In Omaha, Nebraska, pillow-talk case-fixing between Chief Judge Marcela Keim and the local City Prosecutor Matt Kuhse is going to be business as usual

I wrote yesterday about a case where a federal judge refused to recuse from a criminal case where the defendant claimed he used heroin for 14 months with the judge's brother in the presence of the judge's minor nephew, and where the defendant was supposed to testify in an unrelated criminal trial involving the judge's nephew.

The judge simply claimed that he is "estranged" from  his brother, did not see the nephew for a long time - and for that reason he is not biased.  While the judge, of course, kept the defendant in question in pre-trial detention after the defendant asked the judge to recuse himself, lifted the stay he initially imposed on the proceedings while a writ of mandamus to remove him involuntarily was pending in the appellate court, when the defendant asked for as much as a bond hearing (to get out of the pre-trial detention) - and the judge, in the absence of a prohibition from the appellate court, scheduled a trial date, forcing the defendant to file a motion to speed up the prohibition.

The judge, John Adams, was  involuntarily removed from the case by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit on May 9, 2016.

What does that story have to do with what is happening in Omaha, Nebraska?

Well...

Let's see.

The mayor of Omaha, Nebraska, "chose" to appoint a City Prosecutor - a man whose office is supposed to bring criminal cases in front of the local County Judge.

The trick is that the chosen City Prosecutor is "coincidentally" the husband of the County Judge in question, which presents a conundrum - either the judge should recuse and all local criminal cases should be referred to another judge, or a special prosecutor must be appointed for all local criminal cases.  In both situations, there will be additional (huge, and unnecessary) expenses for taxpayers.

So, what were the reasons Mayor Jean Stothert and City Attorney Paul Kratz who "selected" attorney Matt Kuhse to be the City Prosecutor prosecuting cases in front of Matt Kuhse's wife, Douglas County Judge Marcela Keim (a different last name, you see) despite the obvious, and irreconcilable, conflict of interest?

And why would the husband Matt Kuhse accept a position for his office to prosecute cases before his own wife/judge Marcela Keim?  Which will obviously involve at least an appearance and a possibility of a peculiar type of ex parte communications in every case his office will handle in front of the judge - pillow-talk?

And, by the way, Judge Keim is reportedly one of 12 Douglas County judges - and, "coincidentally", the presiding judge of the 4th Judicial District of Nebraska?

Of course, where Matt Kuhse works now is also a conflict of interest with his wife's job - he works for the Douglas County Attorney's Office, while his wife is the Chief Judge of the 4th Judicial District overseeing the Douglas County Court - so, at least theoretically, Douglas County may not be prosecuted for any crimes because of the relationship.

And, the Douglas County attorney Don Kleine already reportedly noted that "Kuhse oversees other lawyers in the County Attorney’s Office, and there are no restrictions on those lawyers appearing in Keim’s courtroom", and that

“[t]hey’re both extremely, highly ethical people who I know will do nothing to jeopardize anyone’s fairness on any side.”

By the way, Matt Kuhse worked in this capacity, as a Douglas County prosecutor, since 1999:

And Keim is on the bench since 2011:

Keim is the presiding judge of the 4th Judicial District, not just the County Court, since 2016, and, "coincidentally", in the same year Keim is elevated to the position of Chief Judge of the 4th Judicial District, her husband is being promoted to the position of City Prosecutor where his salary nearly TRIPLES, see the current salary of the City's "interim prosecutor" Thomas Mumgaard:

And, of course, such a promotion of the Chief Judge's husband has nothing to do with the wife's position as a Chief Judge.

Because everyone involved in making the appointment, accepting the appointment and then presiding over and "supervising" cases handled by the husband and wife team, are all very highly ethical people.

One highly ethically person oversees attorneys under his supervision who appear in cases presided over by the other highly ethically person, his wife-judge - which is ALREADY a basis to REMOVE the judge, FIRE the husband and VACATE all cases so decided, for violation of due process and APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY reasons.

By the way, what Kuhse already supervised as an attorney in Douglas County was FELONY cases prosecuted in front of his wife - so both Kuhse and Keim should be already impeached and disbarred for that, and convictions so drummed up reversed.

Relationship through 1st degree affinity (marriage) between a prosecutor and a judge is a complete disqualification and a taboo, whether the actual prosecutor appears in the courtroom himself, or supervises the case remotely.

Talking about wrongful convictions!

The wife, of course, same as Judge John Adams in Ohio federal court, does not recuse - because her husband is "removed" from the case by "only" supervising those attorney who appear in front of his wife/judge, and not personally appearing in front of her.

And, in view of sanctions that the judge can impose upon attorneys for opponents who obviously can lose their livelihoods if they move to recuse (I was suspended in New York in November of 2015 for making motions to recuse a judge, attorney Christine Mire was suspended for making motions to recuse in Louisiana in 2016, the list of such attorneys is actually very long), attorneys for opponents prefer to sell out their clients not to jeopardize their own livelihoods.

And, since these appearances of husband-supervised attorneys in front of wife-judge continued, as I understand, for quite some time, the local governmental officials decided to secure their position even more, protecting themselves from possible prosecution, and to promote one of their own, a supervising attorney from the Douglas County Attorney's office, to the position of the City Prosecutor, a person who has an absolute discretion to bring or not to bring criminal prosecutions in the City.

And, the people involved in such an appointment, which clearly qualifies as a "criminal enterprise" under RICO, claim that there is no conflict of interest still, because the husband and the wife are both "highly ethical people", and "they would never".

So, the wife, as a Chief Judge, will supervise appointments of judges to criminal cases, or preside over such cases herself.

The husband will (1) decide which criminal cases to bring or not to bring - obviously sparing the local officials who were his prior bosses or colleagues - and (2) will supervise attorneys in his City Prosecutor's office to appear before either his wife as a judge, or in front of judges assigned to cases by his wife.

Beautiful.

And now, every single criminal defense attorney in the City of Omaha, Nebraska will be facing a dilemma whether to make a motion to recuse the entire court and disqualify the prosecutor, or sell the attorney's client and allow the appearance of case-fixing, to preserve the attorney's livelihood.

Lovely.

All of those highly ethical people in Omaha, Nebraska.

And - the attorney disciplinary committee in the State of Nebraska, reportedly supported the appointment of husband to supervise criminal cases in front of wife:

"[Nebraska counsel for discipline Mark Weber] said in an interview that this type of situation has come up in other states, and courts have 'resoundingly' said that a judge’s spouse can’t practice in that courtroom but that colleagues of the spouse can.


'We give people, especially our sworn judges and our attorneys, the benefit that they’ll be objective and remain objective,' Weber said."

Well, here the Nebraska "counsel for discipline" stretched the truth a little bit - Matt Kuhse is not a "colleague" of attorneys who are appearing and will appear in front of Judge Marcela Keim.  

Matt Kuhse is their BOSS, who has an obligation to DIRECT them, and where all prosecutions are done in his name, under his authority and with his signature.

The Nebraska disciplinary counsel and the state courts apparently "resoundingly" overlook this inconvenient detail.


As the situation stands now, we and, most importantly, defense attorneys defending cases against the City Prosecutor/husband sending attorneys he supervises to prosecute cases in front of his own wife, can be assured that, should a motion to recuse be brought in such a situation, the disciplinary committee will go after the defense attorneys and not after the prosecutor and the judge.

And, if you remember, attorney licensing and attorney discipline exists because it is declared by the government attorney licensing protects consumers of legal services.

THIS is how consumers of legal services in Nebraska are "protected".

In my view - as an expert in criminal defense - all criminal convictions already obtained under Matt Kuhse's supervision, and all criminal convictions that are going to be obtained under his supervision in  his capacity as a City Prosecutor, will be void because of the relationship.

The taxpayers of the State of Nebraska, as well as criminal defendants are interested in finality and fairness of the criminal convictions in their state.

Surely there are enough attorneys in the City of Omaha, Nebraska, to fill the position of the City Prosecutor other than the husband of the Douglas County's Chief Judge.

And, it doesn't help that Judge Keim has been an Assistant City Prosecutor in the same office where her husband was now appointed, from 2004 to 2011, when she came to the bench.

Here is the husband Matt Kuhse who obviously uses his familial connection to a high-ranking judge to get a promotion and salary increase:

Not to mention that Judge Keim will FINANCIALLY BENEFIT from that particular salary increase, and is FINANCIALLY INTERESTED in her husband getting that position and keeping that position, so Judge Keim has a financial interest in drumming up convictions for her husband's office.

Judge Keim already had financial interest in the outcome of every criminal conviction prosecuted by her husband's office, from 2011, when she came to the bench, to date, for 5 years so far.

In the city where gang violence and racial tension are still very much a problem, citizens must be assured that people locked up are the criminals, and not innocents framed by a case-fixing husband-and-wife team of Matt Kuhse (in his capacity as the Douglas County assistant attorney - and now City Prosecutor) and Marcela Keim (presiding judge or Chief Judge of the entire 4th Judicial District).

I request my readers from Nebraska to watch the conviction rate in the City of Omaha and whether it is higher than in the neighboring cities and/or counties since 2011, the enthronement of the wife of a local prosecutor to the bench.

I will report how this disgusting and shameless story about misconduct of the "highly ethical people" unfolds.

Stay tuned.

A conceptually new challenge against occupational licensing and discipline by organized bars was launched in Florida

Occupational licensing, as was recognized by President Obama, is stifling the U.S. economy, where over 1/3 of work force in the United States is licensed or certified, thus blocking entries into those professional markets and preventing labor mobility and provision of competitive services.

Attorney regulation is part of occupational licensing.

I have posted many articles on this blog showing that attorney licensing does not protect consumers, does not guarantee good levels of education, training or integrity of members of the bar, monopolists in court representation, and does not ensure protection of people's constitutional rights.

In fact, dependence of court representatives upon the government that those court representatives may have to challenge to protect their clients' constitutional rights, guarantees the opposite, that attorneys will sell out, with few exceptions, their clients' interests in the name of self-preservation.

Therefore, I view any efforts to undo the monopoly of the entrenched legal profession from its monopolistic position that hurts the economy and hurts people's access to justice in this country, is a good thing.

I was recently alerted to a conceptually new challenge on attorney regulation, made in Florida.

Florida, as the majority of jurisdictions in the United States has what is called an "organized bar".

That means that the local state bar association, a labor organization, usually a non-profit, comprised to protect interests of its members, is also "vested" by the state government with state power to regulate occupational licensing among its members.

Well, that is exactly what was the basis of the challenge.

In a motion filed on May 12, 2016, an attorney in Florida asserted that Florida Bar is a Labor Organization under a federal statute, National Labor Relations Act (NRLA), 29 U.S.C. 152(5).

The argument then goes that the Florida bar does deal with employers regarding conditions of work of its members - thus discharging its functions as a labor organization under 29 U.S.C. 152(5).

If the Florida Bar is a labor organization under NRLA, the argument then goes, the NRLA prohibits labor organizations to "threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, whether in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring any person to cease doing business with any other person".

But, the argument goes, suspension or revocation of a law license is specifically "forcing or requiring any person to cease doing business (law business - T.N.) with any other person".

The lawyer next raises the issue of federal pre-emption of inconsistent state law:

Since, as the lawyer argues, National Labor Relations Act pre-empts inconsistent state law, specifically, regulation of attorneys by a labor organization, Florida State Bar, when Florida State Bar attempts to disbar the attorney, it violates NLRA:

And, since there is a pre-emption of actions of the Florida Bar through NRLA, the disciplinary court has no subject matter jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings, and the case should be dismissed.

The challenge, which appears to be logical and sound, presents a complete bar to jurisdictions of state courts in attorney disciplinary proceedings, and in all other proceedings regarding revocation of occupational licenses where the petitioner is the labor organization that is allowed by the state to act as the regulator of that particular market.

Thus, nearly at the same time, in two states, Tennessee and Florida, there emerged two new ways to attack validity of occupational licensing - 

• through a State Constitution prohibiting monopolies without exceptions, which precludes a state legislature from enacting laws legalizing such monopolies, even if the states are allowed to do so by federal law (Tennessee, the Tennessee State Constitution, Article I Section 22) and through 

• the federal National Labor Relations Act, and a federal pre-emption doctrine in the 32 states with "organized bars" (bar associations allowed to act as regulators of its own profession):

1. Alabama, 
2. Alaska, 
3. Arizona, 
4. California, 
5. Florida, 
6. Georgia, 
7. Hawaii, 
8. Idaho, 
9. Kentucky, 
10. Louisiana, 
11. Maine, 
12. Michigan, 
13. Mississippi, 
14. Missouri, 
15. Montana, 
16. Nebraska, 
17. Nevada, 
18. New Hampshire, 
19. New Mexico, 
20. North Dakota, 
21. Oklahoma, 
22. Oregon, 
23. Rhode Island, 
24. South Carolina, 
25. South Dakota, 
26. Texas, 
27. Utah, 
28. Virginia, 
29. Washington State, 
30. West Virginia, 
31. Wisconsin, and 
32. Wyoming.

Since jurisdictions that do not have organized bars, usually have reciprocity agreements with jurisdictions that do have organized bars, the innovative challenge currently brought in Florida may affect all attorneys practicing law in the United States.

I will follow the progress of both the Tennessee lawsuit and the motion to dismiss in Florida and will report about it on this blog.

Stay tuned.

A solution of how to undo the Gordian knot of occupational licensing has been offered in Tennessee

A major breakthrough in civil rights and, believe it or not, in rendering boost and help to the U.S. sagging economy, as well as in attorney regulation, may have come from Tennessee.  

In Tennessee, an unusual lawsuit regarding monopoly in occupational licensing was filed several days ago.

The issue in the lawsuit is state monopoly in occupational licensing on the right to shampoo people's hair for pay.

The State of Tennessee requires a license and 300 hours of training in "theory and practice of shampooing" in a government-approved school.

Naturally, people who add to their income through shampooing other people's hair, do not have money to undergo this rigorous "training".

Of course, a child can shampoo her own, and her siblings' hair quite expertly without any license or training.

But, here the quirk is, and that is what the lawsuit alleges - that the Tennessee State Constitution, Article I Section 22, prohibits existence of monopolies, and protects its citizens from monopolies.

If that is true, occupational licensing, including attorney licensing, is unconstitutional in Tennessee under the State Constitution - which every judge is sworn to uphold.

Yet, every judge in the State of Tennessee is a licensed attorney and PART, the judiciary is the REGULATOR of the monopoly, and thus the PROMOTER of the monopoly, which, under the Tennessee Constitution, is a violation of Tennessee judges' constitutional oaths of office.

Since occupational licensing is stifling this country's economy by stifling mobility of this country's work force upwards (from low income to higher income) and across state borders (where state and even municipality-restricted licensing raise prices and prevent competition), and even President Obama recognized it recently in a report issued in the summer of 2015, the Tennessee "shampooing lawsuit" may prove as a major breakthrough.

But, don't expect help from the feds in this situation.

The recent decision in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v FTC stripping disciplinary boards consisting of market players of antitrust immunity, proved so far to be a toothless tiger and gave states a hint how to perpetuate the monopoly in occupational licensing that is stifling the U.S. economy (over 1/3 of the U.S. labor market is licensed, according to North Carolina Dental and the Obama Report of 2015).

Immediately after the North Carolina Board came out, there were articles hopeful that the North Carolina Board will actually help the situation and strip the bar of the monopoly in court representation.

I was part of those who held those hopes, and I still do think that the North Carolina Board case can be used to undermine the bar monopoly somewhat - but not completely, because, even if they were stripped of antitrust immunity, they will be asserting other immunities, sovereign immunity, quasi-judicial and prosecutorial immunities, and still win, despite engaging in anti-competitive activities.

The North Carolina Board is actually a dangerous precedent for freeing the U.S. labor market from the stifling grip of occupational licensing, as it created an alternative for the states as to how to comply with federal antitrust laws:

either 

1) active state supervision by a neutral body over market players overpowering the disciplinary boards - and thus acting in their anti-competitive interests rather than the interests of the consumers;

or

2) create statutes on state level that legitimize the monopoly as it is.

No state supervision was provided so far in any states for occupational licensing, but state legislatures are getting together to invent means of legalizing the monopolies.

For example, I was recently alerted by a reader to a presentation created by the National Conference of State Legislatures, discussing North Carolina Board in detail, and what the legislatures "can do about it".

The Tennessee lawsuit points out at the way of making the loophole of North Carolina Board unavailable to states who enhance their citizen's protection through a state referendum amending their state Constitutions - if protection from monopolies are not yet in those state Constitutions, as it obviously is in the Tennessee Constitution, Article I, Section 22.

So, for the entire time that the Tennessee state government regulated professions - as well as the legal profession, as a monopolist, it did it in violation of State Constitution.

Meaning that all state regulations and criminal statutes for unauthorized practice of - from shampooing to braiding to law - are unconstitutional under the State Constitution.

People and attorneys of the State of Tennessee, rejoice, you have a protection against the grip of occupational licensing in your own State Constitution, and whatever the court says, it cannot change that Constitution.

As to people whose State Constitutions do not have a prohibition on monopolies yet - that's the work in progress, we need to hold state referendums and amend state Constitutions to include such a prohibition.

If monopolies - any monopolies, including state-established monopolies - are all extinguished, the country's economy will benefit, we all will benefit.

To consumers of legal services: when you are told by the government that you must choose your court representative from licensed professionals because they are better trained, you may be duped. The list of law professors working for a bar-prep monopolist.

Yesterday, I wrote about a class action against the bar-prep course BarBri, owned by West Publications Corp.

The federal lawsuit (the complaint is included in full here), as it was in the previous blog, contained allegations as to how BarBri uses law school professors to promote its monopoly:

I obtained names of professors who teach for BarBri from BarBri's own online advertisements, and then grouped them by states and by schools.

Here are the lists.

From BarBri advertisements of faculty, here and here, I counted 

• 54 professors from 
• 18 jurisdictions and 
• 38 law schools:

The 18 jurisdictions where BarBri hired law professors for its bar-prep courses (let's note that BarBri did not hire professors evenly from all 50 states):

1. California
2. Connecticut
3. Delaware
4. Florida
5. Georgia
6. Illinois
7. Maryland
8. Massachusets 
9. Minnesota
10. New  York
11. New Jersey
12. North Carolina
13. Ohio
14. Pennsylvania
15. Texas
16. Virginia
17. Washington
18. Washington, D.C.

The 38 law schools, with states and numbers of professors from that school involved in teaching for BarBri:

Loyola Law School	California	2
University of Califronia, Irvine School of Law	California	1
Pepperdine University School of Law	California	1
University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall)	California	1
University of Southern California Law School	California	1
University of Connecticut Law School	Connecticut	1
Yale Law School	Connecticut	1
Widener University School of Law	Delaware	1
Florida International Univeristy College of Law	Florida	1
University of Miami School of Law	Florida	1
Emory School of Law	Georgia	4
Northwestern University School of Law	Illinois	1
University of Illinois College of Law	Illinois	1
University of Baltimore School of Law	Maryland	1
Boston University School of Law	Massachussetts	1
Harvard Law School	Massachussetts	1
Seton Hall University School of Law	New Jersey	2
Brooklyn Law School	New York	1
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University	New York	1
Columbia Law School	New York	2
Cornell Law School	New York	1
Fordham School of Law	New York	2
University of North Carolina School of Law	North Carolina	1
Duke University School of Law	North Carolina	2
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law	Ohio	2
University of Pennsylvania School of Law	Pennsylvania	1
University of Texas School of Law	Texas	1
University of Houston Law Center	Texas	2
SMU Dedman School of Law	Texas	1
South Texas College of Law	Texas	1
University of Texas School of Law	Texas	1
George Mason School of Law	Virginia	1
Univeristy of Richmond School of Law	Virginia	1
Seattle University School of Law	Washington	1
University of Washington School of Law	Washington	1
University of Washington School of Law	Washington	1
Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law	Washington, D.C.	1
George Washington University School of Law	Washington, D.C.	3

The list of 54 professors teaching for BarBri, as advertised by BarBri today:

Brian, Robert	Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Loyola Law School	California
Chemerinsky, Erwin	Dean, University of California, Irvine School of Law	California
Levenson, Laurie	Loyola School of Law	California
Pushaw, Robert	Pepperdine University School of Law	California
Talley, Eric	University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall)	California
Altman, Scott	University of Southern California Law School	California
Lahav, Alexandra	University of Connecticut Law School	Connecticut
Harrison, Robert	Yale Law School	Connecticut
Scheuer, Luke	Widener University School of Law (DE)	Delaware
Carbot, Christopher	Associate Director of Recruitment Adjunct Professor of Legal Skills and Values, Florida International University College of Law	Florida
Stotzky, Irwin	University of Miami School of Law	Florida
Satz, Ani	Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law	Georgia
Andieh, Robert	Emory School of Law	Georgia
Freer, Richard D.	Emory School of Law	Georgia
Holbrook, Tim	Emory University School of Law	Georgia
Redish, Martin	Northwestern University School of Law	Illinois
Bilz, Kenworthey	University of Illinois College of Law	Illinois
Sloan, Amy	Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Univeristy of Baltimore School of Law	Maryland
Lawson, Gary	Boston University School of Law	Massachusetts
Goldberg, John	Harvard Law School	Massachusetts
Klass, Alexandra	University of Minnesota Law School	Minnesota
Sebok, Anthony	Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University	New  York
Ponsa, Christina	Columbia University School of Law	New  York
Cornwell, Kip	Seton Hall University School of Law	New Jersey
Franzese, Paula	Seton Hall University School of Law	New Jersey
Reiss, David	Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School	New York
Rossi, Faust	Cornell Law School	New York
Kraus, Jody	David E. Kaufman & Leopold C. Glass  Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University School of Law	New York
Neustadt, Frederick	Fordham School of Law	New York
Flaherty, Martin	Fordham University School of Law	New York
Arlen, Jennifer	Norma Z. Paige Professor of Law, New York University School of Law	New York
Kennedy, Joseph	Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law	North Carolina
Metzloff, Thomas	Duke University School of Law	North Carolina
Salzman, James	Samuel Fox Mordecai Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law	North Carolina
Cole, Sarah	Ohio State University Moritz College of Law	Ohio
Dressler, Joshua	Professor & Frank R.  Strong Chair in Law, Ohio State University Moritz College of Law	Ohio
Robinson, Paul	University of Pennsylvania School of Law	Pennsylvania
Williams, Sean	Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law	Texas
Tilton-McCarthy, Lisa	Associate Professor, University of Houston Law Center	Texas
Forrester, Julie	SMU Dedman School of Law	Texas
Ryan, Meghan	SMU Dedman School of Law	Texas
Rensberger, Jeffrey	South Texas College of Law	Texas
Moll, Douglas	University of Houston Law Center	Texas
Johanson, Stanley	University of Texas School of Law	Texas
Alvare, Helen	George Mason School of Law	Virginia
Epstein, Paul	Univeristy of Richmond School of Law	Virginia
Ramasastry, Anita	D. Wayne & Anne Gittinger Professor of Law Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law	Washington
Ahrens, Deborah	Seattle University School of Law	Washington
Said, Zahr	University of Washington School of Law	Washington
Scordato, Marin	Catholic University of America and Columbus School of Law	Washington, D.C.
Schooner, Heidi	Catholic University of America—Columbus School of Law	Washington, D.C.
Schaffner, Joan	George Washington University Law School	Washington, D.C.
Fairfax, Lisa	George Washington University Law School	Washington, D.C.
Schechter, Roger	George Washington University Law School	Washington, D.C.

These are some preliminary statistics.

I will post some more information about the professor, schools and conflicts of interests involved in law school professors of particular schools to teach at BarBri, and analysis of the statistics later on.

The lists above can be used by law students to verify whether their professors support monopolistic grasp of its employer BarBri in assignments of tasks at law school, as alleged in the federal complaint above.

It is obvious that law students, and law graduates, are entitled to see copies of contracts and earnings of professors from BarBri, to see which of the jobs, the law school faculty, or the BarBri faculty, is more lucrative.

It is especially important to see contracts of professors from both jobs if the law school is a state law school, and professors are state employees.

And, in view of information in the federal complaint that BarBri may be squashing competing scholarship, professors who work for BarBri may be participating in that squashing (of competitors' scholarship), to their own benefit.

BarBri boasts in its advertisements that the list of its "faculty" reads like "Who's Who".

Yet, in view of the class action, participation of professors in BarBri can demonstrate the opposite - that BarBri picks professors who are willing to bend to its ways.

Had I been in law school at this time, I would be really interested if what my professor is teaching me is the best available scholarship, or if the best available scholarship was squashed through BarBri methods, as part of the bargain between BarBri and participating professors.

After all, that's what BarBri was alleged to have done before, 

and by settling before trial, BarBri does not allow these issues to be tried and the truth revealed.

The issues are significant.

The federal lawsuit alleges that 

• law school professors and "student representatives" were "co-opted" to drive competitive and good courses out - like the Bar Secrets that was created by a lawyer and psychologist and produced a 16% higher bar passage rate than BarBri, 
• student government of law schools engaged in blocking advertisement of competitors;
• moles hired to discredit competitors;
• FBI agents hired to break into competitors' databases to obtain competitive materials.

Yes, those are allegations and, since the case settled, we will never know whether the allegations were true or not.

But, the allegations were there, were submitted under oath, and students have a right to ask whether what was alleged was really happening.

Here are some of the allegations - and I encourage my readers to read the entire complaint.

 And here are allegations about the Bar Secrets:

Law students, in my opinion, should be really worried whether 

• their law professors;
• student government and
• the law review student team

are selling them out because they are bought up by BarBri, into accepting a product that is costly, but not better, or maybe worse than the possible competition which was suppressed.

As a disclaimer - I personally did not take BarBri, I took a competitive course that was not mentioned in the lawsuit.  The course came on an iPod, allowed me to re-listen to the course as many times as I wanted, had superior books and materials with it, and cost about 3 times less than BarBri.  Since I am not posting this blog to advertise any bar-prep courses, I do not feel I need to disclose the name of the course I took.

Yet, I remember how my friends from law school were complaining that they are only hearing the lecture once, and that is not enough for thorough understanding, while I could re-listen any number of times, and my materials were very satisfactory and clear.

*   *   *

 Let's not lose the perspective here in all these details.

We are talking about training in the profession that gained monopoly for court representation in this country based specifically on claims of superior training of licensed professionals.

At this time, consumers of legal services are REQUIRED to accept help from the government by having to choose for their court representation - in civil, family, and criminal cases, including death penalty cases - from only government-approved individuals, while the government controls those individuals' livelihoods, and the government actually is on the other side of cases where the most significant loss of constitutional rights may occur.

The government imposes upon the public its "vetted" individuals by the fairy tale of the alleged superior training of those government-vetted individuals.

THIS is how the licensed professionals are trained, in the allegations of law students themselves (all plaintiffs in the class actions were law students and law graduates).

So, when we, as consumers of legal services, are told that we cannot choose a court representative of our choice because the government "helps" us by training an army of such professionals to "protect us" 

- while those same trainees are suing in court to get good training, alleging that the good training is blocked by a monopolist that is buying up their law professors, imposing false advertising, blocking superior training courses and individuals from the market, and employing various tricks worthy of a bad TV crime story 

- we have a problem here, a matter of public concern of constitutional dimensions, and the settlement, which does not reach the issues raised in the lawsuit, will certainly not resolve this problem.

The quality of training of court representative is a serious issue of public concern, and any efforts thwarting provision of the best possible training of those exclusive, monopolistic court representative, undermines our democracy and access to court and justice for every one of us.

Therefore, in the context of this blog article, my question is - are those "star" professors participating in the process of undermining our democracy by financially benefiting and condoning the actions of the monopolist in the training of this country's exclusive court representatives?

My personal opinion is - they are.  They are paid to promote the monopoly, and they do promote the monopoly, and the monopoly of BarBri hurts every one of us.

As I said above, I will provide more information about the professors teaching for BarBri, their potential conflicts of interests and some analysis of the above statistics, a little later.

Stay tuned.