Will #attorneyWoodruffCarroll of Syracuse, NY, be charged with criminal trespass tonight? The fraudster attorney is getting desperate

On May 17, 2016 I reported on this blog about efforts of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York to manipulate the docket and not show my motion to vacate stripping me of legal fees for 3.5 years of civil rights litigation, to recuse the court for misconduct and to disqualify and sanction attorneys in the case I was removed from because of my alleged SECRET suspension in federal court, right after I brought the case against Chenango County Social Services (NY) to trial.

Today, I checked the docket once again - the court inserted the motion it did not acknowledge on May 16, 2016 (that the court received, but did not file on May 13, 2016).

Here is how the docket of the case looked on May 16, 2016 for the period between May 6, 2016 and May, 16, 2016 - my motion that the court and parties received on May 13, 2016 (I have confirmation as to the court receiving my motion on May 13, 2016 in the morning, through tracking that I posted here):

Ok, as of the evening of May 16, 2016 the docket shows no motion filed on May 13, 2016.

Here is what the same docket shows today for the period between May 6, 2016 and May 16, 2016:

The motion miraculously appeared, even though my already-filed motion is not discussed during the 5/16/2016 conference, the court and the parties pretended it was not there - until their behavior was exposed in this blog.

But, this is not the end of miraculous events that happened and continue to be happening in this case.

Here is the rest of the docket after the conference of May 16, 2016.

First of all, the docket entry without number as of 5/17/2016 now mentions that a copy of the court scheduling order is now "sent to pro se movant Tatiana Neroni by regular mail".

So, the court does agree that I am a "pro se movant" and that, as such, I cannot be served electronically - which is what the court and the parties have been doing all along since January of 2016, while calling me to conferences, blaming me for not coming (from South Carolina to New York) and stripping me of 3.5 years' worth of legal fees because I did not properly oppose their never-served pleadings and orders.

Second, there is an interesting interaction between the court and the Plaintiffs' new attorney Woodruff Carroll further confirming my claim that Carroll is completely incompetent.

Here is docket 112, the motion scheduling order:

The motion scheduling order set the following deadlines:

No	Description of procedural step in motion practice	Deadline to file
1	Response (opposition) to the motion	May 31, 2016;
2	My reply to response (opposition) to the motion	June 6, 2016
3	The motion hearing (on papers, without oral argument)	June 15, 2016

Note that, while giving opposing attorneys who received my motion on May 13, 2016, 18 days since the day they received the motion, to respond by electronic filing, the court gives me only 6 days to at the same time, receive the opponent's responses by regular mail and deliver the answer by regular mail to the court, from another state.

Where my opponents were supposed to file and serve their responses on me (by regular mail) by May 31, 2016, I will only receive those pleadings (maybe) by the time I already have to file my responses to those pleadings.

This is the type of discrimination against pro se litigants by federal courts what I described in my currently circulating petition that I filed on May 17, 2016 that I encourage my readers to sign.

Under the current rules of service, where 6 days must be added to serve me and 6 days must be added for my delivery of filings by mail to the court, and 3 days would be a reasonable minimum of time given me to prepare a response, all in all 15 days should be added to May 31, 2016, so June 15, 2016 should be not the review date, but my deadline to file the response, and the review date should be extended accordingly.

But even that is not the main point here - I somehow expected this particular court's ongoing discrimination against me as an attorney-turned-pro se litigant (through the court's unlawful secret suspension), and especially because I criticize the court and as against critics of the court (such as people, like me, filing motions to recuse, and especially criticizing the court in blogs).

What is going on is that new attorney for the Plaintiffs Woodruff Carroll obviously cannot read scheduling orders or comprehend them.

When a scheduling order says "response by", the response deadline is also the deadline for cross-motions.

Mr. Carroll obviously does not know that, with all of his $500/hr fees.

Since Mr. Carroll does not know how to read clear and unambiguous scheduling orders, Mr. Carroll asked the court to set a cross-motion deadline for him - the one that was already set,  for May 31, 2016.

Here is Mr. Carroll's letter of May 17, 2016.

In the letter he is complaining that "[n]o date has been fixed for cross-motions in the order".

Well, on that he was wrong - the date of response, May 31, 2016, was a date of cross-motions.

But, as much the court catered for Mr. Carroll because the court found a friendly soul on Mr. Carroll where Mr. Carroll, according to Plaintiff Dara Argro, was trying to inflame the court at a court conference by claiming how bad I am by threatening to sue him for fraud - "the same as she sued this court" - apparently, the court started to realize that Mr. Carroll's involvement, continued fraud and incompetence may ultimately get the court into trouble for handling this case, "handling" me and failing to impose attorney discipline for ongoing fraud in the case, for constantly lying to the court and for allowing an attorney to sell out his indigent clients and coerce them into a settlement they do not want.

So, the court rescinded the implicit deadline for cross-motions, denying Mr. Carroll's letter request to "fix" what was already "fixed":

In the order issued on May 17, 2016, the court appears to be disgruntled with Mr. Carroll's failure to comply with the court order and file a "Stipulation of Dismissal" or a "Status Report" on or before 5/5/2016. 

The court told Mr. Carroll on May 17, 2016, the following:

1. you informed the court (once again) on May 16, 2016 that the case settled;
2. if the case did not settle, notify the court immediately - 3 days later it was not done;
3. if the case did settle, file a stipulation of dismissal by May 31, 2016, or the case will proceed to trial.

Easy, isn't it?

If the case did not settle - notify immediately (on May 17, 2016).

If the case did settle - file proof by May 31, 2016.

Did Mr. Carroll tell his clients, the Plaintiffs, of the court order of May 17, 2016?

Of course not, and that is the next page in the unfolding saga.

Today I received an unexpected call from Plaintiff Dara Argro.

It was not for legal advice.

It was to give me information as to what is happening in the case.

Dara told me that Mr. Carroll insists on coming to their house today (from Syracuse, NY to Oxford, NY), a 3 hour roundtrip for Mr. Carroll:

Before, Mr. Carroll came to the Plaintiffs only once - to have them sign a retainer agreement.

And, before Mr. Carroll did not have time in three days to even notify Plaintiffs that the court cancelled a court appearance, thus causing his indigent clients to make 

Plaintiffs did not invite Mr. Carroll to come to their house today.

In fact, Dara told me that she does not want him to come to her house today - or at any time.

Dara told me that she in fact told Mr. Carroll that he is not welcome and that he should not come.

But, Mr. Carroll told Dara that he will come anyway - so he is insisting on committing a crime of criminal trespass into his clients' home in order to coerce them to sign papers they don't want to sign.

By the way, the lawsuit is about Chenango County DSS also coming uninvited, and without a court order or search warrants, to that same house and barging into the same house, and doing searches in the house, including searches of extremely private belongings and locations, causing physical damage to at least one of the Plaintiffs - which Mr. Carroll considered not enough to proceed to trial.

Apparently, since Mr. Carroll has a belief  that he himself can barge into his clients' home uninvited because he wants it, it is now understandable why he thought the case was not enough to proceed to trial (even when the court scheduled it to proceed to trial).

So, why does Mr. Carroll want so much to come to Dara's house tonight at 6 p.m.?

Mr. Carroll wants all three Plaintiffs to do the following:

1) have the three Plaintiffs sign the settlement agreement of a multi-million dollar lawsuit for $30,000 - which Plaintiffs do not want to do;  remember Mr. Carroll reported to the court several times that the case already settled, and that was a lie, and a motion was filed asking for sanctions against Mr. Carroll because of this lie and many other lies;

2) have the three Plaintiffs sign an affidavit "against you, Mrs. Neroni", as Dara put it, so, I understand, Mr. Carroll is undeterred by the court's prohibition for him to file cross-motions, and still wants to do it - and ask for sanctions against me, because I exposed his raging misconduct in the case.

At the same time as pushing the plaintiffs to sign an affidavit against me, Carroll, according to Dara, was also playing on plaintiffs' friendly feelings towards me and told them that if they do not sign the settlement agreement, I will not be able to get my legal fees.

Right!

That is - after opposing ANY legal fees for me on plaintiffs' behalf, after having me stripped of any legal fees for 3.5 years of litigation while using my work to get his own inflated fees for doing nothing, lying to the court and refusing to do proper work for his clients at $500/hr.

So, while arguing to the court that I should not get any legal fees, settlement or no settlement - on behalf of plaintiffs - Carroll tells the plaintiffs that they "must" sign the settlement agreement they do not want to sign in order to help me get my legal fees.

So, Mr. Carroll is urging plaintiffs to sign the puny settlement agreement in a multi-million dollar lawsuit claiming that that will help me get my legal fees, after asking the court - successfully - to deny me all legal fees, and while asking the same plaintiffs to sign an affidavit "against me".

What a mess this man is.

Of course, there is no "must" in signing any settlement agreements, and Mr. Carroll well knows that.

Of course, Mr. Carroll does not represent my interests and does not want to help me.  It is simply one more episode of fraud in my future lawsuit against him.

Because soliciting an affidavit from a person where the person must say what that person does not feel (and that's exactly what Mr. Carroll is doing when he is trying to get an affidavit "against me" from three plaintiffs in Argro v Osborne) is three counts of soliciting perjury and fraud.

Three more counts.

Dara told me she does not want to sign the agreement, nor does she want to sign any affidavits against me, and neither do other plaintiffs, and that they want to proceed to trial, which Mr. Carroll refuses to do.

Dara then called me again to inform me that Mr. Carroll talked to her on the phone again and told her that if plaintiffs do not sign the settlement agreement AND the affidavit "against me" today - start trembling right now, it's a horrible thing Mr. Carroll threatned - Mr. Carroll will then - TADA!! - withdraw from the case.

And - guess what - Dara is celebrating Mr. Carroll's withdrawal as we speak.

She said she was happy Mr. Carroll was withdrawing, because now she will be able to get a "real" attorney who would "really" represent her and other plaintiffs - as, she said, I was doing.

Since Mr. Carroll is still threatening to come tonight to Dara and other plaintiffs to coerce her to sign these two documents, I will continue to cover this extraordinary story.

The story is about the lengths to which a federal court and attorneys would go to cut off rights of recovery of victims of CPS misconduct, and to what lengths courts will go to retaliate against an attorney who dared to sue social services - when no other attorney would take such a case, out of fear of retaliation.

By the way, I found a report on the Internet that in 2014, two years ago, the then-57 year old Woodruff Carroll reported a crime committed against him by a 17-year-old girl.

Did he lie about that, too?

Legal research by a reader I could not help and why attorneys are afraid to sue Social Services

Yet another reader contacted me who is trying to sue Social Services, but cannot get an attorney (attorneys are deathly afraid to sue Social Services for fear to lose their licenses and livelihoods).

And, of course, I had to say "no" - because of the alleged (secret) suspension in federal court.

Yet, the reader did not stop at my "no" and sent to me the reader's own research on the subject of lawsuits against social services, together with the reader's own story.

I would like to make that research public - showing that (1) lay people can do their own legal research pretty well, and that (2) attorneys are afraid to take a case suing social services even with all this case law on the side of the victims.

Here are the results of my reader's legal research on the issue of whether CPS can be successfully sued for misconduct.

Thank you, my reader, and I will not publicize your name, e-mail address, or story, for obvious reasons.

 *   *   *

CPS workers are not IMMUNE to the Constitution. Below are a few cases that prove this.

Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, (9th Cir. 2008)
Beltrans sued two caseworkers under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, charging constitutional violations in removing child from their custody and attempting to place him under the supervision of the state by fabricating evidence. Court overruled Doe v. Lebbos, and reversed the district court's ruling that defendants were entitled to absolute immunity.

Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, (7th Cir. 2000)
In 1983, three-year old A.D. Brokaw was removed from her parents' home based on allegations of child neglect. After she turned eighteen, she sued her paternal grandfather, aunt, and uncle, alleging that they conspired to violate her constitutional rights by reporting false claims of child neglect. A.D. also sued the various state actors and agencies involved in removing her from her parents' custody. The district court held that A.D.'s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because, in effect, A.D. was challenging the validity of the state removal proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999)
"This case involves whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special exigency." Can you guess what the answer was? "An unlawful entry or search of a home does not end when the government officials walk across the threshold. It continues as they impose their will on the residents of the home in which they have no right to be."

Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001-NMCA-065, New Mexico Court of Appeals (2001)
Defendants are deputy sheriffs with the Curry County Sheriff's Department, who were called to assist two social workers from the Children, Youth & Families Department on a "child welfare check" at Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's son had not been attending elementary school. Thus, one reason for the visit to Plaintiff's home was to investigate suspected truancy or educational neglect. Held: "At the time of entry into Plaintiff's home, it was well-settled that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures and was intended to protect the sanctity of an individual's home and privacy."

Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997)
Holding that "a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse."

Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2000)
School district officials can be liable under 1983 if they are deliberately indifferent to acts committed by a teacher that violate a student's constitutional rights.

Franz v. United States, 707 F 2d 582, US Ct App (1983)
"The undesirability of cultural homogenization would lead us to oppose efforts by the state to assume a greater role in children's development, even if we were confident that the state were capable of doing so effectively and intelligently." A brilliant analysis of the fundamental right to be free of unwarranted state interference between the child-parent bond, in this case stemming from the Witness Protection Program.

Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, (3d Cir. 1989)
"[P]hysical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is directed," the Court explained, while adding: "It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." No qualified immunity claim to be found here.

Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, (8th Cir.2003)
Waddle, as Chief Juvenile Officer for the Second Circuit of Missouri, effected the removal of 115 boarding students from Heartland Christian Academy . Waddle had obtained ex parte probable-cause state-court orders to remove some of the boarding students, there were no orders of any kind to remove many of the students who were taken from the school. This case is noted for its brilliant analysis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and immunity as an officer of a juvenile court. The court held that: "any single violation of Heartland's federal constitutional rights in this case would be sufficient to sustain Heartland's claim for injunctive relief under ' 1983."

Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2005)
No qualified immunity in this ' 1983 action for alleged violations of Fourth Amendment rights arising from girl's in-school seizure by a deputy sheriff and s Social Worker Supervisor for the New Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department ("CYFD"). "We conclude that the Fourth Amendment violation as alleged in this case is both obvious and outrageous."

Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651, (9th Cir. 1985)
"Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent establish that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child. The state's interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under section 1983."

Lopkof v. Slater, 103 F.3d 144 (10th Cir. 1996) (Unpublished)
Defendants do not dispute that the law was clearly established that a warrantless search of a private residence is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless one of "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" applies. Defendants maintain that because they had "received specific information questioning the safety of children," they acted in an objectively reasonable manner when they entered Lopkoff's private residence. Wrong, and no qualified immunity for these officers.

Loudermilk v. Arpaio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76819 (D. Ariz. September 27, 2007)
With respect to Plaintiffs' claim based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, parents and children have a constitutional right to live together without governmental interference and will not be separated without due process of law except in emergencies. Motion to dismiss by CPS worker and others who coerced entry into home denied.

Mabe v. San Bernardino, 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001)
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another person. Whether reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances existed in a given situation, "and the related questions, are all questions of fact to be determined by a jury." Hence, no immunity for social worker under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

NEW! Michael v. Gresbach, (7th Cir. 2008)
The court held that: "a reasonable child welfare worker would have known that conducting a search of a child's body under his clothes, on private property, without consent or the presence of any other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is in direct violation of the child's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches." No qualified immunity for this CPS caseworker! The court also held that the state statute that allowed for "investigations" on private property without a search warrant was itself unconstitutional as applied.

Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Soc. Servs.191 F.3d 1306, (10th Cir. 1999)
"The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Court also held that: "it was clearly established law that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures."

Norfleet v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993)
Court denies qualified immunity to the Human Services Director and caseworker involved because the state obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection, and supervision with respect to children placed in foster care was well established as of 1991.

Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1996)
The defendants attempt to avoid the imposition of summary judgment by arguing that, even if their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should shield them from liability. Qualified immunity is available to state actors in Section 1983 suits if those actors reasonably believed that their conduct was lawful. However, a good faith belief in the legality of conduct is not sufficient. Held: No qualified immunity.

Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1997)
Holding "a parent has a constitutionally protected right to the care and custody of his children and he cannot be summarily deprived of custody without notice and a hearing except when the children are in imminent danger." No qualified immunity for social worker who removed child not in imminent danger.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2007)
Court held: "the rights of families to be free from governmental interference and arbitrary state action are also important. Thus, we must balance, on the one hand, the need to protect children from abuse and neglect and, on the other, the preservation of the essential privacy and liberty interests that families are guaranteed under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution." Section 1983 case reinforces that removal of children from home by caseworker absent either a warrant or exigent circumstances violates those rights, and therefore no qualified immunity applies to caseworker.

Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, (10 Cir. 2003)
Holding no immunity for caseworkers who entered a home lacking either exigency or a warrant, and finding constitutional protection in the right to maintain a family relationship, Court held: "the law is now clearly established that, absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, social workers may not enter an individual's home for the purpose of taking a child into protective custody."

Tennenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, (2d Cir. 1999)
"We affirm the judgment insofar as it holds that the medical examination violated the Tenenbaums' and Sarah's procedural due-process rights and Sarah's Fourth Amendment rights and awards damages therefor. . . We conclude, however, that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants' removal of Sarah from school was contrary to the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause and to Sarah's right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment." The Missouri Bar has an informative Courts Bulletin describing the case.

Turner v. Houseman, Docket: 07-6108 (10th Cir. 2008) (Unpublished)
"It was clearly established, at least two years before the events in question, that absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, neither police nor social workers may enter a person's home without a valid consent, even for the purpose of taking a child into custody, much less to conduct a search. It was also established that the warrantless seizure and detention of a person without probable cause or exigent circumstances, as alleged in Turner's petition, is unreasonable."

Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)
"In cases of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by constitutional constraints may have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family. Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where no problem of any kind previously existed."

Walsh v. Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, (N.D. Ohio 2003)
"Despite the Defendants' exaggerated view of their powers, the Fourth Amendment applies to them, as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose requests to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door. . . Any agency that expects to send its employees routinely into private homes has a fundamental obligation to ensure that those employees understand the constitutional limits on their authority."

Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, (4th Cir. 1990)
"Substantive due process does not categorically bar the government from altering parental custody rights." What I find interesting about this case is that it was brought pro se, and that he sued a lotmore people than I am.

Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997)
Whismans filed this action against juvenile officers and social workers, claiming they violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights of familial association, denying plaintiffs due process of law. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiffs' claims were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Guess again!

Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, (5th Cir. 2000)
Holding that a "childs right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent. No qualified immunity for police officers who removed young child in this section 1983 action.

 

And, I can add to the above list of cases the case I brought to trial - and was then (allegedly, secretly) suspended on the eve of that trial and stripped of my attorney fees for 3.5 years of litigation.

Argro v Osborne - here is the decision denying summary judgment.

Remember - Argro v Osborne.  The reason why attorneys in NY are afraid to take cases against CPS.  They are afraid they will be suspended, like I was, for suing CPS.

A Tennessee story: a judge will never rat on a judge - even if it is his duty to report judicial misconduct

Ok, so a judge arrives to her job late.

To her job presiding over a criminal court.

To the pre-trial detention hearing of people, presumed innocent and held in jail before trial.

Where witnesses are summoned.

The judge is late for the hearing scheduled by the judge herself.

So, if an attorney is late for the hearing, the attorney will be sanctioned, and the judge would have ruled against the attorney.

But the judge can allow herself to be late.

And, shortly after she arrived (late), the judge has to leave.

Why does she have to leave?

She has "to teach a class".

But, isn't the judge's job is - well, to judge?  Not to teach a class?

Obviously, to teach a class was a priority.

A PERSONAL priority for a Tennessee judge Rachel Bell .

That personal priority of judge Rachel Bell prevented several people from having their detention hearing within 10 days, as required by law.

Since the judge was in a hurry to teach a class - did she release those people because she did not have time, for personal reasons, to hold the detention hearing within 10 days, as required by statute?

Of course, not.

She simply delayed their stay in jail and went to teach a class at a local high school.

And, did the other judge - who vacated her unlawful decision - report her misconduct?

Of course, not.

Judge Mark Fishburn found it not appropriate "to report a colleague".

Judge Fishburn is himself a member of various extra-judicial associations and organizations.

Was his reluctance to report the obvious misconduct of judge Rachel Bell a reflection that he may be in need of the same leniency from her in the future, if he gives priority to his own extra-judicial activities and "community involvement", other than his direct job that taxpayers are paying him for - TO JUDGE?

And - by the way - did Judge Bell appreciate the leniency of Judge Fishburn in not reporting her to disciplinary authorities?

Did she "accept responsibility"?

Did she "express remorse"?  Those are the usual cliches in disciplinary proceedings where leniency is afforded to people committing misconduct.

Oh, no, quite the opposite.

Here is what was reported by The Tennessian as Rachel Bell's reaction to Judge Fishburn's rulings overturning adjournment orders of Judge Bell and releasing the defendants pending trial - which is what Judge Bell was supposed to do if she did not have time for a hearing within time limits required by statute.

Quotes:

"Fishburn's orders infuriated Bell, who went to talk to Fishburn on Thursday morning".

So, a judge talks to an appellate judge expressing her displeasure with the appellate ruling - that is an act of misconduct in itself.

"In an email response to The Tennessean, Bell raised concern not about Atchley's release from jail but about Fishburn's first order and footnote to it.

That order granted Atchley a bond hearing after Mollenkof, the defense lawyer, raised concerns including that Bell lowered Atchley's bond without properly holding a hearing. Bell sent The Tennessean a handwritten court order from April 29 justifying her reasons for lowering the bond and citing a case that says people cannot be held in jail beyond 30 days without a preliminary hearing.

The footnote said Bell does not appear in court before 10:30 a.m. "due to sleep issues related to her Type II diabetes."

Apparently, Judge Fishburn did not take this information out of the thin air, obviously, the judge shared her reasoning for late appearances with somebody.  Usually, judges are quite open about their health issues in chambers with attorneys and with the judge's own secretaries and clerks, so the disclosure, likely, came from the court personnel or an attorney appearing before the judge in chambers.

"Bell told The Tennessean that was untrue. She said cases are typically not ready until 10 a.m. and thus it is better to start late.

"The start time is best for me including but not limited to my health and the best time for the courthouse," Bell wrote to The Tennessean on Thursday, saying she would not discuss her health."

But, if it is "the best time for the courthouse", then hearings must be SCHEDULED for that "best time", too, right?

For 11:00 am?

Apparently, the hearing was not scheduled for that time, it was scheduled for an earlier time.

The judge was late.

Many people were waiting for her to show up at her job.

A police officer who was supposed to be on the streets protecting people's safety (and paid to do that) was waiting for the judge, unnecessarily - and the judge made him wait even more and come another time, because of judge's personal appointments that day.

I wonder if Judge Bell collected her pay for the full day that day, too - while coming late and leaving within 1.5 hours of coming, for a personal reason.

If Judge Bell has health reasons for not being able to come and do her job, the remedy for it is resignation.

Not keeping people in jail longer than the statute allows.

Not wasting the time of taxpayer-paid personnel, utilities, maintenance cost of the courthouse, supported by taxpayer money, by coming to her job late.

Why cases are ready only by 10:30 am? 

Isn't it the job of the judge then to come EARLIER and make sure that cases are ready on time?

Isn't it true that, if cases are ready late, they may be geared to the judge's habitual late-shows?

And, the biggest problem, of course, is Judge Rachel Bell's attitude.

She accuses other people for addressing her misconduct in a court decision.

Which means - she thinks she is in the right, will continue to disregard the law and put her private affairs ahead of her job duties, and, there is a likelihood of retaliation against litigants and attorneys who raised issues of her misconduct.

And that is a very big problem.

So, while Judge Fishburn would not report Judge Bell because he "would not report a colleague", he also puts his personal interactions with the colleague as a priority over his duty to the people who elected him.

And that is an unfitness issue for Judge Fishburn, too.

A reprimand only to the "crying judge" - so, retaliation by the judge is to be expected

In April of this year I wrote about a "crying judge" out of New Jersey - a judge who subjected litigants and attorneys to sexual and insulting remarks in the courtroom - until they could not tolerate that any more (and usually, attorneys are very scared of judges and do not report judicial misconduct, so, in order to have it reported, remarks had to be really bad).

It was reported that the judge was disciplined - but only with a reprimand.

Because, I guess, he cried at his hearing.

And the disciplinary commission sympathized with him.

So, he can remain on the bench and to the same to other people - because such an attitude in a very adult male will not be eradicated or deterred by a reprimand.

Litigants and attorneys appearing in front of New Jersey judge Joseph Portelli - prepare for more abuse.

And for retaliation for turning him in and for his "crying" embarrassment and humiliation.

I will monitor Judge Portelli's further conduct through the press, public documents, social media and feedback from my readers and will report it on this blog.

Stay tuned.

Go drink coffee at a CLE for 3 hours a year - the punishment for misconduct of U.S. Attorney's office

If a civil rights attorney sues a government official, there is an increasing chance that:

(1) the case will be dismissed on judge-invented (and thus illegal under Article III) doctrine or rule;
(2) sanctions and attorney fees - thousands of dollars - will be imposed upon the civil rights attorney.

Thousands of dollars in sanctions.

Thousands of dollars in attorney fees.

And that is - simply because in pleadings, presumed to be true before discovery started, an attorney raised constitutional arguments.

Lying to court is a crime.

Attorneys get disbarred for that.

But, if attorneys who are lying to court are working for the federal government, 

• they are not sanctioned with monetary sanctions;
• they are not ordered to pay attorney fees of the opposing party;
• they are not disbarred

They are told to have 3 hours of ethical training a year.

If you are an attorney working for the government - go drink coffee (or whatever you can smuggle in their to sit and sip) at a free CLE course, free for you as a governmental employee.  

And laugh in the face of taxpayers funding your galore.

On Copper vs Silver Justice and (Corporate Wives) PlayBoy Bunny Judges - the justice for sale galore

Two heads of New York State Legislature, Sheldon Silver (Assembly Speaker) and Dean Skelos (Majority Leader of the Senate) were convicted of corruption charges.

On May 3, 2016, Sheldon Silver was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

On May 12, 2016, Dean Skelos was sentenced to 5 years in prison.

Yet, in both of their cases, judge Valerie Caproni (for Silver) and Judge Kimba Wood (for Skelos) unanimously allowed these two public officials convicted of corruption, whose corruption was proven to juries through testimony and documentary evidence, to remain free pending resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court of a case pertaining - coincidentally - to government corruption.

Here is the procedural history of the U.S. Supreme Court case that these two federal judges used to give a summer break from prison to convicted felons Silver and Skelos.

Such unanimity, from two different federal judges - to keep three convicted felons (Silver, Skelos-father and Skelos-son) - out of prison, defying the jury verdict, defying the statutorily enacted power of the people of this country to criminally prosecute corruption in the government.

Here is judge Valerie Caproni, former wunderkid, former General Counsel for the FBI, former Chief of Special Prosecutions and Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in the U.S. Attorney General's Office,  former "white-collar" criminal defense attorney.   Jane of all trades, who already has a history of using her knowledge acquired in a taxpayer-paid job for personal gain.

Let's see how her career will develop after the seminal decision to keep convicted corrupt public officials free until a corrupt court will decide the issue whether corruption is corruption or just "business as usual" for politicians:

Here is Judge Kimba Wood.  The country should know the faces of its anti-heroes.

Judge Kimba Wood, by the way, is married, by her 3rd marriage, to a Wall Street millionaire financier Frank Richardson III, where Richardson's diaries about his affair with Wood was an explosive part of his divorce action.  Frank Richardson is reportedly Judge Wood's law school classmate.

Judge Wood was reportedly in training as a PlayBoy Bunny in London, which did not prevent her from becoming a lawyer or a federal judge.

Quite a colorful past, and marriage to a rich corporate investor did not prevent Judge Kimba Wood from (1) presiding over a case which can benefit her husband; or (2) throwing herself into the public spotlight by her decision to let convicted corrupt politicians roam free.

It is definite in my mind that Judge Wood should be investigated as to whether her husband Frank Richardson ever engaged in lobbying activities or large campaign contributions to politicians, because then it is an irreconcilable and disqualifying conflict of interest for Judge Wood to preside over the case.

The U.S. Supreme Court is expected, within 2 months, to hand down a decision in the case of corruption of Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell in order to rule "what constitutes corruption as opposed to everyday government action for a benefactor".

Now, WHAT is a "government action for a benefactor" OTHER than corruption?

Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court (1) took the case of Bob McDonnell (in their discretion, remember, while tossing certioraris of Copper Joes left and right, without an explanation) and (2) expressed "concerns" - about this:

"Justices on both sides of the ideological divide expressed concern about federal corruption laws that could criminalize what they variously called “routine” or “everyday” actions that politicians perform for campaign contributors or supporters who have provided them with gifts."

Idiot-logical divide, rather.

First of all, judges CANNOT be "ideological".  If they are admittedly so, they should not be on the bench.

And, is there an issue at all in a reasonable person's mind that politicians' "actions" for "campaign contributors" and "supporters who have provided them with gifts", IS corruption?

Here, a couple of governing legal principles that must spring into action in the McDonnell case:

1) The restriction of the U.S. Constitution, Article III on jurisdiction of federal courts - such courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, may not legislate, only the U.S. Congress has such a right, under Article I of the U.S. Constitution;  thus, the U.S. Supreme Court may not change a federal statute by interpretation;

2) the rule of statutory interpretation - a court does not get to interpret a clear and unambiguous rule;  and, there is no ambiguity in the federal statute as to the "quid pro quo" - what the court expressed "concerns" about cannot be read by any reasonable reader OTHER than corruption.

Another interesting issue here is the exercise of discretion by the U.S. Supreme Court and the timing of such exercise.

Isn't it interesting issue here is - out of all constitutional issues tossed by the U.S. Supreme Court in their "absolute discretion", THIS is the most important issue for the country that the top court must consider - the distinction between "corruption" and "everyday government action for a benefactor"?

And shouldn't the FBI and the U.S. Congress start an impeachment investigation of ALL the U.S. Supreme Court justices in connection with this "timely" exercise of discretion on this particular issue?

The extra-busy U.S. Supreme Court, the court that regularly tosses petitions for a writ of certiorari by pro se litigants and attorneys suffering judicial retaliation for making motions to recuse and for fighting for their clients, those Joe Copper petitions - why such court would suddenly, and "coincidentally" in time as to convictions in Silver and Skelos' cases - decide this particular issue at this particular time?

Is this a bad case of "Silver Justice" - even though the "hunting trip" judge Scalia is already 6 feet under?

Is the power of money, corrupt money, such that the U.S. Supreme Court would take the case of the Virginia Governor while tossing cases of suffering average American citizens - so that Dean Skelos and Sheldon Silver would not have to spend one day in prison, despite conviction and sentencing, and without an inconvenience and uncertainty to have to go through their own appellate process, just through another case, "coincidentally" "timely" decided right about the time when Silver and Skelos must go to prison?

Now, imagine that not a Sheldon Silver, but, let's say, a Joe Copper, was just sentenced.

And, Joe Copper asks the judge to delay his reporting to prison because the U.S. Supreme Court may rule on an issue important for Joe Copper in Joe Copper's criminal proceeding.

Do you have a slightest doubt that Joe Copper will be awaiting the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in prison.

I actually have no doubt that the U.S. Supreme Court would not even undertake a review of an issue beneficial for Joe Copper at the time of Joe Copper's conviction and sentencing.

But, that's, ladies and gentlemen, is Copper justice - reserved to us, mere mortals.

As to what will be the outcome of the Silver justice - the "coincidental" decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that Silver and Skelos are waiting for while roaming free despite their conviction and sentencing - I will cover the story further, so stay tuned.

But, let me tell you this - in a country where a top court has lost its moral compass to the point of considering, in its "discretion"  no less, a distinction between "corruption" and "everyday government action for a benefactor", we are doomed unless we fire that court and institute governmental reform from top to bottom, through constitutional amendments if necessary.