Legal research by a reader I could not help and why attorneys are afraid to sue Social Services

Yet another reader contacted me who is trying to sue Social Services, but cannot get an attorney (attorneys are deathly afraid to sue Social Services for fear to lose their licenses and livelihoods).

And, of course, I had to say "no" - because of the alleged (secret) suspension in federal court.

Yet, the reader did not stop at my "no" and sent to me the reader's own research on the subject of lawsuits against social services, together with the reader's own story.

I would like to make that research public - showing that (1) lay people can do their own legal research pretty well, and that (2) attorneys are afraid to take a case suing social services even with all this case law on the side of the victims.

Here are the results of my reader's legal research on the issue of whether CPS can be successfully sued for misconduct.

Thank you, my reader, and I will not publicize your name, e-mail address, or story, for obvious reasons.

 *   *   *

CPS workers are not IMMUNE to the Constitution. Below are a few cases that prove this.

Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, (9th Cir. 2008)
Beltrans sued two caseworkers under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, charging constitutional violations in removing child from their custody and attempting to place him under the supervision of the state by fabricating evidence. Court overruled Doe v. Lebbos, and reversed the district court's ruling that defendants were entitled to absolute immunity.

Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, (7th Cir. 2000)
In 1983, three-year old A.D. Brokaw was removed from her parents' home based on allegations of child neglect. After she turned eighteen, she sued her paternal grandfather, aunt, and uncle, alleging that they conspired to violate her constitutional rights by reporting false claims of child neglect. A.D. also sued the various state actors and agencies involved in removing her from her parents' custody. The district court held that A.D.'s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because, in effect, A.D. was challenging the validity of the state removal proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.

Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999)
"This case involves whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special exigency." Can you guess what the answer was? "An unlawful entry or search of a home does not end when the government officials walk across the threshold. It continues as they impose their will on the residents of the home in which they have no right to be."

Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners, 2001-NMCA-065, New Mexico Court of Appeals (2001)
Defendants are deputy sheriffs with the Curry County Sheriff's Department, who were called to assist two social workers from the Children, Youth & Families Department on a "child welfare check" at Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's son had not been attending elementary school. Thus, one reason for the visit to Plaintiff's home was to investigate suspected truancy or educational neglect. Held: "At the time of entry into Plaintiff's home, it was well-settled that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures and was intended to protect the sanctity of an individual's home and privacy."

Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir. 1997)
Holding that "a state has no interest in protecting children from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse."

Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2000)
School district officials can be liable under 1983 if they are deliberately indifferent to acts committed by a teacher that violate a student's constitutional rights.

Franz v. United States, 707 F 2d 582, US Ct App (1983)
"The undesirability of cultural homogenization would lead us to oppose efforts by the state to assume a greater role in children's development, even if we were confident that the state were capable of doing so effectively and intelligently." A brilliant analysis of the fundamental right to be free of unwarranted state interference between the child-parent bond, in this case stemming from the Witness Protection Program.

Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, (3d Cir. 1989)
"[P]hysical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is directed," the Court explained, while adding: "It is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." No qualified immunity claim to be found here.

Heartland Acad. Cmty. Church v. Waddle, 335 F.3d 684, (8th Cir.2003)
Waddle, as Chief Juvenile Officer for the Second Circuit of Missouri, effected the removal of 115 boarding students from Heartland Christian Academy . Waddle had obtained ex parte probable-cause state-court orders to remove some of the boarding students, there were no orders of any kind to remove many of the students who were taken from the school. This case is noted for its brilliant analysis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and immunity as an officer of a juvenile court. The court held that: "any single violation of Heartland's federal constitutional rights in this case would be sufficient to sustain Heartland's claim for injunctive relief under ' 1983."

Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2005)
No qualified immunity in this ' 1983 action for alleged violations of Fourth Amendment rights arising from girl's in-school seizure by a deputy sheriff and s Social Worker Supervisor for the New Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department ("CYFD"). "We conclude that the Fourth Amendment violation as alleged in this case is both obvious and outrageous."

Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651, (9th Cir. 1985)
"Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent establish that a parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of his or her child. The state's interference with that liberty interest without due process of law is remediable under section 1983."

Lopkof v. Slater, 103 F.3d 144 (10th Cir. 1996) (Unpublished)
Defendants do not dispute that the law was clearly established that a warrantless search of a private residence is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless one of "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" applies. Defendants maintain that because they had "received specific information questioning the safety of children," they acted in an objectively reasonable manner when they entered Lopkoff's private residence. Wrong, and no qualified immunity for these officers.

Loudermilk v. Arpaio, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76819 (D. Ariz. September 27, 2007)
With respect to Plaintiffs' claim based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, parents and children have a constitutional right to live together without governmental interference and will not be separated without due process of law except in emergencies. Motion to dismiss by CPS worker and others who coerced entry into home denied.

Mabe v. San Bernardino, 237 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2001)
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, violates the constitutional rights of another person. Whether reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances existed in a given situation, "and the related questions, are all questions of fact to be determined by a jury." Hence, no immunity for social worker under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

NEW! Michael v. Gresbach, (7th Cir. 2008)
The court held that: "a reasonable child welfare worker would have known that conducting a search of a child's body under his clothes, on private property, without consent or the presence of any other exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, is in direct violation of the child's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches." No qualified immunity for this CPS caseworker! The court also held that the state statute that allowed for "investigations" on private property without a search warrant was itself unconstitutional as applied.

Malik v. Arapahoe County Dept. of Soc. Servs.191 F.3d 1306, (10th Cir. 1999)
"The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 for actions taken while performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Court also held that: "it was clearly established law that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures."

Norfleet v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993)
Court denies qualified immunity to the Human Services Director and caseworker involved because the state obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection, and supervision with respect to children placed in foster care was well established as of 1991.

Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707 (3rd Cir. 1996)
The defendants attempt to avoid the imposition of summary judgment by arguing that, even if their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should shield them from liability. Qualified immunity is available to state actors in Section 1983 suits if those actors reasonably believed that their conduct was lawful. However, a good faith belief in the legality of conduct is not sufficient. Held: No qualified immunity.

Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1997)
Holding "a parent has a constitutionally protected right to the care and custody of his children and he cannot be summarily deprived of custody without notice and a hearing except when the children are in imminent danger." No qualified immunity for social worker who removed child not in imminent danger.

Rogers v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2007)
Court held: "the rights of families to be free from governmental interference and arbitrary state action are also important. Thus, we must balance, on the one hand, the need to protect children from abuse and neglect and, on the other, the preservation of the essential privacy and liberty interests that families are guaranteed under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution." Section 1983 case reinforces that removal of children from home by caseworker absent either a warrant or exigent circumstances violates those rights, and therefore no qualified immunity applies to caseworker.

Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, (10 Cir. 2003)
Holding no immunity for caseworkers who entered a home lacking either exigency or a warrant, and finding constitutional protection in the right to maintain a family relationship, Court held: "the law is now clearly established that, absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, social workers may not enter an individual's home for the purpose of taking a child into protective custody."

Tennenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, (2d Cir. 1999)
"We affirm the judgment insofar as it holds that the medical examination violated the Tenenbaums' and Sarah's procedural due-process rights and Sarah's Fourth Amendment rights and awards damages therefor. . . We conclude, however, that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants' removal of Sarah from school was contrary to the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause and to Sarah's right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment." The Missouri Bar has an informative Courts Bulletin describing the case.

Turner v. Houseman, Docket: 07-6108 (10th Cir. 2008) (Unpublished)
"It was clearly established, at least two years before the events in question, that absent probable cause and a warrant or exigent circumstances, neither police nor social workers may enter a person's home without a valid consent, even for the purpose of taking a child into custody, much less to conduct a search. It was also established that the warrantless seizure and detention of a person without probable cause or exigent circumstances, as alleged in Turner's petition, is unreasonable."

Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)
"In cases of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by constitutional constraints may have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family. Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where no problem of any kind previously existed."

Walsh v. Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, (N.D. Ohio 2003)
"Despite the Defendants' exaggerated view of their powers, the Fourth Amendment applies to them, as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose requests to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door. . . Any agency that expects to send its employees routinely into private homes has a fundamental obligation to ensure that those employees understand the constitutional limits on their authority."

Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, (4th Cir. 1990)
"Substantive due process does not categorically bar the government from altering parental custody rights." What I find interesting about this case is that it was brought pro se, and that he sued a lotmore people than I am.

Whisman v. Rinehart, 119 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir. 1997)
Whismans filed this action against juvenile officers and social workers, claiming they violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights of familial association, denying plaintiffs due process of law. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that plaintiffs' claims were not actionable under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983. Guess again!

Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, (5th Cir. 2000)
Holding that a "childs right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent. No qualified immunity for police officers who removed young child in this section 1983 action.

 

And, I can add to the above list of cases the case I brought to trial - and was then (allegedly, secretly) suspended on the eve of that trial and stripped of my attorney fees for 3.5 years of litigation.

Argro v Osborne - here is the decision denying summary judgment.

Remember - Argro v Osborne.  The reason why attorneys in NY are afraid to take cases against CPS.  They are afraid they will be suspended, like I was, for suing CPS.

A Tennessee story: a judge will never rat on a judge - even if it is his duty to report judicial misconduct

Ok, so a judge arrives to her job late.

To her job presiding over a criminal court.

To the pre-trial detention hearing of people, presumed innocent and held in jail before trial.

Where witnesses are summoned.

The judge is late for the hearing scheduled by the judge herself.

So, if an attorney is late for the hearing, the attorney will be sanctioned, and the judge would have ruled against the attorney.

But the judge can allow herself to be late.

And, shortly after she arrived (late), the judge has to leave.

Why does she have to leave?

She has "to teach a class".

But, isn't the judge's job is - well, to judge?  Not to teach a class?

Obviously, to teach a class was a priority.

A PERSONAL priority for a Tennessee judge Rachel Bell .

That personal priority of judge Rachel Bell prevented several people from having their detention hearing within 10 days, as required by law.

Since the judge was in a hurry to teach a class - did she release those people because she did not have time, for personal reasons, to hold the detention hearing within 10 days, as required by statute?

Of course, not.

She simply delayed their stay in jail and went to teach a class at a local high school.

And, did the other judge - who vacated her unlawful decision - report her misconduct?

Of course, not.

Judge Mark Fishburn found it not appropriate "to report a colleague".

Judge Fishburn is himself a member of various extra-judicial associations and organizations.

Was his reluctance to report the obvious misconduct of judge Rachel Bell a reflection that he may be in need of the same leniency from her in the future, if he gives priority to his own extra-judicial activities and "community involvement", other than his direct job that taxpayers are paying him for - TO JUDGE?

And - by the way - did Judge Bell appreciate the leniency of Judge Fishburn in not reporting her to disciplinary authorities?

Did she "accept responsibility"?

Did she "express remorse"?  Those are the usual cliches in disciplinary proceedings where leniency is afforded to people committing misconduct.

Oh, no, quite the opposite.

Here is what was reported by The Tennessian as Rachel Bell's reaction to Judge Fishburn's rulings overturning adjournment orders of Judge Bell and releasing the defendants pending trial - which is what Judge Bell was supposed to do if she did not have time for a hearing within time limits required by statute.

Quotes:

"Fishburn's orders infuriated Bell, who went to talk to Fishburn on Thursday morning".

So, a judge talks to an appellate judge expressing her displeasure with the appellate ruling - that is an act of misconduct in itself.

"In an email response to The Tennessean, Bell raised concern not about Atchley's release from jail but about Fishburn's first order and footnote to it.

That order granted Atchley a bond hearing after Mollenkof, the defense lawyer, raised concerns including that Bell lowered Atchley's bond without properly holding a hearing. Bell sent The Tennessean a handwritten court order from April 29 justifying her reasons for lowering the bond and citing a case that says people cannot be held in jail beyond 30 days without a preliminary hearing.

The footnote said Bell does not appear in court before 10:30 a.m. "due to sleep issues related to her Type II diabetes."

Apparently, Judge Fishburn did not take this information out of the thin air, obviously, the judge shared her reasoning for late appearances with somebody.  Usually, judges are quite open about their health issues in chambers with attorneys and with the judge's own secretaries and clerks, so the disclosure, likely, came from the court personnel or an attorney appearing before the judge in chambers.

"Bell told The Tennessean that was untrue. She said cases are typically not ready until 10 a.m. and thus it is better to start late.

"The start time is best for me including but not limited to my health and the best time for the courthouse," Bell wrote to The Tennessean on Thursday, saying she would not discuss her health."

But, if it is "the best time for the courthouse", then hearings must be SCHEDULED for that "best time", too, right?

For 11:00 am?

Apparently, the hearing was not scheduled for that time, it was scheduled for an earlier time.

The judge was late.

Many people were waiting for her to show up at her job.

A police officer who was supposed to be on the streets protecting people's safety (and paid to do that) was waiting for the judge, unnecessarily - and the judge made him wait even more and come another time, because of judge's personal appointments that day.

I wonder if Judge Bell collected her pay for the full day that day, too - while coming late and leaving within 1.5 hours of coming, for a personal reason.

If Judge Bell has health reasons for not being able to come and do her job, the remedy for it is resignation.

Not keeping people in jail longer than the statute allows.

Not wasting the time of taxpayer-paid personnel, utilities, maintenance cost of the courthouse, supported by taxpayer money, by coming to her job late.

Why cases are ready only by 10:30 am? 

Isn't it the job of the judge then to come EARLIER and make sure that cases are ready on time?

Isn't it true that, if cases are ready late, they may be geared to the judge's habitual late-shows?

And, the biggest problem, of course, is Judge Rachel Bell's attitude.

She accuses other people for addressing her misconduct in a court decision.

Which means - she thinks she is in the right, will continue to disregard the law and put her private affairs ahead of her job duties, and, there is a likelihood of retaliation against litigants and attorneys who raised issues of her misconduct.

And that is a very big problem.

So, while Judge Fishburn would not report Judge Bell because he "would not report a colleague", he also puts his personal interactions with the colleague as a priority over his duty to the people who elected him.

And that is an unfitness issue for Judge Fishburn, too.

A reprimand only to the "crying judge" - so, retaliation by the judge is to be expected

In April of this year I wrote about a "crying judge" out of New Jersey - a judge who subjected litigants and attorneys to sexual and insulting remarks in the courtroom - until they could not tolerate that any more (and usually, attorneys are very scared of judges and do not report judicial misconduct, so, in order to have it reported, remarks had to be really bad).

It was reported that the judge was disciplined - but only with a reprimand.

Because, I guess, he cried at his hearing.

And the disciplinary commission sympathized with him.

So, he can remain on the bench and to the same to other people - because such an attitude in a very adult male will not be eradicated or deterred by a reprimand.

Litigants and attorneys appearing in front of New Jersey judge Joseph Portelli - prepare for more abuse.

And for retaliation for turning him in and for his "crying" embarrassment and humiliation.

I will monitor Judge Portelli's further conduct through the press, public documents, social media and feedback from my readers and will report it on this blog.

Stay tuned.

Go drink coffee at a CLE for 3 hours a year - the punishment for misconduct of U.S. Attorney's office

If a civil rights attorney sues a government official, there is an increasing chance that:

(1) the case will be dismissed on judge-invented (and thus illegal under Article III) doctrine or rule;
(2) sanctions and attorney fees - thousands of dollars - will be imposed upon the civil rights attorney.

Thousands of dollars in sanctions.

Thousands of dollars in attorney fees.

And that is - simply because in pleadings, presumed to be true before discovery started, an attorney raised constitutional arguments.

Lying to court is a crime.

Attorneys get disbarred for that.

But, if attorneys who are lying to court are working for the federal government, 

• they are not sanctioned with monetary sanctions;
• they are not ordered to pay attorney fees of the opposing party;
• they are not disbarred

They are told to have 3 hours of ethical training a year.

If you are an attorney working for the government - go drink coffee (or whatever you can smuggle in their to sit and sip) at a free CLE course, free for you as a governmental employee.  

And laugh in the face of taxpayers funding your galore.

On Copper vs Silver Justice and (Corporate Wives) PlayBoy Bunny Judges - the justice for sale galore

Two heads of New York State Legislature, Sheldon Silver (Assembly Speaker) and Dean Skelos (Majority Leader of the Senate) were convicted of corruption charges.

On May 3, 2016, Sheldon Silver was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

On May 12, 2016, Dean Skelos was sentenced to 5 years in prison.

Yet, in both of their cases, judge Valerie Caproni (for Silver) and Judge Kimba Wood (for Skelos) unanimously allowed these two public officials convicted of corruption, whose corruption was proven to juries through testimony and documentary evidence, to remain free pending resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court of a case pertaining - coincidentally - to government corruption.

Here is the procedural history of the U.S. Supreme Court case that these two federal judges used to give a summer break from prison to convicted felons Silver and Skelos.

Such unanimity, from two different federal judges - to keep three convicted felons (Silver, Skelos-father and Skelos-son) - out of prison, defying the jury verdict, defying the statutorily enacted power of the people of this country to criminally prosecute corruption in the government.

Here is judge Valerie Caproni, former wunderkid, former General Counsel for the FBI, former Chief of Special Prosecutions and Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in the U.S. Attorney General's Office,  former "white-collar" criminal defense attorney.   Jane of all trades, who already has a history of using her knowledge acquired in a taxpayer-paid job for personal gain.

Let's see how her career will develop after the seminal decision to keep convicted corrupt public officials free until a corrupt court will decide the issue whether corruption is corruption or just "business as usual" for politicians:

Here is Judge Kimba Wood.  The country should know the faces of its anti-heroes.

Judge Kimba Wood, by the way, is married, by her 3rd marriage, to a Wall Street millionaire financier Frank Richardson III, where Richardson's diaries about his affair with Wood was an explosive part of his divorce action.  Frank Richardson is reportedly Judge Wood's law school classmate.

Judge Wood was reportedly in training as a PlayBoy Bunny in London, which did not prevent her from becoming a lawyer or a federal judge.

Quite a colorful past, and marriage to a rich corporate investor did not prevent Judge Kimba Wood from (1) presiding over a case which can benefit her husband; or (2) throwing herself into the public spotlight by her decision to let convicted corrupt politicians roam free.

It is definite in my mind that Judge Wood should be investigated as to whether her husband Frank Richardson ever engaged in lobbying activities or large campaign contributions to politicians, because then it is an irreconcilable and disqualifying conflict of interest for Judge Wood to preside over the case.

The U.S. Supreme Court is expected, within 2 months, to hand down a decision in the case of corruption of Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell in order to rule "what constitutes corruption as opposed to everyday government action for a benefactor".

Now, WHAT is a "government action for a benefactor" OTHER than corruption?

Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court (1) took the case of Bob McDonnell (in their discretion, remember, while tossing certioraris of Copper Joes left and right, without an explanation) and (2) expressed "concerns" - about this:

"Justices on both sides of the ideological divide expressed concern about federal corruption laws that could criminalize what they variously called “routine” or “everyday” actions that politicians perform for campaign contributors or supporters who have provided them with gifts."

Idiot-logical divide, rather.

First of all, judges CANNOT be "ideological".  If they are admittedly so, they should not be on the bench.

And, is there an issue at all in a reasonable person's mind that politicians' "actions" for "campaign contributors" and "supporters who have provided them with gifts", IS corruption?

Here, a couple of governing legal principles that must spring into action in the McDonnell case:

1) The restriction of the U.S. Constitution, Article III on jurisdiction of federal courts - such courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, may not legislate, only the U.S. Congress has such a right, under Article I of the U.S. Constitution;  thus, the U.S. Supreme Court may not change a federal statute by interpretation;

2) the rule of statutory interpretation - a court does not get to interpret a clear and unambiguous rule;  and, there is no ambiguity in the federal statute as to the "quid pro quo" - what the court expressed "concerns" about cannot be read by any reasonable reader OTHER than corruption.

Another interesting issue here is the exercise of discretion by the U.S. Supreme Court and the timing of such exercise.

Isn't it interesting issue here is - out of all constitutional issues tossed by the U.S. Supreme Court in their "absolute discretion", THIS is the most important issue for the country that the top court must consider - the distinction between "corruption" and "everyday government action for a benefactor"?

And shouldn't the FBI and the U.S. Congress start an impeachment investigation of ALL the U.S. Supreme Court justices in connection with this "timely" exercise of discretion on this particular issue?

The extra-busy U.S. Supreme Court, the court that regularly tosses petitions for a writ of certiorari by pro se litigants and attorneys suffering judicial retaliation for making motions to recuse and for fighting for their clients, those Joe Copper petitions - why such court would suddenly, and "coincidentally" in time as to convictions in Silver and Skelos' cases - decide this particular issue at this particular time?

Is this a bad case of "Silver Justice" - even though the "hunting trip" judge Scalia is already 6 feet under?

Is the power of money, corrupt money, such that the U.S. Supreme Court would take the case of the Virginia Governor while tossing cases of suffering average American citizens - so that Dean Skelos and Sheldon Silver would not have to spend one day in prison, despite conviction and sentencing, and without an inconvenience and uncertainty to have to go through their own appellate process, just through another case, "coincidentally" "timely" decided right about the time when Silver and Skelos must go to prison?

Now, imagine that not a Sheldon Silver, but, let's say, a Joe Copper, was just sentenced.

And, Joe Copper asks the judge to delay his reporting to prison because the U.S. Supreme Court may rule on an issue important for Joe Copper in Joe Copper's criminal proceeding.

Do you have a slightest doubt that Joe Copper will be awaiting the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in prison.

I actually have no doubt that the U.S. Supreme Court would not even undertake a review of an issue beneficial for Joe Copper at the time of Joe Copper's conviction and sentencing.

But, that's, ladies and gentlemen, is Copper justice - reserved to us, mere mortals.

As to what will be the outcome of the Silver justice - the "coincidental" decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that Silver and Skelos are waiting for while roaming free despite their conviction and sentencing - I will cover the story further, so stay tuned.

But, let me tell you this - in a country where a top court has lost its moral compass to the point of considering, in its "discretion"  no less, a distinction between "corruption" and "everyday government action for a benefactor", we are doomed unless we fire that court and institute governmental reform from top to bottom, through constitutional amendments if necessary.

"Once you cut off the head of a snake, the rest of the body dies" - a federal lawsuit reveals how a New York criminal defense attorney subjected to wiretapping, searches, and criminal investigation in retaliation for doing his job

Here is a federal lawsuit filed on May 13, 2016 (this past week) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Reads like a crime novel, but, unfortunately, it is not a novel.
It was the gruesome reality for an independent criminal defense attorney out of Westchester County.

Attorney George Galgano filed a federal civil rights lawsuit

 against:

• County of Putnam, New York;
• Putnam District Attorney's Office;
• Town of Carmel, New York;
• Town of Carmel Police Department;
• Adam Levy - former District Attorney of Putnam County (voted out of office in 2015, but still lists himself on attorney registration website as Putnam County DA, in violation of attorney registration rules requiring him to re-register 30 days after leaving employment with new information); Adam Levy is coincidentally, the son of TV "Judge Judy" - and thus considers himself not subject to attorney rules;
• Andres Gil - Assistant District Attorney of Putnam County, still employed there;
• Heather Abissi - Assistant District Attorney of Putnam County, no longer employed in Putnam County DA's office, now employed in a civil rights law firm Sussman & Watkins at Goshen, New York;  Defendant Heather Abissi's new employer has on its front page these attorney advertisements, on behalf of the law firm and on behalf of each attorney employed by the law firm, including Heather Abissi, now sued for gross civil rights violations:

• Lourdes Gonzalez - investigator in Putnam County District Attorney's office;
• Henry Lopez - senior investigator in Putnam County District Attorney's office;
• Michael T. Nagle - Detective Sergeant in Town of Carmel (NY) Police Department.

Here is the registration information of the Plaintiff, criminal defense attorney George Galgano, showing his admission to the bar in 2000, so he has now 16 years of experience.

The lawsuit mentions that prosecutors Gil and Levy were sanctioned by Putnam County judge for destruction or spoliation of evidence in a criminal case that the former Putnam County DA Adam Levy, according to the lawsuit, fabricated against a supporter of Adam Levy's political opponent.

Yet, despite such sanctions, there is "no record of public discipline" in their attorney registration anyway:

compare

with

The complaint lists the following misconduct of defendants:

• fabricating a criminal case against the DA's political opponent Mr. Zaimi;
• spoiling or destroying evidence in the Zaimi criminal case where Mr. Galgano represented Mr. Zaimi as a criminal defense attorney;
• knowingly obtaining false testimony from a witness;
• knowing not releasing to Mr. Galgano "Brady" material, statements of that witness that the sexual crime charged was not committed by Mr. Zaimi and that the witness received money in return for consensual sex;
• obtaining a court order and installing a "pen register" (wiretapping device) to record conversations between the defense witness of that opponent and the defense attorney (Mr. Galgano), based on a false affidavit claiming that Mr. Galgano is about to bribe a witness;
• obtaining a court order and installing a device locating the defense attorney Mr. Galgano's cell phone;
• obtaining a court order for a wiretapping order on Mr. Galgano's phone based on a false affidavit, which resulted in intercepting of private and privileged communications of Mr. Galgano with clients, other attorneys, doctors and family members;

• obtaining an incriminating statement against Mr. Galgano after hours of interrogation of a person completely disabled by ingesting 4 bags of heroin;

• repeatedly trying to obtain false statements against Mr. Galgano, including by a trick when a police detective claimed that somebody else already acknowledged that Mr. Galgano committed a crime, offering an "easy confession";

• destroying exculpatory evidence in the McQuaid case on a cell phone the same way evidence was destroyed in the Ziami case - for which prosecutors were already sanctioned by the court:

• trying to embed false memories into a drugged witness's head and extract a false incriminating statement against Mr. Galgano based on those false embedded memories:

• applying, based on a false affidavit, for a search warrant of Mr. Galgano's car, home and law office:

• synchronized search raids of the defense attorney's home and law office based on unlawfully obtained search warrants:

• obtaining privileged files from Mr. Galgano's law office:

• searching the defense attorney's home and seizing internal security surveillance of rooms where the attorney slept with his wife and of rooms where their young daughters dressed and undressed, intimidating and traumatizing the attorney's children;

• subjecting Mr. Galgano's employees to warrantless arrests, with claims that they will not be released unless they "consent" to submit to warrantless searches of their person;
• attempting to coerce Mr. Galgano's employees to incriminate Mr. Galgano by intimidation:

All unlawful activities against Mr. Galgano were summed up by DA's Investigator himself:  "once you cut off the head of a snake, the rest of the body dies"

• subjecting Mr. Galgano to a warrantless search of his person;

Mr. Galgano alleges in his lawsuit that no incriminating evidence was - or could be - unearthed against Mr. Galgano, but searches worked as planned, hurting him financially and as a professional.

• arresting and prosecuting Mr. Galgano and his employee attorney Eric Sharp on "constructive possession" of drugs charges which were dropped a year later because the prosecuting Westchester DA's office (current New York Chief Judge Janet DiFiore) admitted that there is no probable cause

The question is - why it took DA DiFiore a year to dismiss fabricated charges against two criminal defense attorneys?

Moreover, even though the "Galgano" criminal case was prosecuted in Westchester County and by the Westchester County DA (DiFiore), somehow Adam Levy, prosecutor from Putnam County, controlled the prosecution and claimed that Galgano is his "trophy":

Adam Levy also sought indictment,  based on false evidence, of attorney Galgano in front of Putnam County grand jury (even though his office was located in Westchester County).

It appears from the complaint that Westchester DA DiFiore was notified by Mr. Garland of criminal activities of prosecutors, police officers and Putnam DA office investigator in Westchester County - but never prosecuted them.

Otherwise, she would not have been elevated as the Chief Judge of the State of New York, right?

In August of 2014, Galgano and the second-chair attorney in Zaimi trial Eric Sharp were indicted and publicly humiliated with huge TV coverage arranged by Levy, and Levy immediately moved to disqualify them from the Zaimi trial:

The lawsuit alleges that in order to set up high bail on Mr. Galgano or keep him in jail, Putnam County ADA Gil made a false statement that Mr. Galgano threatened to kill a prosecutor:

Six months after the indictment was brought, the Putnam County Court dismissed the indictment against both Mr. Galgano and Eric Sharp citing insufficient evidence to support charges and prosecutorial error and misconduct.

Apparently, attorney Eric Sharp was subjected to the ordeal of criminal prosecution because he did not want to commit perjury falsely incriminating Mr. Galgano.

The court clearly stated that it was improper for police witnesses to mischaracterize Mr. Galgano's lawful actions as motivated by criminal intent.

Notwithstanding all police and prosecutorial misconduct in the case, the dismissing judge David Zuckerman did two astonishing things:

• allowed the same prosecutors who committed misconduct to re-submit the case against Mr. Galgano to another grand jury, and
• lifted the injunction from continued searches against Mr. Galgano's computers, officers etc.

After the dismissal based on prosecutorial misconduct, Putnam County DA, amazingly, threatened to file disciplinary charges against Mr. Galgano:

But, Levy did one mistake in the case, which cost him.

He mistakenly appointed an honest prosecutor, Chief ADA Ortolano, to handle additional investigation of Mr. Galgano, claiming that Levy trusts Ortolano implicitly to do the right thing.

She did, but not the "right thing" Levy apparently contemplated:

Instead, as the complaint claims, Lisa Ortolano left the DA's office (her current attorney registration indicates that she is still working there).

Mr. Galgano was indicted by Mr. Levy again (I will dedicate a separate blog to circumstances surrounding the 2nd indictment), and the indictment was dismissed.

And, Mr. Galgano is suing prosecutors, investigators and police.

I can foresee claims of prosecutorial absolute immunity and of "qualified immunity" by police officers being made.

Yet, fabricating evidence during investigation does not come within prosecutorial immunity and making false statements to the press certainly does not come within immunity either.

Moreover, recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, surprisingly, cut out an exception from prosecutorial immunity in cases where prosecutors fabricate evidence in preparation for presentation to the grand jury, and Mr. Galgano can definitely rely upon that direct precedent fighting any claims of prosecutorial immunity by Adam Levy and other defendants-prosecutors in this case.

I will run a separate blog as to the 2nd indictment against Mr. Galgano and the 2nd dismissal, and I will certainly run an additional blog with analysis of misconduct of Mr. Levy and other public officials involved.

I will also monitor how this case proceeds and will report it on this blog.

Stay tuned.