The disgruntled Judge Jeanette Knoll avenges her forced recusal in "legacy cases" against an innocent bystander without political clout, attorney Christine Mire. And on behalf of a friend #JudgePhyllisKeaty.

On January 22, 2016 it was announced that the Louisiana appellate #JudgeJeannetteTheriotKnoll was retiring on December 31, 2016 - because her term was ending and because the Louisiana state law did not allow her to run for re-election because of her age.

But, before Judge Knoll is going to retire at the end of the year, she left a slimy trace in the history of Louisiana judicial system.

Two slimy interweaving traces, actually.

Two disgraceful and disgusting traces.

First, Judge Knoll wrote a blistering "opinion" criticizing her colleagues' decision to force her recusal - there is no basis for her to write opinions regarding a court's decision to force her recusal, but she did that anyway.  

Well, her judicial colleague who was also forced to recuse from the same case, judge Jeff Hughes actually outdid Jeannette Theriot Knoll by filing a federal civil rights lawsuit against his colleagues who ordered him to recuse from that case.

Imagine what kind of stakes were involved and what kind of promises may have been made by the judges if they fought recusal they way they did.

Thankfully, in Louisiana - unlike New York - judges challenged with a motion to recuse do not get to decide motions to recuse on the merits.  Otherwise, imagine what judge Knoll and Judge Hughes would have done to those who made the motion.

Judge Knoll in her accusatory "opinion" against her colleagues blasts that they recused her because her colleagues allegedly succumbed to the influence of "interest groups".

The motion to recuse was reportedly filed by lawyers for three oil companies - ExxonMobil Corp., BP America Co. and Chevron Corp.

These three oil companies legitimately raised the appearance of impropriety for Judge Knoll to preside 

The interesting part was that the Louisiana Supreme Court then voted not to take up the "legacy lawsuits" in question, 4 days after forcing the two judges, Hughes and Knoll, to recuse.

The jist of the motions was reportedly that Judge Hughes accepted large PAC campaign contributions from the plaintiffs' lawyers in 2012, and that Judge Knoll's husband represented parties suing oil companies in several similar "legacy lawsuits" in the past.

Once again, that was enough for the Supreme Court for the State of Louisiana to force recusal of Judge Hughes and Judge Knoll.

And here is how Judge Knoll struck back.

In her "objection opinion" Judge Knoll accused of impropriety both her colleagues who ordered the recusal, and the attorneys for the oil companies.  

Judge Knoll also engaged in a loving tribute protecting reputation of her husband - once again, in an opionion which was completely procedurally uncalled for - but that does not bother Judge Knoll when personal interests are at stake:

What did the Martindale-Hubbel rating of her husband had to do with the decision as to whether she had a conflict of interest to preside over a case because her "successful" attorney husband handled similar cases on the plaintiffs' side (and derived income from those cases) - is anybody's guess.

Judge Knoll goes further with even more flowery language, now extolling her own virtues and reputation:

Nothing like patting yourself on the head.

So, Judge Knoll praises herself for her own:

1. dedicated ability to "serve the judiciary" - at least she is honest in that she is serving not the public, but the judiciary, her words, not mine;
2. for serving the judiciary "with integrity" - in the way integrity understood by the judiciary that gifted itself with immunity for malicious and corrupt acts in violation of their oath of office, while at the same time presuming integrity of their actions on the bench.

And, Judge Knoll made an oath of serving two masters - the people of the State of Louisiana (to whom her initial oath of office went) and the judiciary (where service to the judiciary, members of her own class, is in conflict to service to the people when such judiciary, especially her own friends, are involved in APPEARANCE of corrupt activities).

And look what language Judge Knoll uses in characterizing her remaining future service to both "the people" and "the judiciary": she promises to serve both:

1. evenhandedly;
2. courageously;
3. patiently;
4. with a clear head, and
5. with strong traces of common sense and kindness

The rule of thumb where people engage in excessive and flowery self-praise is that usually such people are crooks.

It appears to be so with Judge Jeannette Theriot Knoll.

The only kindness I noticed in Judge Knoll's concurring opinion in Christine Mire's case is to Judge Keaty and other judges whose recusal Christine Mire requested.

Otherwise, Judge Knoll's concurring opinion exuded as much 

• evenhandedness;
• courage;
• patience;
• clear head;
• common sense, and
• kindness

as a fishwife cursing at the market square.

It was obvious that Judge Knoll was high-strung on the issue of her own forced recusal and ready to strike against any other attorney who, unlike attorneys for oil companies who made a successful motion to recuse Judge Knoll, do not have the political clout and support.

And it was obvious that Judge Knoll was a loose cannon and should not have been allowed to sit in panels on any decisions involving sanctions against attorneys for making motions to recuse, because her mind was made up on the ISSUE, on personal grounds, without regard to IDENTITY of the attorney subject to discipline.

Judge Knoll found such a victim and scapegoat to strike at in retaliation  -  in young female minority attorney Christine Mire.

Christine Mire dared to make a motion to recuse Judge Knoll's long-time friend judge Phyllis B. Keaty.

Judge Knoll's second slimy trace in the history of Louisiana court in 2016, the last year on the bench, was her "concurring" opinion in the order denying rehearing to attorney Christine Mire, see yesterday's press-release here - compare analysis by Judge Knoll with analysis by Judge Weimer in his scathing dissent, and the prior dissent of the same Judge Weimer against sanctioning Christine Mire.  

Christine Mire was previously sanctioned - with Judge Knoll's unrecused participation - for making a motion to recuse Judge Knoll's friend Phyllis Keaty and for a writ application to the appellate court that preferred to ignore misconduct of Phyllis Keaty based on overwhelming appearance of impropriety.

The appearance of impropriety was obvious when Judge Keaty's non-existent disclosure of conflicts of interest suddenly surfaced by being added into an audio tape of court proceedings - which was confirmed by testimony of technical experts.  

Judge Keaty was also forced to recuse from Christine Mire's case when Christine Mire made the motion to recuse, because in Louisiana, judges challenged on such a motion do not get to decide it on the merits.  

Which did not help Christine Mire.

Instead of Judge Keaty sanctioning her, her friend Judge Knoll did, and then added insult to injury by casting a decisive vote in denying her a rehearing of her discipline - for making a legitimate motion to recuse on behalf of her clients against Judge Knoll's friend.

In her "concurring opinion" supporting denial of the petition for rehearing, Judge Knoll outdid herself in flowery language, and I will address that below, but what caught my attention the most is that Judge Knoll allowed herself to offer unsworn testimony as a character witness in support of Judge Keaty who is, reportedly, Judge Knoll's personal friend, while blasting attorney Christine Mire.

It goes without saying that both judge Knoll and Judge Keaty are elderly white women while attorney Christine Mire is a young and beautiful minority woman - which, I think, added a lot of female jealousy and racism into the equation.

Judge Knoll's arguments, with her legal training and all, were actually 100% matching in tone, probative value and retaliative intent, the recent "arguments" offered in hate comments on my blog regarding the suspicious house fire of my friend and critic of the government in Delaware County, New York, Barbara O'Sullivan - by a wife and a girlfriend of firefighters.

The statement in the blog article, based on eyewitness accounts, was - the firefighters refused to make an efforts to extinguish the fire and let the house burn.

Here are the firefighters wives' arguments:  I am a liar, because, while they were not at the site of the house fire, and my sources, the eyewitnesses, were, their husbands/boyfriends will NEVER.

Here are the hearsay statements of firefighter's wife Sharon Reichert-Morgan - "I was not there, but my husband 'would never'".

Here are even more simplistic statements of a firefighter's girlfriend Colleen Church - "I was not there, my firefighter boyfriend was not there, but I know those people, they would NEVER, and, by the way, you are a stupid mail order bride bitch, and gloves are off against you for reporting the way you did".

Translation - I bite you because I don't like you and because you dared to bite my friends.

What Colleen Church said about describes exactly what Judge Knoll did to Christine Mire.

Judge Knoll killed Christine Mire's chance for rehearing of unconstitutional sanctions imposed upon her because Christine Mire bit at Judge Knoll's friend Judge Keaty with a motion to recuse.

A well-founded motion - as the dissenting judge pointed out, in great detail.

The essence of Judge Knoll's concurring opinion is:  "I was not there, but I PERSONALLY know Judge Keaty's stellar reputation, and this is an attorney with a 'checkered past'" - and that allegedly 'checkered past' (where the instances of "checkered past" are refuted by evidence in the record) somehow explains why irrefutable evidence of Judge Keaty's APPEARANCE of misconduct (which is enough to make a motion to recuse) should have been disregarded by Christine Mire.

Remember the Rule #1 of whistle-blowers in this country?  As expressed by the government criticized by those whistle-blowers?

Keep your head low, don't whistle-blow.  Or else - feel the "burn".

Happens all the time, to female whistle-blowers especially.

And "the burn" did come upon Christine Mire - in bricks.

Here is the gist of Judge Knoll's concurring opinion, in snippets of that opinion:

No mentioning that Keaty was also a friend, and that reviewing her work for many years was thus inappropriate for Judge Knoll to begin with.

I know at least two high-standing public officials, heads of both chambers of New York Legislature, Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos, previously with "sterling reputation" who were just convicted for felonies involving rampant corruption.

"Sterling reputation" is not a defense on a motion to recuse for an appearance of impropriety where actual conflicts of interest did exist, where there was sworn testimony that the judge's disclosure of a conflict of interest was added into the audio of the hearing by a tech company outside of court proceedings, and where another judge actually ordered Judge Keaty to recuse.

So, this is content-based regulation of speech which is absolutely protected by the 1st Amendment - no mentioning of the U.S. Constitution here - compare it with Judge Knoll's outburst in her "objections to forced recusal" where she lovingly offers unsolicited unsworn testimony about her husband and raises constitutional questions on her own behalf.

Here is also Judge Knoll's scathing criticism of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in making a decision legitimizing same sex marriage - which can easily be deemed as "besmirching the reputation" of the justices who made the majority decision.

last time I checked, the rule of law is supposed to equally protect anyone and everyone, whether the judge likes that attorney or not.

By the way, the only reason judges do not have "checkered history" is because they gave themselves a self-gift of judicial immunity for malicious and CORRUPT acts on the bench, which they enforce religiously in lawsuits against members of their class, not allowing discovery of those malicious and corrupt acts and dismissing lawsuits against judges on filing, for "lack of jurisdiction" - which does not preclude them from having "jurisdiction" for sanctioning those who filed such lawsuits.

Nobody is above or below the law - right, Judge Knoll?  Or some are more equal than others under the law?  Like judges?

If Judge Knoll considered Christine Mire "a troubling attorney", she had no business presiding over the case, because her bias against Christine Mire was obvious.

The nature of conduct being diligent investigation of Judge Knoll's friend Judge Keaty's conflict of interest (which were confirmed), due diligence investigation of doctored audio of a hearing where disclosure of such conflicts were added onto the tape (which was confirmed by testimony) and making a motion to recuse on behalf of a client which was attorney Christine Mire's duty to do.

Judge Knoll's personal knowledge of Judge Keaty for 30 years was enough to disqualify her from presiding over the case where Judge Keaty was the complaining witness, but no - Judge Knoll is not known for recusing herself voluntarily in cases involving conflicts of interest, and she had an agenda to "show them" for forcing her to recuse from the "legacy cases" in November of 2015 in the first place.

See how the same "egregious conduct" was characterized by the dissenter Judge Weimer in yesterday's dissenting opinion:

In other words, there were 3 recording devices recording the hearing, and the proffered explanation that they ALL malfunctioned at the very time Judge Keaty was making disclosure of her conflict of interest making the "audio splicing" necessary defies all odds and common sense.

By the way, each time I ask for security video tapes in New York state courts, something happens to the equipment - it either prematurely overwrites the requested footage, or malfunctions and does not capture the footage in the first place.

So, this particular trick is well known.

For being a trick.

Moreover, as Judge Weimer pointed out that the "reasonable person"'s opinion in the situation - that of a recording technician testifying at Christine Mire's discipinary case was that:

Moreover, Judge Weimer points out that the majority opinion's speculation that malfunction occurred on 3 recording devices simultaneously, thus "reasonably" requiring splicing, was not supported by facts - where the stenographer did not report that any malfunction on recording devices occurred:

And, the order to stenographer was to produce a FULL COPY of what was already on record - not to order "splicing" when conflicts of interest of a judge were raised on a motion to recuse, and the stenographer then went to extraordinary lengths, even filing a lawsuit against Christine Mire and her client trying to prevent her from obtaining the record of proceedings at all.

Let's restore the history of the case.

An attorney, Christine Mire, had a reason to believe that a real estate company owned by a presiding judge in the case had an interest in selling the property being divided by that judge in a divorce proceeding.

That was a disqualifying conflict of interest.

The judge did not make that disclosure.

The attorney sought tapes of the court hearing to prove that the judge did not make the disclosure.

That's where the "ordinary" procedure stopped and the Orwellian nightmare started, for the attorney who asked for tapes of court proceedings to which her client was absolutely entitled.

The stenographer who was asked for the tapes, sued the attorney and her client in response to request for tapes - which was completely out of the ordinary.

The stenographer did not have any right for such a lawsuit, because, as it turned out, nothing from other hearings was on the tape, what was on the tape was only pertaining to proceedings of Christine Mire's clients.

Surely the stenographer knew about that before bringing the lawsuit.

And, Christine Mire experienced intimidation from the stenographer's attorney even before the lawsuit was brought.

The lawsuit of the stenographer produced a court order against the stenographer - requiring the stenographer to produce a full copy of the proceedings to Christine Mire.  

The order was as clear as bell.

Yet, here the irregularities continue.

While making an appointment for "copying" and while not stating that any of the 3 recording devices from which the copy was supposed to be made, the stenographer ordered "splicing" of the audio - but did not offer any explanation as to why she did that.

Again, as part of due diligence, Christine Mire had an expert analyze the "splicing" and found that something was added into the tape, and that "something" was - surprise, surprise! - Judge Keaty's disclosure of conflicts of interest that were not made on the record, upon the memory of Christine Mire and her client.

And, after Christine Mire made more than necessary steps in her due diligence preparation to make a motion to recuse, that was still not enough, and she was still sanctioned with loss of her livelihood for "egregious conduct" in "besmirching" reputation of Judge Keaty, and those appellate judges who covered up her "appearance of misconduct".

There is a concept in law called RES IPSA LOQUITUR - would not have happened without negligence.

Tell me, please, WHO ELSE would have ordered the "splicing" of the audio tape BUT judge Keaty for whom this episode was very damaging, especially during her elections?

The stenographer herself?

Let's be realistic.

Disciplinary authorities putting pressure on Christine Mire, openly stating to her, reportedly, that her motion to recuse were badly timed during Judge Keaty's election campaign, and that they wouldn't have brought the disciplinary petition "but for" the timing of the motion to recuse.

And, Christine Mire has public records showing that at the time when pressure was imposed upon Christine Mire to "cease and desist" criticizing Judge Keaty during her election campaign, 5 governmental bodies expressed interest in activities of Christine Mire.

One of them was the local fire marshal.

The fire marshal visited Christine Mire's office, told her that she has "too many locks on the office door", which may be a "fire hazard", forced her to remove a lock - and the very next couple of days Christine Mire's office was broken into, and somebody went through her office files, for which there is a police report.

The only person who knew that Christine Mire removed the lock that was so strong that "could have been a fire hazard" was the fire marshal.

Somehow, these facts - which should have triggered CRIMINAL investigation about ORGANIZED CRIME where part of that organized criminal enterprise are Louisiana courts, attorney disciplinary authority and even a fire marshal, did not result in criminal investigation of corruption, and did not find their way into the judicial decisions regarding Christine Mire.

 After all, these pesky facts did not mesh with the accusatory tone and the obvious decision to pre-judge and punish Christine Mire for breaking the taboo, raising the APPEARANCE of CRIMINAL ACTIVITY of a judge, as was Christine Mire's DUTY TO  HER CLIENT to do, in ensuring her client's constitutional right to impartial judicial review.

It is easier to just slam an honest attorney doing her duty with a slimy claim that she has a "checkered past" - and for that reason is not entitled to any constitutional rights, obviously.

Former judge Andrew P. Napolitano described the phenomenon of what happened to Christine Mire - in a book published 5 years prior to what happened to Christine Mire.

It appears that judiciary has its gloves off in striking against those who dangerously raise the issue that there is an appearance of CRIMINAL misconduct on behalf of a judge or judges.

Without any traces of common sense - or loyalty to the law.

But with a lot of loyalty to members of their own class.

In all of Judge Knoll's zeal to punish Christine Mire for biting her friend with a motion to recuse, what was completely left out of the decision was - how did the sanction against Christine Mire's for making a well-founded motion to recuse against a judge on behalf of a client co-ordinate with the declared purpose of attorney regulation (and discipline) - protecting consumers?

It was Christine Mire who protected the consumers, right?

And it was the criminal cartel consisting of her competitors who disciplined her for that, right?

And where are the feds for this criminal cartel, including Judge Keaty and Judge Knoll?  And the fire marshal? And those who broke into Christine Mire's office? And those who pursued discipline against her on the complaint of Judge Keaty because Christine Mire made a motion to recuse during Judge Keaty's re-election campaign and refused to "cease and desist" (shut up)?

Criminal behavior is not immune, even if the criminal is a judge?
Right?

So where are you, the FBI?

How long will the legal consumers be waiting for the feds who are paid by taxpayers to clear corruption in the government to do their jobs?

While India invalidates its bar exam for violating a fundamental right to practice law, the U.S. imposes upon its consumers of legal services a limited set of providers who were never taught or tested in areas of laws they are allowed to practice

I did not see this news announced by the American Bar Association somehow.

While this is a piece of news very relevant to the legal profession anywhere in the world.

Because on March 1, 2016 the Supreme Court of India invalidated the bar examination requirement to become licensed to practice law - as violating attorneys' fundamental right.

I know, I know.

In the U.S. the already-licensed attorneys fighting for survival in the ever-shrinking market of paid legal services, will say - "no, without a bar examination, how will the consumers know that the attorney representing them knows the law?"

My question is - how do they know now?

Let's look at the laws of different states and see what the already licensed attorneys are expected to know.

My overseas friends often assume that law licenses in the U.S. are nationwide.

Yet, they are not.

They are state-wide only, and some states have "comity agreements" with some limited number of states to admit attorneys from participating states without an examination, and other states do not have comity agreements and require all individuals, including attorneys already licensed by other states, to take their bar examination.

Let's look at the requirement of bar examination from the point of protection of the consumer - the declared purpose of attorney regulation in the U.S. and in the states.

A bar examination is a culmination of law school education.

To get licensed in the state, an individual should have:

• a high school diploma (usually K to 12, 13 years);
• a bachelor's degree (usually 4 years);
• a Juris Doctor degree (usually 3 years) from a law school accredited with the American Bar Association, all in all 20 years of formal education.

And, the law school graduate must pass the state bar.

State law licenses cover ALL TYPES of laws.

In other words, when a law school graduate gets a law license, that means that on the day the license was issued he or she is entitled to go into any state court and represent any person on any issue of state law.

And, the license and the education process is supposedly needed to guarantee quality of such representation to consumers of that person's services.

But, let's look at the set of state laws.

For example, let's look at the laws of the State of New York, here they are in open access.

When printed in books, these laws occupy a wall in a lawyer's office.  An entire wall.

Of course, there is not enough time to teach all those laws in the 3 years of law school.

And, of course, knowledge of all of those laws is not tested in the New York State bar examination.

But, nevertheless, the law license in New York permits any licensed attorney to practice any of the above mentioned laws - even if that attorney never read those laws in law school, was never taught about the content or intricacies of application of those laws, and was never tested on knowledge of those laws.

Now - where is the protection of clients here?

And where is the guarantee of knowledge by a licensed attorney?

What if a trusted individual without a law degree, a neighbor, read enough of a particular law to apply it better than a lawyer who never read that law, but is licensed to practice it?

The result will be counter-productive for the consumer.

The knowledgeable person will be criminally prosecuted for unauthorized practice of law if that person attempts to help a consumer of legal services with a problem that the knowledgeable person knows how to resolve and can provide real help with.

On the other hand, the licensed attorney who knows nothing about that area of law, will be allowed to present the case to the court - and botch it - and the only feeble way or protection against such an attorney, after the case was already botched because of the attorney's incompetence, will be a disciplinary complaint filed by the consumer or a malpractice lawsuit.

A disciplinary complaint will most likely be rejected, with no real mechanism to appeal (even the new rules of attorney discipline introduced in New York on December 29, 2015 do not provide for a strong right to appeal dismissals of meritorious complaints).

A malpractice lawsuit means more litigation, more money spent on attorneys, a difficulty finding an attorney who would be willing to sue another attorney, and an uncertainty of winning, where it is very difficult to prove a negative - lack of knowledge by a licensed attorney.

So, is the consumer of legal services protected by the process of attorney licensing?

The answer is apparent.

The answer will be even more apparent if, as part of an experiment, my readers can call their attorneys and ask off-the-top questions regarding some areas of law randomly chosen from list of statutes above.

Most attorneys would tell them that they do not "specialize" in such area of law, and they "specialize" only in a few narrow areas.

But, their license does not restrict their practice to those areas, so technically, an attorney who is desperate to get money from clients, can accept cases where he has absolutely no competence.

Actually, that is the case with the so-called "pro bono help".

I think I already told the story on this blog of some of my law professors not specializing in criminal law nevertheless boasting of accepting "pro bono" criminal cases.

My hair stood up when I heard that.

There are so many itty-bitty details in New York criminal law and procedure that taking a criminal case without knowing the law nearly guarantees that the case will be botched.

When I then was licensed to practice law, I heard many times from judges who were asked by indigent criminal defendants for assignment of a certain criminal defense attorney some quite cynical statements, such as that he is entitled to "an" attorney, not to an attorney of his choice, and not to a competent attorney either.

The same "protection through licensing" exists when one state blocks an attorney from another state from practicing within the state.

Please, tell me, how are legal consumers protected by requiring an attorney to have a physical office within the licensing state - that's what the 2nd Circuit recently ruled as "constitutional" for New York.

And how legal consumers are protected by allowing to practice, without an additional bar examination, attorneys who have agreements with the licensing state that they will do the same for that state's attorneys - license them without a bar examination?

New York has "comity" agreements with 39 states:

I will repost the list of states that entered the comity licensing agreement with New York so that the number of state is visible:

1. Alaska

2. Arizona

3. Arkansas

4. Connecticut

5. Colorado

6. District of Columbia

7. Georgia

8. Idaho

9. Illinois

10. Indiana

11. Iowa

12. Kansas

13. Kentucky

14. Maine

15. Massachusetts

16. Michigan

17. Minnesota

18. Mississippi

19. Missouri

20. Montana

21. Nebraska

22. New Hampshire

23. New Mexico

24. North Carolina

25. North Dakota

26. Ohio

27. Oklahoma

28. Oregon

29. Pennsylvania

30. South Dakota

31. Tennessee

32. Texas 

33. Utah

34. Vermont

35. Virginia

36. Washington

37. West Virginia

38. Wisconsin

39. Wyoming

Do you think Albany Law School and other schools in New York teach laws of these 38 states and the District of Columbia?

Nope.

Do you think law schools in these states teach New York law?

Equally - nope.

Yet, you do not know how big is the horde of attorneys from those states who were admitted "on motion" in New York without having a clue of New York law, and the same applies to attorneys admitted in those 39 jurisdictions having not a clue about the laws of those states.

HOW does that protect legal consumers and HOW does that guarantee quality of representation and HOW does that guarantee that the licensed attorney knows the law?

By the way, if you check out attorney registration pages of New York attorneys, those pages DO NOT reflect how the attorney was admitted - after a full bar examination.

In New York bar exam, conducted in 2 days (testing state and federal law on separate days), there is a "New York State" testing day, with a 6-hour rigorous examination of at least some areas of New York law, and the same applies to other states checking knowledge of their own state laws, at least some of them, in their own bar examinations.

Yet, if you are represented by a licensed attorney, with this extensive comity agreement that New York has with 39 jurisdiction, you have no guarantee that your attorney was EVER taught New York law, any of it, or EVER sat for a New York bar examination.

A lot of protection, isn't it?

Isn't it true that waiver of a bar examination does not guarantee that the states who are parties to mutual "comity" agreements teach laws of participating states?

So, such comity agreements between states are none other than turf-sharing agreements that have nothing to do with protection of the consumer, right?

By those agreements, an attorney admitted in the State of New York and who knows NOTHING about MOST of the laws of his or her own state (see list above), is accepted without a bar examination to be licensed in yet another state where he knows NOTHING about MOST of the laws of that state either, and a horde of lawyers from 39 jurisdictions are similarly accepted in New York, by simply paying a $400 motion fee.

It's a matter of revenue, nothing more, nothing else.

Not a matter of consumer protection.

And, despite the fact that the attorney was never taught or tested on knowledge of laws of the state where he is licensed, he will be licensed to practice in ALL of areas of law in both states, including in the areas he knows nothing about, was never taught about it and was never tested about.

Supporters of such arrangements can, of course, say - but, that attorney can read and self-teach him/herself about the new law!

He or she can certainly self-teach.

And he or she can hopefully read.

But - so can everybody else, every other unlicensed individual.

Yet, the declared purpose of licensing of the practice law is a guarantee of quality of service through education and testing, and that guarantee goes out the door when licensing covers areas of law which were neither taught nor tested.

And in that respect, India is ahead of the U.S. to simply recognize it and cancel the bar examination as an unconstitutional encroachment upon a right to earn a living.

Bar examinations are money-makers for the states and for bar-prep companies facilities where such examinations are held.

Yet, bar examinations - which are also known as a rapid brain-dump where quickly-learned bar prep course is as quickly forgotten after the bar exam - are useless to assure any guarantees of quality of service for legal consumers, and should be abolished, same as India has wisely done.

And, attorney licensing should go the way of the bar examination, too, protecting nobody but the legal establishment, and hurting those who it is claiming to help - consumers of legal services.

Consumers of legal services are hurt when they are restricted by the government (by the way, that same government which consumers may want to sue controls who consumers can choose to represent them to sue that government - a direct and irreconcilable conflict of interest) as to who they may choose to represent themselves in court, through attorney licensing.

And yet, as it is described here, because law schools do not teach or test knowledge of all laws of the licensing state, and because bar exams do not test all areas of laws in which the attorney is licensed, and licenses cover areas of law not taught, tested or even known by the licensed attorney, and because comity agreements allow licensing of attorneys who were never taught or tested on knowledge of ANY of state laws where they are being licensed - there is NO protection of legal consumers in attorney licensing, and it makes NO sense.

Because law licensing excludes people who know the law and can help from being able to help, and instead allows people who have no clue and can hurt instead of help, to have exclusive right of such "helping" - which makes no sense at all and contributes to the "justice gap" crisis in the United States.

ABA has a policy of non-support of civil rights attorneys suspended for criticism of the government

In preparation of my testimony for Congress as to Dr. Teng Biao's case, I just checked out whether ABA has a policy of non-support for attorneys suspended or disbarred for criticizing the government - just like NYSBA does.

And I mean - any attorneys, from any country, and those who are criticizing any government.

It does have such a policy - actually, it has TWO such policies, both for the attorneys within the United States and outside of the United States.

When you go to the website of ABA, here, first, you see only 5 categories of who can join the association.

The top right category is "Associates" - "individuals interested in the legal profession but not U.S.-licensed attorneys or students".

Ok, I am not a "U.S.-licensed attorney or student".  I am suspended for criticism of the government.

So, I am a non-lawyer, for purposes of joining the ABA, and a member of the public "interested in the law".

And, ABA indicates in answer to the Frequently Asked Questions this:

Non-lawyers (paralegals, law librarians, economists AND OTHERS interested in the ABA) may join.

I am "others".  

I may join the ABA, because I am interested in the ABA.

Right?

Wrong.

When you press the "join" button, the following screen pops up:

I am "none of the above", and I pressed on "See More Details".

The "more details" is actually the policy that the ABA refused to admit they had - of not supporting attorneys who suffered any oppression for criticizing the government.

Here it is.

Actually, you may not join the ABA as a member of the public if you are a suspended or disbarred attorney.

The language pretends at neutrality, but it is not neutral, because the ABA does not CARE what are the reasons for suspension or disbarment.

It PRESUMES that the suspension or disbarment is constitutional, even if it is not so, even if the suspension or disbarment was a sanction for criticism of the government - and I am sure that ABA has enough resources to learn about that tendency in the United States.

Here is the salary of its executive director and some officers for the year 2013.

Here is ABA's top "contractor" expenses for the same year - taken out of their IRS form.

$1,009,746 a year's salary of the Executive Director.

$2,910,000 a year spent on shipping.

$1,706,475 a year spent on telemarketing.

Surely such an organization has resources to figure out about corruption and oppressions against civil rights attorneys trying to defend clients which are not wealthy enough to be members of the American Bar Association?

Those clients whose interests - as consumers of legal services - ABA claims it is promoting, as well as the interests of its paying members, including judges and foreign LICENSED attorneys.

Now, in connection with Dr. Teng Biao's case, the question arises - is Dr. Teng Biao "licensed" in China?

And, if not, why not?

Because he criticized the government too much?

Then he MAY NOT join the ABA.

And, consequently, ABA WILL NOT support Dr. Teng Biao's book - as well as it will not support any American attorney suspended for criticizing the government while doing his or her job for a client.

I understand, under the same policy ABA will admit an attorney "licensed" by a horribly corrupt or tyrannical regime, but will not admit an attorney who is ostracized or cast out of the profession and stripped of his/her attorney status as a political repression in retaliation for the attorney's criticism of the government, as part of the attorney's political or professional activity.

That's the ABA's true policy.

And that's the ABA's true face.

Money talks.

Even if it is foreign money.

And you know what?

And, the ABA has the audacity to earn money on advertising articles about the so-called "legal rebels", those within and without the profession who are "rebelling" within the boundaries of the taboo on criticizing the government, of course.

And ABA is advertising those "legal rebels" while snubbing the real people, who are engaged in a real civil rights struggle and are defending real human rights of real people while necessarily criticizing the U.S. and state governments and the international governments. 

Support of such "legal rebels" is too dangerous for the ABA's bottom line.

10 major points of testimony in the U.S. Congress

I am currently drafting my written testimony/request for oral testimony before several Committees of the U.S. Congress, including the Congressional-Executive Committee on China and the U.S. House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary on the issues related to access to justice, availability of effective legal remedies and political repressions against civil rights attorneys which hurt the entire population.

Here are the main points of the argument - I will publish the full testimony when I complete it.

I.                     ABA’s withdrawal of its book deal for a Chinese civil rights attorney is a continuation of ABA’s policy of non-support of politically oppressed civil rights attorneys in the United States.

II.                   The U.S. Constitution has become largely unenforceable through the Civil Rights Act because of the court-invented rules and doctrines.  The lack of effective legal remedies for violations of human rights is a major problem in the U.S. which ABA refuses to address – and that refusal is directly related to ABA’s position on rescinding its book offer to Dr. Teng Biao. Analysis of court-created rules, doctrines and practices and explanation why they undermine enforcement of constitutional violations is included.

III.                 Antitrust problems, conflicts of interest in regulation of the legal profession, including control by the ABA, and control by the government attorneys are contrary to the declared purpose of attorney regulation, protection of consumers of legal services.  Such problems are undermining access to justice of indigent population for enforcement of their constitutional rights against encroachment by the government.  Analysis of legal concepts involved, facts and links to documents in support is provided.

IV.                Control of a non-profit corporation ABA over governmental licensing through certification of legal education as a pre-condition of such licensing, and thus control by a corporation with foreign membership and financing over independence of court representatives and over access to court is a major problem.  Consumers of legal services must be given a right to choose their court representative themselves, and not out of a government-vetted pool, especially when the government is opponent in litigation.

V.                  Secret-membership organizations with participation of attorneys and judges providing opportunities for fixing cases through ex parte communications behind closed doors and providing attorney-sponsored benefits to judges (free meals, free trips, scholarships etc.).

VI.                Unavailability of strong whistle-blower protection for attorneys raising federal constitutional issues.

VII.               Use of court rules and sanctions as a means of political repression against attorneys raising constitutional issues on behalf of their clients in the United States, impact of such sanctions upon the independence of the bar and upon access to court and the rule of law for all Americans.

VIII.             Unavailability of discipline for judges and prosecutors as the majority pool of judicial candidates.  Analysis, facts and links to documents in support are provided.

IX.                 Unavailability of a legal remedy for violation of human rights outside of the country – through the U.N. Convention on Political and Civil Rights.

X.                   The needs for reforms, and proposed reforms.



I request feedback from my readers, if they would like me to cover any other points related to the above topics in my testimony.

I appreciate and will review all suggestions.

Thank you.