THE EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY IN THE UNITED STATES:

"If the judges interpret the laws themselves, and suffer none else to interpret, they may easily make, of the laws, [a shredded] shipman's hose!" - King James I of England, around 1616.

“No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities of observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. Hundreds of those who are called on to vote never enter a court-house, or if they do, it is only at intervals as jurors, witnesses or parties. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system,” Justice Sharwood in Ex Parte Steinman and Hensel, 95 Pa 220, 238-39 (1880).

“This case illustrates to me the serious consequences to the Bar itself of not affording the full protections of the First Amendment to its applicants for admission. For this record shows that [the rejected attorney candidate] has many of the qualities that are needed in the American Bar. It shows not only that [the rejected attorney candidate] has followed a high moral, ethical and patriotic course in all of the activities of his life, but also that he combines these more common virtues with the uncommon virtue of courage to stand by his principles at any cost.

It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law. The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not constantly replenished with lawyers like these. To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox, time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrade it.” In Re Anastaplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E.2d 429 (1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), affirmed over strong dissent, 366 U.S. 82 (1961), Justice Black, Chief Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan, dissenting.

" I do not believe that the practice of law is a "privilege" which empowers Government to deny lawyers their constitutional rights. The mere fact that a lawyer has important responsibilities in society does not require or even permit the State to deprive him of those protections of freedom set out in the Bill of Rights for the precise purpose of insuring the independence of the individual against the Government and those acting for the Government”. Lathrop v Donohue, 367 US 820 (1961), Justice Black, dissenting.

"The legal profession must take great care not to emulate the many occupational groups that have managed to convert licensure from a sharp weapon of public defense into blunt instrument of self-enrichment". Walter Gellhorn, "The Abuse of Occupational Licensing", University of Chicago Law Review, Volume 44 Issue 1, September of 1976.

“Because the law requires that judges no matter how corrupt, who do not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction while performing a judicial act, are immune from suit, former Judge Ciavarella will escape liability for the vast majority of his conduct in this action. This is, to be sure, against the popular will, but it is the very oath which he is alleged to have so indecently, cavalierly, baselessly and willfully violated for personal gain that requires this Court to find him immune from suit”, District Judge A. Richard Caputo in H.T., et al, v. Ciavarella, Jr, et al, Case No. 3:09-cv-00286-ARC in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Document 336, page 18, November 20, 2009. This is about judges who were sentencing kids to juvenile detention for kickbacks.


Wednesday, May 4, 2016

Did Derek Bowie deliberately try to kill Kylie Smith?

I've read the affidavit of Kylie Smith submitted to the court where she says that she had confirmed rib fractures from when Derek Bowie slammed her on the floor, and that Derek Bowie THEN sat on her.




Derek Bowie, at his deposition, admitted under oath not only to sitting on Kylie Smith, after he brought her down (and broke her ribs, according to her affidavit), but also to shifting his weight upon her in order to overpower her better - broken ribs and all. 

When Derek Bowie sat on Kylie Smith, he must have both heard - by cries of pain - and felt (by sitting on fractured bones) that Kylie Smith's ribs were fractured.

Continuing to sit on Kylie Smith and shifting his position could very well cause Kylie Smith's death, if a sharp fractured piece of her rib would penetrate her heart or lungs.


Not to mention that such behavior is sadistic - and confirms that Derek Bowie should not be allowed to be anywhere near the police force, while he was quietly shifted from one police department to another and is now toiling, according to my information, in the police department of the Village of Deposit.

Here is the list of complications that can result from a rib fracture:




Yet, there is no indication, despite the requirements of Delaware County Sheriff's policy on use of force by its police officers, not revealed through responses to my many FOIL requests on the subject over many years, but submitted to the court, that Derek Bowie inquired about Kylie Smith's injuries or attempted to arrange for provision of medical help to Kylie Smith

Instead of organizing for medical help for Kylie Smith, Derek Bowie only attempted to aggravate Kylie Smith's injury, from what I see in the court documents so far submitted, and very likely tried to cause her death by shifting his weight upon her when her ribs were broken when he sank his karate-trained knees into the woman's spine.

She is "lucky" he only broke her ribs, not the spinal column.

Did Derek Bowie deliberately and intentionally mean to kill Kylie Smith by first fracturing her ribs and then sitting and shifting his weight on them?

Why nobody is investigating that incident as an attempted murder?

I will analyze the policy of the Delaware County Sheriff's Department on the use of force - and blatant disregard of that policy by the Sheriff's Department, Derek Bowie and his supervisors in both cases, of Kylie Smith and of Barbara O'Sullivan, in a separate blog.

Stay tuned.

And, people living or passing through Deposit area - be very afraid if this man approaches you, in or out of police uniform.

The picture below was voluntarily put on Facebook in public access by Derek Bowie and/or his mother.  Note that Derek Bowie also has a German shepherd which can be as dangerous as its master, or more.





He is a dangerous and violent sadist, and the local government "has his back 100%".

Filed a FOIL request with Delaware Opportunities, Inc.

I just filed a Freedom of Information request with Delaware Opportunities, Inc., a "community action" and "community development" "agency" of Delaware County, see my previous blog about why I consider Delaware Opportunities, Inc., a non-profit corporation, subject to Freedom of Information Law.

Here is the FOIL request:





I will publish any responses of Delaware Opportunities, Inc. to this FOIL request on the blog.

Stay tuned.

Who are 279 people employed in Delaware Opportunities Inc. and its "affiliates"?

After reading the audit of the Delaware County by the New York State Comptroller conducted in 2015 and showing that Delaware County funneled millions of dollars into Delaware Opportunities Inc. "and its affiliates" without public bidding;

and

after reading the audit report of Delaware Opportunities, Inc. indicating that it applied and received "pass-through" grants from Delaware County Department of Social Services, Town of Deposit and Village of Hancock, some of them for "community development", 



and 

after seeing in Delaware Opportunities Inc. the self-characterization that it is a "community action AGENCY"


and

after reading this advisory opinion of the New York State Committee for Open Government, citing to court opinions that "community development corporations", even though having an official status of non-profit corporations, are nevertheless deemed "agencies" within the meaning of Public Officers Law 86(3) and are subject to Freedom of Information Law - 

I decided to FOIL Delaware Opportunities, Inc. for certain records that may be of public interest.

Delaware Opportunities Inc. is, of course, trying to mislead those who come to read the "About Us" section on the website its website that it is not part of the local government (at least for purposes of FOIL) by saying this:


It is called "Delaware Opportunities", putting the name of the county into the name of the corporation, in violation of New York Business Corporations law, sending to people a message that it IS part of the government - because usually when this "corporation" is mentioned by the government (such as social services), social services do not say "Delaware Opportunities, Inc.", they say "Delaware Opportunities", clearly sending a message that it IS a part of the local government.

Delaware Opportunities, Inc. is funded by the government, it involves members of the local government in its Board of Directors, it claims to be a "community action AGENCY" on its tax returns, it performs governmental functions and services, it gets "pass-through" grants from the government for "community development" - and yet they say that they are are an "agency" that is "not a part of local government"?

Well, as the 1993 advisory opinion of the NYS Committee for the Open Government stated, citing to court decisions, it IS part of the local government - at least for purposes of being subject to Freedom of Information Law.

I will file FOIL requests with Delaware Opportunities, Inc. and will let the public know how they will respond.

Because I really want to know who are 279 people employed, as per the latest published tax return, with Delaware Opportunities Inc., and who are people employed with this "community action" and "community development" "agency" now.

And not only that.

Stay tuned.





Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Crimes are not attorney disciplinary violations in Texas - when such violations are alleged against the attorney representing the attorney disciplinary board

Here there is an interesting blog from attorney Ty Clevenger about corruption in Texas attorney disciplinary board.

Attorney Ty Clevenger turned in the Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton after Ken Paxton was indicted for felonies, including securities fraud.

Attorney Ty Clevenger's disciplinary complaint against Ken Paxton was dismissed on astounding grounds - that the crimes that Ken Paxton was indicted for did not constitute attorney disciplinary violations.

The establishment is protecting their own to the very bitter end.

And, it is interesting to mention that, by law, the disciplinary body that dismissed the complaint is represented by that same Ken Paxton.

No surprises.

#TheMokaySaga gets more and more bizarre: attorney Richard Harlem now claims under oath his own purported client is lying. And asks the court to make a person who never was a party in the case to sue my husband and accept paid representation from son-of-a-judge Richard Harlem. Wow.

I wrote on this blog extensively about the "Mokay saga", the case litigated by a son-of-a-judge Richard Harlem of Oneonta, NY, an attorney who brazenly stated to several courts during 8.5 years of litigation that he represented a client, David Mokay, on whose behalf he brought the lawsuit - while never calling David Mokay to testify, even at the trial on damages, and while blocking any possibility of direct contact with David Mokay through discovery, interrogatories and depositions.

After the trial on damages was over, after a judgment in favor of David Mokay and other purported plaintiffs in the Mokay case was made, David Mokay came forward and provided an affidavit saying that he never hired Richard Harlem or his law firms to represent him in the Mokay case and never sued my husband, Frederick J. Neroni.

The affidavit was provided in November.

The affidavit said that Richard Harlem was confronted by David Mokay that his signature on the alleged retainer agreement from 2007 was a forgery.

 Richard Harlem fought tooth and claw to block us from seeing the original of the retainer agreement, and Judge Becker obliged in allowing us only to see the copy - that could have been that forgery that David Mokay claims it is, made on a copying machine.

Anyway, there is an original affidavit of Richard Harlem's purported client David Mokay.

Richard Harlem claimed to the court under oath that Richard Harlem represents David Mokay in an appellate proceedings started in June of 2015 with filing of a Notice of Appeal, let's remember the date when proceedings where Richard Harlem is making that claim started.

My husband submitted an original affidavit of David Mokay saying that Richard Harlem does not represent him in any proceedings pertaining to the Mokay case - and never did, and that David Mokay never sued in that case.

The ONLY path for an attorney after a client provides such an affidavit to the OPPONENT in litigation is to disqualify himself from the ENTIRE case.

That's not for Richard Harlem.

Richard Harlem instead, without making a motion to withdraw from the case, did the following:

1) claimed to the court that David Mokay (his own client) is lying on the issue that Richard Harlem is not representing him, and never did;

of course, claiming that the attorney's own client is lying REQUIRES that attorney to withdraw - but not for Richard Harlem, Richard Harlem goes on;

2) Richard Harlem provided an affidavit from David Mokay's brother, a co-plaintiff in the Mokay saga on behalf of himself individually and as Executor of the Estate of his father - so the brother had an obvious financial interest in the outcome of the appeal.

Richard Harlem, completely disregarding the screaming impropriety of what he is doing, submitted an affidavit of his client Daniel Mokay.

In that affidavit, Richard Harlem's client Daniel Mokay is accusing of lying and a crime of perjury Richard Harlem's claimed client David Mokay who denied ever having been Richard Harlem's client, and did it under oath.

Daniel Mokay says "I saw David Mokay sign a retainer agreement with Harlem & Harlem".

Wait a minute, Harlem & Harlem was dissolved in 2012 when Richard Harlem's father Robert Harlem died, that was 4 years ago.

Richard Harlem is opposing an appeal in 2016 that was started in 2015, and where a separate retainer agreement is required, for that appellate proceeding, so even if Daniel Mokay were telling the truth - which David Mokay denies under oath - Daniel Mokay's statement would be irrelevant because it is not the same law firm and it is not the same proceeding, and a new retainer agreement, as of 2015, with Harlem & Jervis, would have been needed.

But, Richard Harlem is not to be deterred from his crash course.

Now we have two affidavits from:


  1. Richard Harlem's client Daniel Mokay and from 
  2. Richard Harlem's purported client (who denies being a client) David Mokay.
Both of affidavits are on the issue of representation of David Mokay by Richard Harlem and his law firms.

David Mokay says Richard Harlem does not represent him, and never did.

Daniel Mokay says David Mokay signed a retainer agreement with Harlem & Harlem - without indicating the date when that event allegedly happened, and Harlem & Harlem is dead, as well as its partner Robert Harlem.  Dead for many years.  And the original retainer was never submitted into the record, only a copy.  And David Mokay claims that copy is a forgery.  He claims it under oath.


One affidavit of the two is the "impeaching affidavit" of one client against the other, purported client, and is submitted (and, I am sure, drafted), by Richard Harlem himself.

Now THAT is one OUTSTANDING conflict of interest.

But, what does Richard Harlem say about the whole mess?

He says this:

1) why does Frederick J. Neroni bring up the issue of the affidavit of David Mokay only 5 months after he received David Mokay's affidavit?  

Note that Richard Harlem does not contest authenticity of David Mokay's signature - because an original affidavit was submittted to the court, where the notary in the state of New York, a person who we do not know, verified David Mokay's identity before he signed it.

Note that my husband's statute of limitations to sue Richard Harlem for fraud and fraud upon the court under New York State law is 6 years, so whether my husband held onto the affidavit for 5 months or for the entire 6 years, or for 100 years, does not change the authenticity of the affidavit.

The next claim of Richard Harlem is - "the issue of my disqualification is not properly before the court, because Mr. Neroni did not make a cross-motion to disqualify".

Mr. Neroni did not make a cross-motion to disqualify.

Yet, Mr. Neroni did raise before the court the issue of Richard Harlem's ongoing fraud for two limited reasons already explained to the court in Mr. Neroni's sworn statement:

1) to prevent the ongoing fraud from continuing; and
2) to mitigate Mr. Neroni's losses for purposes of future lawsuit against Richard Harlem for fraud upon the court, as required by New York State law.

Yet, Richard Harlem asks the court - please, please, please, disregard the fact that:

1) Richard Harlem made a sworn statement that he:


  • represents David Mokay;
  • is opposing the appeal of the judgment that he obtained on behalf David Mokay;
  • the judgment obtained is based on his legal fees against David Mokay for over 8.5 years;
and that

2) David Mokay made a sworn statement, after the judgment on damages was already in, that 

  • David Mokay never sued Mr. Neroni,
  • that Richard Harlem never represented David Mokay,
  • that David Mokay's signature on the copy of the retainer agreement (the original was never submitted to the court) was a forgery;
  • that Richard Harlem was confronted by David Mokay about his fraudulent representation and about the forgery, and that
  • Richard Harlem proceeded with his fraudulent representation anyway
and that

3) Richard Harlem, to fight the affidavit of his own purported client David Mokay, presented an affidavit from an interested witness, his other client Daniel Mokay, accusing Richard Harlem's purported client David Mokay of lying under oath (crime of perjury); 

and that

4) Richard Harlem asks the court to disregard all this mess, and to allow Richard Harlem to proceed opposing the appeal after his disqualification and misconduct in the case sank to a monumental depth and INDISPUTABLY REQUIRES Richard Harlem's disqualification from the case - and if Richard Harlem would do that, he should be sua sponte forced to do that, by the court.

What Richard Harlem asks the court to do is actually to allow Richard Harlem to MAKE David Mokay accept Richard Harlem's costly representation in an appellate case while David Mokay says that he never hired Richard Harlem, never was a party in that case, and does not want to have anything to do with it.

The court simply does not have authority to make an individual sue anybody.

That's what Richard Harlem asks the court to compel David Mokay to do.

By the way, David Mokay was not noticed with that claim - and that would be a requirement, a personal notice to David Mokay where Richard Harlem, an attorney with an outrageous conflict of interest, accusing David Mokay of a crime of perjury, nevertheless begs the court to make David Mokay to accept paid representation from Richard Harlem in a case where David Mokay claims under oath he was never a party.

Wow.

Wow.
Wow.

Let's hold our collective breath as to what the 3rd Department will say NOW.






The racist Louisiana court strikes against a black attorney. And a black judge participates in that racist decision. No surprises where a black judge can only get into a Louisiana state court through a federal lawsuit. And no surprises where black judges are disciplined for fighting racism in the court system.

I've just put in a blog about the outrageously unconstitutional, personally motivated, pre-judged and - yes, racist - decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in denying rehearing in the disciplinary case of Christine Mire .

Attorney Mire's only "sin" was that she courageously made a motion to recuse in the face of criminal behavior (doctoring audio tape of a hearing regarding her own non-disclosure of conflicts of interest, a piece regarding disclosure was added to the tape) of a judge, Judge Phyllis Keaty who was since elevated to an appellate court.

Here is attorney Mire.



Attorney Mire DID NOT raise the issue of her race in her disciplinary proceedings, while racism - in my white woman's view - was screaming from the pages of the disciplinary decision against her.

She was trying to be professional.

She was trying not to be identified by the color of her skin, but by what she was doing as a professional, as an attorney.

Apparently, professionalism has nothing to do with how things are done in Louisiana court system - and across the country.

Here is Chief Judge of the court Bernette Johnson (who agreed with Judge Knoll to deny Christine Mire a rehearing without putting in her own opinion):


A wise decision, Judge Johnson.

Support a racist stance of one old white judge 




on behalf of her old white judge-friend 




against a young female black attorney 



- who is right while the judges are wrong (which is the worst sin for any attorney in this country - especially if he/she does not shut up and reports the issue).


After all, see what happened to a Kentucky black judge Olu Stevens when he fought against racism in the Kentucky court system?

Judge Johnson, of all people, must know how alive is racism in Louisiana and how racist the Louisiana court system is: after all, Judge Johnson got her position as Chief Judge, despite obvious seniority, only after a federal lawsuit.

And Judge Johnson must remember the stinging racist comments to articles regarding your election/appointment as the Chief Supreme Court judge made 4 years ago.

These ones:






There was only one voice of reason buried in those racist comments:


Judge "Theriot" is Judge Jeannette Theriot Knoll, obviously.

But, what commentators clearly pointed out is that - people of the state of Louisiana did not vote this black judge in.

She had to be appointed, because she wouldn't have won the elections.


Because she would have been filibustered at the polls by the racist white population of the State of Louisiana?

That's what it is?

And, it appears that, once Judge Johnson overcome racial discrimination against herself, she is now trying hard to retain her position and connections by PARTICIPATING in racial discrimination against attorney Mire, by participating in a completely unconstitutional decision where attorney Mire is right - and that is the whole danger about it.

Judge Johnson knew what race attorney Mire was.

Judge Johnson should have seen from the circumstances of the case how racist the disciplinary proceedings against attorney Mire were.

Even if attorney Mire, based on her professional pride, did not raise that issue, didn't Judge Johnson have to?

Well, she didn't.

Out of self-preservation, obviously.

After all, once again - remember what happened to the black judge Olu Stevens in Kentucky?

Appears that Judge Johnson remembers well.









The disgruntled Judge Jeanette Knoll avenges her forced recusal in "legacy cases" against an innocent bystander without political clout, attorney Christine Mire. And on behalf of a friend #JudgePhyllisKeaty.

On January 22, 2016 it was announced that the Louisiana appellate #JudgeJeannetteTheriotKnoll was retiring on December 31, 2016 - because her term was ending and because the Louisiana state law did not allow her to run for re-election because of her age.

But, before Judge Knoll is going to retire at the end of the year, she left a slimy trace in the history of Louisiana judicial system.

Two slimy interweaving traces, actually.

Two disgraceful and disgusting traces.

First, Judge Knoll wrote a blistering "opinion" criticizing her colleagues' decision to force her recusal - there is no basis for her to write opinions regarding a court's decision to force her recusal, but she did that anyway.  

Well, her judicial colleague who was also forced to recuse from the same case, judge Jeff Hughes actually outdid Jeannette Theriot Knoll by filing a federal civil rights lawsuit against his colleagues who ordered him to recuse from that case.

Imagine what kind of stakes were involved and what kind of promises may have been made by the judges if they fought recusal they way they did.

Thankfully, in Louisiana - unlike New York - judges challenged with a motion to recuse do not get to decide motions to recuse on the merits.  Otherwise, imagine what judge Knoll and Judge Hughes would have done to those who made the motion.

Judge Knoll in her accusatory "opinion" against her colleagues blasts that they recused her because her colleagues allegedly succumbed to the influence of "interest groups".

The motion to recuse was reportedly filed by lawyers for three oil companies - ExxonMobil Corp., BP America Co. and Chevron Corp.

These three oil companies legitimately raised the appearance of impropriety for Judge Knoll to preside 

The interesting part was that the Louisiana Supreme Court then voted not to take up the "legacy lawsuits" in question, 4 days after forcing the two judges, Hughes and Knoll, to recuse.

The jist of the motions was reportedly that Judge Hughes accepted large PAC campaign contributions from the plaintiffs' lawyers in 2012, and that Judge Knoll's husband represented parties suing oil companies in several similar "legacy lawsuits" in the past.

Once again, that was enough for the Supreme Court for the State of Louisiana to force recusal of Judge Hughes and Judge Knoll.

And here is how Judge Knoll struck back.

In her "objection opinion" Judge Knoll accused of impropriety both her colleagues who ordered the recusal, and the attorneys for the oil companies.  






Judge Knoll also engaged in a loving tribute protecting reputation of her husband - once again, in an opionion which was completely procedurally uncalled for - but that does not bother Judge Knoll when personal interests are at stake:






What did the Martindale-Hubbel rating of her husband had to do with the decision as to whether she had a conflict of interest to preside over a case because her "successful" attorney husband handled similar cases on the plaintiffs' side (and derived income from those cases) - is anybody's guess.

Judge Knoll goes further with even more flowery language, now extolling her own virtues and reputation:




Nothing like patting yourself on the head.

So, Judge Knoll praises herself for her own:


  1. dedicated ability to "serve the judiciary" - at least she is honest in that she is serving not the public, but the judiciary, her words, not mine;
  2. for serving the judiciary "with integrity" - in the way integrity understood by the judiciary that gifted itself with immunity for malicious and corrupt acts in violation of their oath of office, while at the same time presuming integrity of their actions on the bench.
And, Judge Knoll made an oath of serving two masters - the people of the State of Louisiana (to whom her initial oath of office went) and the judiciary (where service to the judiciary, members of her own class, is in conflict to service to the people when such judiciary, especially her own friends, are involved in APPEARANCE of corrupt activities).

And look what language Judge Knoll uses in characterizing her remaining future service to both "the people" and "the judiciary": she promises to serve both:

  1. evenhandedly;
  2. courageously;
  3. patiently;
  4. with a clear head, and
  5. with strong traces of common sense and kindness

The rule of thumb where people engage in excessive and flowery self-praise is that usually such people are crooks.

It appears to be so with Judge Jeannette Theriot Knoll.

The only kindness I noticed in Judge Knoll's concurring opinion in Christine Mire's case is to Judge Keaty and other judges whose recusal Christine Mire requested.

Otherwise, Judge Knoll's concurring opinion exuded as much 

  • evenhandedness;
  • courage;
  • patience;
  • clear head;
  • common sense, and
  • kindness

as a fishwife cursing at the market square.


It was obvious that Judge Knoll was high-strung on the issue of her own forced recusal and ready to strike against any other attorney who, unlike attorneys for oil companies who made a successful motion to recuse Judge Knoll, do not have the political clout and support.

And it was obvious that Judge Knoll was a loose cannon and should not have been allowed to sit in panels on any decisions involving sanctions against attorneys for making motions to recuse, because her mind was made up on the ISSUE, on personal grounds, without regard to IDENTITY of the attorney subject to discipline.

Judge Knoll found such a victim and scapegoat to strike at in retaliation  -  in young female minority attorney Christine Mire.

Christine Mire dared to make a motion to recuse Judge Knoll's long-time friend judge Phyllis B. Keaty.

Judge Knoll's second slimy trace in the history of Louisiana court in 2016, the last year on the bench, was her "concurring" opinion in the order denying rehearing to attorney Christine Mire, see yesterday's press-release here - compare analysis by Judge Knoll with analysis by Judge Weimer in his scathing dissent, and the prior dissent of the same Judge Weimer against sanctioning Christine Mire.  






Christine Mire was previously sanctioned - with Judge Knoll's unrecused participation - for making a motion to recuse Judge Knoll's friend Phyllis Keaty and for a writ application to the appellate court that preferred to ignore misconduct of Phyllis Keaty based on overwhelming appearance of impropriety.

The appearance of impropriety was obvious when Judge Keaty's non-existent disclosure of conflicts of interest suddenly surfaced by being added into an audio tape of court proceedings - which was confirmed by testimony of technical experts.  

Judge Keaty was also forced to recuse from Christine Mire's case when Christine Mire made the motion to recuse, because in Louisiana, judges challenged on such a motion do not get to decide it on the merits.  

Which did not help Christine Mire.

Instead of Judge Keaty sanctioning her, her friend Judge Knoll did, and then added insult to injury by casting a decisive vote in denying her a rehearing of her discipline - for making a legitimate motion to recuse on behalf of her clients against Judge Knoll's friend.

In her "concurring opinion" supporting denial of the petition for rehearing, Judge Knoll outdid herself in flowery language, and I will address that below, but what caught my attention the most is that Judge Knoll allowed herself to offer unsworn testimony as a character witness in support of Judge Keaty who is, reportedly, Judge Knoll's personal friend, while blasting attorney Christine Mire.

It goes without saying that both judge Knoll and Judge Keaty are elderly white women while attorney Christine Mire is a young and beautiful minority woman - which, I think, added a lot of female jealousy and racism into the equation.

Judge Knoll's arguments, with her legal training and all, were actually 100% matching in tone, probative value and retaliative intent, the recent "arguments" offered in hate comments on my blog regarding the suspicious house fire of my friend and critic of the government in Delaware County, New York, Barbara O'Sullivan - by a wife and a girlfriend of firefighters.

The statement in the blog article, based on eyewitness accounts, was - the firefighters refused to make an efforts to extinguish the fire and let the house burn.

Here are the firefighters wives' arguments:  I am a liar, because, while they were not at the site of the house fire, and my sources, the eyewitnesses, were, their husbands/boyfriends will NEVER.

Here are the hearsay statements of firefighter's wife Sharon Reichert-Morgan - "I was not there, but my husband 'would never'".

Here are even more simplistic statements of a firefighter's girlfriend Colleen Church - "I was not there, my firefighter boyfriend was not there, but I know those people, they would NEVER, and, by the way, you are a stupid mail order bride bitch, and gloves are off against you for reporting the way you did".

Translation - I bite you because I don't like you and because you dared to bite my friends.

What Colleen Church said about describes exactly what Judge Knoll did to Christine Mire.

Judge Knoll killed Christine Mire's chance for rehearing of unconstitutional sanctions imposed upon her because Christine Mire bit at Judge Knoll's friend Judge Keaty with a motion to recuse.

A well-founded motion - as the dissenting judge pointed out, in great detail.

The essence of Judge Knoll's concurring opinion is:  "I was not there, but I PERSONALLY know Judge Keaty's stellar reputation, and this is an attorney with a 'checkered past'" - and that allegedly 'checkered past' (where the instances of "checkered past" are refuted by evidence in the record) somehow explains why irrefutable evidence of Judge Keaty's APPEARANCE of misconduct (which is enough to make a motion to recuse) should have been disregarded by Christine Mire.

Remember the Rule #1 of whistle-blowers in this country?  As expressed by the government criticized by those whistle-blowers?

Keep your head low, don't whistle-blow.  Or else - feel the "burn".

Happens all the time, to female whistle-blowers especially.

And "the burn" did come upon Christine Mire - in bricks.

Here is the gist of Judge Knoll's concurring opinion, in snippets of that opinion:



No mentioning that Keaty was also a friend, and that reviewing her work for many years was thus inappropriate for Judge Knoll to begin with.


I know at least two high-standing public officials, heads of both chambers of New York Legislature, Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos, previously with "sterling reputation" who were just convicted for felonies involving rampant corruption.

"Sterling reputation" is not a defense on a motion to recuse for an appearance of impropriety where actual conflicts of interest did exist, where there was sworn testimony that the judge's disclosure of a conflict of interest was added into the audio of the hearing by a tech company outside of court proceedings, and where another judge actually ordered Judge Keaty to recuse.





So, this is content-based regulation of speech which is absolutely protected by the 1st Amendment - no mentioning of the U.S. Constitution here - compare it with Judge Knoll's outburst in her "objections to forced recusal" where she lovingly offers unsolicited unsworn testimony about her husband and raises constitutional questions on her own behalf.

Here is also Judge Knoll's scathing criticism of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in making a decision legitimizing same sex marriage - which can easily be deemed as "besmirching the reputation" of the justices who made the majority decision.





last time I checked, the rule of law is supposed to equally protect anyone and everyone, whether the judge likes that attorney or not.

By the way, the only reason judges do not have "checkered history" is because they gave themselves a self-gift of judicial immunity for malicious and CORRUPT acts on the bench, which they enforce religiously in lawsuits against members of their class, not allowing discovery of those malicious and corrupt acts and dismissing lawsuits against judges on filing, for "lack of jurisdiction" - which does not preclude them from having "jurisdiction" for sanctioning those who filed such lawsuits.

Nobody is above or below the law - right, Judge Knoll?  Or some are more equal than others under the law?  Like judges?

If Judge Knoll considered Christine Mire "a troubling attorney", she had no business presiding over the case, because her bias against Christine Mire was obvious.








The nature of conduct being diligent investigation of Judge Knoll's friend Judge Keaty's conflict of interest (which were confirmed), due diligence investigation of doctored audio of a hearing where disclosure of such conflicts were added onto the tape (which was confirmed by testimony) and making a motion to recuse on behalf of a client which was attorney Christine Mire's duty to do.

Judge Knoll's personal knowledge of Judge Keaty for 30 years was enough to disqualify her from presiding over the case where Judge Keaty was the complaining witness, but no - Judge Knoll is not known for recusing herself voluntarily in cases involving conflicts of interest, and she had an agenda to "show them" for forcing her to recuse from the "legacy cases" in November of 2015 in the first place.

See how the same "egregious conduct" was characterized by the dissenter Judge Weimer in yesterday's dissenting opinion:





In other words, there were 3 recording devices recording the hearing, and the proffered explanation that they ALL malfunctioned at the very time Judge Keaty was making disclosure of her conflict of interest making the "audio splicing" necessary defies all odds and common sense.

By the way, each time I ask for security video tapes in New York state courts, something happens to the equipment - it either prematurely overwrites the requested footage, or malfunctions and does not capture the footage in the first place.

So, this particular trick is well known.

For being a trick.

Moreover, as Judge Weimer pointed out that the "reasonable person"'s opinion in the situation - that of a recording technician testifying at Christine Mire's discipinary case was that:




Moreover, Judge Weimer points out that the majority opinion's speculation that malfunction occurred on 3 recording devices simultaneously, thus "reasonably" requiring splicing, was not supported by facts - where the stenographer did not report that any malfunction on recording devices occurred:



And, the order to stenographer was to produce a FULL COPY of what was already on record - not to order "splicing" when conflicts of interest of a judge were raised on a motion to recuse, and the stenographer then went to extraordinary lengths, even filing a lawsuit against Christine Mire and her client trying to prevent her from obtaining the record of proceedings at all.



Let's restore the history of the case.

An attorney, Christine Mire, had a reason to believe that a real estate company owned by a presiding judge in the case had an interest in selling the property being divided by that judge in a divorce proceeding.

That was a disqualifying conflict of interest.

The judge did not make that disclosure.

The attorney sought tapes of the court hearing to prove that the judge did not make the disclosure.

That's where the "ordinary" procedure stopped and the Orwellian nightmare started, for the attorney who asked for tapes of court proceedings to which her client was absolutely entitled.

The stenographer who was asked for the tapes, sued the attorney and her client in response to request for tapes - which was completely out of the ordinary.

The stenographer did not have any right for such a lawsuit, because, as it turned out, nothing from other hearings was on the tape, what was on the tape was only pertaining to proceedings of Christine Mire's clients.

Surely the stenographer knew about that before bringing the lawsuit.

And, Christine Mire experienced intimidation from the stenographer's attorney even before the lawsuit was brought.

The lawsuit of the stenographer produced a court order against the stenographer - requiring the stenographer to produce a full copy of the proceedings to Christine Mire.  

The order was as clear as bell.

Yet, here the irregularities continue.

While making an appointment for "copying" and while not stating that any of the 3 recording devices from which the copy was supposed to be made, the stenographer ordered "splicing" of the audio - but did not offer any explanation as to why she did that.

Again, as part of due diligence, Christine Mire had an expert analyze the "splicing" and found that something was added into the tape, and that "something" was - surprise, surprise! - Judge Keaty's disclosure of conflicts of interest that were not made on the record, upon the memory of Christine Mire and her client.

And, after Christine Mire made more than necessary steps in her due diligence preparation to make a motion to recuse, that was still not enough, and she was still sanctioned with loss of her livelihood for "egregious conduct" in "besmirching" reputation of Judge Keaty, and those appellate judges who covered up her "appearance of misconduct".

There is a concept in law called RES IPSA LOQUITUR - would not have happened without negligence.

Tell me, please, WHO ELSE would have ordered the "splicing" of the audio tape BUT judge Keaty for whom this episode was very damaging, especially during her elections?

The stenographer herself?

Let's be realistic.

Disciplinary authorities putting pressure on Christine Mire, openly stating to her, reportedly, that her motion to recuse were badly timed during Judge Keaty's election campaign, and that they wouldn't have brought the disciplinary petition "but for" the timing of the motion to recuse.

And, Christine Mire has public records showing that at the time when pressure was imposed upon Christine Mire to "cease and desist" criticizing Judge Keaty during her election campaign, 5 governmental bodies expressed interest in activities of Christine Mire.

One of them was the local fire marshal.

The fire marshal visited Christine Mire's office, told her that she has "too many locks on the office door", which may be a "fire hazard", forced her to remove a lock - and the very next couple of days Christine Mire's office was broken into, and somebody went through her office files, for which there is a police report.

The only person who knew that Christine Mire removed the lock that was so strong that "could have been a fire hazard" was the fire marshal.

Somehow, these facts - which should have triggered CRIMINAL investigation about ORGANIZED CRIME where part of that organized criminal enterprise are Louisiana courts, attorney disciplinary authority and even a fire marshal, did not result in criminal investigation of corruption, and did not find their way into the judicial decisions regarding Christine Mire.

 After all, these pesky facts did not mesh with the accusatory tone and the obvious decision to pre-judge and punish Christine Mire for breaking the taboo, raising the APPEARANCE of CRIMINAL ACTIVITY of a judge, as was Christine Mire's DUTY TO  HER CLIENT to do, in ensuring her client's constitutional right to impartial judicial review.

It is easier to just slam an honest attorney doing her duty with a slimy claim that she has a "checkered past" - and for that reason is not entitled to any constitutional rights, obviously.

Former judge Andrew P. Napolitano described the phenomenon of what happened to Christine Mire - in a book published 5 years prior to what happened to Christine Mire.




It appears that judiciary has its gloves off in striking against those who dangerously raise the issue that there is an appearance of CRIMINAL misconduct on behalf of a judge or judges.

Without any traces of common sense - or loyalty to the law.

But with a lot of loyalty to members of their own class.

In all of Judge Knoll's zeal to punish Christine Mire for biting her friend with a motion to recuse, what was completely left out of the decision was - how did the sanction against Christine Mire's for making a well-founded motion to recuse against a judge on behalf of a client co-ordinate with the declared purpose of attorney regulation (and discipline) - protecting consumers?

It was Christine Mire who protected the consumers, right?

And it was the criminal cartel consisting of her competitors who disciplined her for that, right?

And where are the feds for this criminal cartel, including Judge Keaty and Judge Knoll?  And the fire marshal? And those who broke into Christine Mire's office? And those who pursued discipline against her on the complaint of Judge Keaty because Christine Mire made a motion to recuse during Judge Keaty's re-election campaign and refused to "cease and desist" (shut up)?

Criminal behavior is not immune, even if the criminal is a judge?
Right?

So where are you, the FBI?

How long will the legal consumers be waiting for the feds who are paid by taxpayers to clear corruption in the government to do their jobs?