and there was no conspiracy.

While meticulous factual analysis by the court of the overcharging efforts of prosecutors should be commended, it appears that the court makes political decisions - the same court disregards and even misrepresents facts from the record when it wants to sustain a murder conviction and a life sentence, no matter what the record says, and yet wants to present itself as a fighter of wrongful convictions when "just" drugs are involved.

So much for the court's independence and integrity.

Cuomo announces that New York "Stands with Israel" while New York Attorney General defends violent Anti-Semitic actions of judge Kevin Dowd in a civil rights lawsuit

New York governor Andrew Cuomo, with much fanfare, announced today his executive order divesting public funds from all campaigns that support Boycotts, Divestments or Sanctions against the State of Israel.

The press-conference about this Executive Order, held on a Sunday, was transmitted on Twitter and Facebook, among other social media sources.

First of all, I do not believe that the Executive Order of Governor Cuomo is legal - because it refers to national foreign policy, to the State of Israel being an "invaluable ally", and expressing a standpoint on a sensitive international policy issue.

Governor Cuomo, as a state Governor, has no right to make any decisions impacting foreign policy of the United States.

Moreover, if, as it was mentioned at the press-conference introducing this executive order, the order was meant to fight anti-semitism, Governor Cuomo should then start practicing what he preaches - and see that New York Attorney General's Office and the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct do not receive public funds, since both of these entities openly support anti-semitism:

1) New York State Commission for Judicial Conduct - by refusing to prosecute anti-semitic conduct of Chenango County Supreme Court judge Kevin Dowd; and

2) New York State Attorney General - by representing Judge Dowd against a now-pro se appellant Moshe Schtrauch and claiming on behalf of Judge Dowd that Judge Dowd's violent unlawful anti-semitic behavior regarding Moshe Shtrauch was justified as "preventing disruptions of court proceedings" (Judge Dowd ordered a known anti-Semitic security officer, a Nazi sympathizer, who was armed, to forcibly eject Moshe Shtrauch, the citizen of the State of Israel, out of the Chenango County courthouse AFTER Judge Dowd recused from Moshe Shtrauch's divorce case - because Moshe Shtrauch had the audacity of bringing a motion to recuse Judge Dowd, which Judge Dowd granted).

The transcript of the conference after which Judge Dowd recused and ordered ejection of Moshe Shtrauch does not show any disrespectful statements by Moshe Shtrauch or any other signs of claimed "disruption" of the court proceedings, and no proof of such disruption was ever provided to the court since the case was dismissed before discovery on the grounds of "absolute judicial immunity" for malicious and corrupt acts.

And those malicious and corrupt acts include Anti-Semitic acts on the bench by New York judges.

NOW.

In view of today's Executive Order - has Judge Dowd just been stripped off services of the New York State Attorney General?

After all, the Executive Order prohibited the use of taxpayer money to support anti-semitism.

Right?

So, Judge Dowd should not be represented by New York State Attorney General any more in opposition of Moshe Shtrauch's pro se appeal in his civil rights case against Judge Dowd.

Right?

Or, is it just lip service by Cuomo to the "largest Jewish population out of the State of Israel" (in New York) while Cuomo is the target of a criminal investigation by the feds?

A cry for help to the wealthy Jewish community to apply some pressure upon U.S. Assistant Attorney Preet Bharara?

The investigation against Cuomo has gotten that bad?

What remains is - while New York Attorney General continues to assert violent Anti-Semitism of a judge against a citizen of the State of Israel (or anybody else), even after he recused from a case, as subject to "absolute judicial immunity" - the executive order is nothing other than hypocrisy, a distinguishing feature of Cuomo.







Delaware County (NY) illegally employs all of its police force

I already wrote on this blog about the controversy with residency problems of former Deputy Sheriff Derek Bowie, the beater of women.

Former Delaware County (NY) Deputy Sheriff Derek Bowie who is involved so far in two lawsuits that I know of involving two look-alike women who he assaulted while claiming to be acting as Delaware County Deputy Sheriff - was residing in Broome County and had no right to be employed as Delaware County Deputy Sheriff, where such hiring is a condition of employment.

I filed a FOIL request with the Delaware County on April 29, 2016, by e-mail, asking to provide records of residency for all Deputy Sheriffs employed by the County, as well as other information about such Deputy Sheriffs, such as police academy training, Criminal Justice Department certification, Taser certification and pistol license.

Here is what the Delaware County answered me on June 3, 2016 - that is, within 25 business days, and not 5 business days, as required by the Freedom of Information Law:



So, let's see.

No residency information for ALL Deputy Sheriffs currently employed by Delaware County, NY. 

That means that ALL Deputy Sheriffs are employed - and are paid by the County, at taxpayers' expense, illegally.

There is no information on file with the County that Deputy Sheriffs are hired out of the civil service registry - which is also extremely interesting because, for example, Derek Bowie testified at a deposition that he was hired without even a written application, by "invitation" - obviously, because his uncle Jeff Bowie worked as a longtime DA/DSS Investigator in the Delaware County District Attorney's Office.

Delaware County refused to provide to me any information whether police officers employed by the county have:

(1) Taser certification;
(2) Criminal Justice Division certification, and
(3) whether they graduated from the police academy BEFORE they were hired.

The basis for the denial was, as the response indicates, New York "Civil Service Law 50-a".

There is no such statute in New York.

There is a statute, Civil RIGHTS Law 50-a, but that controversial statute prohibits only the release of records that are needed towards "performance evaluation" "towards continued employment".  So much for County Attorney's competency - he doesn't even know the name of the statute used to deny access to records under FOIL.

I was talking about conditions of hiring the officers in the first place:

(1) education;
(2) Criminal Justice Division certification, and
(3) Taser certification.

The records precluded for disclosure under Civil Rights Law 50-a are disciplinary records of police officers, not records regarding their education, training and certification.

By the way, the Delaware County also responded to me that it does not have on file the employed Deputy Sheriff's pistol licenses either:



It is apparent that Delaware County Sheriff's Department is in deep trouble, and tries to cover it up.

It unleashes upon people untrained police force without verification of police officers:

1) residency;
2)education;
3) Criminal Justice Division certification.

It arms such officers with Tasers and pistols without verifying or having their Taser certification and without having on file their pistol permits.

Are you feeling safe from your own "protectors", the police force, residents of Delaware County?

I will continue to disclose the interesting revelations of Delaware County (NY) that I received through my recent FOIL request.

Stay tuned.




Criminal prosecutions and convictions in Delaware County NY under Acting DA Hubbard illegal as Acting DA Hubbard's residency is not verified

A District Attorney of any county in New York must reside in that county.

When DA Northrup was elected County Judge in 2015, and Acting DA Hubbard replaced DA Northrup as District Attorney, DA Hubbard now has to reside in Delaware County.

With that in mind, I made a Freedom of Information Request with Delaware County.

After a prolonged delay to answer my request, Delaware County finally answered - 



Since the county has no records verifying whether the Delaware County Acting District Attorney John Hubbard resides within Delaware County, there are the following two legal consequences of this statement:


(1) Delaware County has no right to pay John Hubbard his Acting DA salary;
(2) all investigations, prosecutions and convictions obtained by Acting DA John Hubbard are illegal - imposing liability on the County and all of its taxpayers for illegal convictions.

And that is especially so that a witness indicated to me that John Hubbard actually drives around with Schoharie County license plates.

John Hubbard is not the only one public official whose employment with the county depends on this residency within the county and whose residency, as a condition of employment, is not verified by the County for purposes of such employment.

I will continue disclosing contents of Delaware County's astonishing answers to my FOIL request in separate blogs.

Stay tuned.


A complaint was filed against the Tenessee judge Rachel Bell who delayed a hearing and kept a man in jail because she was in a hurry to speak to school students

Two weeks ago I wrote about a Tennessee judge who, reportedly,  is habitually coming late to criminal proceedings, and who kept people in jail beyond the allowed time in preliminary detention (while they are presumed innocent, before trial) because she did not have time to do her job - she had school students to meet and talk to.


We'll see if any discipline will be meted out at all - after all, judges in this country can do whatever they like on and off the bench, with rarely any discipline imposed upon them.

I will continue to cover the story.

Stay tuned.


Friday, June 3, 2016

When a death penalty jury is blocked from full information about applicable law, 2 judges of the U.S. Supreme Court find it appropriate

On May 31, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court has reversed (with 2 dissenting votes) a death sentence (not conviction) out of Arisona death row inmate Shawn Patrick Lynch because the criminal defendant was not allowed to tell the jurors who were deciding between the two alternatives:

1) the death penalty and
2) life sentence without possibility of parole

that the "without possibility of parole" element of the 2nd option did not exist - that Mr. Lynch was ineligible to parole:

"Under Arizona law, 'parole is available only to individuals who committed a felony before January 1, 1994,' and Lynch committed his crimes in 2001."

In other words, the jurors were not told about the applicable LAW as applied to their deliberations.

It was clear that (1) the state court judge presiding over the death penalty phase violated his duty in not advising the jurors of the state law making the defendant ineligible for parole; and (2) the state prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by pushing to withhold information about applicable law from the jurors, or objecting against the defense introducing that piece of information in any way, even at the final argument.

At stake was the person's life.

And that person had to be given every possibility to introduce at the very least the applicable law - and was denied even that.

As it appears from the texts of Mr. Lynch's court decisions, death penalty cases are decided in Arizona in three stages and decided by two separate juries - 

  1. the stage of guilt
  2. the stage of aggravation and 
  3. the stage of the death penalty - stages # 2 and #3 are decided by a single separate jury from a jury that decides stage # 1


According to the state appellate case (which affirmed the conviction) "[t]he jury found him guilty on all counts, but did not reach a unanimous verdict on premeditated murder." 

That already had to give the prosecution pause not to seek the death penalty.

It didn't.

There was then a hung jury on the aggravation stage:

"[i]n the aggravation phase of the trial, the jury could not agree on whether the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain. See A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(5) (2010). The jury made separate findings that the murder was both especially heinous and cruel, but could not decide whether the murder was also especially depraved. See A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6). In the penalty phase, the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict."

It is obvious that, as a matter of fairness, the entire conviction under the circumstances had to be tossed and the entire case had to be re-tried.

It did not happen.

Instead, a second "aggravation/death penalty" jury was convened, precluded from knowing the applicable law as to the defendant's ineligibility to parole - and the defendant was condemned to death.

That is what the U.S. Supreme Court reversed - only the sentence of death, not the conviction.

Incredibly, there were 2 dissenters to the reversal: Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.

While acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed in reliance on its own precedent:

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) providing that "[w]here the State puts the defendant’s future dangerousness in
issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing juryby either argument or instruction—that he is parole ineligible” - that precedent is allegedly wrong and should not be followed.

The state sentencing court obviously disregarded that set precedent.

The dissenting judges claimed that "it is the “sheer depravity of [the defendant’s] crimes, rather than any specific fear for the future, which induced the . . . jury to conclude that the death penalty
was justice,”  and that it was sufficient for the jury to know that, if they do not condemn the defendant to death, the court can then sentence him to life in prison with or without possibility of parole - whether the defendant was or was not eligible for parole.

In other words, the two judges claimed that the issue of parole was not relevant to the issue of life or death in sentencing and that the U.S. Supreme Court should not "micromanage state sentencing procedures".

It is interesting to mention that "Justice" Thomas cited two of his own dissenting opinions in favor of death penalty and one of "Justice" Scalia.

But, at least for now, it appears that the court becomes more convinced that,  before the death penalty is imposed,  at the very least, the death penalty jury should be given correct information about the law.

As to Justice Thomas and Alito - this dissent is the matter of their personal conscience, or rather, lack thereof. 

Basically, Thomas and Alito lamented that state courts were not allowed to disregard a U.S. Supreme Court precedent on point, Simmons v South Carolina, decided in 1994.

So, U.S. Supreme Court cases do not have precedential value, as argued by two justices of the same court?

Do justices Thomas and Alito need to consider retirement?